World
Digitisation Will Transform Competition Law in Africa—Report
Digitisation has ushered in an era of hyper-connectivity, marked by disruptive digital platforms that operate on a global scale.
A recent Baker McKenzie report, Competition in the Digital Economy: An African Perspective, shows that, in Africa, this dynamic evolution of markets presents an opportunity for competition regulators to drive structural transformation and development.
To effectively achieve this, though, competition authorities need to balance the importance of upholding the regulatory process with the promotion of innovation and investment.
Lerisha Naidu, Partner and Head of the Competition & Antirust Practice Group at Baker McKenzie in Johannesburg, explains that digital markets are characterised by, among other things, multi-sided platforms, large returns to scale and complex network effects.
As a result, competition authorities are increasingly presenting novel theories of anticompetitive harm, which, unlike those in the more traditional markets, are yet to be tested. In this regard, there a number of common themes related to merger control, abuse of dominance and cartel conduct that point to the nexus between competition regulation and the digital economy in Africa.
In the context of merger control, Naidu notes that competition regulators increasingly perceive that the digital sector has been prone to false negatives – that is, transactions that should have been prohibited or approved subject to conditions, were instead approved.
“Whether or not such perception is accurate is debatable, but it is definitively a contributing factor in the regulators’ appetite to amend various merger control principles insofar as digital markets are concerned,” notes Naidu.
For example, Naidu explains that market definition is becoming more intricate in the evolving digital era, especially in relation to so-called zero-price markets, where users of products or services do not pay money for their use, such as social networks.
“One of the emerging views by regulators is that because market boundaries are difficult to define, and change rapidly in the case of platform markets, less emphasis should be placed on market definition in the competition assessment, and more on the theories of harm and identification of anticompetitive strategies,” she says.
Naidu explains further that it is common for mergers to be notifiable and subject to evaluation only where the merging parties meet certain thresholds, usually in terms of turnover figures and asset values or market shares.
“An unexpected consequence of the use of financial thresholds is that mergers with meaningful effects in digital markets may, in certain circumstances, fall well below the prescribed monetary thresholds, with the result that market-altering transactions are able to escape competition law scrutiny.
“Compounding this concern is the threat of “merger creep”, where numerous small start-ups are acquired through transactions that may appear relatively inconsequential on an individual basis but, when considered collectively, have significant competition implications for the market,” she explains.
Naidu notes that competition authorities argue that the traditional financial threshold-based approach to merger notifiability may need to be reconsidered and, perhaps, replaced when it comes to transactions involving digital markets.
Angelo Tzarevski, a Senior Associate in Baker McKenzie’s Competition & Antitrust Practice in Johannesburg, explains that another key attribute of digital markets is the acquisition of small start-ups by large firms. Start-ups often need to be acquired to access the capital required to scale up, leading to procompetitive effects.
“Africa has the fastest-growing tech start-up ecosystem in the world – going forward, competition authorities will likely pay close attention to determining and distinguishing between procompetitive acquisitions intended to expand or improve product offerings from those that have the object of eliminating competition – also termed killer acquisitions,” he explains.
Competition authorities are also increasingly focussing on conduct that, if undertaken by dominant digital market players, may result in harm to competition.
“The issue is whether existing theories of harm apply to digital markets in all cases or whether new theories should be considered. It’s also not clear how certain abusive conduct arising in digital markets will be assessed,” he says.
Tzarevski notes that competition authorities have identified self-preferencing, the act of giving preference to your products or services over those of your rivals, as one example of potentially harmful conduct that may have the effect of entrenching dominance and excluding competitors.
Another example is the ability to acquire, process and analyse large volumes of data, which could enable dominant firms to exploit user data to exclude rivals. Regulators are increasingly arguing that, to remedy this concern, large data owners should be forced to share it with competitors.
Tzarevski, however, notes that there are several difficulties associated with treating data as “essential” and forcing data owners to share it with competitors.
“Data is ubiquitous, replicable and varies in its value and usefulness. It cannot be guaranteed that the data held by one entity is essential for the market participation of another entity. Moreover, placing an onerous obligation on data-rich firms to share data may also enable competitors to reverse-engineer proprietary algorithms and, in so doing, encourage free riding.
“Ultimately, this will deter investment in large-scale data-collection and innovation into data-driven platforms. Obligations to transfer data to competitors may also give rise to data privacy concerns,” he explains.
Naidu notes further that with digital innovation opening up the economy to many individuals and businesses that were, until recently, excluded from meaningful economic participation, it is also likely that public interest imperatives will play a crucial role in the development and implementation of competition law in the digital space in Africa.
“Governments around the world have decisively shifted away from the purely economics-based origins of competition regulation, turning instead towards a model that acknowledges and, to an extent, caters to the broader needs of modern society,” she adds.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite geopolitical complexities, tensions and pressure, Russia’s military arms and weaponry sales earned approximately $15 billion at the closure of 2025, according to Kremlin report. At the regular session, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Jan. 30, the Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries analyzed the results of its work for 2025, and defined plans for the future.
It was noted that the system of military-technical cooperation continued to operate in difficult conditions, and with increased pressure from the Western countries to block business relations with Russia. The meeting, however, admitted that export contracts have generally performed sustainably. Russian military products were exported to more than 30 countries last year, and the amount of foreign exchange exceeded $15 billion.
Such results provide an additional opportunity to direct funds to the modernization of OPC enterprises, to the expansion of their production capacities, and to advanced research. It is also important that at these enterprises a significant volume of products is civilian products.
The Russian system of military-technical cooperation has not only demonstrated effectiveness and high resilience, but has created fundamental structures, which allow to significantly expand the “geography” of supplies of products of military purpose and, thus strengthen the position of Russia’s leader and employer advanced weapons systems – proven, tested in real combat conditions.
Thanks to the employees of the Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation and Rosoboronexport, the staff of OPC enterprises for their good faith. Within the framework of the new federal project “Development of military-technical cooperation of Russia with foreign countries” for the period 2026-2028, additional measures of support are introduced. Further effective use of existing financial and other support mechanisms and instruments is extremely important because the volumes of military exports in accordance with the 2026 plan.
Special attention would be paid to the expansion of military-technological cooperation and partnerships, with 14 states already implementing or in development more than 340 such projects.
Future plans will allow to improve the characteristics of existing weapons and equipment and to develop new promising models, including those in demand on global markets, among other issues – the development of strategic areas of military-technical cooperation, and above all, with partners on the CIS and the CSTO. This is one of the priority tasks to strengthen both bilateral and multilateral relations, ensuring stability and security in Eurasia.
From January 2026, Russia chairs the CSTO, and this requires working systematically with partners, including comprehensive approaches to expanding military-technical relations. New prospects open up for deepening military-technical cooperation and with countries in other regions, including with states on the African continent. Russia has been historically strong and trusting relationships with African countries. In different years even the USSR, and then Russia supplied African countries with a significant amount of weapons and military equipment, trained specialists on their production, operation, repair, as well as military personnel.
Today, despite pressure from the West, African partners express readiness to expand relations with Russia in the military and military-technical fields. It is not only about increasing supplies of Russian military exports, but also about the purchase of other weapons, other materials and products. Russia has undertaken comprehensive maintenance of previously delivered equipment, organization of licensed production of Russian military products and some other important issues. In general, African countries are sufficient for consideration today.
By Adedapo Adesanya
President Donald Trump has named Mr Kevin Warsh as the successor to Mr Jerome Powell as the Federal Reserve chair, ending a prolonged odyssey that has seen unprecedented turmoil around the central bank.
The decision culminates a process that officially began last summer but started much earlier than that, with President Trump launching a criticism against the Powell-led US central bank almost since he took the job in 2018.
“I have known Kevin for a long period of time, and have no doubt that he will go down as one of the GREAT Fed Chairmen, maybe the best,” Mr Trump said in a Truth Social post announcing the selection.
US analysts noted that the 55-year old appear not to ripple market because of his previous experience at the apex bank as Governor, with others saying he wouldn’t always do the bidding of the American president.
If approved by the US Senate, Mr Warsh will take over the position in May, when Mr Powell’s term expires.
Despite having argued for reductions recently, “Warsh has a long hawkish history that markets have not forgotten,” one analyst told Bloomberg.
President Trump has castigated Mr Powell for not lowering interest rates more quickly. His administration also launched a criminal investigation of Powell and the Federal Reserve earlier this month, which led Mr Powell to issue an extraordinary rebuke of President Trump’s efforts to politicize the independent central bank.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Donald Trump has been leading the United States as its president since January 2025. Washington’s priority is to Make America Great Again (MAGA). Trump’s tariffs have rippled many economies from Latin America through Asian region to the continent of Africa. Trump’s Davos speech has explicitly revealed building a ‘new world order’ based on dominance rather than trust. He has also initiated whirlwind steps to annex Greenland, while further created the Board of Peace, aimed at helping end the two-year war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and to oversee reconstruction. Trump is handling the three-year old Russia-Ukraine crisis, and other deep-seated religious and ethnic conflicts in Africa.
These emerging trends, at least in a considerable short term, are influencing BRICS which has increased its geopolitical importance, and focusing on uniting the countries in the Global East and Global South. From historical records, BRICS, described as non-western organization, and is loosing its coherence primarily due to differences in geopolitical interests and multinational alignments, and of course, a number of members face threats from the United States while there are variations of approach to the emerging worldwide perceptions.
In this conversation, deputy director of the Center for African Studies at Moscow’s National Research University High School of Economics (HSE), Vsevolod Sviridov, expresses his opinions focusing on BRICS agenda under India’s presidency, South Africa’s G20 chairmanship in 2024, and genegrally putting Africa’s development priorities within the context of emerging trends. Here are the interview excerpts:
What is the likely impact of Washington’s geopolitics and its foreign policy on BRICS?
From my perspective, the current Venezuela-U.S. confrontation, especially Washington’s tightened leverage over Venezuelan oil revenue flows and the knock-on effects for Chinese interests, will be read inside BRICS as a reminder that sovereign resources can still be constrained by financial chokepoints and sanctions politics. This does not automatically translate into BRICS taking Venezuela’s side, but it does strengthen the bloc’s long-running argument for more resilient South-South trade settlement, diversified energy chains, and financing instruments that reduce exposure to coercive measures, because many African and other developing economies face similar vulnerabilities around commodities, shipping, insurance, and correspondent banking. At the same time, BRICS’ expansion makes consensus harder: several members maintain significant ties with the U.S., so the most likely impact is a technocratic push rather than a loud political campaign.
And highlighting, specifically, the position of BRICS members (South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt, as well as its partnering African States (Nigeria and Uganda)?
Venezuela crisis urges African members to demand that BRICS deliver usable financial and trade tools. For South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the Venezuela case is more about the precedent: how quickly external pressure can reshape a country’s fiscal room, debt dynamics, and even investor perceptions when energy revenues and sanctions compliance collide. South Africa will likely argue that BRICS should prioritize investment, industrialization, and trade facilitation. Ethiopia and Egypt, both debt-sensitive and searching for FDI, will be especially attentive to anything that helps de-risk financing, while avoiding steps that could trigger secondary-sanctions anxieties or scare off diversified investors.
Would the latest geopolitical developments ultimately shape the agenda for BRICS 2026 under India’s presidency?
India’s 2026 chairmanship is already framed around “Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” and Venezuela’s shock (paired with broader sanction/market-volatility lessons) will likely sharpen the resilience part. From an African perspective, that is an opportunity: South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt can press India to translate the theme into deliverables that matter on the ground: food and fertilizer stability, affordable energy access, infrastructure funding. India, in turn, has incentives to keep BRICS focused on economic problem-solving rather than becoming hostage to any single flashpoint. So the Venezuela episode may function as a cautionary case study that accelerates practical cooperation where African members have the most to gain. And I would add: the BRICS agenda will become increasingly Africa-centered simply because Africa’s weight globally is rising, and recent summit discussions have repeatedly highlighted African participation as a core Global South vector. South Africa’s G20 chairmanship last year explicitly framed around putting Africa’s development priorities high on the agenda, further proves this point.
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