Feature/OPED
Angola’s Story of Politically Exposed Persons and Debt Traps
By Fadi A. Haddadin
In its financing attempts that brought the resource-rich country to become indefinitely indebted for a long time, the Government of Angola sought a $15 billion loan from China (one of many) last May. Just as this latest round of financing commenced, Standard and Poors downgraded Angola’s sovereign credit rating to B- due to concerns about “the rising debt service costs and weak economic prospects.”
The latest move is part of another debt trap through which the new government uses oil-backed loans at high interest rates, yet financed through opaque and unaccountable offshore structures. This comes at a time when Angola’s banking sector is weak and some important state banks are undergoing restructuring processes; posing contingent risks to government.
Manuel Vicente has remained a ruthless fixture of Angolan politics for over three decades. Today, as the “most wanted by Portuguese authorities” and an advisor to Joao Lourenco (who almost made it to the Presidency), Vicente has been at the forefront of the landmark exploitation of the resource-rich Portuguese colony since his appointment as Chairman of Angola’s state oil company, Sonangol EP. By the time he left his position in 2012, Vicente had proudly created complex, personally profitable, and self-rewarding mechanisms to leverage the nation’s resources for the profit of a small cartel, spanning well-known illustrious names in Africa and the world, ranging from organized crime to Wall Street. He purposely transformed the looting which decimated the West African nation during its brutal civil war into the merciless leveraging of state assets under the guise of ‘development’ for over sixteen years (and still ongoing).
Under the leadership of Vicente, or as one would call it, “Politically Exposed Person” (PEP), Sonangol gained an unusual degree of autonomy. In the world of financial regulation, PEP is a term describing someone who has been entrusted with a prominent public function and presents a higher risk for potential involvement in bribery and corruption by virtue of his/her position and the influence held. Vicente successfully resisted efforts of government institutions, such as the Ministry of Petroleum and the National Bank of Angola (BNA), by curbing their power and oversight functions; simply through instilling watchdogs that he would reward handsomely.
As the civil war ended in 2002, Angola’s relationships with the IMF and the World Bank had deteriorated serendipitously, with a golden opportunity that coincided with Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s initiation of his grand “Look to the West” strategy. Chinese interests in Angola were particularly attractive to Vicente (with the development of his own sphere of influence) as the offered funds had far fewer transparency requirements to traditional Western lenders. In June 2004, China Sonangol Asia Limited was formed as the first public-private consortium to turn the new geopolitical paradigm into private profits. It was registered in Hong Kong and owned entirely by Lo Fong Hung, Wi Yang, and, naturally, Manuel Vicente, unbeknownst to the then leadership. In the weeks following China Sonangol’s incorporation, Vicente and the 88 Queensway Group incorporated nine subsidiaries of China Sonangol, with Pierson Asia acting as its primary financial consultant. The firm would help Vicente and his Chinese partners to create a complex network of financial subsidiaries to extract, divert, and embezzle funds.
Vicente’s influence, along with Chinese capital, positioned these newly-created firms to dominate the finances of Angola and the majority of investments in the country through two small and nebulous companies: China International Fund Limited (responsible for US$2.9 billion in construction projects), and, China Sonangol International Holdings Limited (responsible for the energy sector—notably obtaining three oil blocks and establishing a joint venture with Sinopec for oil exploration in Angola).
The vehicles for the embezzlement of such funds are the product of an idea developed in the 1990s, known as “prime bank schemes,” through which Vicente and his son would set up pop-up corporations for the collection and transfer of assets. The same entities would be used for the purchase of more than US$300 million in U.S. treasury bills on behalf of Angola’s national bank, Banco Angolano de Investimentos (BAI)—formerly Banco Africano de Investimentos—and enjoyed absolute authority to manage major portions of BNA’s funds under the direct, repeated permissions of the then-governor of Angola’s central bank, Aguinaldo Jaime (1998-2002). Jaime, in his capacity as governor, signed a “letter of authority” informing HSBC that BNA “will supply, on behalf of the Angolan Government, a US$50 million treasury bill to be used as a collateral by MSA Inc” to raise funds for Angolan ‘development projects.’ Another example of the prime bank scheme was the creation of the sister bank, HSBC Equator Bank plc in 2006—nothing to do with the HSBC that we all know—which earned in excess of US$80 million from revolving short-term trade finance lines, serviced by an assignment of oil proceeds afforded through a nebulous relationship with BAI.
The central paradox for the people of Angola is the calculus of BAI in taking on such unfavourable terms and failing to execute its fiduciary duty. This paradox is resolved when we consider the true nature and ownership of BAI, which is in fact a private bank. As per a U.S. Senate Committee investigation, in March 16, 2006, HSBC received a list of BAI’s shareholders, which included three private corporations, each of which would turn out to be a special purpose shell corporation: Arcinella Assets, Sforza Properties, and Dabas Management. BAI currently has assets with a total value of over US$7.6 billion which alerted and instigated the investigation. And following the implementation of the Patriot Act, HSBC expended its efforts to determine the true owners of BAI. The subsequent disclosure, under the PEP/anti-money laundering (AML) protection, revealed that the beneficial owner of Dabas Management is Jose Paiva (former board director of Sonangol) and the beneficial owner of the shell company, called ABL, is Manuel Vicente (PEP from 1999-2012). Today, each personally owns 5% of BAI through these special purpose corporations.
Angola continued to have weak AML controls and an ongoing corruption problem. The above history shows how an Angolan PEP (like Manuel Vicente), an Angolan government official (like Aguinaldo Jaime), and an Angolan financial institution (like BAI) have used global banks to gain access to the financial system, often bypassing AML and PEP safeguards. It shows how politically powerful officials, their relatives, and close associates (referred to in international agreements as PEPs) can use the services of global professionals and financial institutions to bring large amounts of suspect funds into different jurisdictions to advance their interests. It also clarifies the need for strengthening PEP controls to prevent such corrupt figures from concealing, protecting, and utilizing their ill-gotten gains; corroding the rule of law, national economic development, and democratic principles. U.S. and EU institutions should consult with foreign officials, international organizations, financial regulators, and experts in AML and anti-corruption efforts in order to expose some of the tactics being used by PEPs and their facilitators.
Feature/OPED
Why Creativity is the New Infrastructure for Challenging the Social Order
By Professor Myriam Sidíbe
Awards season this year was a celebration of Black creativity and cinema. Sinners directed by Ryan Coogler, garnered a historic 16 nominations, ultimately winning four Oscars. This is a film critics said would never land, which narrates an episode of Black history that had previously been diminished and, at some points, erased.
Watching the celebration of this film, following a legacy of storytelling dominated by the global north and leading to protests like #OscarsSoWhite, I felt a shift. A movement, growing louder each day and nowhere more evident than on the African continent. Here, an energetic youth—representing one-quarter of the world’s population—are using creativity to renegotiate their relationship with the rest of the world and challenge the social norms affecting their communities.
The Academy Awards held last month saw African cinema represented in the International Feature Film category by entries including South Africa’s The Heart Is a Muscle, Morocco’s Calle Málaga, Egypt’s Happy Birthday, Senegal’s Demba, and Tunisia’s The Voice of Hind Rajab.
Despite its subject matter, Wanuri Kahiu’s Rafiki, broke the silence and secrecy around LGBTQ love stories. In Kenya, where same sex relationships are illegal and loudly abhorred, Rafiki played to sold-out cinemas in the country’s capital, Nairobi, showing an appetite for home-grown creative content that challenges the status quo.
This was well exemplified at this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos when alcoholic beverages firm, AB InBev convened a group of creative changemakers and unlikely allies from the private sector to explore new ways to collaborate and apply creativity to issues of social justice and the environment.
In South Africa, AB inBev promotes moderation and addresses alcohol-related gender-based violence by partnering with filmmakers to create content depicting positive behaviours around alcohol. This strategy is revolutionising the way brands create social value and serve society.
For brands, the African creative economy represents a significant opportunity. By 2030, 10 per cent of global creative goods are predicted to come from Africa. By 2050, one in four people globally will be African, and one in three of the world’s youth will be from the continent.
Valued at over USD4 trillion globally (with significant growth in Africa), these industries—spanning music, film, fashion, and digital arts—offer vital opportunities for youth, surpassing traditional sectors in youth engagement.
Already, cultural and creative industries employ more 19–29-year-olds than any other sector globally. This collection of allies in Davos understood that “business as usual” is not enough to succeed in Africa; it must be on terms set by young African creatives with societal and economic benefits.
The key question for brands is: how do we work together to harness and support this potential? The answer is simple. Brands need courage to invest in possibilities where others see risk; wisdom to partner with those others overlook; and finally, tenacity – to match an African youth that is not waiting but forging its own path.
As the energy of the creative sector continues to gain momentum, I am left wondering: which brands will be smart enough to get involved in our movement, and who has what it takes to thrive in this new world?
Professor Sidíbe, who lives in Nairobi, is the Chief Mission Officer of Brands on a Mission and Author of Brands on a Mission: How to Achieve Social Impact and Business Growth Through Purpose.
Feature/OPED
Why President Tinubu Must End Retirement Age Disparity Between Medical and Veterinary Doctors Now
By James Ezema
To argue that Nigeria cannot afford policy inconsistencies that weaken its already fragile public health architecture is not an exaggeration. The current disparity in retirement age between medical doctors and veterinary professionals is one such inconsistency—one that demands urgent correction, not bureaucratic delay.
The Federal Government’s decision to approve a 65-year retirement age for selected health professionals was, in principle, commendable. It acknowledged the need to retain scarce expertise within a critical sector. However, by excluding veterinary doctors and veterinary para-professionals—whether explicitly or by omission—the policy has created a dangerous gap that undermines both equity and national health security.
This is not merely a professional grievance; it is a structural flaw with far-reaching consequences.
At the heart of the issue lies a contradiction the government cannot ignore. For decades, Nigeria has maintained a parity framework that places medical and veterinary doctors on equivalent footing in terms of salary structures and conditions of service. The Consolidated Medical Salary Structure (CONMESS) framework recognizes both professions as integral components of the broader health ecosystem. Yet, when it comes to retirement policy, that parity has been abruptly set aside.
This inconsistency is indefensible.
Veterinary professionals are not peripheral actors in the health sector—they are central to it. In an era defined by zoonotic threats, where the majority of emerging infectious diseases originate from animals, excluding veterinarians from extended service retention is not only unfair but strategically reckless.
Nigeria has formally embraced the One Health approach, which integrates human, animal, and environmental health systems. But policy must align with principle. It is contradictory to adopt One Health in theory while sidelining a core component of that framework in practice.
Veterinarians are at the frontline of disease surveillance, outbreak prevention, and biosecurity. They play critical roles in managing threats such as anthrax, rabies, avian influenza, Lassa fever, and other zoonotic diseases that pose direct risks to human populations. Their contribution to safeguarding the nation’s livestock—estimated in the hundreds of millions—is equally vital to food security and economic stability.
Yet, at a time when their relevance has never been greater, policy is forcing them out prematurely.
The workforce realities make this situation even more alarming. Nigeria is already grappling with a severe shortage of veterinary professionals. In some states, only a handful of veterinarians are available, while several local government areas have no veterinary presence at all. Compelling experienced professionals to retire at 60, while their medical counterparts remain in service until 65, will only deepen this crisis.
This is not a theoretical concern—it is an imminent risk.
The case for inclusion has already been made, clearly and responsibly, by the Nigerian Veterinary Medical Association and the Federal Ministry of Livestock Development. Their position is grounded in logic, policy precedent, and national interest. They are not seeking special treatment; they are demanding consistency.
The current circular, which limits the 65-year retirement age to clinical professionals in Federal Tertiary Hospitals and excludes those in mainstream civil service structures, is both administratively narrow and strategically flawed. It fails to account for the unique institutional placement of veterinary professionals, who operate largely outside hospital settings but are no less critical to national health outcomes.
Policy must reflect function, not merely location.
This is where decisive leadership becomes imperative. The responsibility now rests squarely with Bola Ahmed Tinubu to address this imbalance and restore coherence to Nigeria’s health and civil service policies.
A clear directive from the President to the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation can correct this anomaly. Such a directive should ensure that veterinary doctors and veterinary para-professionals are fully integrated into the 65-year retirement framework, in line with existing parity policies and the realities of modern public health.
Anything less would signal a troubling disregard for a sector that plays a quiet but indispensable role in national stability.
This is not just about fairness—it is about foresight. Public health security is interconnected, and weakening one component inevitably weakens the entire system.
Nigeria stands at a critical juncture, confronted by complex health, food security, and economic challenges. Retaining experienced veterinary professionals is not optional; it is essential.
The disparity must end—and it must end now.
Comrade James Ezema is a journalist, political strategist, and public affairs analyst. He is the National President of the Association of Bloggers and Journalists Against Fake News (ABJFN), National Vice-President (Investigation) of the Nigerian Guild of Investigative Journalists (NGIJ), and President/National Coordinator of the Not Too Young To Perform (NTYTP), a national leadership development advocacy group. He can be reached via email: [email protected] or WhatsApp: +234 8035823617.
Feature/OPED
N4.65 trillion in the Vault, but is the Real Economy Locked Out?
By Blaise Udunze
Following the successful conclusion of the banking sector recapitalisation programme initiated in March 2024 by the Central Bank of Nigeria, the industry has raised N4.65 trillion. No doubt, this marks a significant milestone for the nation’s financial system as the exercise attracted both domestic and foreign investors, strengthened capital buffers, and reinforced regulatory confidence in the banking sector. By all prudential measures, once again, it will be said without doubt that it is a success story.
Looking at this feat closely and when weighed more critically, a more consequential question emerges, one that will ultimately determine whether this achievement becomes a genuine turning point or merely another financial milestone. Will a stronger banking sector finally translate into a more productive Nigerian economy, or will it be locked out?
This question sits at the heart of Nigeria’s long-standing economic contradiction, seeing a relatively sophisticated financial system coexisting with weak industrial output, low productivity, and persistent dependence on imports truly reflects an ironic situation. The fact remains that recapitalisation, by design, is meant to strengthen banks, enhancing their ability to absorb shocks, manage risks and support economic growth. According to the apex bank, the programme has improved capital adequacy ratios, enhanced asset quality, and reinforced financial stability. Under the leadership of Olayemi Cardoso, there has also been a shift toward stricter risk-based supervision and a phased exit from regulatory forbearance.
These are necessary reforms. A stable banking system is a prerequisite for economic development. However, the truth be told, stability alone is not sufficient because the real test of recapitalisation lies not in stronger balance sheets, but in how effectively banks channel capital into productive economic activity, sectors that create jobs, expand output and drive exports. Without this transition, recapitalisation risks becoming an exercise in financial strengthening without economic transformation.
Encouragingly, early signals from industry experts suggest that the next phase of banking reform may begin to address this long-standing gap. Analysts and practitioners are increasingly pointing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as a key destination for recapitalisation inflows, which is a fact beyond doubt. Given that SMEs account for over 70 per cent of registered businesses in Nigeria, the logic is compelling. With great expectation, as has been practicalised and established in other economies, a shift in credit allocation toward this segment could unlock job creation, stimulate domestic production, and deepen economic resilience. Yet, this expectation must be balanced with reality. Historically, and of huge concern, SMEs have received only a marginal share of total bank credit, often due to perceived risk, lack of collateral, and weak credit infrastructure.
Indeed, Nigeria’s broader financial intermediation challenge remains stark. Even as the giant of Africa, private sector credit stands at roughly 17 per cent of GDP, and this is far below the sub-Saharan African average, while SMEs receive barely 1 per cent of total bank lending despite contributing about half of GDP and the vast majority of employment. These figures underscore the structural disconnect between the banking system and the real economy. Recapitalisation, therefore, must be judged not only by the strength of banks but by whether it meaningfully improves this imbalance.
Nigeria’s economic challenge is not merely one of capital scarcity; it is fundamentally a problem of low productivity. Manufacturing continues to operate far below capacity, agriculture remains largely subsistence-driven, and industrial output contributes only modestly to GDP. Despite decades of banking sector expansion, credit to the real sector has remained limited relative to the size of the economy. Instead, banks have often gravitated toward safer and more profitable avenues such as government securities, treasury instruments, and short-term trading opportunities.
This is not irrational. It reflects a rational response to risk, policy signals, and market realities. However, it has created a structural imbalance in which capital circulates within the financial system without sufficiently reaching the productive economy. The result is a pattern where financial sector growth outpaces real sector development, a phenomenon widely described as financialisation without productivity gains.
At the centre of this challenge is the issue of credit allocation. A recapitalised banking sector, strengthened by new capital and improved buffers, should theoretically expand lending. But this is, contrarily, because the more important question is where that lending will go. Will Nigerian banks extend long-term credit to manufacturers, finance agro-processing and value chains, and support scalable SMEs, or will they continue to concentrate on low-risk government debt, prioritise foreign exchange-related gains, and maintain conservative lending practices in the face of macroeconomic uncertainty? Some of these structural questions call for immediate answers from policymakers.
Some industry voices are optimistic that the expanded capital base will translate into a broader loan book, increased investment in higher-risk sectors, and improved product offerings for depositors; this is not in doubt. There are also expectations that banks will scale operations across the continent, leveraging stronger balance sheets to expand their regional footprint. Yes, they are expected, but one thing that must be made known is that optimism alone does not guarantee transformation. The fact is that without deliberate incentives and structural reforms, capital may continue to flow toward low-risk assets rather than high-impact sectors.
Beyond lending, experts are also calling for a shift in how banking success is measured. The next phase of reform, according to the experts in their arguments, must move from capital thresholds to customer outcomes. This includes stronger consumer protection frameworks, real-time complaint management systems and more transparent regulatory oversight. A more technologically driven supervisory model, one that allows regulators to monitor customer experiences and detect systemic risks early, could play a critical role in strengthening trust and accountability within the system.
This dimension is often overlooked but deeply significant. A banking system that is well-capitalised but unresponsive to customer needs risks undermining public confidence. True financial development is not only about capital strength but also about accessibility, fairness, and service quality. Nigerians must feel the impact of recapitalisation not just in improved financial ratios, but in better banking experiences, more inclusive services, and greater economic opportunity.
The recapitalisation exercise has also attracted notable foreign participation, signalling confidence in Nigeria’s banking sector. However, confidence in banks does not necessarily translate into confidence in the broader economy. The truth is that foreign investors are typically drawn to strong regulatory frameworks, attractive returns, and market liquidity, though the facts are that these factors make Nigerian banks appealing financial assets; it must be made explicitly clear that they do not automatically reflect confidence in the country’s industrial base or productivity potential.
This distinction is critical. An economy can attract capital into its financial sector while still struggling to attract investment into productive sectors. When this happens, growth becomes financially driven rather than fundamentally anchored. The risk, therefore, is that recapitalisation could deepen Nigeria’s financial markets, but what benefits or gains when banks become stronger or liquid without addressing the structural weaknesses of the real economy.
It is clear and explicit that the current policy direction of the CBN reflects a strong emphasis on stability, with tightened supervision, improved transparency, and stricter prudential standards. These measures are necessary, particularly in a volatile global environment. However, there is an emerging concern that stability may be taking precedence over growth stimulation, which should also be a focal point for every economy, of which Nigeria should not be left out of the equation. Central banks in emerging markets often face a delicate balancing act, and this is putting too much focus on stability, which can constrain credit expansion, while too much emphasis on growth can undermine financial discipline, as this calls for a balance.
In Nigeria’s case, the question is whether sufficient mechanisms exist to align banking sector incentives with national productivity goals. Are there enough incentives to encourage long-term lending, sector-specific financing, and innovation in credit delivery? Or does the current framework inadvertently reward risk aversion and short-term profitability?
Over the past two decades, it has been a herculean experience as Nigeria’s economic trajectory suggests a growing disconnect between the financial sector and the real economy. Banks have become larger, more sophisticated and more profitable, yet the irony is that the broader economy continues to struggle with high unemployment, low industrial output, and limited export diversification. This divergence reflects the structural risk of financialization, a condition in which financial activities expand without a corresponding increase in real economic productivity.
If not carefully managed, recapitalisation could reinforce this trend. With more capital at their disposal, banks may simply scale existing business models, expanding financial activities that generate returns without contributing meaningfully to production. The point is that this is not solely a failure of the banking sector; it is a systemic issue shaped by policy design, regulatory priorities, and market incentives, which needs the urgent attention of policymakers.
Meanwhile, for recapitalisation to achieve its intended purpose and truly work, it must be accompanied by a deliberate shift or intentional policy change from capital accumulation to productivity enhancement and the economy to produce more goods and services efficiently. This begins with creating stronger incentives for real sector lending with differentiated capital requirements based on sector exposure, credit guarantees for high-impact industries, and interest rate support for priority sectors, which can encourage banks to channel funds into productive areas, and this must be driven and implemented by the apex bank to harness the gains of recapitalisation.
This transformative process is not only saddled with the CBN, but the Development finance institutions also have a critical role to play in de-risking long-term investments, making it easier for commercial banks to participate in financing projects that drive economic growth. At the same time, one of the missing pieces that must be taken into cognisance is that regulatory frameworks should discourage excessive concentration in risk-free assets. No doubt, banks thrive in profitability, as government securities remain important; overreliance on them can crowd out private sector credit and limit economic expansion.
Innovation in financial products is equally essential. Traditional lending models often fail to meet the needs of SMEs and emerging industries, as this has continued to hinder growth. Banks must explore new approaches, including digital lending platforms, supply chain financing, and blended finance solutions that can unlock new growth opportunities, while they extend their tentacles by saturating the retail space just like fintech.
Accountability must also be embedded in the system. One fact is that if recapitalisation is justified as a tool for economic growth, then its outcomes and gains must be measurable and not obscure. Increased credit to productive sectors, higher industrial output and job creation should serve as key indicators of success. Without such metrics, the exercise risks being judged solely by financial indicators rather than its real economic impact.
The completion of the recapitalisation programme represents more than a regulatory achievement; it is a defining moment for Nigeria’s economic future. The country now has a banking sector that is better capitalised, more resilient, and more attractive to investors. These are important gains, but they are not ends in themselves.
The ultimate objective is to build an economy that is productive, diversified, and inclusive. Achieving this requires more than strong banks; it requires banks that actively power economic transformation.
The N4.65 trillion recapitalisation is a significant step forward. It strengthens the foundation of Nigeria’s financial system and enhances its capacity to support growth. However, capacity alone is not enough and truly not enough if the gains of recapitalisation are to be harnessed to the latter. What matters now is how that capacity is deployed.
Some of the critical questions for urgent attention are as follows: Will banks rise to the challenge of financing Nigeria’s productive sectors, particularly SMEs that form the backbone of the economy? Will policymakers create the right incentives to ensure credit flows where it is most needed? Will the financial system evolve from a focus on profitability to a broader commitment to the economic purpose of fostering a more productive Nigerian economy and the $1 trillion target?
The above questions are relevant because they will determine whether recapitalisation becomes a catalyst for change or a missed opportunity if not taken into cognisance. A well-capitalised banking sector is not the destination; it is the starting point. The real journey lies in building an economy where capital works, productivity rises, and growth becomes both sustainable and inclusive.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
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