Feature/OPED
Saving Ubeji Community in Delta State From Devastating Impacts of Gas Flaring
By Jerome-Mario Utomi
If President Bola Ahmed Tinubu-led federal government is desirous of ending gas flaring in the country, then, the administration should consider as urgent, taking both practical and pragmatic steps to save the people of Ubeji Community, a sleepy satellite community located around the Warri petrochemical company in Warri South local government area of Delta State, from the choking soot which reportedly emanates from the towering chimney that pierces the skyline of the community, a facility reportedly owned by a famous gas company in the country.
Again, if the Governor of Delta State, Sheriff Oborevwori, recognises that the provision of security and pursuit of the economic welfare of the citizens are the only two constitutional responsibilities which all leaders must achieve, which the current circumstances in Ubeji community, one of the Governor’s mandate communities clearly and woefully demonstrate the opposite, the state governor needs to take urgent and coordinated action aimed at resolving the ongoing unacceptable pollution arising from gas flaring reportedly by the organisation.
Aside from the awareness that the community has been suffering from the gas flaring pollution for decades and the entire environment and ecosystem destroyed because the flaring is an everyday action as it never goes off at all, a visit to the community reveals a people faced with increased socioeconomic difficulties with no record of survival if something is not done urgently to save the situation.
Though the community has not vanished physically, many of the residents have been sacked by the pollution and businesses within the space destroyed. Some families have been decimated and dispersed.
Those that chose to stay back in the community have been ‘absorbed’ by the pollution. They no longer enjoy economic, social and healthy progress that flows from good governance and social cohesion; their lives are now fraught with uncertainty!
“The flaring from the company is severely disturbing us. In my house, just like elsewhere in the neighbourhood, you will see the black carbon smeared all over the place. The heat from that facility is also disturbing us. It’s a never-ending cycle. We paint our houses, and it blackens again. How long can we keep up?” a resident of Agberuku Crescent in Ubeji Community queried.
If the above description is a challenge, the next comment from another resident amply qualifies as a crisis.
“My wife too happens to be a high BP (blood pressure) patient as a result of this gas flaring. When I took her to the hospital, the doctor asked me if I stay in an environment with questionable activities and I answered in the affirmative. Consequently, he advised that I should relocate her away from there and that was how my family left.
“For about four or five years now that they have been away from here, none of them has called to report any health challenge. When they are here, you will find the soot even in the nostrils of the children when they wake up in the morning. Everything is coated with soot.
“Our health is at stake here. We live in constant fear of what this pollution is doing to us and our children. Something must be done.
“I have stopped drinking water from my house. I strictly take bottled water which I carry everywhere I go.
“There was a time I kept experiencing a runny stomach. I kept going to the hospital, not for malaria, but for different health issues. Then, the doctor asked that I should check what I eat as I might be frequently poisoned.
“So, I decided to check my kitchen and discovered that every wipe on my utensil; pots, cups, spoons, plates and surfaces was filled with soot. This meant that everything we eat is soot.
“There was a time I was stooling for three months straight. As you can see, I have a runny nose which has refused to abate. It is always like this all year long; from January to December. To breathe is a problem.
“If I cook food, I have to cover it immediately because if I don’t… Even the lead of the pots, when you wipe it, you will see the black carbon.
“So, we are not safe. Sometimes, we see some strange reactions on our skins. We go the extra mile to treat ourselves and seek medical attention. We are indeed strong as Africans, but this is beyond us. I keep reacting to a certain allergy. I keep sneezing and even if you come back in the next three months, I am still sneezing.
“So, I am on a steady dose of Vitamin C. It got to a point that I thought that the Nigerian brands were not effective, I had to bring in Vitamin C from Canada but it didn’t change anything,” another resident said.
Indeed, while Nigeria and Nigerians persevere to encounter gas flaring in the country despite the enormous health and economic woes inherent, this piece on its part believed and still believes that the time has come for the Federal Government to ensure that operators in the nation’s crude oil and sector comply fully with all the enabling laws in the country prohibiting gas flaring.
The reason is not farfetched.
Ubeji Community in Warri, Delta state is, but just one out of hundreds of communities in the region suffering a similar fate. There are countless examples.
A tour by boat of creeks and coastal communities of Warri South West and Warri North Local Government Areas of Delta State will amply clarify this position. Another journey by road from Warri via Eku-Abraka to Agbor, and a similar trip from Warri through Ughelli down to Ogwuashi Ukwu in Aniocha Local Government of the state, shows an environment where people cannot properly breathe as it is littered with gas flaring points.
Again, the federal government must ensure that justice is delivered to the good people of Ubeji Community and others within the region because gas flaring is an action taken by the operators based on economic gains as against human health and safety considerations.
Take, as an illustration, from what experts are saying, the major reason for flaring of gasses is that when crude oil is extracted from onshore and offshore oil wells, it brings with it raw natural gas to the surface and where natural gas transportation, pipelines, and infrastructure are lacking, like in the case of Nigeria, this gas is instead burned off or flared as a waste product as this is the cheapest option. This has been going on since the 1950s when crude oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria.
Aside from the economic and health losses arising from gas flaring, another important reason why the federal government must rise to this clarion call, using the Ubeji Community as a case study, is that for a very long time, the nation Nigeria has been on this particular case without tangible result.
Successive federal governments made what could be best described as a mere declaration of intent without the political will to enforce such laws.
In 2016, President Muhammadu Buhari-led administration enacted Gas Flare Prohibition and Punishment), an act that among other things made provisions to prohibit gas flaring in any oil and gas production operation, blocks, fields, onshore or offshore, and gas facility treatment plants in Nigeria.
On Monday, September 2, 2018, the then Minister of State for Petroleum, Ibe Kachikwu, while speaking at the Buyers’ Forum/stakeholders’ Engagement organised by the Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria in Abuja, said, “I have said to the Department of Petroleum Resources, beginning from next year (2019 emphasis added), we are going to get quite frantic about this (ending gas flaring in Nigeria) and companies that cannot meet with extended periods –the issue is not how much you can pay in terms of fines for gas flaring, the issue is that you would not produce. We need to begin to look at the foreclosing of licenses.”
That threat has since ended in the frames as the Minister did little or nothing to get the threat actualized.
The administration also launched the now abandoned National Gas Flare Commercialization Programme (NGFCP), a programme, according to the federal government aimed at achieving the flares-out agenda/zero routine gas flaring in Nigeria by 2020.
Again, like a regular trademark, it failed.
Away from Buhari’s administration, in 1979, the then federal government, in a similar style, came up with the Associated Gas Re-injection Act which summarily prohibited gas flaring and also fixed the flare-out deadline for January 1, 1984. It failed in line with the leadership philosophy in the country.
Similar feeble and deformed attempts were made in 2003, 2006, and 2008.
In the same style and span, precisely on July 2, 2009, the Nigerian Senate passed a Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2009 (SB 126) into Law fixing the flare-out deadline for December 31, 2010- a date that slowly but inevitably failed. Not stopping at this point, the FG made another attempt in this direction by coming up with the Petroleum Industry Bill which fixed the flare-out deadline for 2012. The same Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was protracted till 2021 when it completed its circle and was subsequently signed into law by President Buhari, as the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA).
Despite this vicious movement to save the industry, the environment and its people, the Niger Delta challenge remains.
Utomi Jerome-Mario is the Programme Coordinator (Media and Policy) for Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA), Lagos. He can be reached via [email protected]/08032725374
Feature/OPED
How Nigeria’s New Tax Law Could Redefine Risk in the Banking Sector
By Blaise Udunze
Nigeria’s new tax identification portal goes live nationwide tomorrow, Friday, January 1, 2026, marking a pivotal moment in the country’s fiscal and financial governance. Designed to modernise tax administration and strengthen taxpayer identification, the reform reflects a decisive shift in economic strategy by a government grappling with shrinking oil revenues, rising public debt, and widening fiscal deficits.
At the centre of this shift is a deeper integration of identity systems, banking data, and tax administration, most notably the adoption of the National Identification Number (NIN) as a tax identification mechanism for operating bank accounts. In parallel, banks will also begin charging a N50 stamp duty on electronic transfers of N10,000 and above, following the implementation of the Tax Act.
Individually, these measures may appear modest, even reasonable. Collectively, however, they signal a fundamental reordering of the relationship between the state, banks, and citizens with far-reaching implications for banking business, customer trust, financial inclusion, and credit creation.
Banks at the Centre of Fiscal Enforcement
Under the new tax framework, Nigerian banks are no longer merely financial intermediaries or corporate taxpayers. They are increasingly positioned as collection agents, reporting hubs, and frontline enforcement points for government revenue policy.
The linkage of NIN to tax compliance, combined with transaction-based stamp duties, reinforces a stark reality that the banking system has become the most visible and accessible channel through which the state now extracts revenue from citizens.
This expanded role exposes banks to a new layer of risk not just financial or operational, but social, reputational, and political risks that extend far beyond balance sheets.
A Structural Shift in the Banking, Tax Relationship
Historically, banks played a facilitative role in tax compliance, primarily through payment processing and remittance support. The use of NIN as a tax identifier marks a structural departure from this model.
Bank accounts are no longer merely financial tools; they are becoming gateways to tax visibility.
This shift fundamentally alters the risk profile of the banking business. Banks are now exposed not only to credit, market, and operational risks, but also to heightened social backlash, reputational damage, and political sensitivity, arising from their expanded enforcement role.
Account Friction and Slower Customer Onboarding
One of the earliest and most visible consequences of NIN-based tax identification is increased friction in account opening and maintenance.
Consequently, in a real sense, millions of Nigerians will continue to face challenges with the NIN system, including delays in enrolment and correction, biometric mismatches as well as inconsistencies between NIN, BVN, and bank records.
For banks, this translates into slower onboarding processes, higher rates of account restriction or rejection, and increased congestion across branches and digital platforms.
What should be a growth engine for deposit mobilisation instead becomes a bottleneck, resulting in lost customers, fewer transactions, and weakened scale advantages in an increasingly competitive banking environment.
Banks as the Face of an Unpopular Tax Regime
Perhaps the most underappreciated consequence of the new tax regime is the escalation of customer hostility toward banks.
When accounts are flagged, restricted, or subjected to enhanced scrutiny, customers rarely direct their frustration at tax authorities or policymakers. Instead, they confront the most visible institution in the chain, their bank.
Banks are increasingly blamed for account freezes, accused of colluding with government, and perceived as punitive rather than service-oriented institutions. This hostility is particularly pronounced among informal sector operators, small traders, artisans, and self-employed professionals with irregular income streams.
In a low-trust economy such as Nigeria’s, perception often outweighs regulation. Banks risk becoming the public face of coercive taxation, absorbing reputational damage for policies they neither designed nor control.
Erosion of Trust in the Banking Relationship
Banking fundamentally depends on trust that deposits are safe, transactions are private, and institutions act in customers’ best interests.
When NIN becomes a tax enforcement gateway, that trust begins to fray. Banks are no longer seen primarily as custodians of savings, enablers of enterprise, or neutral financial intermediaries. Instead, they are increasingly perceived as extensions of tax authorities, surveillance nodes, and compliance police.
Once trust erodes, customer behaviour adjust often in ways that undermine the formal financial system itself.
The Hidden Impact of the N50 Stamp Duty
The introduction of a N50 stamp duty on electronic transfers of N10,000 and above may appear trivial. In practice, it carries outsized implications.
For many Nigerians, especially low- and middle-income earners, electronic transfers are not discretionary transactions. They are salary payments, family support remittances, SME operating expenses, and routine commercial settlements.
Customers rarely distinguish between government levies and bank charges. The stamp duty will therefore be perceived as yet another bank fee, deepening resentment toward institutions already accused of excessive charges.
Behaviourally, customers may respond by breaking transactions into smaller amounts, increasing cash usage, or migrating to informal transfer channels, distorting transaction patterns and weakening the efficiency of the digital payments ecosystem.
Although banks merely collect the duty on behalf of the government, they will once again bear the reputational cost.
Threat to Deposit Mobilisation and Liquidity
Fear of tax exposure is a powerful behavioural driver. As NIN becomes closely associated with tax scrutiny and transaction charges mount, many customers are likely to reduce account balances, avoid lump-sum deposits, split transactions to stay below thresholds, or move funds outside the banking system entirely.
For banks, the consequences are clear, as these will result in slower deposit growth, volatile liquidity positions, and reduced capacity to fund loans.
Deposit mobilisation is the lifeblood of banking. Any policy that discourages formal savings weakens banks’ intermediation role and, by extension, the broader economy.
Reversal of Financial Inclusion Gains
Nigeria has invested more than a decade in expanding financial inclusion through agent banking, digital wallets, and tiered KYC frameworks. The use of NIN as a tax trigger threatens to reverse these gains.
Many newly banked individuals, particularly those at the base of the economic pyramid, may abandon formal accounts, revert to cash-based transactions, or rely on informal savings mechanisms.
The irony is stark as an identifier designed to formalise the economy may inadvertently push activity back into informality.
Rising Compliance, Legal, and Technology Costs
Operationally, integrating NIN as a tax identifier significantly increases banks’ compliance burden. However, institutions are expected to synchronise multiple databases, resolve inconsistencies at scale, implement continuous monitoring systems while also managing customer disputes arising from mismatches or wrongful flags.
The challenges inherent in these demands require heavy investment in IT infrastructure, expanded compliance teams and enhanced cybersecurity. The costs either erode profitability or are passed on to customers, further fuelling public resentment.
Credit Creation and Economic Growth at Risk
Reduced deposits, higher compliance costs, reputational strain, and customer attrition converge on a single outcome that mainly constrained lending capacity.
There is no two ways about this, banks under sustained pressure will tighten credit standards, reduce SME and consumer lending, and favour low-risk government securities. The ripple effects include slower job creation, constrained entrepreneurship, and, on a dangerous level, it leads to weaker economic growth, ultimately undermining the very revenue base the tax reform seeks to expand.
Revenue Without Ruin
No doubt, linking NIN to tax identification and expanding transaction-based levies may enhance government visibility over economic activity, but in reality they carry significant unintended consequences for banking business.
They risk weakening customer trust, undermining deposit mobilisation, reversing financial inclusion gains, increasing operational and reputational risks, and constraining credit growth.
Banks do not oppose taxation. What they caution against is turning financial inclusion infrastructure into a blunt instrument of tax enforcement without adequate safeguards.
For the policy to succeed without damaging the banking system, regulators must ensure clear thresholds and exemptions, strong data protection guarantees, phased implementation and ensure sustained public education to redirect hostility away from banks.
Ultimately, the critical question is not legislative readiness but execution, especially coordination across institutions, technological preparedness and the capacity to prevent unintended disruption to businesses and citizens alike. The authorities must understand that when revenue meets risk, wisdom lies in balance.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Nigeria’s 2025 Reform Year: How Security, Markets, Industry and Innovation Are Building a $1trn Economy
By David Okon
Nigeria’s economic story in 2025 has not been defined by a single reform or headline moment. It has been shaped by sequencing, a deliberate effort to stabilise the macroeconomy, restore institutional credibility and align security, fiscal, and market policy towards growth. At the centre of that sequencing has been the Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Wale Edun, whose framing of security, capital mobilisation, and reform discipline has increasingly influenced how investors perceive Nigeria.
The year began with the government focused on repairing the analytical foundations of economic planning. In early 2025, Nigeria completed a long-awaited rebasing of its Gross Domestic Product to a 2019 base year, a technical exercise led by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) that expanded the measured contribution of services, ICT, and the informal economy. According to the NBS, the rebasing placed nominal GDP at about ₦372.8 trillion, equivalent to roughly $240–250 billion, giving policymakers and investors a clearer picture of economic structure and scale.
That reset mattered. It framed the fiscal choices that followed, including tighter expenditure controls, tax administration reforms, and coordination with monetary authorities to slow inflation and stabilise the foreign-exchange market. By the fourth quarter of 2025, inflation which had exceeded 24 percent earlier in the year, began a steady descent, reaching about 14.45 percent by November 2025. Foreign reserves strengthened toward $47 billion, reinforcing external buffers and signalling improved balance-of-payments management, trends noted by multilateral institutions including the World Bank and Afreximbank in their 2025 outlooks for Nigeria.
By mid-year, the reform narrative shifted from stabilisation to confidence, and nowhere was that clearer than in Nigeria’s capital markets. The Nigerian Exchange closed 2025 as one of Africa’s strongest-performing bourses, with the All-Share Index up about 49 per cent year-to-date by late December. Total market capitalisation across equities, debt, and ETFs rose to nearly ₦150 trillion, driven by strong earnings, bank recapitalisation, and new listings, according to the NGX Group chairman, Umaru Kwairanga.
Banking reform was pivotal. As part of recapitalisation efforts aimed at strengthening credit transmission and financial stability, Nigerian banks raised an estimated ₦2.5 trillion in fresh capital by December 2025 through rights issues, private placements, and public offers, according to NGX filings and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approvals. The capital raising reinforced balance sheets and helped drive the market rally, underscoring the link between prudential reform and investor confidence.
Debt markets told a similar story. Between April and October 2025, companies raised over ₦753 billion through commercial paper issuances to finance short-term working capital needs across manufacturing, energy, and agriculture. “These figures are not just numbers; they represent confidence in our regulatory framework and the resilience of our market architecture,” said Emomotimi Agama, Director-General of the SEC, in a public briefing on capital-raising approvals. Landmark transactions, including a ₦500 billion climate-linked SPV and a ₦200 billion Elektron Finance bond, pointed to growing appetite for infrastructure and sustainable finance.
Corporate earnings reinforced the macro signal. MTN Nigeria Communications Plc, one of the Exchange’s largest listed companies, delivered one of the year’s most striking turnarounds. By the first nine months of 2025, the telecoms giant reported revenues of ₦3.73 trillion, up 57 per cent year-on-year, and profit after tax of about ₦750 billion, reversing prior losses. Capital expenditure exceeded ₦565 billion in the first half of the year alone, underscoring confidence in Nigeria’s digital future and the policy direction of the telecoms sector. Other blue-chip firms, including Dangote Cement, posted strong earnings with profit after tax exceeding ₦520 billion, reinforcing the sense that reform was translating into corporate resilience rather than contraction.
Amid these developments, Nigeria’s fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) sector also began to reflect the macroeconomic stabilisation delivered by policy reforms. After several years of losses driven by foreign-exchange volatility and inflationary pressures, major FMCG firms recorded a notable rebound in 2025 as currency conditions improved. The sector posted 54.1 per cent value growth in 2025, up from 34.3 per cent in 2024, according to a report by global data and analytics firm NielsenIQ.
Nigerian consumers continued to underpin demand, lifting the FMCG market to an estimated value of $25 billion, the second largest in Africa after South Africa’s $27.5 billion market. Across the continent, the five largest FMCG markets; South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco and Kenya, together account for about $42 billion in total value.
Nigeria’s growth rate outpaced its peers. Egypt expanded by 23.1 per cent to $10.2 billion, Morocco grew 7.6 per cent to $7.5 billion, and Kenya increased 5.5 per cent to $3.3 billion, highlighting Nigeria’s outsized contribution to regional momentum.
At the company level, Nestlé Nigeria Plc returned to profitability, posting a ₦88.4 billion pre-tax profit in the first half of 2025, compared with a ₦252.5 billion loss in the same period a year earlier. The turnaround was supported by a 43 per cent increase in revenue to ₦581.1 billion and more stable cost structures.
Broader market data reflected the recovery. FMCG stocks delivered strong performances on the Nigerian Exchange, with the consumer goods index posting solid gains and several stocks recording returns of more than 100 per cent over the year as investor confidence returned to the sector.
“Nigeria’s FMCG story is one of grit and innovation,” said Dr Tayo Ajayi, a Lagos-based consumer market analyst. “Even when the economy is under pressure, Nigerians adjust their spending habits rather than stop spending. That adaptability is what keeps the sector alive.”
Energy and industrial policy formed the next layer of the reform arc. The Dangote Refinery, already operating at 650,000 barrels per day, confirmed plans to expand capacity to 1.4 million barrels per day, a move analysts say could significantly reduce fuel imports, ease pressure on foreign exchange, and strengthen Nigeria’s trade balance. The refinery has become emblematic of the government’s push to support large-scale local production as a substitute for imports and a magnet for global capital.
At the national level, NNPC Ltd continued its post-commercialisation reset. Group Chief Executive Bayo Ojulari said recent operational improvements reflected structural reforms within the company, noting that oil production rose from about 1.5 million barrels per day in 2024 to over 1.7 million barrels per day in 2025. He also highlighted the strategic importance of the 614-kilometre Ajaokuta–Kaduna–Kano (AKK) gas pipeline, designed to transport 2.2 billion standard cubic feet of gas per day, in unlocking industrial growth in northern Nigeria. Ojulari said the company’s focus for 2026 would be attracting new investments, lifting output to at least 1.8 million barrels per day, and supporting President Bola Tinubu’s directive for NNPC to help attract $30 billion in investments by 2030.
Infrastructure and future-facing sectors rounded out the year. Progress continued on the Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway, with financing of approximately $1.126 billion secured by the Ministry of Finance and the Economy for Phase 1, Section 2 of the road, a signature project of the Tinubu administration. President Tinubu stated: “This is a major achievement, and closing this transaction means the Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway will continue unimpeded. Our administration will continue to explore available funding opportunities to execute critical economic and priority infrastructural projects across the country”.
Port decentralisation plans in southern Nigeria, along with digital-skills programmes under the Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy including the 3 Million Technical Talent (3MTT) initiative led by Minister Bosun Tijani, complemented the infrastructure drive (FMOCDE). The creative economy, encompassing film, music, fashion, and digital content, remained a fast-growing source of jobs and exports, increasingly recognised in policy circles as a serious economic asset.
The year’s most sensitive test of investor confidence came in its final week. On 25 December, US forces conducted targeted airstrikes against Islamic State-linked camps in Sokoto State, in coordination with Nigerian authorities. The government moved quickly to frame the action as part of a broader stability agenda. In a statement released on 28 December, Wale Edun stressed that “security and economic stability are inseparable,” describing the operation as “precise, intelligence-led and focused exclusively on terrorist elements that threaten lives, national stability, and economic activity.” He added that Nigeria “is not at war with itself or any nation, but is confronting terrorism alongside trusted international partners,” a distinction aimed squarely at markets and multilateral partners.
That framing captured the essence of Nigeria’s 2025 reform story. Security was not presented as an isolated military matter, but as an economic input, a prerequisite for investment, production, and growth. As Edun noted, “Every effort to safeguard Nigerians is, by definition, pro-growth and pro-investment,” a message calibrated for investors as markets prepared to reopen.
Nigeria enters 2026 with risks still evident, but with clearer direction. The proposed ₦58.18 trillion federal budget for 2026, anchored on revenue mobilisation, infrastructure spending, and deficit restraint, reflects an effort to consolidate gains rather than reset strategy. For investors, the signal from 2025 is not perfection, but coherence: policy, security, and markets increasingly moving in the same direction.
For an economy long defined by stops and starts, that alignment may prove the most valuable reform of all.
David Okon is a marketing communications and policy consultant at Quadrant MSL, a part of the Publicis Groupe and Troyka+InsightRedefini Group
Feature/OPED
Nigeria’s N58.18trn Budget and Rising Cost of Deficit Governance
By Blaise Udunze
When President Bola Tinubu presented the N58.18 trillion 2026 Appropriation Bill to the National Assembly, unbeknownst to some, it opened with a contradiction that should unsettle even its most optimistic readers. It is an irony that a budget promises consolidation, renewed resilience, and shared prosperity, at the same time, it is built on a deficit of N23.85 trillion, as the largest budget in the nation’s history, equivalent to 4.28 percent of GDP, financed largely through borrowing, and debt servicing alone will consume N15.52 trillion, nearly half of the projected revenue. What a contradiction! The reality today is that Nigeria is borrowing not primarily to expand productive capacity or unlock long-term growth, but to keep the machinery of the state running. Salaries, overheads, inherited liabilities, and interest payments increasingly define the purpose of new debt. Capital formation, though loudly advertised, struggles to keep pace with fiscal reality. This raises a fundamental and unavoidable question. How sustainable is a fiscal model where debt service crowds out development spending year after year? Until this question is convincingly answered, no amount of reform rhetoric can restore confidence in Nigeria’s budgeting process.
A Nation Drowning in Deficits and Debt
The problem with the deficit is that it is not a number by itself. It shows that there are problems with the way things are set up. By the middle of 2025, Nigeria owed a lot of money, N152.4 trillion, which represented about a 348.6 percent increase following the assumption of President Bola Tinubu into office in 2023. Before he assumed office, the country owed N33.3 trillion, and this is a country that was already having trouble paying for basic things it needed to.
Reflecting on Nigeria’s predicament, it mirrors a wider African crisis. Reviewing the occurrences across the continent of Africa, external debt now surpassed $1.3 trillion, while the debt servicing costs are estimated at $89 billion this year alone. Nigeria’s case is unique not because of the amount of debt, but because of its poor productive return. The lingering challenge is that Nigeria’s borrowing has skyrocketed, yet the economy remains conspicuously faced with fragile infrastructure. The fiscal irony is stark that Nigeria is borrowing to survive, not to thrive.
A Deficit-Fuelled Budget and the Rising Cost of Survival
Deficits can be useful tools when deployed strategically. But Nigeria’s deficits have become structural, persistent, and increasingly divorced from growth outcomes. The N23.85 trillion deficit in the 2026 budget represents a dramatic escalation from the N11-N12 trillion range of recent years. Analysts warn that this is no longer a counter-cyclical policy; it is a sign of fiscal stress. Tilewa Adebajo, Chief Executive Officer of CFG Advisory, describes Nigeria’s fiscal space as “the biggest threat to our economic recovery.” According to him, the country continues to expand its budget despite failing to meet revenue targets. “We cannot have a N23 trillion deficit, that’s not sustainable,” he warned, noting that deficits have doubled in just a few years. More troubling is what the deficit implies. With N15.52 trillion earmarked for debt servicing, nearly half of the projected revenue is already spoken for before development spending begins. Some estimates suggest that over 25 percent of Nigeria’s annual revenue now goes directly into debt servicing, and in certain months, the ratio rises far higher. Experts warn that when over 90 percent of revenue is consumed by old debts, governance becomes an exercise in survival rather than progress. This is the fiscal corner Nigeria is steadily backing itself into.
Borrowing to Run Government, Not to Build the Economy
Between July and October 2025 alone, Nigeria secured over $24.79 billion in new borrowings, alongside €4 billion, ¥15 billion, N757 billion, $500 million in sukuk, and other facilities, most justified as “development financing.” Yet the real sector continues to wait for a tangible impact. The African Democratic Congress (ADC) argues that a budget planning to generate N34 trillion in revenue while borrowing nearly N24 trillion amounts to an admission of fiscal insolvency. A deficit-to-revenue ratio approaching 70 percent, it insists, would be unacceptable in any functional fiscal system. While opposition language is often sharp, the underlying concern is valid. Borrowing makes economic sense only when it finances self-liquidating projects like investments that generate revenue to repay the loans. Instead, Nigeria increasingly borrows to service past debts and plug recurrent expenditure gaps. Uche Uwaleke, Professor of Finance and Capital Markets at Nasarawa State University, underscores the danger: “Nigeria’s debt service ratio is inimical to economic development, chiefly because what could have been used to build infrastructure and invest in human capital is used to service debt. The opportunity cost for the country is high.” In effect, debt has shifted from a development instrument to a fiscal life support system.
Revenue Projections Caught Between Reform Ambition and Structural Limits
The Nigerian government projected N34.33 trillion in revenue for 2026, which is squarely anchored on improved oil output, non-oil tax reforms, and digitised revenue mobilisation across Government-Owned Enterprises (GOEs). To actualize its target, President Tinubu vowed to clamp down on leakages, enforce performance targets, and deploy real-time monitoring systems. Though these reforms are necessary. The question is whether they are sufficient and timely. Recent performance suggests caution. As at Q3 2025, only 61 percent of revenue targets had been achieved. Capital releases lagged sharply, and comprehensive implementation reports have not been published. Ayokunle Olubunmi, Head of Financial Institutions Ratings at Agusto & Co., expressed doubts about the credibility of the projections, citing weak performance in 2024 and 2025. “We don’t even know how many budgets we are implementing now,” Olubunmi observed, pointing to overlapping cycles and missing reports. The ADC goes further, describing revenue projections as detached from reality, while noting that revenue growth in 2024 was largely driven by currency devaluation, not structural expansion, before being doubled for 2025 and increased again for 2026. Nominal gains, it argues, are being mistaken for real fiscal strength. Without deep structural reforms, reliable power, export diversification, and productivity growth, revenue expansion risks remaining inflationary and fragile, unable to support the scale of spending proposed.
Budget Execution and the Credibility Gap
President Tinubu has declared 2026 a turning point. He promised an end to overlapping budgets, abandoned projects, and perpetual rollovers. All prior capital liabilities, he said, will be closed by March 31, 2026, ushering in a single budget cycle. Yet Nigeria’s execution record invites skepticism. The Coalition of United Opposition Political Parties (CUPP) points out that no comprehensive 2025 budget implementation report has been published, the first such lapse in 15 years. Quarterly performance reports, once routine, have been withheld, violating fiscal responsibility norms. “How can a new budget be proposed when the performance of the current one remains unknown?” CUPP asked. Execution failure is not cosmetic; it is costly. Projects stall, costs balloon, and borrowed funds yield no returns. Without transparency and enforcement, discipline risks becoming a slogan rather than a system.
Capital Spending vs the Persistent Cost of Governance
The N26.08 trillion allocated to capital expenditure is one of the budget’s most advertised strengths, with infrastructure, agriculture, education, and health featuring prominently. Yet Nigeria’s history cautions against equating allocations with outcomes. Recurrent non-debt expenditure remains high at N15.25 trillion, reflecting a governance structure that consumes significant resources. Ministries, departments, agencies, and political overheads continue to limit fiscal space. Mr. Idakolo Gbolade of SD&D Capital Management acknowledges the budget’s ambition but warns that over 70 percent of capital expenditure may be carried over into 2026. This suggests that implementation bottlenecks remain unresolved. Borrowing to fund capital projects that are delayed or abandoned compounds fiscal inefficiency. Nigeria risks paying interest on infrastructure that exists only on paper. Until the cost of governance is structurally reduced, capital spending will struggle to deliver transformative impact, regardless of headline figures.
Security Spending at Scale, But Lacking Clarity
Security receives the largest sectoral allocation, N5.41 trillion, alongside a new national counterterrorism doctrine targeting all armed non-state actors. The administration argues, correctly, that without security, investment cannot thrive. On the contrary, Nigeria’s experience shows that security spending does not automatically translate into security outcomes. Over the years, allocations have risen while insecurity persists across multiple regions. The challenge is not merely funding, but accountability, coordination, and effectiveness. Without transparency in procurement and deployment, security budgets risk becoming opaque sinks for public funds, undermining the very growth assumptions embedded in the budget.
Shared Prosperity Under Pressure
Though the budget promises shared prosperity, citing allocations of N3.52 trillion for education and N2.48 trillion for health, alongside agricultural and infrastructure investments, and with the National Bureau of Statistics announcement that inflation has moderated, and growth has improved modestly. Yet for ordinary Nigerians, relief remains elusive. Food prices are high, transport costs elevated, and real incomes squeezed. Social sector spending still struggles to keep pace with population growth. Shared prosperity cannot remain an aspiration deferred to the future. It must translate into jobs, affordable food, functioning schools, accessible healthcare, and rising real incomes.
Borrowing Without Beneficiaries
At the 2025 IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, D.C., global leaders again pledged to address developing countries’ debt burdens. But as Nigeria continues to issue Eurobonds, sukuk, and bilateral loans, a simple question demands attention: who benefits from all this borrowing? If the answer is not citizens, businesses, and future generations, then the debt is not development finance; it is deferred hardship.
When Deficits Become Destiny
The 2026 budget reflects an administration aware of Nigeria’s fiscal dysfunctions and eager to correct them. The language of discipline, digitisation, and delivery signals intent. But credibility is not declared; it is earned. A deficit-driven budget that leans heavily on borrowing, struggles with revenue realism, and carries unresolved execution gaps places Nigeria on a narrow fiscal path. If borrowing is decisively tied to self-liquidating projects, transparency restored, and governance costs reduced, the budget could mark a turning point. If not, it risks confirming a grim truth as Nigeria is financing today by mortgaging tomorrow. Until debt stops crowding out development and revenue begins to fund governance rather than merely service it, deficits will no longer be temporary tools. They will become destiny.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
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