World
Russian Grain Politics And Africa’s Import-Dependency Syndrome
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite its sudden exit from the United Nations-brokered agreement that allowed Ukraine to export grains, Moscow says it will continue to consolidate efforts and deliver its grains uninterruptedly to the world markets. With most African countries in need, Moscow offered its assurances and would further negotiate agreements at the forthcoming summit in St. Petersburg.
At the media briefing, the Russian Foreign Ministry also offered similar assurances on the African leaders’ gathering. African countries will receive Moscow’s assurances concerning food supplies at the Russia-Africa summit, which will be held in St. Petersburg, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said.
“The countries in need will definitely receive the necessary assurances in their contacts with us and during the upcoming Russia-Africa summit regarding their need for agricultural products, primarily grain,” Vershinin. Russia understands concerns that its African partners might have, he said, “But I’d like to say that these concerns are not only understandable but will also be fully taken into account.”
A group of African countries led by South Africa have put forward a peace initiative to resolve the Ukrainian conflict. Meanwhile, Russia’s influence on the social and economic situation in African countries has increased in line with rising prices for food, fertilizer and energy.
Another source also indicated that the participants of the Russia-Africa Summit do not plan on making a separate statement on the situation in Ukraine, although the ongoing conflict will be discussed on the forum’s sidelines. However, a separate statement on this issue should not be expected, except there will be a general declaration dedicated to the positive bilateral agenda and a document relating to the global geopolitical situation.
At different occasions, Russian President Vladimir Putin has unreservedly stressed that “Russia is reliably fulfilling all its obligations pertaining to the supply of food, fertilisers, fuel and other products that are critically important to the countries of Africa, and ready to ensure their food security.”
On July 17, Russia rejected a further extension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, or so-called grain deal, an agreement initially concluded in Istanbul in July 2022 to ensure the safe export of Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs through humanitarian corridors in the Black Sea. Moscow said, however, that it may consider returning to the Istanbul initiative if the provisions of the deal allowing for exports of Russian agricultural products to world markets can be duly implemented.
The international community denounced Moscow’s decision, while Turkey, which had brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative jointly with the United Nations, expressed hope that the deal could be reanimated. Although upbeat statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed to prevent grain prices from soaring on major commodity exchanges, experts claimed that “the price increase was largely speculative.”
Some media reports have indicated that Putin’s latest economic assault on the West is fueling fears of a global food crisis. Business Insider’s George Glover wrote that Russia has started bombing Ukrainian ports and threatened to attack ships, and these actions have pushed prices soaring and sparked fears of a global food crisis.
When international grain prices rise, it becomes more expensive for poorer countries to import those commodities – so Russia’s withdrawal from the UN’s initiative has fueled policymakers’ fears that there could be a worldwide food crisis. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Putin has tried to squeeze commodity supplies in a bid to disrupt the global economy and hinder Kyiv’s Western allies.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the Kremlin’s decision to pull out of the grain deal would end “a lifeline for global food security” and extinguish “a beacon of hope”, while the European Union’s head of foreign policy Josep Borrell told journalists there could be a “big and huge food crisis in the world”.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) says Russia’s exit from Ukraine’s grain deal risks adding to global food inflation. An IMF spokesperson said the global lender would continue to carefully monitor ongoing developments in the region and their impact on global food insecurity.
“The discontinuation of the initiative impacts the food supply to countries that rely heavily on shipments from Ukraine, in particular in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia,” the fund said. “It worsens the food security outlook and risks adding to global food inflation, especially for low-income countries.”
Several Group of 20 members this week condemned Russia’s move to quit the United Nations-brokered Black Sea grain deal over what it called a failure to meet its demands to implement a parallel agreement easing rules for its own food and fertilizer exports.
Local Russian financial daily newspaper Kommersant reported on July 24 that despite the termination of the grain deal, where there are indications that Kyiv, Ankara and the West remain committed to resuming shipments of Ukrainian agricultural products across the Black Sea.
Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky has called an emergency meeting of the newly formed NATO-Ukraine Council, which allies have touted as an alternative to admitting the country into the alliance. For now, however, the West seems to be placing more hope in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ability to find convincing arguments in dialogue with Moscow.
The proposal to engage a third-party country to escort commercial ships across the Black Sea has been raised several times since Russia’s withdrawal from the Istanbul agreements, but no side has taken it up because all stakeholders see such a scenario as entailing a potentially serious risk of escalation.
According to the Financial Times, Washington is attempting to persuade its African partners to condemn Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal. For its part, Russia is not sitting idle and says that Moscow understands “the concerns that may arise among our African friends” and is proposing to provide free food supplies to the continent, but continues to insist that the initial Russia-related provisions of the Black Sea Grain Initiative must be implemented before there can be any return to the deal, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin noted.
These past several days, the current questions discussed most by both the Russian and foreign media were related to Russia’s threats to block Black Sea shipping, no Putin at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, and that the Western and European sanctions were insufficient.
The European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and Canada simultaneously expanded sanctions against Russian individuals and legal entities. But as Russia continues to attack Ukraine with missiles and drones, the existing sanctions are clearly not enough to hinder its weapons production, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his evening address on July 18.
Russia has started blocking Ukraine’s seaports. The recent Russian missile strike targeting Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast’s port infrastructure, has destroyed 60,000 tons of grains. Russia’s Defense Ministry has designated all ships bound for Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea as “potential carriers of military cargo,” Russian news agency RIA Novosti reported on July 19.
Russia’s air attack against Odesa highlights the country’s attitude towards food security, African nations, the UN and global hunger, Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, tweeted on July 19.
The termination of the deal would affect a number of countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia. Due to the limited transport capacity and infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe, a significant part of the land export of grain from Ukraine may get stuck in transit countries, which have local producers of this agricultural product.
The Black Sea agreement has helped keep benchmark foodstuff prices under control by boosting supply to world markets. On July 17, Russia officially withdrew from the grain agreement after an attack at the Crimean Bridge. In addition, Moscow withdrew guarantees of navigation safety in the Black Sea. The UN-brokered Black Sea grain deal expired on July 18.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Social media platform, TikTok’s Chinese owner ByteDance has signed binding agreements with United States and global investors to operate its business in America.
Half of the joint venture will be owned by a group of investors, including Oracle, Silver Lake and the Emirati investment firm MGX, according to a memo sent by chief executive, Mr Shou Zi Chew.
The deal, which is set to close on January 22, 2026 would end years of efforts by the US government to force ByteDance to sell its US operations over national security concerns.
It is in line with a deal unveiled in September, when US President Donald Trump delayed the enforcement of a law that would ban the app unless it was sold.
In the memo, TikTok said the deal will enable “over 170 million Americans to continue discovering a world of endless possibilities as part of a vital global community”.
Under the agreement, ByteDance will retain 19.9 per cent of the business, while Oracle, Silver Lake and Abu Dhabi-based MGX will hold 15 per cent each.
Another 30.1 per cent will be held by affiliates of existing ByteDance investors, according to the memo.
The White House previously said that Oracle, which was co-founded by President Trump’s supporter Larry Ellison, will license TikTok’s recommendation algorithm as part of the deal.
The deal comes after a series of delays.
Business Post reported in April 2024 that the administration of President Joe Biden passed a law to ban the app over national security concerns, unless it was sold.
The law was set to go into effect on January 20, 2025 but was pushed back multiple times by President Trump, while his administration worked out a deal to transfer ownership.
President Trump said in September that he had spoken on the phone to China’s President Xi Jinping, who he said had given the deal the go ahead.
The platform’s future remained unclear after the leaders met face to face in October.
The app’s fate was clouded by ongoing tensions between the two nations on trade and other matters.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite the complexities posed by Russia-Ukraine crisis, United States has been taking conscious steps to improve commercial relations with Russia. Unsurprisingly, Russia, on the other hand, is also moving to restore and normalise its diplomacy, negotiating for direct connections of air-routes and passionate permission to return its diplomats back to Washington and New York.
In the latest developments, Kirill Dmitriev, Chief Executive Officer of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), has been appointed as Russian President’s Special Envoy to United States. This marked an important milestone towards raising bilateral investment and economic cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked him to exclusively promote business dialogue between the two countries, and further to negotiate for the return of U.S. business enterprises. According to authentic reports, United States businesses lost $300+ bn during this Russia-Ukraine crisis, while Russia’s estimated 1,500 diplomats were asked to return to Moscow.
Strategically in late November 2025, the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) has awarded Kirill Dmitriev, praised him for calculated efforts in promoting positive dialogue between the United States and Russia within the framework decreed by President Vladimir Putin. Chief Executive Officer of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev is the Special Representative of the Russian President for Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries. Since his appointment, his primary focus has been on United States.
“Received an American Chamber of Commerce award ‘For leadership in fostering the US-Russia dialogue,’” Dmitriev wrote on his X page, in late November, 2025. According to Dmitriev, more than 150 US companies are currently operating in Russia, with more than 70% of them being present on the Russian market for over 25 years.
In addition, Chamber President Sergey Katyrin and American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) President Robert Agee have also been discussing alternatives pathways to raise bilateral business cooperation. Both have held series of meetings throughout this year, indicating the the importance of sustaining relations as previously. Expectedly, the Roscongress Foundation has been offered its platforms during St. Petersburg International Economic (SPIEF) for the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham).
On December 9, Sergey Katyrin and Robert Agee noted that, despite existing problems and non-economic obstacles, the business communities of Russia and the United States proceed from the necessity of maintaining professional dialogue. Despite the worsening geopolitical conditions, Sergey Katyrin and Robert Agee noted the importance of preserving stable channels of trade and pragmatic prospects for economic cooperation. These will further serve as a stabilizing factor and an instrument for building mutual trust at the level of business circles, industry associations, and the expert community.
The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) will be working in the system of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) in the Russian Federation, which currently comprises 57,000 legal entities, 130 regional chambers and a combined network of representative offices covering more than 350 points of presence.
According to reports obtained by this article author from the AmCham, promising sectors for Russian-American economic cooperation include healthcare and the medical industry, civil aviation, communications/telecom, natural resource extraction, and energy/energy equipment. The United States and Russia have, more or less, agreed to continue coordinating their work to facilitate the formation of a more favorable environment for Russian and American businesses, reduce risks, and strengthen business ties. Following the American-Russian Dialogue, a joint statement and working documents were adopted.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
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