Feature/OPED
The 10th NASS, PIA as a First Line of Conflict
By Jerome-Mario Chijioke Utomi
Even when it is obvious that, as humans, it is always convenient to forget and uncomfortable to remember, one invaluable asset the outgone 9th National Assembly left behind that will be too difficult to forget by Nigerians, particularly the people of the Niger Delta region, South-South geopolitical zone of the country is the 2021 passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill, after over 17 years of back and forth movement, and its subsequent signing to law by former President Muhammadu Buhari.
Aside from being the most audacious attempts to overhaul the petroleum sector in Nigeria, stakeholders believed that If properly and vigorously implemented, the PIA could represent the gold standard of natural resource management, with clear and separate roles for the subsectors of the industry; the existence of a commercially-oriented and profit-driven national petroleum company; the codification of transparency, good governance, and accountability in the administration of the petroleum resources of Nigeria; the economic and social development of host communities; environmental remediation; and a business environment conducive for oil and gas operations to thrive in the country.
Further amplifying the celebration of PIA advent is the awareness that the people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria have been cheated for a protracted period in ways that rendered restitution a costly process; inferior education, poor housing, unemployment, poor healthcare facilities and very recently recession. These are the bitter tablets of oppression the people have taken for the period under review. Now, this neglect has accumulated interest, and its cost to this nation has become substantial in financial and human terms.
However, like every invention, which usually comes with its opportunities and challenges, even so, has PIA which provided two regulatory agencies, the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) and the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA), among other responsibilities, provide technical and commercial regulation of petroleum operations in their respective sectors, contrary to expectations become the first and fundamental line of conflict between the operators and the host communities-leading to a renewed call by host communities on the Federal Government to give them full control of their resources and then they can developmentally change the lives of their people.
Beginning with the frosty relationship between the operators and host communities, among many examples, the recent ultimatum/threat by the oil-rich community of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) in Warri North Local Government Area of Delta State to shut down ongoing exploration activities of Conoil Producing Limited, if the company failed to reach a definite agreement with the community on the implementation of Chapter 3 of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) for the Tsekelewu bloc of communities, supports this assertion.
Entitled ‘Fourteen (14) Days Ultimatum to Implement Chapter 3 of 2021 Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) in Tsekelewu (Polobubo) Host Community and Bloc of Communities by Conoil Producing Limited at OML 103’, the petition/ultimatum, Dated December 30, 2022, signed by the President-General of the Tsekelewu (Polobubo) Development Association, Dr Bright Abulu and the spokesman of the association, Mr Christmas Ukagha and addressed to the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer of Conoil Producing Limited, among other things, lamented that they adopted the option due to the seemingly snobbish attitude of the management of Conoil Producing as the company’s management had refused to honour letters asking for a meeting with the TCDA on the issue of the PIA implementation.
Essentially, while the people of the Tsekelewu (Polobubo) Host Community continue to wait for what becomes the outcome of their ultimatum, there is, indeed, greater evidence that points to the fact that the underlying premise behind PIA enactment has been defeated. There is equal reason for concern that what is currently happening between Oil Companies and their host communities may no longer be the first half of a reoccurring circle but, rather, the beginning of something negatively new and different.
According to a commentator, the challenge of ambiguity, interpretation and imprecision in the law is so ‘profound’. For example, it is unclear whether host community development trust obligations are additional to existing community levies (such as the Niger Delta development levy) or will be an aggregation of those levies. Similarly, the law is silent on the definition of “frontier basin” and host community, instead deferring to the NUPRC on the definition of the frontier basin and to settlors or license holders on the definition of “host community.” These definitions are not neutral to revenue; they have revenue implications. This lack of clarity creates uncertainty and even possible disputes, especially if relevant parties define them differently.
On Capacity building, the referenced commenter captures it this way; this law is complex and complicated. While capacity in the oil and gas sector has been built over the years, the new legal provisions and fiscal framework will need new capacities to succeed. This challenge will be particularly acute in the new regulatory institutions; in the understanding, interpretation, and application of the law; and in the management of the funds, including the Host Community Development Trust Funds (HCDTF).
In my view, another major area of ‘interest ‘’ that the 10th NASS must watch as it calls for urgent amendment is the fiscal framework of PIA which highlights penalties for gas flaring arising from midstream operations. It stated that revenues from these penalties would accrue to the Midstream and Downstream Infrastructure Fund and would be used to finance midstream and downstream infrastructure investment.
Aside from the fact that the law was more interested in income generation for the government through payment of fines/penalties by the operators and has no protection for the host communities, who are the real victims of pollution arising from gas flaring, another major flaw inherent in the provision is that a tour by boat of creeks and coastal communities of Warri South West and Warri North Local Government Areas of Delta state will amply reveal that the much-anticipated end in sight of gas flaring is actually not in sight. In the same manner, a journey by road from Warri via Eku-Abraka to Agbor, and another road trip from Warri through Ughelli down to Ogwuashi Ukwu in Aniocha Local Government of the state, shows an environment where people cannot properly breathe as it is littered by gas flaring points.
In simple language, the operators appear more comfortable with the payment of fines/penalties arising from flared gases than taking practical steps to end the ‘practice’.
To a large extent, the above confirms as true the recently published report, which among other concerns, noted that Nigeria has about 139 gas flare locations spread across the Niger Delta both in onshore and offshore oil fields where gas which constitutes about 11 per cent of the total gas produced are flared. Apart from the health implication of flared gases on humanity, their adverse impact on the nation’s economy is equally weighty. For instance, a parallel report published a while ago underlined that about 888 million standard cubic feet of gas were flared daily in 2017.
The flared gas, it added, was sufficient to light up Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa, generate 2.5 gigawatts (Gw) of power or produce 50 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) or produce 600,000 metric tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) per year, produce 22 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2), feed two-three liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains, generate 300,000 jobs, able to attract $3.5 billion investment into Nigeria and has $350 million carbon credit value’. This is an illustrative pointer as to why the nation economically gropes and stumbles.
Looking at the enormity of the health and economic losses inherent in gas flaring, one may be tempted to ask what set the stage for gas flaring in Nigeria. The politics that keep it going, and why it flourishes unabated?
Banking on what experts are saying, the major reason for the flaring of gasses is that when crude oil is extracted from onshore and offshore oil wells, it brings with it raw natural gas to the surface and where natural gas transportation, pipelines, and infrastructure are lacking, like in the case of Nigeria, this gas is instead burned off or flared as a waste product as this is the cheapest option. This has been going on since the 1950s when crude oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria.
To make the PIA rewarding and meet the changing needs of all the parties involved, Senator Godswill Akpabio’s led 10th National Assembly must amend the existing legislation. It has to be simple and without any form of ambiguity in its provisions. Take as an illustration; the NASS must not fail to remember that the Host Community Development Trust Fund (HCDTF) is to foster sustainable prosperity, provide direct social and economic benefits from petroleum to host communities, and enhance peaceful and harmonious coexistence between licensees or lessees and host communities. The 10th NASS must do more to strengthen these provisions.
Most importantly, it has recently become evident that every normal human being from the Niger Delta is against the 3% allocation to the host communities. They are in support of the community’s demand of 10%.
While the above state of affairs has tactically exposed the fundamental flaw in the PIA, which was at a time celebrated, the truth is that if the members of the 10th NASS and, of course, President Bola Tinubu-led federal government do nothing to amend this legislation, it will translate to failing future generations of Niger Deltans by leaving them an Act that will more diminish and devastate their region.
The NASS should also put these concerns into consideration.
Utomi Jerome-Mario is the Programme Coordinator (Media and Policy) for Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA), Lagos. He can be reached via je*********@***oo.com/08032725374
Feature/OPED
Mr President, Please Reconsider -No to State Police
By Abba Dukawa
Nigeria stands today at a painful and defining crossroads in its security journey. Across the nation, families live with growing fear as insecurity spreads—kidnappings, banditry, and terrorism have become harsh realities in too many communities. These threats do not respect state boundaries. Organised criminal networks move across states, leaving ordinary citizens feeling exposed and abandoned.
Nigerians are facing intertwined challenges. The anger is no longer whispered in private—it is now spoken openly with frustration and worry. Another pressing issue confronting Nigerians is the renewed debate over the creation of state police. When will the federal government strengthen the effectiveness of its security agencies? How much longer must communities endure this uncertainty?
At the same time, another urgent debate rises from the hearts of the people. In the face of this deepening crisis, should state governments be allowed to establish their own police forces to protect their citizens? Or will Nigeria continue to rely solely on a centralised system that many believe is struggling to respond quickly enough to local threats?
These are not just political questions. They are questions of safety, dignity, and the right of every Nigerian to live without fear. The nation is waiting, hoping for bold decisions that will restore trust, strengthen security, and protect the future of its people. State police cannot be the answer to these pressing issues that bedevil federal security agencies.
Recently, the President appealed to the leadership of the National Assembly to consider constitutional amendments that would create a legal framework for state police, arguing that such reform is necessary to address Nigeria’s worsening security challenges. The fragmented policing structure could complicate efforts to combat crime effectively.
Reigniting the debate over state police comes as no surprise, given that he has long been seen as an advocate for the idea since his tenure as Governor of Lagos State. He supported the concept then and has continued to promote it as President. Many Nigerians, particularly in the South-West, have long called for state police as a means to address the country’s growing insecurity. Despite the constitutional considerations, discussions around state police continue to evoke strong emotions nationwide.
How will state police address security breaches committed by local militias or vigilante groups such as the OPC in the Southwestern states? What actions would state police take regarding the Amotekun group, which is openly endorsed by Southwest governors, if it were to commit serious violations of the rights of citizens, especially those from other parts of the country? How quickly have the proponents of state police chosen to erase from memory the horrific atrocities the OPC inflicted on the Northern community in Lagos in February 2002? The scars of that tragedy are still raw, yet some behave as though it never happened—as if the pain and the lives lost meant nothing. It is a bitter betrayal of justice and our collective conscience.
Reintroducing this issue at a time when the federal security apparatus is already strained shows a lack of sensitivity. Proponents overlook that Section 214(1) clearly states there is only one police force for the federation, the Nigeria Police Force and no other police force may be established for any part of the federation. The section does not permit the establishment of state police. Policing is on the Exclusive Legislative List, meaning only the federal government can create or control a police force.
Even today, the Nigeria Police Force, under the centralised command of the Inspector-General, faces accusations of harassment and intimidation of the weak and vulnerable citizens. If such problems persist under federal control, imagine the risks of placing police authority under state governors, who already wield significant influence over state and local structures.
Implications For The State Police Structures In The Hand Of The State Governors
I must state clearly: I do not support the establishment of state police—at least not at this stage of Nigeria’s development. Our institutions remain fragile, and introducing such a system carries significant risks of abuse. History offers reasons for caution: the Native Authority police of the past were often linked to political repression and misuse of power.
Supporters argue that state police would bring law enforcement closer to local communities and improve response to crime. However, there are serious concerns rooted in Nigeria’s social realities.
Nigeria is a diverse nation with multiple ethnic and religious sentiments. If recruitment into state police forces becomes dominated by particular groups, minority communities may feel marginalised or threatened.
State police could deepen divisions and weaken public trust. State-controlled Police could also become instruments of political intimidation, especially during election periods, potentially targeting opposition figures, critics, and journalists.
Financial capacity is another major concern. Establishing and maintaining a professional police force requires substantial investment in training, equipment, salaries, welfare, and infrastructure. Many states already struggle to pay workers and provide essential services. How, then, can they adequately fund a state police? The likely outcome is poorly trained, under-equipped personnel—conditions that often foster corruption and inefficiency.
Even under federal oversight, Nigeria’s police system struggles with weak accountability and abuse of power. Transferring these weaknesses to the state level without safeguards could have severe consequences.
A poorly structured state police force could become loyal to governors rather than the Constitution, serving political interests rather than citizens’ interests. For these reasons, introducing state police, even with the constitutional amendment, could create more problems than it solves. Sustainability, accountability, and adherence to constitutional principles are critical and will likely be violated
Nigeria must strengthen law enforcement while protecting citizens’ rights and preserving national unity. Mr President, please reconsider your decision on state police. Nigerians want a strong, effective, and unified police force, not one that risks further dividing a system already struggling to meet its constitutional obligations.
Dukawa can be reached at ab**********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
Measures at Ensuring Africa’s Food Sovereignty
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
China’s investments in Africa have primarily been in the agricultural sector, reinforcing its support for the continent to attain food security for the growing population, estimated currently at 1.5 billion people. With a huge expanse of land and untapped resources, China’s investment in agriculture, focused on increasing local production, has been described as highly appreciable.
Brazil has adopted a similar strategy in its policy with African countries; its investments have concentrated in a number of countries, especially those rich in natural resources. It has significantly contributed to Africa’s economic growth by improving access to affordable machinery, industrial inputs, and adding value to consumer goods. Thus, Africa has to reduce product imports which can be produced locally.
The China and Brazil in African Agriculture Project has just published online a series of studies concerning Chinese and Brazilian support for African agriculture. They appeared in an upcoming issue of World Development. The six articles focusing on China are available below:
–A New Politics of Development Cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian Engagements in African Agriculture by Ian Scoones, Kojo Amanor, Arilson Favareto and Qi Gubo.
–South-South Cooperation, Agribusiness and African Agricultural Development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique by Kojo Amanor and Sergio Chichava.
–Chinese State Capitalism? Rethinking the Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa by Jing Gu, Zhang Chuanhong, Alcides Vaz and Langton Mukwereza.
–Chinese Migrants in Africa: Facts and Fictions from the Agri-food Sector in Ethiopia and Ghana by Seth Cook, Jixia Lu, Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.
–Chinese Agricultural Training Courses for African Officials: Between Power and Partnerships by Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.
–Science, Technology and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres in Africa by Xiuli Xu, Xiaoyun Li, Gubo Qi, Lixia Tang and Langton Mukwereza.
Strategic partnerships and the way forward: African leaders have to adopt import substitution policies, re-allocate financial resources toward attaining domestic production, and sustain self-sufficiency.
Maximising the impact of resource mobilisation requires collaboration among governments, key external partners, investment promotion agencies, financial institutions, and the private sector. Partnerships must be aligned with national development priorities that can promote value addition, support industrialisation, and deepen regional and continental integration.
Feature/OPED
Recapitalisation Without Transformation is a Risk Nigeria Cannot Afford
By Blaise Udunze
In barely two weeks, Nigeria’s banking sector will once again be at a historic turning point. As the deadline for the latest recapitalisation exercise approaches on March 31, 2026, with no fewer than 31 banks having met the new capital rule, leaving out two that are reportedly awaiting verification. As exercise progresses and draws to an end, policymakers are optimistic that stronger banks will anchor financial stability and support the country’s ambition of building a $1 trillion economy.
The reform, driven by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under Governor Olayemi Cardoso, requires banks to significantly raise their capital thresholds, which are set at N500 billion for international banks, N200 billion for national banks, and N50 billion for regional lenders. According to the apex bank, 33 banks have already tapped the capital market through rights issues and public offerings; collectively, the total verified and approved capital raised by the banks amounts to N4.05 trillion.
No doubt, at first glance, the strategy definitely appears straightforward with the idea that bigger capital means stronger banks, and stronger banks should finance economic growth. But history offers a cautionary reminder that capital alone does not guarantee resilience, as it would be recalled that Nigeria has travelled this road before.
During the 2004-2005 consolidation led by former CBN Governor Charles Soludo, the number of banks in the country shrank dramatically from 89 to 25. The reform created larger institutions that were celebrated as national champions. The truth is that Nigeria has been here before because, despite all said and done, barely five years later, the banking system plunged into crisis, forcing regulatory intervention, bailouts, and the creation of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to absorb toxic assets.
The lesson from that experience is simple in the sense that recapitalisation without structural reform only postpones deeper problems.
Today, as banks race to meet the new capital thresholds, the real question is not how much capital has been raised but whether the reform will transform the fundamentals of Nigerian banking. The underlying fact is that if the exercise merely inflates balance sheets without addressing deeper vulnerabilities, Nigeria risks repeating a familiar cycle of apparent stability followed by systemic stress, as the resultant effect will be distressed banks less capable of bringing the economy out of the woods.
The real measure of success is far simpler. That is to say, stronger banks must stimulate economic productivity, stabilise the financial system, and expand access to credit for businesses and households. Anything less will amount to a missed opportunity.
One of the most critical issues surrounding the recapitalisation drive is the quality of the capital being raised.
Nigeria’s banking sector has reportedly secured more than N4.5 trillion in new capital commitments across different categories of banks. No doubt, on paper, these numbers may appear impressive. Going by the trends of events in Nigeria’s economy, numbers alone can be deceptive.
Past recapitalisation cycles revealed troubling practices, whereby funds raised through related-party transactions, borrowed money disguised as equity, or complex financial arrangements that recycled risks back into the banking system. If such practices resurface, recapitalisation becomes little more than an accounting exercise.
To avert a repeat of failure, the CBN must therefore ensure that every naira raised represents genuine, loss-absorbing capital. Transparency around capital sources, ownership structures, and funding arrangements must be non-negotiable. Without credible capital, balance sheet strength becomes an illusion that will make every recapitalisation exercise futile.
In financial systems, credibility is itself a form of capital. If there is one recurring factor behind banking crises in Nigeria, it is corporate governance failure.
Many past collapses were not triggered by global shocks but by insider lending, weak board oversight, excessive executive power, and poor risk culture. Recapitalisation provides regulators with a rare opportunity to reset governance standards across the industry.
Boards must be independent not only in structure but also in substance. Risk committees must be empowered to challenge executive decisions. Insider lending rules must be enforced without compromise because, over the years, they have proven to be an anathema against the stability of the financial sector. The stakes are high.
When governance fails, fresh capital can quickly become fresh fuel for old excesses. Without governance reform, recapitalisation risks reinforcing the very weaknesses it seeks to eliminate.
Another structural vulnerability lies in Nigeria’s increasing amount of non-performing loans (NPLs), which recently caused the CBN to raise concerns, as Nigeria experiences a rise in bad loans threatening banking stability.
Industry data suggests that the banking sector’s NPL ratio has climbed above the prudential benchmark of 5 per cent, reaching roughly 7 per cent in recent assessments. Many of these troubled loans are concentrated in sectors such as oil and gas, power, and government-linked infrastructure projects, alongside other factors such as FX instability, high interest rates, and the withdrawal of Covid-era forbearance, which threaten bank stability.
While regulatory forbearance has helped maintain short-term stability, it has also obscured deeper asset-quality concerns. A credible recapitalisation process must confront this reality directly.
Loan classification standards must reflect economic truth rather than regulatory convenience. Banks should not carry impaired assets indefinitely while presenting healthy balance sheets to investors and depositors.
Transparency about asset quality strengthens trust. Concealment destroys it. Few forces have disrupted Nigerian bank balance sheets in recent years as severely as exchange-rate volatility.
Many banks still operate with significant foreign exchange mismatches, borrowing short-term in foreign currencies while lending long-term to clients earning revenues in naira. When the naira depreciates sharply, these mismatches can erode capital faster than any credit loss.
Recapitalisation must therefore be accompanied by stricter supervision of foreign exchange exposure, as this part calls for the regulator to heighten its supervision. Banks should be required to disclose currency risks more transparently and undergo rigorous stress testing at intervals that assume adverse currency scenarios rather than best-case outcomes. In a structurally import-dependent economy, ignoring FX risk is no longer an option.
Nigeria’s banking system has long been characterised by excessive concentration in a few sectors and corporate clients, which calls for adequate monitoring and the need to be addressed quickly for the recapitalisation drive to yield maximum results.
Growth in most advanced economies comes from the small and medium-sized enterprises that are well-funded. Anything short of this undermines it, since the concentration of huge loans to large oil and gas companies, government-related entities, and major conglomerates absorbs a disproportionate share of bank lending. This has continued to pose a major threat to the system, as the case is with small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of job creation, which remain chronically underfinanced. This imbalance weakens the economy.
Recapitalisation should therefore be tied to policies that encourage credit diversification and risk-sharing mechanisms that allow banks to lend more confidently to productive sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and technology rather than investing their funds into the government’s securities. Bigger banks that remain narrowly exposed do not strengthen the economy. They amplify its fragilities.
Nigeria’s macroeconomic conditions, which are its broad economic settings, are defined by frequent and sometimes sharp changes or instability rather than stability.
Inflation shocks, interest-rate swings, fiscal pressures, and currency adjustments are not rare disruptions; but they have now become a normal part of the economic environment. Despite all these adverse factors, many banks still operate risk models that assume relative stability. Perhaps unbeknownst to the stakeholders, this disconnect is dangerous.
Owing to possible shocks, and when banks increase their capital (recapitalisation), it is required that banks adopt more sophisticated risk-management frameworks capable of withstanding severe economic scenarios, with the expectation that stronger banks should also have stronger systems to manage risks and survive economic crises. In Nigeria today, every financial institution’s stress testing must be performed in the face of the economy facing severe shocks like currency depreciation, sovereign debt pressures, and sudden interest-rate spikes.
Risk management should evolve from a compliance obligation into a strategic discipline embedded in every lending decision.
Public confidence in the banking system depends heavily on credible financial reporting.
Investors, analysts, and depositors need to be able to understand banks’ true financial positions without navigating non-transparent disclosures or creative accounting practices, which means the industry must be liberated to an extent that gives room for access to information.
Recapitalisation provides an opportunity to strengthen the enforcement of international financial reporting standards, enhance audit quality, and require clearer disclosure of capital adequacy, asset quality, and related-party transactions. Transparency should not be feared. It is the foundation of trust.
One thing that must be corrected is that while recapitalisation often focuses on financial metrics, the banking sector ultimately runs on human capital.
Another fearful aspect of this exercise for the economy is that consolidation and mergers triggered by the reform could lead to workforce disruptions if not carefully managed. Job losses, casualisation, and declining staff morale can weaken institutional culture and productivity. Strong banks are built by strong people.
If recapitalisation strengthens balance sheets while destabilising the workforce that powers the system, the reform risks undermining its own economic objectives. Human capital stability must therefore form part of the broader reform strategy.
Doubtless, another emerging shift in Nigeria’s financial landscape is the rise of digital financial platforms that are increasingly changing how people access and use money in Nigeria.
Millions of Nigerians are increasingly relying on fintech platforms for payments, microloans, and everyday financial transactions. One of the advantages it offers is that these services often deliver faster and more user-friendly experiences than traditional banks. While innovation is welcome, it raises important questions about the future structure of financial intermediation.
The point here is that the moment traditional banks retreat from retail banking while fintech platforms dominate customer interactions, systemic liquidity and regulatory oversight could become fragmented.
The CBN must see to it that the recapitalised banks must therefore invest aggressively in digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and customer experience, while cutting down costs on all less critical areas in the industry.
Nigerians should feel the benefits of recapitalisation not only in stronger balance sheets but also in faster apps, reliable payment systems, and responsive customer service.
As banks grow larger through recapitalisation and consolidation, a new challenge emerges via systemic concentration.
Nigeria’s largest banks already control a significant share of industry assets. Further consolidation could deepen the divide between dominant institutions and smaller players. This creates the risk of “too-big-to-fail” banks whose collapse could threaten the entire financial system.
To address this risk, regulators must strengthen resolution frameworks that allow distressed banks to fail without triggering systemic panic, their collapse does not damage the whole financial system, and do not require taxpayer-funded bailouts to forestall similar mistakes that occurred with the liquidation of Heritage Bank. Market discipline depends on credible failure mechanisms.
It must be understood that Nigeria’s banking recapitalisation is not merely a financial exercise or, better still, increasing banks’ capital. It is a rare opportunity to rebuild trust, strengthen governance, and reposition the financial system as a true engine of economic development.
One fact is that if the reform focuses only on capital numbers, the country risks repeating a familiar pattern of churning out impressive balance sheets followed by another cycle of crisis.
But the actors in this exercise must ensure that the recapitalisation addresses governance failures, asset quality concerns, risk management weaknesses, and transparency gaps; and the moment this is done, the banking sector could emerge stronger and more resilient.
Nigeria does not simply need bigger banks. It needs better banks, institutions capable of financing innovation, supporting entrepreneurs, and building economic opportunity for millions of citizens.
The true capital of any banking system is not just money. It is trust. And whether this recapitalisation ultimately succeeds will depend on whether Nigerians see that trust reflected not only in financial statements but in the everyday experience of saving, borrowing, and investing in the economy. Only then will bigger banks translate into a stronger nation.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
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