Feature/OPED
Criticism Highlights Russia’s Media Weakness in Africa
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
In her weekly media briefing July 23, Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, criticised the United States support for educational programs, media and NGOs in Africa.
In addition, Zakharova said, “the allocation of grants fits into the White House’s efforts to promote the idea that there is no alternative to Western concepts regarding state governance and the imposition of alien values on sovereign states, and this represents another manifestation of neo-colonialism and an element of covertly formalizing inequality in the overall system of international ties.”
Russia’s position as contained in her briefing is available on the official website, and part of which is quoted here: “We have no choice but to comment and explain why we perceive this as Washington’s striving to eliminate the favourable regional socio-political background with regard to Russia that became particularly obvious following the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in October 2019.
“It appears that the United States is deliberately encouraging anti-Russia publications in some African media outlets and is trying to portray Russia as a destabilizing force. We are confident that such methods of unfair competition and misinformation show that there is no hard evidence confirming the so-called Russian policy of propaganda and misinformation, and this is also the consequence of weak US approaches in the field of public diplomacy.”
That well-said of the United States, it is equally important to note that since the Soviet collapse in 1991, the question of media representation both ways, in Russia and in Africa, has attracted unprecedented concerns and discussions.
Over the years, nearly 30 years after the Soviet era, Russia has not encouraged African media, especially those from south of Sahara, to operate in the Russian Federation.
On the other hand, Russian media resources are largely far from eminent in Africa, and these include the media conglomerate popularly referred to as Rossiya Sevogdnya (RIA Novosti, Voice of Russia and Russia Today), TASS News Agency and Interfax Information Service.
These are powerful and reputable Russian brands, compared to most well-known Western and European media organizations that operate in and cooperate with Africa.
Even not quite long, that was in November 2018, the State Duma, the lower house of parliamentarians, called for an increased Russian media presence in African countries, while Russia has closed its doors in offering opportunities for Africa media representation in the Russian Federation.
During the meeting that was scheduled to brainstorm for fresh views and ideas on the current Russia-African relations, State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin told Ambassadors from African countries: “it is necessary to take certain steps together for the Russian media to work on the African continent.”
“You know that the Russian media provide broadcasting in various languages, they work in many countries, although it is certainly impossible to compare this presence with the presence of the media of the United States, United Kingdom and Germany,” Volodin said, and promised that the State Duma would create the necessary legal basis for this long-term media cooperation.
Experts say that neither Russia has an African media face nor Africa has a Russian media face. Thus, in the absence of suitable alternative sources, African political leaders and corporate business directors depend on western media reports about developments in Russia and from the developed world.
Interestingly, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Information and Press Department has accredited media from Latin America, the United States, Europe and Asian countries, and only two African media came from the Maghreb region (Morocco and Egypt) in North Africa.
The official information presented during the first Russia-Africa Summit, held in October 2019, explicitly showed the degree of priority given to African media.
Some 300 media bureaus from 60 countries are currently operating in Russia, including 800 foreign correspondents while there are only two African news bureaus from Egypt and Morocco, according to Artem Kozhin, who represented the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Information and Press Department, at the panel discussion on media.
According to his interpretation, this extremely low representation of African media hardly meets the level of current dynamically developing relations between Russia and Africa.
“We invite all interested parties to open news bureaus and expand media cooperation with Russia,” Kozhin said at the gathering, inviting Africa media to Moscow.
Nearly all the panellists noted precisely that western media dominates in Africa. “Oftentimes, unique news offerings created by the Russian media simply do not make to the users and viewers in many regions, including Africa.
“Evidently, this vacuum gets filled with one-sided information from other players in the media market. This information can be biased, or outright hostile towards Russia and residents of other countries,” said Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa.
During the Russia-Africa Summit, Professor Alexey Vasiliev, the first appointed Special Representative of Russian President for Relations with Africa (2006-2011) and currently the Head of the Center for African and Arab Studies at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (2013-2020), told the audience there in Sochi: “Africa is largely unaware of Russia since African media mainly consumes information the Western media sources and then replicates them. And all the fake news, the Rusophobia and anti-Russian propaganda, spread by the western media, are repeated in the African media.”
“Measures are needed to enable us to better understand each other,” suggested Professor Vasiliev, who regularly advises the Presidential Administration, the Government of the Russian Federation, both chambers of the Federal Assembly, and the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Some experts have consistently argued that Russia has discriminated against the media from sub-Saharan Africa. That trend remains unchanged even after the first Russia-Africa Summit, held in Sochi with the primary aim of helping identify new areas and forms of cooperation, put forward promising initiatives that would bring collaboration between Russia and Africa to a qualitatively new level and contribute to strengthening multifaceted cooperation between the two regions.
Let that be the acceptable case, but both Russia and Africa have basic questions that still need quick answers. The questions raised at the panel discussion on media in Russia-Africa gathering: What issues are currently encountered in the formation of the modern media landscape? What role does the media play in Russian-African relations? What are the prospects for collaboration in the information sphere? What needs to be done to develop a Russian media agenda in Africa? What is the role and place of Russia in the information space of Africa today? What role can African media play in promoting further Russia’s image in Africa?
In practical terms, the highly successful spade-work was the first Russia-Africa Summit. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to layout some new mechanisms and adopt a more favourable approach that could readily attract African media to operate in the Russian Federation.
Russia and Africa need to examine every sphere based on shared partnership interests and redefine a practical approach to realizing whatever plans on media cooperation. Media and NGOs, as instruments for improving adequately public knowledge, especially on developments and emerging opportunities, have not been persuaded to match the desired future objectives and policy goals.
The stark reality is that Russia needs Africa media and Africa needs Russian media, in order for them to enlighten ties in the economic spheres, to promote a better understanding among African elites and the middle class through media reports. The middle class is twice Russia’s population and almost the size the population of the United States.
Professor Vladimir Shubin, the former Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies, explained in an interview with me that political relations between Russia and Africa, as well as the economic cooperation, would continue to attract more and more academic discussions. Such scholarly contributions, in essence, would help deepen understanding of the problems that impede building solid relationship or partnership with Russia.
In order to maintain this relationship, both Russia and Africa have to pay high attention to and take significant steps in promoting their achievements and highlighting the most development needs in a comprehensive way for mutual benefits using appropriately the media, according to Professor Shubin.
“African leaders do their best in developing bilateral relations,” he added. “Truly and passionately, they come to Russia more often than ten years ago, but a lot still has to be done; both Russian and African media, in this case, have a huge role to play.”
Perhaps, one of the reasons why some African leaders appear to have “written off” Russia has been lack of adequate information about Russia, or rather plenty of distorted information they have received from the Western media coverage of Russia, Professor Shubin concluded.
“Russian media write very little about Africa, what is going on there, what are the social and political dynamics in different parts of the continent. Media and NGOs should make big efforts to increase the level of mutual knowledge, which can stimulate interest for each other and lead to increased economic interaction as well,” said Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal ‘Russia in Global Affairs’ and also the Chairman of the State Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.
“To a certain extent,” Lukyanov said, “the intensification of non-political contacts may contribute to increased interest. But in Russia’s case, the main drivers of any cooperation are more traditional rather than the political interests of the state and economic interests of big companies. Soft power has never been a strong side of Russian policy in the post-Soviet era.”
Similarly, Bunn Nagara, a Senior Fellow of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, member of the Valdai Discussion Club, has observed that “Russian businesses face a number of challenges. First, there is little information available internationally about the opportunities and possibilities for partnerships between Russian and foreign businesses.”
“Russia is a large country spanning both Europe and Asia. So, it can do much to bring Asian and European business linkages together and build on them. Better public relations and improved information dissemination are very important. To do this, it needs to do more in spreading more and better information about its achievements, the progress so far, its future plans, and the opportunities available,” Bunn Nagara said.
Early October 2019, the Valdai Discussion Club released an ebook titled “Russia’s Return to Africa: Strategy and Prospects” jointly or collectively authored by Vadim Balytnikov, Oleg Barabanov, Andrei Yemelyanov, Dmitry Poletaev, Igor Sid and Natalia Zaiser.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004, with a goal is to promote dialogue between Russian and international intellectual elite and to make an independent, unbiased scientific analysis of political, economic and social events in Russia and the rest of the world.
The authors explicitly suggested the need to take steps in countering Western anti-Russia clichés that are spreading in Africa and shaping a narrative whereby only dictators and outcast partner with Russians. Therefore, efforts to improve Russia’s image must target not only the continent’s elite but also a broader public opinion. It would be advisable to create and develop appropriate media tools to this effect.
Media and NGOs, working with the civil society, have to support official efforts in pushing for building a positive image and in strengthening diplomacy. Displaying an attentive and caring attitude towards the African diaspora in Russia, the key objective is to overcome racist stereotypes that persist in marginal segments of Russian society. Helping highly qualified educated African migrants to integrate through employment. This will, in addition, showcase and shape public opinion about Africa in the Russian Federation.
According to the authors, building a more and consistent positive public opinion within Russia and Africa should be considered extremely important at this stage of relations between Russia and Africa. Should Russia assist other countries for political purposes only? Will the recipient countries be willing to lend Russia their political support, and can they be trusted? Should Russia build its partnerships exclusively based on the principle of economic expediency?
The authors wrote: “Russia will have to answer these questions as it moves towards implementing its African strategy. Its experience in working with public opinion and governments across Eurasia to shape public perceptions will come in handy in Africa.”
In the context of these existing challenges, leaders on both sides have to draw a roadmap. Inside Africa, Africans have had enough of all these public debates. The time has come to make progressive changes to the current approach, create a new outlook or simply call it “media facelift” instead of maintaining the old status quo. It, therefore, means taking concrete practical steps toward an effective media cooperation, this will substantially not only broaden but deepen two-way understanding of current developments in Russia and in Africa.
The irreversible fact is that there is the need to have an informed African society, and this has to be done largely, systematically and necessarily through the media. Africa has the largest number of young people, who look at the world with open eyes and are ready for cooperation with partner countries. This is a good opportunity to inform the young generation, bring them together through knowledge from Russia, Eurasia, and Africa. According to UN forecasts, Africa’s middle class, constitutes a very huge vibrant information-consuming market, will exceed 350 million by 2025.
Kester Kenn Klomegah writes frequently about Russia, Africa and the BRICS. Most of his well-resourced articles are reprinted elsewhere in a number of reputable foreign media.
Feature/OPED
Gen Alpha: Africa’s Digital Architects, Not Your Target Audience
By Emma Kendrick Cox
This year, the eldest Gen Alpha turns 16.
That means they aren’t just the future of our work anymore. They are officially calling for a seat at the table, and they’ve brought their own chairs. And if you’re still calling this generation born between 2010 and 2025 the iPad generation, then I hate to break it to you, but you’re already obsolete. To the uninitiated, they look like a screen-addicted mystery. To those of us paying attention, they are the most sophisticated, commercially potent, and culturally fluent architects Africa has ever seen.
Why? Because Alphas were not born alongside the internet. They were born inside it. And by 2030, Africa will be home to one in every three Gen Alphas on the planet.
QWERTY the Dinosaur
We are witnessing the rise of a generation that writes via Siri and speech-to-text before they can even hold a pencil. With 63% of these kids navigating smartphones by age five, they don’t see a QWERTY keyboard as a tool. They see it as a speed bump, the long route, an inefficient use of their bandwidth. They don’t need to learn how to use tech because they were born with the ability to command their entire environment with a voice note or a swipe.
They are platform agnostic by instinct. They don’t see boundaries between devices. They’ll migrate from an Android phone to a Smart TV to an iPhone without breaking their stride. To them, the hardware is invisible…it’s the experience that matters.
They recognise brand identities long before they know the alphabet. I share a home with a peak Gen Alpha, age six and a half (don’t I dare forget that half). When she hears the ding-ding-ding-ding-ding of South Africa’s largest bank, Capitec’s POS machine, she calls it out instantly: “Mum! Someone just paid with Capitec!” It suddenly gives a whole new meaning to the theory of brand recall, in a case like this, extending it into a mental map of the financial world drawn long before Grade 2.
And it ultimately lands on this: This generation doesn’t want to just view your brand from behind a glass screen. They want to touch it, hear it, inhabit it, and remix it. If they can’t live inside your world, you’re literally just static.
The Uno Reverse card
Unlike any generation we’ve seen to date, households from Lagos to Joburg and beyond now see Alphas hold the ultimate Uno Reverse card on purchasing power. With 80% of parents admitting their kids dictate what the family buys, these Alphas are the unofficial CTOs and Procurement Officers of the home:
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The hardware veto: Parents pay the bill, but Alphas pick the ISP based on Roblox latency and YouTube 4K buffers.
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The Urban/Rural bridge: In the cities, they’re barking orders at Alexa. In rural areas, they are the ones translating tech for their families and narrowing the digital divide from the inside out.
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The death of passive: I’ll fall on my sword when I say that with this generation, the word consumer is dead. It implies they just sit there and take what you give them, when, on the contrary, it is the total opposite. Alphas are Architectural. They are not going to buy your product unless they can co-author the experience from end to end.
As this generation creeps closer and closer to our bullseye, the team here at Irvine Partners has stopped looking at Gen Alpha as a demographic and started seeing them as the new infrastructure of the African market. They are mega-precise, fast, and surgically informed.
Believe me when I say they’ve already moved into your industry and started knocking down the walls. The only question is: are you building something they actually want to live in, or are you just a FaceTime call they are about to decline?
Pay attention. Big moves are coming. The architects are here.
Emma Kendrick Cox is an Executive Creative Director at Irvine Partners
Feature/OPED
Why Digital Trust Matters: Secure, Responsible AI for African SMEs?
By Kehinde Ogundare
For years, security for SMEs across sub-Saharan Africa meant metal grilles and alarm systems. Today, the most significant risks are invisible and growing faster than most businesses realise.
Artificial Intelligence has quietly embedded itself into everyday operations. The chatbot responding to customers at midnight, the system forecasting inventory requirements, and the software identifying unusual transactions are no longer experimental technologies. They are becoming standard features of modern business tools.
Last month’s observance of Safer Internet Day on February 10, themed ‘Smart tech, safe choices’, marked a pivotal moment. As AI adoption accelerates, the conversation must shift from whether businesses should use AI to how they deploy it responsibly. For SMEs across Africa, digital trust is no longer a technical consideration. It is a strategic business imperative.
The evolving threat landscape
Cybersecurity threats facing sub-Saharan African SMEs have moved well beyond basic phishing emails. Globally, cybercrime costs are projected to reach $10.5 trillion this year, fuelled by generative AI and increasingly sophisticated social engineering techniques. Ransomware attacks now paralyse entire operations, while other threats quietly extract sensitive customer data over extended periods.
The regional impact is equally significant. More than 70% of South African SMEs report experiencing at least one attempted cyberattack, and Nigeria faces an average of 3,759 cyberattacks per week on its businesses. Kenya recorded 2.54 billion cyber threat incidents in the first quarter of 2025 alone, whilst Africa loses approximately 10% of its GDP to cyberattacks annually.
The hidden risk of fragmentation
A common but often overlooked vulnerability lies in digital fragmentation.
In the early stages of growth, SMEs understandably prioritise affordability and agility. Over time, this can result in a patchwork of disconnected applications, each with separate logins, security standards, and privacy policies. What begins as flexibility can involve operational complexity.
According to IBM Security’s Cost of a Data Breach Report, companies with highly fragmented security environments experienced average breach costs of $4.88 million in 2024.
Fragmented systems create blind spots; each additional data transfer between applications increases exposure. Inconsistent security protocols make governance harder to enforce. Limited visibility reduces the ability to detect anomalies early. In practical terms, complexity increases risk.
Privacy-first AI as a competitive differentiator
As AI capabilities become embedded in business software, SMEs face a choice about how they approach these powerful tools. The risks are not merely theoretical.
Consumers across Africa are becoming more aware of data rights and are willing to walk away from businesses that cannot demonstrate trustworthiness. According to KPMG’s Trust in AI report, approximately 70% of adults do not trust companies to use AI responsibly, and 81% expect misuse. Meanwhile, studies also show that 71% of consumers would stop doing business with a company that mishandles information.
Trust, once lost, is difficult to rebuild. In the digital age, a single data leak can destroy a reputation that took ten years to build. When customers share their payment details or purchase history, they extend trust. How you handle that trust, particularly when AI processes their data, determines whether they return or take their business elsewhere.
Privacy-first, responsible AI design means building intelligence into business systems with data protection, transparency and ethical use embedded from the outset. It involves collecting only necessary information, storing it securely, being transparent about how AI makes decisions, and ensuring algorithms work without compromising customer privacy. For SMEs, this might mean choosing inventory software where predictive AI runs on your own data without sending it externally, or customer service platforms that analyse patterns without exposing individual records. When AI is built responsibly into unified platforms, it becomes a competitive advantage: you gain operational efficiency whilst demonstrating that customer data is protected, not exploited.
Unified platforms and operational resilience
The solution lies in rethinking digital infrastructure. Rather than accumulating disparate tools, businesses need unified platforms that integrate core functions whilst maintaining consistent security protocols.
A unified approach means choosing cloud-based platforms where functions share common security standards, and data flows seamlessly. For a manufacturing SME, this means inventory management, order processing and financial reporting operate within a single security framework.
When everything operates cohesively, security gaps diminish, and the attack surface shrinks. And the benefits extend beyond risk reduction: employees spend less time on administrative friction, customer data stays consistent, and platforms enable secure collaboration without traditional infrastructure costs.
Safer Internet Day reminds us that the digital world requires active stewardship. For SMEs across the African continent who are navigating complex threats whilst harnessing AI’s potential, digital trust is foundational to sustainable growth. Security, privacy and responsible AI are essential characteristics of any technology infrastructure worth building upon. Businesses that embrace unified, privacy-first platforms will be more resilient against cyber threats and better positioned to earn and maintain trust. In a market where trust is currency, that advantage is everything.
Kehinde Ogundare is the Country Head for Zoho Nigeria
Feature/OPED
Iran-Israel-US Conflict and CBN’s FX Gains: A Stress Test for Nigeria’s Monetary Stability
By Blaise Udunze
At the 304th policy meeting held on Wednesday, the 25th February, the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) Monetary Policy Committee cut the rate by 50 basis points to 26.5 per cent from 27 per cent, which has been widely described as a cautious transition from prolonged tightening to calibrated easing. The CBN stated that the decision followed 11 consecutive months of disinflation. The economy witnessed headline inflation easing to 15.10 per cent in January 2026, and food inflation falling sharply to 8.89 per cent. Foreign reserves are climbing to $50.45 billion, their highest level in 13 years. The Purchasing Managers’ Index is holding at an expansionary 55.7 points.
As reported in the paper, no doubt that the macroeconomic narrative appears encouraging. On a closer scrutiny, the sustainability of these gains is now being tested by forces far beyond the apex bank’s policy corridors. This is as a result of the clear, direct ripple effect of the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel, with direct military involvement from the United States, which has triggered one of the most significant geopolitical energy shocks in decades. For Nigeria, the timing is delicate. Just as the CBN signals confidence in disinflation and stability, global volatility threatens to complicate and possibly distort its monetary path.
The rate cut, though welcomed by many analysts, must be understood in context. Nigeria remains in an exceptionally high-rate environment. An MPR of 26.5 per cent is still restrictive by any standard. The Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) remains elevated at 45 per cent for commercial banks, and this effectively sterilises nearly half of deposits, while liquidity ratios are tight, and lending rates to businesses often exceed 30 per cent once risk premiums are included. The adjustment is therefore incremental, not transformational.
The Director/CEO of the Centre for the Promotion of Private Enterprise (CPPE), Dr. Muda Yusuf, has repeatedly noted that Nigeria’s deeper challenge lies in weak monetary transmission. According to him, even when the benchmark rate falls, structural rigidities, high CRR, elevated deposit costs, macroeconomic uncertainty, and crowding-out from government borrowing prevent meaningful relief from reaching manufacturers, SMEs, agriculture, and other productive sectors. Monetary easing, without structural reform, risks becoming cosmetic. The point is that even before structural reforms take effect, the fact is that an external shock will first reshape the landscape.
The Iran-Israel conflict and US involvement have reignited fears in global energy markets. Joint U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets and retaliatory missile exchanges across the Gulf have unsettled oil traders. Brent crude, already rising in anticipation of escalation, surged toward $70-$75 per barrel and could climb higher if shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20 per cent of global oil supplies pass, faces disruption. It is still an irony that a major crude exporter is also an importer of refined petroleum products.
Higher crude prices offer a theoretical windfall. For Nigeria’s economy, it is well known that oil remains its largest source of foreign exchange and accounts for roughly 50 per cent of government revenue. The good thing is that rising prices could boost reserves, improve forex liquidity, strengthen the naira, and ease fiscal pressures. In theory, this external cushion could support macroeconomic stability and reinforce the CBN’s easing posture.
However, the upside is constrained by structural weaknesses. Nigeria’s oil production remains below optimal capacity. A significant portion of crude exports is tied to long-term contracts, limiting immediate gains from spot price surges. As SB Morgen observed in its analysis, Nigeria’s “windfall” is volatile and limited by soft production performance.
More critically, Nigeria’s dependence on imported refined products exposes it to imported inflation. Rising global crude prices increase the cost of petrol, diesel, jet fuel and gas. With fuel subsidies removed, these increases are passed directly to consumers and businesses. Depot pump prices have already adjusted upward amid Middle East tensions.
Energy costs are a primary driver of Nigeria’s inflation, and this has remained sacrosanct. When fuel prices rise, transportation, logistics, food distribution, power generation, and manufacturing costs will definitely skyrocket, as well as the inflationary impulse spreads quickly through the economy. This will push households to face higher food and transportation costs. Businesses see shrinking margins. Real incomes erode.
Thus, the same oil shock that boosts government revenue may simultaneously reignite inflationary pressure, precisely at a moment when the CBN has begun cautiously easing policy.
This dynamic introduces a difficult policy dilemma, even as this could be for the fragile gains of the MPC. This is to say that if energy-driven inflation resurges, the CBN may be forced to pause or reverse its easing cycle. It is clearly spelt that high inflation typically compels tighter monetary conditions. As Yusuf warned, geopolitical headwinds that elevate inflation often push central banks toward higher interest rates. A renewed tightening would strain credit conditions further, undermining growth prospects.
There is also the risk of money supply expansion. Increased oil revenues, once monetised, can expand liquidity in the domestic system. Historically, surges in oil receipts have been associated with monetary growth, inflationary pressure, and exchange rate volatility. Without sterilisation discipline, a revenue boost could ironically destabilise macro fundamentals.
The exchange rate dimension compounds the complexity. Heightened geopolitical risk, just as it is currently playing out with the Iran-Israel conflict, often triggers global flight to safety. This will eventually lure investors to retreat to U.S. Treasuries and gold. Emerging markets face capital outflows. If it happens that foreign portfolio investors withdraw from Nigeria’s fixed-income market in response to global uncertainty, pressure on the naira could intensify.
Already, the CBN has demonstrated sensitivity to exchange rate dynamics by intervening to prevent excessive naira appreciation. A sharp rate cut in the midst of global volatility could destabilise carry trades and spur dollar demand. What should be known is that the 50-bps reduction reflects not just domestic disinflation, but global risk management such as geopolitical tensions, oil prices, and foreign investor sentiment.
Beyond macroeconomics, geopolitical implications carry security concerns. Analysts warn that a widening Middle East conflict could embolden extremist narratives across the Sahel and it directly has security consequences for Nigeria and the broader region. Groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP may exploit anti-Western framing to recruit and mobilise more followers in the Sahel region, thereby giving the extremist groups new propaganda opportunities. The pebble fear is that a diversion of Western security resources away from West Africa could create regional vacuums. What the Nigerian economy will begin to experience is that security instability will disrupt agricultural output, logistics corridors, and investor confidence, feeding back into inflation and slow economic growth, and as ripple effects, the economy becomes weaker.
Nigeria’s diplomatic balancing act adds another layer of fragility because it is walking on a tactful tightrope. The country is trying not to upset anyone, but maintains cautious neutrality, urging restraint while preserving ties with Western allies and Middle Eastern partners. Yet rising tensions globally between major powers, including Russia and China, complicate the geopolitical chessboard. Invariably, this will have a direct impact as trade flows, remittances, and investment patterns may change unexpectedly, affecting Nigeria’s economy.
With the current conflict in the Middle East, the prospects for economic growth also face renewed strain or are under increased pressure. The stock markets in developed countries have been fluctuating a lot because people are worried that there will be problems with the energy supply. If the whole world does not grow fast, then people will use less oil over time. This means that the good things that happen to Nigeria because of oil prices will probably not last, and any extra money Nigeria gets from oil prices now will be lost. Nigeria will not get to keep the money from high oil prices for a long time. The oil prices will affect Nigeria. Then the effect will go away. One clear thing is that since Nigeria relies heavily on oil exports, this commodity dependence exposes the country to significant risk.
Meanwhile, Nigeria’s domestic fundamentals remain structurally challenged. The recapitalisation of banks, with 20 of 33 institutions meeting new capital thresholds, strengthens resilience, but does not guarantee credit expansion into productive sectors. Banks continue to prefer risk-free government securities over private lending in uncertain environments.
Fiscal discipline remains essential. Elevated debt service obligations absorb substantial revenue. Election-related spending poses upside inflation risks. This understanding must be adhered to, that without credible deficit reduction and revenue diversification, monetary easing may be undermined by fiscal expansion.
At the moment, given the current global and domestic uncertainties, the 50 per cent interest cut rate appears less like a pivot toward growth and more like a signal of cautious optimism under conditional stability. The policy decision is based on several key expectations with the assumptions that disinflation will persist, exchange rate stability will hold, and global conditions will not deteriorate dramatically.
But the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict introduces uncertainty into all three assumptions, which is wrongly perceived as behind the rate cut that inflation will keep coming down, that the exchange rate will stay stable, and global conditions won’t worsen, are all undermined by the unfolding conflict.
If the global oil prices rise sharply and fuel becomes more expensive locally, overall prices in the economy could increase again, which means inflation could accelerate. Another dangerous trend is that if foreign investors pull capital out of Nigeria, exchange rate stability could weaken, seeing the naira coming under pressure. If global growth slows, export earnings could decline. Each of these scenarios would constrain the CBN’s flexibility.
This is not to dismiss potential upsides. Higher oil prices, if production improves, could bolster reserves and moderate fiscal deficits. Forex liquidity could strengthen the naira. Investment in upstream oil and gas could gain momentum. Historically, crude price increases have correlated with improved GDP performance and stock market optimism in Nigeria.
Yet history also warns of volatility. A good example is during the 2022 Ukraine conflict, oil prices spiked above $100 per barrel, which created a potential revenue windfall for oil-exporting countries, but Nigeria struggled to translate that temporary advantage into sustained economic improvement. Inflation persisted. In the case of Nigeria, the deep-rooted systemic or structural weaknesses and inefficiency diluted the benefits that should have been gained.
The lesson is clear because temporary external windfalls or short-term luck cannot substitute for structural and deep internal economic reforms.
The point is that sustainable development demands diversification beyond oil, to strengthening multiple parts of its economy at the same time, such as improved refining capacity, infrastructure investment, agricultural security, logistics efficiency, and fiscal consolidation. Monetary policy, as the action taken by the CBN at the MPC meeting by adjusting interest rates or attempting to control money supply, can anchor expectations and moderate volatility, but it cannot build productive capacity; it will only help to reduce short-term economic swings.
The CBN’s decision to cut the interest rate appears cautious. It is not a bold shift but rather a small adjustment. This shows that the bank is being careful and optimistic about the economy. It also knows that there are still problems. The trouble in the Middle East, like the fighting that affects the oil supply, reminds the people in charge that Nigeria’s economy is closely tied to what happens with energy around the world. This includes things like inflation, the value of money, and how fast the economy grows.
Until structural reforms reduce dependence on volatile oil cycles and imported fuel, Nigeria’s monetary policy will remain reactive to external crises. To really make the economy strong and stable, Nigeria needs to make some changes. It requires resilience against geopolitical storms.
The MPC has taken a step. Whether it marks a turning point depends less on 50 basis points and more on how Nigeria navigates a world increasingly defined by conflict-driven volatility.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
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