Beyond the Headlines of Terror

By Sani Abdulrazak, PhD

Long before satellites surveyed battlefields, military commanders understood that superior weapons could not compensate for failed signals, delayed intelligence or fractured coordination. In The Art of War, the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu examined intelligence, deception and the coordination of military action. Centuries later, the battlefield has changed, but the underlying truth endures: force without information is a blunt instrument, and strategy without communication is a map drawn in darkness.

In modern warfare, communication is not the bugle sounded after battle; it is part of the machinery through which battles are fought, victories consolidated and public confidence sustained.

Nigeria must confront an uncomfortable paradox. Our security challenges demand sophisticated intelligence, technological adaptation and coordinated military action, yet communication with the public often becomes conspicuous only after tragedy strikes. By then, a second battle has begun: the struggle for public understanding. This is not to suggest that communication can substitute for military effectiveness.

But the failure to communicate consistently creates a vacuum in which rumours flourish, distrust hardens and public understanding becomes captive to the latest tragedy. The question is not whether Nigeria’s security institutions should communicate with citizens. They must. The more important question is why communication so often appears reactive when it ought to be an enduring component of national security management.

Consider the familiar choreography of insecurity in Nigeria. An attack occurs. Images and videos begin circulating across social media, carrying grief, fear and indignation from one digital gathering to another. Preliminary casualty figures acquire the permanence of established fact.

Speculation dons the robes of certainty. Before the circumstances have been fully established, verdicts are delivered, and the entire security apparatus is summoned to account for its perceived failures. Much of the anger is justified. Nigerians have endured too many attacks, kidnappings and displacements to be expected to greet each new tragedy with equanimity. Citizens are entitled to demand protection, and the government cannot invoke the complexity of military operations as an exemption from accountability. Yet the information vacuum surrounding these incidents often allows the latest event to eclipse the wider picture.

The military cannot disclose every operational detail. Troop movements, intelligence sources, surveillance vulnerabilities and planned operations must remain protected. But there is a considerable distance between safeguarding sensitive information and leaving citizens uninformed about the strategic objectives, broad progress and verifiable outcomes of the campaign against insecurity. The people’s support and awareness are pertinent in combating insecurity.

Operational secrecy is a necessity, but public silence is not a strategy. Nigeria needs a public conversation capable of examining both the human cost of violence and the wider evidence surrounding security interventions. This requires the military to communicate consistently, the media to investigate persistently, and the public to have access to reliable information.

One practical step would be the establishment, or strengthening where comparable structures already exist, of a dedicated Defence Communication Centre under the appropriate authority at Defence Headquarters. This must not become another office that issues statements after attacks, nor a propaganda unit designed to manufacture favourable impressions of military performance. Its purpose should be to build a reliable bridge between the Armed Forces and Nigerians while preserving the confidentiality required for effective operations. The centre should provide regular briefings on broad military priorities, explain significant security initiatives, publish verified information about completed operations where disclosure is safe, correct false reports and clarify what remains unknown. It should coordinate communication across the services so that citizens are not left navigating contradictory official accounts.

A properly equipped centre would maintain an accessible digital information platform staffed by trained defence communicators and subject-matter specialists. Its responsibilities would include public education on new military capabilities, periodic summaries of operational outcomes and timely responses to emerging misinformation. The centre must also protect classified information, avoid compromising ongoing operations and resist becoming an instrument for dismissing legitimate criticism as misinformation. Its credibility will depend on telling the public what can responsibly be told, distinguishing fact from conjecture and never promising what cannot be demonstrated. Such an institution would not eliminate criticism. It would help ensure that public judgement rests on firmer evidence.

On 9 October 2026, Chief of Defence Staff General Olufemi Oluyede directed the Defence Space Administration to extend space-based intelligence and surveillance support to Operation FANSAN YAMMA in the North-West and Operation SAVANNAH SHIELD in the North-Central, building on support already provided to Operation HADIN KAI in the North-East. The directive was intended to strengthen operational effectiveness and improve troops’ situational awareness.

A proactive communication system would help Nigerians understand the initiative before another attack triggers a fresh round of accusations. It would explain the strategic problem being addressed, the broad expectations attached to the intervention and the evidence that should be examined as implementation proceeds. The announcement is a starting point for inquiry, not proof that insecurity has been defeated.

The Chief of Defence Staff has also highlighted concerns about manipulated images, fabricated videos and other forms of digital misinformation. These threats reinforce the need for a dependable source of timely, verifiable information. When authentic information is scarce or delayed, falsehoods find easier passage through the public square.

The military cannot carry this burden alone. The media must also reconsider the life cycle of security reporting. A newsroom that reports an attack but never returns to examine the response leaves the public with an incomplete account. A journalist who announces a new security initiative without investigating its implementation risks confusing activity with achievement.

A commentator who treats every setback as proof of total failure, or every official announcement as evidence of progress, has exchanged analysis for certainty. Journalists should follow the thread after the initial commotion has passed. Did attacks in the affected area decline? Were abducted persons recovered? Did criminal groups disperse only to regroup elsewhere? Have displaced residents returned safely? What do independent sources say, and where do their findings differ from official accounts? A regular security review, supported by independent research and reliable data, could help institutionalise this practice. A publicly accessible dashboard could track attacks, fatalities, kidnappings, rescues and displacement across affected areas, with clear definitions and explanations of data limitations. Discrepancies between sources should be investigated rather than concealed. The absence of reliable data must never masquerade as evidence of success. The goal is to equip Nigerians to make informed judgements.

Objectivity does not require citizens to suspend their grief. It requires institutions, journalists and commentators to avoid allowing grief, political allegiance or institutional self-interest to determine what the evidence means. The military can be undertaking serious operations and still have shortcomings. A promising technology can offer genuine potential without yet producing measurable results. An attack can expose a grave failure without proving that every intervention has been ineffective. The public must retain the freedom to ask hard questions. The military must provide credible answers where it can do so safely. The media must test those answers, and independent researchers must examine the available evidence. None should claim a monopoly on the truth. A mature security conversation does not ask citizens to choose between compassion and critical thought. It insists that both sit at the same table.

Communication alone cannot answer these questions. Effective operations, reliable intelligence, institutional coordination and sustained attention to the conditions that allow armed criminality to persist remain indispensable. The security establishment must learn to speak to Nigerians before the next tragedy, not explain itself after one. It must communicate the broad purpose of its work, acknowledge the limits of its achievements and allow evidence, rather than publicity, to determine the verdict. Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Sani Abdulrazak, PhD, is an Analytical Chemist, Writer and Public Commentator based in Zaria. He writes on governance, public affairs, society and the environment