Feature/OPED
Youth Employment and Oborevwori’s N2bn Agricultural Intervention Fund
By Jerome-Mario Utomi
In recent weeks, the Governor of Delta State, Mr Sheriff Oborevwori, took some leadership decisions that amply qualify as people-focused.
Some of these actions by the Governor, in no particular order include but not limited to the inspection of the Accelerated Agricultural Development Scheme (AADS) at Mbiri Farm Settlement with 30 greenhouses for the cultivation of tomatoes and other vegetables, the Agro-Industrial Park in Aboh-Ogwashi for rice milling and others, in Ika North-East and Aniocha South local government areas, respectively, with a promise that his administration will continue to improve on the agricultural value chain to ensure food security and job creation in the state.
The second is the signing of a Shareholders Agreement by the state with the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) Limited and UTM Offshore Limited, for the development of the first Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) in Nigeria.
The third is the allocation of a take-off site for the Federal University of Medical and Health Sciences in Kwale, situated within the Ndokwa West Local Government Area of the State.
The fourth and very key was the Governor’s declaration that the state would disburse N2 billion in the Special Agricultural Intervention Fund to farmers this month, among others.
Indeed, while these initiatives share a common denominator as they are envisioned to create job opportunities for our youths and advance the socio-economic development of the state, the state governor’s decision to invest N2 billion in agriculture, in the opinion of this piece, stands out and the reason for this assertion is not farfetched.
First, instead of investing massively in agricultural development in the state, particularly as the sector is globally recognized as not only the backbone but the oxygen for human survival, successive administrations in the state, on the contrary, dissipated the state’s resources on cosmetic empowerment programmes understood within the context of shabbily executed youth skill training, unfortunately, characterized by neither substance nor concrete plan for sustainability. The presentation of starter packs was the only Key Performance Indicator (KPI) for measuring the success of such slanted visions and misdirected programmes.
Within this period, agriculture was brazenly relegated to the background while these past leaders on their part failed to remember that behind every failure lies a failed decision, and behind every failed decision, lies a government that failed its people.
Secondly, Oborevwori’s investment in agriculture is coming at a time when policymakers across the globe are actively integrating policy frameworks that both protect the rights and opportunities of coming generations and contribute to compatible approaches and in a season when there exists a veiled agreement across the world that agriculture sector holds the key for resolving youth unemployment challenge.
For a better understanding of where this piece is headed, youth in every society, says a study report, has the potential to stimulate economic growth, social progress, and all national development through active involvement in the agricultural sector.
The strategic role of youths in the development of different societies of the world such as Cuba, Libya, China, Russia and Israel is obvious. Youth unemployment is potentially dangerous as it sends signals to all segments of the Society. Here in Nigeria, the rate of youth unemployment is high, even at the period of economic normalcy i.e. the oil boom of the 1970s (6.2%); 1980s (9.8%), and the 1990s (11.5%).
Youth unemployment, therefore, is not a recent phenomenon. But if what happened in the 1980s/90s was a challenge of the sort, what is happening presently, going by the latest report by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), is a challenge. This and many other concerns have unexpectedly caused divided opinion and a proliferation of solutions.
This piece is not alone in this line of argument.
In fact, many Nigerians of goodwill have lately expressed concern that it is not right for state and federal governments to create agencies that dole money to Nigerian youths to eradicate poverty. Such huge resources, they argued do not have economic value. Instead, such an amount should be invested in the agricultural sector.
They underlined that considering the slow-growing economy but scary unemployment levels in the country, the nation will continue to find itself faced with difficulty accelerating the economic life cycle of the nation until its handlers contemplate commercial farming in such specialized areas. And a long-term goal of exporting such goods to West/African markets should be brought into focus.
Others canvassed less emphasis on university education. Agricultural colleges, they insisted should be established and funded to produce graduates that will champion such crusade.
Still on the relevance of the Governor’s decision to invest in agriculture, aside from the worrying reports that by 2050, global consumption of food and energy is expected to double as the world’s population and incomes grow, while climate change is expected to hurt both crop yields and the number of arable acres, we are in dire need of solution to this problem because unemployment has diverse implications.
Security-wise, a large unemployed youth population is a threat to the security of the few that are employed. Any transformation that does not have job creation as its main objective will not take us anywhere and the agricultural sector can absorb the teeming unemployed youth in the country.
The above trend has brought about dramatic shifts from agriculture in preference for white-collar jobs- a trend that urgently needs to be reversed.
Take, as an illustration, over the past century in the United States of America (USA), a study has it that there exists a shift in the locations and occupations of urban consumers.
In 1900, about 40% of the total population was employed on the farm, and 60% lived in rural areas. Today, the respective figures are only about 1% and 20%. Over the past half-century, the number of farms has fallen by a factor of three.
As a result, the ratio of urban eaters to rural farmers has markedly risen, giving the food consumer a more prominent role in shaping the food and farming system. The changing dynamic has also played a role in public calls to reform federal policy to focus more on the consumer implications of the food supply chain.
Separate from job creation, averting malnutrition which constitutes a serious setback to the socio-economic development of any nation is another reason why the Delta state government’s decision to embrace agriculture should be celebrated. As we know, agriculture remains a vehicle for food security and a sustainable socio-economic sector.
In fact, it was noted recently that in Nigeria, governments over the years have come to realize that sustainable growth is achievable only under an environment in which the generality of the people is exposed to a balanced diet, not just food. This explains why agricultural production should receive heightened attention. Again, it was reported that in Nigeria, an estimated 2.5 million children under five suffer from severe acute malnutrition (sam) annually, exposing nearly 420,000 children within that age bracket to early death from common childhood illnesses such as diarrhoea, pneumonia and malaria.
This is unacceptable!
For us to, therefore, achieve this objective in agriculture that will guarantee food security as well as bring about sustainable development, the state government must provide the needed support, technical know-how and other specialized training.
To catalyse the process, this piece holds the opinion that the state government must start thinking of developing for these farmers good transportation system and other infrastructure that offers low fares and connection of major economic towns and landlocked cities to aid the distribution of food products and other economic products from advantaged to less advantaged areas.
Other state governments and of course the Federal government must on their path draw a lesson from the ongoing initiative in Delta State.
Jerome-Mario Utomi is the Programme Coordinator (Media and Public Policy) for Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA), Lagos. He can be reached via [email protected]/08032725374
By Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm
In a report filed by The Business Standard on August 8, 2026, India, the current BRICS chair, opposes a proposal for a common currency to counter the US dollar.
The Indian Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, told reporters in Jaipur, Rajasthan, northwestern India, after a two-day BRICS trade and industry meeting, that India was not in favour of a BRICS currency. He added that India did not support the introduction of any such BRICS currency scheme.
It is good these things are showing signs at this early stage of attempts by BRICS member countries to crystallise a research finding published by a British economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neil, in 2001.
None of the leaders and country members of BRICS ever conceived on record the formation of such an economic or political bloc until the research publication, which spurred leaders of the mentioned countries to marshal resources and begin a dialogue of formalisation.
The current membership that started involuntarily with just Brazil, Russia, India, and China as a concept published by a research economist, that later included South Africa, now has 10 members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia.
Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are designated partner countries that participate in framework meetings without full voting rights.
Originally, the publication by Jim O’Neil wasn’t intended or proposed as a vehicle for the political grouping that has drawn the attention of the rest of the world, as mentioned members took a step further from the appraisal or assessment paper to coalesce into a political force overflowing its original boundaries today.
For the above reasons, the initial step of early contacts was to take advantage of things in common in member countries for the stimulation of economic growth and global prosperity. At that stage, suspicions were managed, and plans didn’t consider historical political differences and disagreements as grounds for suspicion or discontinuation of cooperation.
Of course, China and India had trust issues over decades of border disputes. And in the early stages of heightened escalations of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship when India offered to mediate and broker for ceasefire and eventual peace, Russia wasn’t sceptical but took steps to host the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi.
But at the back of the mind of the Russian-Indian relationship, history was revealing about betrayals, especially after what the country endured in assassinations of leading members of the Indian National Congress, that killed Indira Gandhi and swept her son, Rajiv Gandhi, and thereafter ravaged the family dynasty with threats of violence.
These paved the way for the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist party, and its leader, Narendra Modi. The BJP is not directly responsible for the intimidation and violent campaign against the INC, a close former Soviet-era ally of Russia, but a beneficiary. There are grounds to suspect a frosty relationship with Russia, although concealed in diplomatic niceties and global market dynamics of cross-border business and trade.
India turned into the redistribution hub of Russian discounted grains and oil supplies as a third country, after sanctions were imposed on Russia in what Russia described as demilitarisation and denazification special operations in Ukraine.
India is considered by Western powers as a democracy. It was once a British colony, gaining independence on August 15, 1947. It is also a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. On a normal day, it doesn’t add or take away anything. But under these circumstances, these are serious factors to consider in arriving at a decision.
Be it as it may, China and Russia have found their way out in world trade, bypassing SWIFT. China operates the Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System, whilst Russia is running the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). India has IMPS and NEFT. In principle, these payment systems bypass SWIFT and the US dollar, nonetheless.
As the world waits to hear India back its dissenting views with supporting facts, world trade will never remain the same again.
Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm has extensive scholarly publications that establish him as a leading academic expert in regional geopolitical dynamics and diplomatic relations in Africa. Author of e-monographs on geopolitics, ethnic conflicts, and political philosophy.
Feature/OPED
What Dangote’s Reported $40bn Private-Placement Valuation Could Mean for Nigerian Investors, NGX
Dangote Petroleum Refinery could become an unusually large part of Nigeria’s stock market if its eventual IPO valuation is close to the roughly $40 billion implied by a recent private placement.
EBC Financial Group (EBC) highlights that this would value the refinery at about N54.63 trillion, using the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market rate of N1,365.6856 per USD on August 7. Against the N158.513 trillion value of companies listed on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) on the same date, adding the refinery at that value would produce a market worth about N213.14 trillion, with Dangote Refinery accounting for 25.6%.
This scenario assumes the full $40 billion equity value is reflected in NGX market capitalisation and other listed company values remain unchanged. At that size, movements in the company could become highly visible across the Nigerian equity market, although its actual influence on NGX indices may depend on the shares available for public trading and the relevant index rules.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said: “If Dangote Refinery entered the Nigerian Exchange at close to a $40 billion valuation, it could account for roughly one-quarter of the resulting NGX market value. If that valuation is difficult to support, few shares are available for public trading, or investors need to reduce other Nigerian holdings to participate, the effects could extend across Nigeria’s equity market, including existing NGX-listed companies and their shareholders.”
A Private Transaction Can Indicate Value, but Public Investors Need Financial Evidence
Based on the private transaction, $40 billion provides an indication of Dangote Refinery’s value, but it does not establish the eventual IPO price. Details published on August 4 said a $2.5 billion private placement for a 6% stake implied a valuation of roughly $40 billion. The proposed initial public offering (IPO) was reported to target about $5 billion, while the eventual IPO valuation and percentage offered to the public were not disclosed. This is important as a private transaction may produce a different valuation from the price a broad group of public investors is prepared to accept.
For context, public equity market values cited alongside the transaction were about $12 billion for Türkiye’s Tupras and $16 billion for US-listed HF Sinclair. The Dangote figure is about 3.3 times Tupras and 2.5 times HF Sinclair. They are not direct comparisons because profitability, debt, operations and growth plans differ. The gap nevertheless increases the need for audited earnings, cash flow, debt and investment plans that explain what supports the higher valuation.
The reported $5 billion fundraising target is equivalent to about N6.83 trillion at the August 7 exchange rate, or approximately 4.3% of the N158.513 trillion existing NGX market value. Proposed $5 billion raise. If new Nigerian or foreign money funds the offer, the pool of capital invested in Nigerian equities could expand. If investors sell current holdings to participate, capital could instead move away from other listed companies.
Publicly Tradable Shares and New Investment Could Shape the Wider Market Impact
NGX rules show why total company value does not tell investors how much stock they can actually trade. Main Board companies can qualify through either 20% public ownership held by at least 300 shareholders or publicly tradable shares worth at least N20 billion. The Premium Board value alternative is N40 billion. Holdings controlled by promoters, directors and close relatives, government, or strategic investors owning at least 5% are excluded from qualifying public shares.
This means a company worth tens of trillions of naira could still have a much smaller amount of stock available for regular trading if ownership remains concentrated. The key issue is therefore how much of Dangote Refinery becomes accessible to public investors and how widely those shares are held.
Regional investment could also affect the outcome. Details published on 4 August indicated engagement involving South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Ghana and Rwanda, including possible Kenyan participation of up to $500 million, although no allocations were confirmed. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange separately said Dangote Group had shown strong intent to pursue a South African listing after Nigeria. Regional participation in the Nigerian offer could bring new capital directly into Nigerian equities. A later South African listing could broaden access but would not itself increase money raised through the Nigerian IPO.
Pension funds face the same question of capital allocation. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) waived the usual existence, profitability and dividend requirements so Pension Fund Administrators can consider the IPO, while retaining internal investment policies, risk-management requirements and duties to contributors and retirees. PenCom Circular on Dangote Refiner. PenCom states that the dispensation is exceptional, one-off and specific to this proposed IPO.
Pension funds held N5.907 trillion in domestic ordinary shares at the end of June, compared with the offer’s approximately N6.83 trillion equivalent. This does not imply pension funds would finance the offer. It shows why managers must consider exposure to one company and whether participation requires reducing other investments.
Precious added, “Dangote being listed could become a turning point for Nigeria’s equity market if it brings wider public ownership and additional African capital. Investors still need clear evidence supporting the valuation, clarity on how much of the company they can trade and an explanation of where the money raised will go. Those answers will determine whether the listing expands the Nigerian equity market or concentrates more investment around one company.”
An approved prospectus should clarify the valuation, shares offered, public ownership and use of proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) said on June 23 that no IPO application had then been filed or approved and ordered unauthorised pre-marketing to stop. Details published on 4 August later said an IPO application had been submitted, with regulatory approval expected in the following weeks. Until final terms are disclosed, the test for Nigeria is whether the listing combines a supportable valuation with broad public ownership and genuinely additional investment.
Feature/OPED
Moving the Stablecoin Conversation From Hype to Utility in Africa’s Next Payments Evolution
By Rajat Mishra
For much of the past decade, discussions around stablecoins have been dominated by cryptocurrency speculation. Increasingly, however, stablecoins are emerging as practical financial infrastructure for moving money across borders, managing liquidity and improving payment efficiency.
The real opportunity lies not in choosing between traditional finance and digital assets, but in building an integrated financial ecosystem where both work together to improve efficiency, broaden financial access and deepen economic connectivity across the continent.
Despite significant advances in financial inclusion and digital payments, moving money across African borders remains far more difficult than it should be. Businesses continue to face challenges when making cross-border payments. Fragmented payment networks, multiple intermediaries, and lengthy settlement processes increase costs and create operational inefficiencies.
Remittance providers, the specialised financial services that millions rely on to send money home, face many of the same structural challenges. These providers play a critical role across the continent. In fact, 19 of Africa’s 54 countries receive remittance inflows equivalent to at least 4% of their GDP. Yet Africa remains the world’s most expensive region to send money to.
These challenges are not a reflection of remittance providers themselves, but of the fragmented banking and settlement infrastructure underpinning international money movement. Financial institutions must often manage liquidity across multiple disconnected currency markets while relying on complex correspondent banking networks and clearing systems. The result is higher costs, slower settlements, and capital that remains unnecessarily locked up.
One of the most immediate opportunities for stablecoins lies in improving cross-border settlement. Consider a Kenyan business importing goods from South Africa. Under traditional settlement models, payments often pass through multiple correspondent banking relationships, involve several foreign exchange conversions, and can take days before funds reach the intended recipient.
Stablecoin-enabled settlement rails have the potential to reduce much of this friction by enabling value to move more efficiently between financial institutions across markets. The result can be shorter settlement times, greater transparency and improved predictability for businesses operating across borders.
The benefits extend well beyond businesses. For millions of Africans working abroad, remittances remain a financial lifeline, helping families pay school fees, healthcare costs and daily living expenses. Yet sending money home often involves navigating a complex chain of money transfer operators, correspondent banks, and local payout partners, with each additional layer introducing costs and delays.
Stablecoins can help streamline the backend movement of funds between institutional participants, reducing settlement costs and improving efficiency across the value chain.
For end users, the advantage is simplicity. Recipients do not need to interact with, or even understand stablecoins directly. They continue to receive money through familiar, trusted channels, whether a local bank account or mobile money wallet, only faster and at a lower cost.
Beyond payments, stablecoins also address one of the less visible but most significant challenges in cross-border finance: liquidity management. Financial institutions operating across multiple markets must constantly ensure they have sufficient funds in the right currency, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time. Today, this often requires pre-funding accounts across multiple countries, a costly practice that traps large amounts of capital and limits financial flexibility.
Stablecoins introduce a new model for moving value across borders in near real time, enabling institutions to manage liquidity dynamically as demand arises. This can reduce the need for large pre-funded balances, improve treasury efficiency and free up capital that can be deployed more productively. Ultimately, these efficiencies can translate into faster settlements, lower costs, and better services for businesses and consumers alike.
However, the true value of stablecoins will not come from isolated blockchain networks operating independently of existing financial systems. Their long-term impact will depend on how effectively they integrate with banks, mobile money platforms, payment service providers and existing payment infrastructure. Interoperability will be critical to ensuring payment flows move seamlessly between systems, markets and currencies. The goal should be to strengthen and modernise today’s payment ecosystem, not replace it.
From experiment to infrastructure: what global moves are telling us
Some of the clearest signals that stablecoins are moving from experimentation to infrastructure are coming from card networks. Mastercard’s reported agreement to acquire BVNK, valued at up to $1.8 billion, points to a strategic investment in the settlement layer connecting stablecoin rails with traditional banking and reflects growing institutional confidence in stablecoin-enabled cross-border payments.
Visa’s expansion of stablecoin-backed cards through Stripe’s Bridge to more than 100 countries reflects a complementary strategy. Rather than acquiring infrastructure outright, Visa is leveraging its existing global network as the final distribution layer for stablecoin-funded payments.
The inclusion of African markets is particularly significant. It signals growing confidence that stablecoin-backed payment instruments can operate alongside, and in some cases complement, the mobile money ecosystems that already dominate wallet-based payments across much of the continent.
Taken together, these developments point to a broader shift. Card payment networks are moving from observing the stablecoin conversation to investing directly in the infrastructure that underpins it. For Africa, the implication is not that stablecoins will replace existing payment rails, but that success will increasingly belong to institutions capable of orchestrating multiple settlement rails – cards, bank transfers, mobile money and stablecoins- within a unified, interoperable ecosystem. Local market expertise, regulatory relationships and last-mile distribution will remain decisive competitive advantages.
Building for scale through trust and regulation
But despite their potential, stablecoins cannot operate outside the boundaries of regulated financial systems. Their long-term viability across Africa depends on clear regulatory frameworks, robust compliance standards and trusted infrastructure that supports transparency, risk management and consumer protection.
We are already seeing this evolution. In markets such as South Africa, institutions facilitating cross-border settlements must navigate increasingly sophisticated regulatory requirements, including approvals for certain offshore crypto-related activities. Globally, initiatives such as the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) and expanded Travel Rule obligations are raising expectations around reporting, tax transparency and compliance.
These developments reinforce a simple reality: stablecoin infrastructure does not reduce compliance obligations. It raises the bar for governance, transparency and institutional risk management. The objective is not to bypass regulation, but to build interoperable payment systems that can innovate confidently within it.
From the edges to the plumbing
The stablecoin conversation is steadily moving beyond speculation and towards practical implementation. What once sat at the edges of the payments debate is becoming part of the plumbing of cross-border finance rather than a parallel system to it.
The question is no longer whether stablecoins have a role to play in payments. The question is where they deliver the greatest value. In Africa, that value is increasingly clear: faster settlement, improved liquidity efficiency and more connected cross-border commerce. The winners will not be those that replace existing financial systems, but those that successfully connect stablecoin rails with the banks, mobile money networks and payment providers that already power the continent’s economy.
For pan-African payment networks such as Onafriq, the priority is ensuring that emerging technologies complement the financial infrastructure businesses and consumers already trust, rather than introducing new layers of complexity.
The opportunity lies in connecting stablecoin settlement with banks, mobile money networks and payment providers, ensuring the benefits of this new infrastructure deliver tangible outcomes for African businesses and consumers.
Rajat Mishra is the CPO for Network Product & Deputy Group CPIO at Onafriq
