World
Impact of African Policies on Development of Infrastructure Projects, Emergence of Debt-Trap and Neo-Colonialism
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
In this interview taken by Kester Kenn Klomegah for Eurasia Review, Dr. Frangton Chiyemura, a lecturer in International Development at the School of Social Sciences and Global Studies, The Open University in the United Kingdom, discusses the impact of African policies on development and realization of infrastructure projects, the possible of running into “debt-traps” and the emergence of “neo-colonialism” in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
Early December, you held discussions and shared your research on how African leaders influence the modality of engagement and negotiation process with China. What were the key points you discussed with the audience and participants who attended?
First of all, I was invited to share my research findings with Oxford University China-Africa Network (OUCAN). OUCAN engages with researchers, think tanks, policy makers involved in Africa-China relations. My talk was part of this initiative to share research and evidence-based findings and conclusions on Africa-China relations.
My talk was based on my completed PhD research project where I investigated how the Ethiopian government exercised agency – defined as the ability to shape, control and influence, when engaging with the Chinese in the context of wind energy infrastructure. The key point was that the Ethiopian government was able to broker, negotiate, structure, implement and manage Chinese involvement in Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind farms.
The audience was quite engaging and wondered how the Ethiopian government was able to exercise agency as compared to other African governments dealing with the Chinese. There are several factors which make Ethiopia to have such clout when dealing with the Chinese as compared to other African countries. Such factors are not only limited to the governance and leadership model of the government especially under Meles Zenawi and Hailermariam.
Secondly, it relates to the geographic location of Ethiopia, which makes it a stabilising force in volatile East African region. Ethiopia, has a unique advantage, as it is the diplomatic hub of Africa – hosting the African Union (AU) and other international organizations. This adds weight to Ethiopia when negotiating with external powers.
What are the general perceptions and attitudes toward this kind of relations? How do the political and business elites, interpret the benefits of determining concrete directions of investment in Africa?
Both Ethiopian and Chinese governments see the relations as win-win. This comes at the backdrop of strong relations at the political party to party level. In the case of my research I conducted, I can confirm that the Chinese Communist Party has very strong relations with the then Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. In fact, during my research, I found out that the corporate deals are informally negotiated at the party to party level before they are transferred to the government level for formalization. There seems to be a seamless connection between the ruling party and the government, and any decisions reached at the party level are by extension seamlessly binding on the government.
How would you explain neo-colonialism by foreign players in Africa? What is it and what foreign (external) countries are referred to as neo-colonisers, in your view?
Neocolonialism argument is present in Africa-China relations especially proposed so by scholars who come from a neo-Marxian epistemological grounding. Neocolonialism can be seen as a new form of domination, plunder and exploitation using clandestine and economic statecraft. Of course, there could be some hints or pointers to suggest neocolonial tendencies, but I believe such claims should be levelled on case by case basis, and there has to be concrete evidence to suggest that way. That said, I think we have to be careful to scrutinize where such claims of neocolonialism are coming from, and potentially scrap beyond the surface to establish the motivations and interests for spreading or proposing such claims.
In my opinion, I believe there is no free lunch in the world, African countries should enter into partnerships based on their strategic interests and an understanding of what the partners can provide or deliver. Secondly, every African country should do a comprehensive evaluation of the structure and, the terms and conditions of their engagements with foreign powers. By so doing, this will eliminate the chances for the emergence of claims of neocolonialism. Instead of extending the blame to someone elsewhere, Africa needs to do its homework especially on the implementation and monitoring aspects of the deals. Africa has some of the best regulations and standards, but the problem lies in implementation and monitoring.
Without doubt, Africa needs investment in infrastructure, agriculture and industry, and in many other sectors. Despite negative criticisms, what admirable roles is China playing here, we are talking about working towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Africa?
China is playing a huge role in infrastructure financing and development. For example, available evidence suggests that between 2000 and 2017, China provided about US$143 billion worthy of loans to African governments. This has come quite handy especially given the shortage of finance to build the much-needed infrastructure targeting the SDGs.
In terms of trade, China became Africa’s trading partner in 2009, and two-way trade volume reached its peak in 2014 at the value of US$215 billion. Further, in 2017, it was estimated to have reached about US$148 billion. Of course, trade transactions still remain unbalanced in favour of China. In addition, between 2000 and 2017, transport (US$38.1 billion), power (US$30.1 billion) and mining (US$19.1 billion) ranked respectively as top three sectors that have received the lion’s share of Chinese loans in Africa.
What is your interpretation of debt-trap most often discussed in various platforms and leveled accusations on China? But tangible infrastructure have been built with these loans in many African countries
Interestingly, I don’t believe in this debt-trap diplomacy. First of all, it does not make any business sense that the Chinese will design a project targeting ‘failure’ so that they can control or pull the strings of a particular country. Second, most of the so-called assets that the Chinese are poised to be targeting to run are very complicated, messy and at times quite straining for the Chinese to dirty their hands. Therefore, it doesn’t make any sense for me.
That said, I would not refer to it as ‘trap’ but as merely debt and the consequences associated with that. What that implies is that, for example, in the power sector, African requires on average more than 5 billion worth of investment per year for the next 10 years to address this challenge. Inevitably, part of the money will come from debt financing. For me, I am not really worried about ‘productive debt’ – defined as any money borrowed to invest in a project that has the ability to boost economic growth and at the same time, generate a revenue stream that will pay back the loan. I would be worried about countries that borrow to build, say, a presidential palace, a stadium, or to pay salaries. That type of borrowing for me is bad – its destructive and unproductive borrowing, and that must necessarily stop.
I have to disagree with the assertion that China is debt-trapping Africa. Of course, there are some African countries that are in debt distress situation, others have high risk of being in distress, but the contributions of Chinese finances towards that leave much to be desired. For example, countries such as Chad, Sao Tome and Principle, South Sudan are in high debt distress but the contributions of the Chinese towards that is very insignificant.
We also have some countries like Ethiopia, Cameroon and Ghana where the Chinese hold a substantial share of the debt, but those countries are not in debt distress, although they are high risk of debt distress. You will be surprised that according to World Bank, Africa’s debt to China is less than 23%, compared to what Africa owes to private lenders (32%), and multilateral institutions such as World Bank, IMF etc. (35%). Sometimes, I see the hypocrisy of the West – with whom Africa has substantial debt, demonizing the Chinese on debt-trap diplomacy.
In your expert view, what are the key challenges and problems facing Chinese investors in Africa, what are your suggestions how some aspects of the relations be improved between Africa and China?
Of course, like any other relations, Africa-China engagements have their own challenges which need to be worked on to ensure there is mutual benefit and win-win situation. Some of the challenges relate implementation of regulations and standards by African governments when dealing with the Chinese. The issues lie not in regulations, but for me in the implementation and enforcement. This is the first aspect that needs to be addressed by African governments, especially in the infrastructure sector.
The second challenge relates to peace and security. Some of the African countries are in conflict situation or are, at least, under terrorist threat. This threatens some of the Chinese businesses and enterprises.
Third, the unbalanced nature of trade between China and Africa create room for emergence of neo-colonial arguments and such needs to be addressed immediately. Some of the challenges are minor, these include language barriers, differences in culture and work ethics. These can easily be resolved.
The fourth and final is about in some African countries lack policy certainty and stability which negatively impact on Chinese long-term business planning. Such countries include Zimbabwe where there has been of note currency uncertainty, policy uncertainty and even regulatory uncertainty. This impacts on long-term Chinese business interest.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
After the expiration of bilateral agreement on trade, the US Congress as well as African leaders, highly recognizing its significance, has been pursuing the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The agreement, which allows duty-free access to American markets for African exporters, expired on September 30, 2025.
The US Congress is advancing a bill to revive and extend AGOA, but South Africa’s continued inclusion remains uncertain. The trade pact still has strong bipartisan support, with the House Ways and Means Committee approving it 37-3. However, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, raised concerns about South Africa, citing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and said the administration could consider excluding the country.
This threat puts at risk the duty-free access that has significantly benefited South African automotive, agricultural, and wine exports. The debate highlights how trade policy is becoming entangled with broader diplomatic tensions, casting uncertainty over a key pillar of US-Africa economic relations.
Nevertheless, South Africa continues to lobby for inclusion. South Africa trade summary records show that the US goods and services trade with South Africa estimated at $26.2 billion in 2024. The US and South Africa signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as far back as in 2012.
The duty-free access for nearly 40 African countries has boosted development and fostered more equitable and sustainable growth in Africa. By design AGOA is a useful mechanism for improving accessibility to trade competitiveness, connectivity, and productivity. During these past 25 years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key features and benefits of AGOA:
It’s worth reiterating here that during these past several years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, as AGOA is closely working with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and with the African Union (AU), trade professionals could primarily leverage various economic sectors and unwaveringly act as bridges between the United States and Africa.
* Duty-free Access: AGOA allows eligible products from sub-Saharan African countries to enter the US market without paying tariffs.
* Promotion of Economic Growth: The program encourages economic growth by providing incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets.
* Encouraging Economic Reforms: AGOA encourages economic and political reforms in eligible countries, including the rule of law and market-oriented policies.
* Increased Trade and Investment: The program aims to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.
With the changing times, Africa is also building its muscles towards a new direction since the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was officially launched in July 2019.
In practical terms, trading under the AfCFTA commenced in January 2021. And the United States has prioritized the AfCFTA as one mechanism through which to strengthen its long-term relations with the continent. In the context of the crucial geopolitical changes, African leaders, corporate executives, and the entire business community are optimistic over the extension of AGOA, for mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the United States.
Worthy to say that AGOA, to a considerable degree, as a significant trade policy has played a crucial role in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa stands at the cusp of a transformative digital revolution. With the expansion of mobile connectivity, internet penetration, digital platforms, and financial technology, the continent’s digital economy is poised to become a significant driver of sustainable development, intra-Africa trade, job creation, and economic inclusion.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 1 (a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development), highlights the importance of leveraging technology and innovation. The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has opened a new chapter in market integration, creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of the digital economy across all sectors.
Despite remarkable progress, challenges persist. These include limited digital infrastructure, disparities in digital literacy, fragmented regulatory frameworks, inadequate access to financing for tech-based enterprises, and gender gaps in digital participation. Moreover, Africa must assert its digital sovereignty, build local data ecosystems, and secure cyber-infrastructure to thrive in a rapidly changing global digital landscape.
Against this backdrop, the 16th African Union Private Sector Forum provides a timely platform to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s digital economy to accelerate intra-Africa trade and sustainable development.
The 16th High-Level AU Private Sector forum is set to take place in Djibouti, from the 14 to 16 December 2025, under the theme “Harnessing Africa’s Digital Economy and Innovation for Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development”
The three-day Forum will feature high-level plenaries, expert panels, breakout sessions, and networking opportunities. Each day will spotlight a core pillar of Africa’s digital transformation journey.
Day 1: Digital Economy and Trade Integration in Africa
Focus: Leveraging digital platforms and technologies to enhance trade integration and competitiveness under AfCFTA.
Day 2: Innovation, Fintech, and the Future of African Economies
Focus: Driving economic inclusion through fintech, innovation ecosystems, and youth entrepreneurship.
Day 3: Building Policy, Regulatory Frameworks, and Partnerships for Digital Growth
Focus: Creating an enabling environment for digital innovation and infrastructure through effective policy, governance, and partnerships.
To foster strategic dialogue and action-oriented collaboration among key stakeholders in Africa’s digital ecosystem, with the goal of leveraging digital economy and innovation to boost intra-Africa trade, accelerate economic transformation, and support inclusive, sustainable development.
* Promote Digital Trade: Identify mechanisms and policy actions to enable seamless cross-border digital commerce and integration under AfCFTA.
* Foster Innovation and Fintech: Advance inclusive fintech ecosystems and support innovation-driven entrepreneurship, especially among youth and women.
* Policy and Regulatory Harmonization: Build consensus on regional and continental digital regulatory frameworks to foster trust, security, and interoperability.
* Encourage Investment and Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthen collaboration between governments, private sector, and development partners to invest in digital infrastructure, R&D, and skills development.
* Advance Digital Inclusion and Sustainability: Ensure that digital transformation contributes to environmental sustainability and the empowerment of marginalized communities.
The AU Private Sector Forum has held several forums, with key recommendations. These recommendations provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the African private sector and offer guidance for policymakers on how to support its growth and development.
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