Feature/OPED
Forced Evictions and Lagos State Government
By Jerome-Mario Chijioke Utomi
It was in the news recently that residents of the Oworonshoki area in Lagos State on Wednesday, August 2, 2023, protested the ongoing demolition in their area by the Lagos State Task Force, which has seen many residents lose their belongings and homes, left several women and children homeless, and forced many to seek shelter in churches and uncompleted buildings in other areas.
During the protest, which was held at the state House of Assembly complex in Alausa, Ikeja, protesters were seen with placards with inscriptions such as “Say no to land grabbers and wrong demolition”, “Please help us in Oworonshoki “ and “We plead to the government to come to our rescue.”
Even the Lagos State House of Assembly has, a while ago, in a face-saving effort, ordered the State Environmental and Special Offences Enforcement Unit known as Taskforce to stop the demolition and, in its place, set up a five-member ad-hoc committee to investigate the matter and report to the House in two weeks, there are, however, reasons that ring apprehension as to the frequency of this potentially deadly ‘culture’ of demolition/forced eviction in the state and qualify as a reality to worry about, the choice of forced eviction by the state government in its efforts to engineer the development of the state.
Aside from lacking in conventional approaches that infuse human rights principles of participation, accountability, transparency and non-discrimination towards the attainment of equity and justice in such a ‘developmental initiative’, most troubling is the awareness that the present demolition is coming barely two years after a similar thoughtless demolition/forced eviction in July 2021, at the same Oworonshoki was reportedly carried out by the same state government.
Expressly, this piece does not think that what the state government is doing presently in the name of urban renewal/upgrade or regeneration is the best way of turning ‘Slum to Neighbourhood’.
Tragically ‘interesting’ is the awareness that the state has chronically become reputed for achieving urban-related upgrades, renewal and developmental programmes more from a reactionary perspective as against proactive design of effective policies anchored on international best practices.
Take, as an illustration, demolition/forced eviction gained entrance into the state leadership lexicon in July 1990 when Raji Rasaki, in his capacity as Military Governor of Lagos State for yet-to-be-identified reasons, destroyed Maroko. Over 300,000 people that inhabited Maroko then were reportedly affected.
According to reports, Maroko was a sub-city within Lagos. It was peaceful and very popular. The places now called Oniru Royal Estate, some parts of Victoria Island and Lekki Phase 1, were formerly known as Maroko, and it was inhabited by mainly low-income earners. Over 300,000 people inhabited Maroko then. Maroko prided itself on over 150 streets and houses owned by 10,000 landlords. The people were happy people.
Nine years after the Maroko experience, democracy came on board. At each electioneering, intending governors present baskets of manifestos with the promise to make Lagos a more human-friendly, liveable state as the loudest. But contrary to that expectation, documented experience reveals that between 2003 and 2020, demolition/forced evictions of citizens without alternative accommodation characterized every administration in the state.
Beginning with Senator Ahmed Bola Tinubu (May 1999 to 2007, now President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to Babatunde Raji Fashola (SAN), 2007 to 2015. From Akinwunmi Ambode (2015 to 2019) and presently Mr Babajide Sanwolu, there was no shift in paradigm as they all stuck to the practice.
The most painful aspect of the narrative is that to achieve this heinous objective; the government has a way of tagging the targeted community as a highly populated urban residential area consisting mostly of closely packed, decrepit housing units in a situation of deteriorated or incomplete infrastructure, inhabited primarily by impoverished persons.
Under the above description/excuse, the following Lagos communities have, between 2003 and 2015, partly or wholly fallen under the bulldozers of the Lagos State Government; Makoko community, Yaba, Ijora East and Ijora Badiya, PURA-NPA Bar Beach, Ikota Housing Estate, Ogudu Ori-Oke, Mosafejo in Oshodi, Agric-Owutu communities, Ageologo-Mile 12, and some communities along Mile 2 Okokomaiko to mention but a few.
As if that was not enough trouble for the poor Lagosians, in 2016, Mr Ambode vowed to evacuate all waterfront shantytowns — a population totalling about 300,000, according to the Nigerian Slum/Informal Settlement Association.
A few months later, 30,000 people lost their homes when one of the slums, Otodo Gbame, a poor fishing community close to the upmarket southeastern district of Lekki, was razed.
During the reported demolition of the Makoko community on July 17, 2012, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) stated that a letter from the Lagos state government was served on residents the previous week, giving them 72 hours to vacate their properties.
The Lagos state authorities further noted in that Letter that the illegal constructions in Makoko constituted an “environmental nuisance, security risk and an impediment to the economic and gainful utilisation of the waterfront” and undermined the “megacity status” of Lagos.
Adding to the woes of the evictees is the government’s ‘love’ for disobeying court directives and non-fulfilment of their promises to resettle those evicted.
As another example, it was reported in the media that at the Supreme Court, Abuja, in the year 2002, the Lagos state government, through the then Lagos State Commissioner for Justice, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, the immediate past Vice President of Nigeria, accepted responsibility for demolishing Maroko community and promised the evictees 1,000 housing units every year, till the whole former house-owners of Maroko are fully resettled.
He admitted that though the government acquired Maroko town in 1972, it again relinquished the acquisition in 1977, thereby confirming that Maroko was not under government acquisition when it was demolished in 1990. But regrettably, to this day, nothing has been done by the state government or its agents to remedy the situation or fulfil the promise made.
The above sad account is an emblem of governments that are unmindful of or deliberately decided to ignore the clarification by the United Nations Independent Expert on the Right to Development, which among other remarks, noted that for a programme to be tagged development, it must require a particular process that allows the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights, and all fundamental freedoms, by expanding the capabilities and choices of the individual.
In a similar vein, the international convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Ratified by Nigeria in 1993) is one document that probably did more than anything else to capture the gully of disappointments and many sins of successive administrations in the state against the evictees.
It recognized that globally, forced eviction is a brazen violation of the right to life, the right to a fair hearing, the right to dignity of the human person, the right to a private and family life, and the rights to property guaranteed by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the African charter of Human and peoples’ Right (Ratification and Enforcement Act 1990). Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Commission Resolutions 1993/77 and 2004/28 affirm that when forced evictions are carried out, they violate a range of internationally recognised human rights.
These include the Human rights to adequate housing, security of the person, security of the home, health, food, water, work/livelihood, education, freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, freedom of movement, information, and participation and self-expression.
While it has been reported repeatedly that clearance operations should take place only when conservation arrangements and rehabilitation are not feasible, relocation measures stand made, UN Resolution 2004/28 recognized the provisions on forced evictions contained in the Habitat Agenda of 1996 and recommended that, “All Governments must ensure that any eviction that is otherwise deemed lawful is carried out in a manner that does not violate any of the human rights of those evicted.”
It will be highly rewarding if the state government internalizes these provisions and develops processes or processes that allow the realization of economic and social development of the state in a way that protects the rights of the people.
Broadly speaking, from the above accounts, it is evident that the practice of forced eviction by state actors remains a sad account of or a symbol of, governments that have consciously decided to flagrantly ignore the global framework on physical planning of liveable neighbourhoods, slum upgrade and urban regeneration.
To further buttress this claim, let’s cast a glance at how a ‘famous’ slum challenge was creatively handled in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, without displacement or eviction of the original occupants.
Instead of removing the favelas, a people initially considered/described as illegal occupants, many of the government’s policies were made to focus more on improving the infrastructure of the people/the area.
The Inter-American Development Bank, for example, funded a $180 million “slum to neighbourhood” project in 1995, which sought to integrate existing favelas into the fabric of the city through infrastructure upgrading and service development.
The project involved 253,000 residents in 73 favela neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. When a favela was selected, a master plan for upgrades was drafted, and community organizations were contacted and asked to provide their input. When the final plan was approved, incentive plans were implemented for hiring construction companies that employed local community workers.
From Brazil to Spain and South Africa, the story and experience are the same.
Comparatively, when one juxtaposes the above accounts as recorded in Brazil with that of July 1990 Maroko’s experience, there exists a gully of difference.
Essentially, aside from the imperative of drawing useful lessons from Brazil’s experience, this piece would also appreciate the Lagos state government explaining whose responsibility it is to provide infrastructures; government or the people/residents?
For me, providing an answer(s) to the above question will redefine as well as address the government’s relationships with the people on issues of physical planning and urban re-generation, usher in eviction-free co-existence while sending new lessons to other states in the country and of course the federal government reputed for practices of forced evictions.
Utomi is the Programme Coordinator (Media and Policy) for Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA) in Lagos. He can be reached via [email protected]/08032725374
Feature/OPED
Ledig at One: The Year We Turned Stablecoins Into Real Liquidity for the Real World
Ever tried sending a large amount of money into or out of certain markets and felt your stomach twist a bit? That was the feeling many companies carried long before Ledig existed. Delays. Guesswork. Phone calls that sounded unsure. People waiting on people, and no reliable derivatives hedging protocol to shield them from currency swings. It was messy.
That frustration is what pushed us to open Ledig to the world a year ago. We wanted a system built for big transfers. Not a few hundred dollars. Serious amounts. A hundred thousand. A million. Even more. And we wanted it to move in seconds, not a strange timeline that no one could explain.
So, we built a setup that lets companies bring in stablecoins and get local currency out quickly. We also kept the opposite direction just as clean. Local currency in, stablecoins out. Both ways needed to feel the same because business doesn’t move in only one direction. Some clients even switch between the two during the same week.
In the early days, people sent smaller amounts to test us. Fair enough. But once they saw a large payment settle almost instantly, confidence spread. This is how we crossed our first $100M. Most of that came from global companies working across Africa and other emerging markets. These firms care about stability, not buzzwords. They just want their money to land where it should.
A lot of the magic sits behind the scenes. Wallets. Local settlement tools. A solid FX engine that adjusts as needed. None of this appears on the surface. All a user sees is a simple dashboard or a set of API calls that get the job done. They don’t even need to think about crypto. The tech exists under the hood, doing the heavy lifting quietly.
But fast movement alone wasn’t enough.
Ledig derivatives hedging protocol
There was another problem staring companies in the face. Currency swings. And they hurt. Imagine finishing a project today and waiting ninety days to get paid in a currency that drops often. By the time the company receives the money, the value has fallen so much that the profit is almost gone. This is a real issue, and many firms have lived through that shock.
This is where our derivatives hedging protocol stepped in. It lets companies lock in their value early so they don’t get caught off guard later. The product ran off-chain at first and still passed $55M in activity. Now we’re taking the derivatives hedging protocol fully on-chain. We picked Base for this next step because it fits the type of stablecoins our settlement system relies on. It also gives companies a clean, transparent environment to execute derivatives hedging protocol strategies built for actual commercial needs rather than trading games.
It took time to get here. Our team is small, which surprised a lot of people, but that worked in our favour. We avoided noise. We focused on building pieces that work. Think of it like a set of tools. One tool converts stable to fiat. Another handles fiat to stable. Another manages FX. Another supports treasury. Another delivers hedging to protect value. Each tool works alone, but when a company puts them together, they get a full workbench that covers money movement and risk in one place.
We rarely talk about revenue publicly, but the business is in a good place. The real sign of health is that companies keep trusting us with large transactions. Not one-off tests. Proper flows. The kind that supports payrolls, suppliers, expansion, and daily operations. In markets where delays can break everything, this matters.
Looking ahead, our focus for 2026 is simple. Bring the derivatives hedging protocol on-chain at scale. Grow our liquidity pipeline so larger payments stay just as smooth as they are today. Strengthen our licensing and regulatory setup, so bigger institutions can work with us without extra steps. And continue tightening the entire system so companies entering emerging markets can do it with far less stress.
Ledig is one year old. The mission is still the same. Move large amounts of money fast. Protect companies from painful currency swings using a battle-tested derivatives hedging protocol. Build tools they can rely on without worrying about how the background tech works.
This is just the beginning.
Feature/OPED
If You Understand Nigeria, You Fit Craze
By Prince Charles Dickson PhD
There is a popular Nigerian lingo cum proverb that has graduated from street humour to philosophical thesis: “If dem explain Nigeria give you and you understand am, you fit craze.” It sounds funny. It is funny. But like most Nigerian jokes, it is also dangerously accurate.
Catherine’s story from Kubwa Road is the kind of thing that does not need embellishment. Nigeria already embellishes itself. Picture this: a pedestrian bridge built for pedestrians. A bridge whose sole job description in life is to allow human beings cross a deadly highway without dying. And yet, under this very bridge, pedestrians are crossing the road. Not illegally on their own this time, but with the active assistance of a uniformed Road Safety officer who stops traffic so that people can jaywalk under a bridge built to stop jaywalking.
At that point, sanity resigns.
You expect the officer to enforce the law: “Use the bridge.” Instead, he enforces survival: “Let nobody die today.” And therein lies the Nigerian paradox. The officer is not wicked. In fact, he is humane. He chooses immediate life over abstract order. But his humanity quietly murders the system. His kindness baptises lawlessness. His good intention tells the pedestrian: you are right; the bridge is optional.
Nigeria is full of such tragic kindness.
We build systems and then emotionally sabotage them. We complain about lack of infrastructure, but when infrastructure shows up, we treat it like an optional suggestion. Pedestrian bridges become decorative monuments. Traffic lights become Christmas decorations. Zebra crossings become modern art—beautiful, symbolic, and useless.
Ask the pedestrians why they won’t use the bridge and you’ll hear a sermon:
“It’s too stressful to climb.”
“It’s far from my bus stop.”
“My knee dey pain me.”
“I no get time.”
“Thieves dey up there.”
All valid explanations. None a justification. Because the same person that cannot climb a bridge will sprint across ten lanes of oncoming traffic with Olympic-level agility. Suddenly, arthritis respects urgency.
But Nigeria does not punish inconsistency; it rewards it.
So, the Road Safety officer becomes a moral hostage. Arrest the pedestrians and risk chaos, insults, possible mob action, and a viral video titled “FRSC wickedness.” Or stop cars, save lives, and quietly train people that rules are flexible when enough people ignore them.
Nigeria often chooses the short-term good that destroys the long-term future.
And that is why understanding Nigeria is a psychiatric risk.
This paradox does not stop at Kubwa Road. It is a national operating system.
We live in a country where a polite policeman shocks you. A truthful politician is treated like folklore—“what-God-cannot-do-does-exist.” A nurse or doctor going one year without strike becomes breaking news. Bandits negotiate peace deals with rifles slung over their shoulders, attend dialogue meetings fully armed, and sometimes do TikTok videos of ransoms like content creators.
Criminals have better PR than institutions.
In Nigeria, you bribe to get WAEC “special centre,” bribe to gain university admission, bribe to choose your state of origin for NYSC, and bribe to secure a job. Merit is shy. Connection is confident. Talent waits outside while mediocrity walks in through the back door shaking hands.
You even bribe to eat food at social events. Not metaphorically. Literally. You must “know somebody” to access rice and small chops at a wedding you were invited to. At burial grounds, you need connections to bury your dead with dignity. Even grief has gatekeepers.
We have normalised the absurd so thoroughly that questioning it feels rude.
And yet, the same Nigerians will shout political slogans with full lungs—“Tinubu! Tinubu!!”—without knowing the name of their councillor, councillor’s office, or councillor’s phone number. National politics is theatre; local governance is invisible. We debate presidency like Premier League fans but cannot locate the people controlling our drainage, primary schools, markets, and roads.
We scream about “bad leadership” in Abuja while ignoring the rot at the ward level where leadership is close enough to knock on your door.
Nigeria is a place where laws exist, but enforcement negotiates moods. Where rules are firm until they meet familiarity. Where morality is elastic and context-dependent. Where being honest is admirable but being foolish is unforgivable.
We admire sharpness more than integrity. We celebrate “sense” even when sense means cheating the system. If you obey the rules and suffer, you are naïve. If you break them and succeed, you are smart.
So, the Road Safety officer on Kubwa Road is not an anomaly. He is Nigeria distilled.
Nigeria teaches you to survive first and reform later—except later never comes.
We choose convenience over consistency. Emotion over institution. Today over tomorrow. Life over law, until life itself becomes cheap because law has been weakened.
This is how bridges become irrelevant. This is how systems decay. This is how exceptions swallow rules.
And then we wonder why nothing works.
The painful truth is this: Nigeria is not confusing because it lacks logic. It is confusing because it has too many competing logics. Survival logic. Moral logic. Emotional logic. Opportunistic logic. Religious logic. Tribal logic. Political logic. None fully dominant. All constantly clashing.
So, when someone says, “If dem explain Nigeria give you and you understand am, you fit craze,” what they really mean is this: Nigeria is not designed to be understood; it is designed to be endured.
To truly understand Nigeria is to accept contradictions without resolution. To watch bridges built and ignored. Laws written and suspended. Criminals empowered and victims lectured. To see good people make bad choices for good reasons that produce bad outcomes.
And maybe the real madness is not understanding Nigeria—but understanding it and still hoping it will magically fix itself without deliberate, painful, collective change.
Until then, pedestrians will continue crossing under bridges, officers will keep stopping traffic to save lives, systems will keep eroding gently, and we will keep laughing at our own tragedy—because sometimes, laughter is the only therapy left.
Nigeria no be joke.
But if you no laugh, you go cry—May Nigeria win.
Feature/OPED
Post-Farouk Era: Will Dangote Refinery Maintain Its Momentum?
By Abba Dukawa
“For the marketers, I hope they lose even more. I’m not printing money; I’m also losing money. They want imports to continue, but I don’t think that is right. So I must have a strategy to survive because $20 billion of investment is too big to fail. We are in a situation where we will continue to play cat and mouse, and eventually, someone will give up—either we give up, or they will.” —Aliko Dangote
This statement reflects that while Dangote is incurring losses, he remains committed to his investment, determined to outlast competitors reliant on imports. He believes that persistence and strategy will eventually force them to concede before he does.
Aliko Dangote has faced unprecedented resistance in the petroleum sector, unlike in any of his other business ventures. His first attempt came on May 17, 2007, when the Obasanjo administration sold 51% of Port Harcourt Refinery to Bluestar Oil—a consortium including Dangote Oil, Zenon Oil, and Transcorp—for $561 million. NNPC staff strongly opposed the sale. The refinery was later reclaimed under President Yar’adua, a setback that provided Dangote a tough but invaluable lesson. Undeterred, he went on to build Africa’s largest refinery.
As a private investor, Dangote has delivered much-needed infrastructure to Nigeria’s oil-and-gas sector. Yet, his refinery faces regulatory hurdles from agency’s meant to promote efficiency and growth. Despite this monumental private investment in the nation’s downstream sector, powerful domestic and foreign oil interests may have influenced Farouk Ahmad, former NMDPRA Managing Director, to hinder the refinery’s operations.
The dispute dates back to July 2024, when the NMDPRA claimed that locally refined petroleum products including those from Dangote’s refinery were inferior to imported fuel. Although the confrontation appeared to subside, the underlying rift persisted. Aliko Dangote is not one to speak often, but the pressure he is facing has compelled him to break his silence. He has begun to speak out about what he sees as a deliberate targeting of his investments, as his petroleum-refining venture continues to face repeated regulatory and institutional challenges.
The latest impasse began when Dangote accused the NMDPRA of issuing excessive import licenses for petroleum products, undermining local refining capacity and threatening national energy security. He alleged that the regulator allowed the importation of cheap fuel, including from Russia, which could cripple domestic refineries such as his 650,000‑barrel‑per‑day Lagos plant.
The conflict intensified after Dangote publicly accused Farouk Ahmad, former head of NMDPRA, of living large on a civil servant’s salary. Dangote claimed Ahmad’s lifestyle was way too lavish, pointing out that four of his kids were in pricey Swiss schools. He took his grievance to the ICPC, alleging misconduct and abuse of office.
It’s striking how Nigerian office holders at every level have mastered the art of impunity. Even though Ahmad dismissed the accusations but the standoff prompting Ahmad’s resignation. But the bitter irony these “public servants” tasked with protecting citizens’ interests often face zero consequences for violating policies meant to safeguard the Nation and public interest.
The clash of titans lays bare deeper flaws in Nigeria’s petroleum governance. It shows how institutional weaknesses turn regulatory disputes into personal power plays. In a system with robust norms, such conflicts would be settled via clear rules, independent oversight, and transparent processes not media wars and public accusations.
Even before completion, the refinery’s operating license was denied. Farouk Ahmad claimed Dangote’s petrol was subpar, ordering tests that appeared aimed at public embarrassment. Dangote countered with independent public testing of his diesel, challenging the regulator’s claims.
He also invited Ahmad to verify the tests on-site, but the offer was declined. Moreover, NNPC initially refused to supply crude oil, forcing Dangote to source it from the United States a practice that continues.
President Tinubu later directed the NNPC to resume crude supplies and accept payment in naira, reportedly displeasing the state oil company. In addition to presidential directives, Farouk claimed Dangote was producing petrol beyond the approved quantity and insisted that crude oil be purchased exclusively in U.S. dollars a condition Dangote accepted.
From the public’s point of view, the Refinery is a game-changer for Nigeria, with the potential to end fuel imports and boost the economy. With a capacity of 650,000 barrels per day, it produces around 104 million liters of petroleum products daily, meeting 90% of Nigeria’s domestic demand and allowing exports to other West African countries.
The Dangote Refinery is poised to earn foreign exchange, stabilize fuel prices, and strengthen Nigeria’s energy security. However, the ongoing dispute surrounding the refinery underscores the challenges of aligning national interests with regulatory and institutional frameworks.
The Dangote Refinery’s growing dominance has sparked concerns among stakeholders like NUPENG and PENGASSAN, who fear it could lead to a private monopoly, stifling competition and harming smaller players. This concern stems from the refinery’s rejection of the traditional ₦5 million-per-truck levy on petroleum shipments.
However, Dangote has taken steps to address these concerns, reducing the minimum purchase requirement from 2 million liters to 250,000 liters, opening the market to smaller operators and strengthening distribution networks. The refinery has also purchased 2,000 CNG trucks to maintain operations, emphasizing its commitment to making energy affordable and accessible
Many are watching closely to see if Dangote’s actions are driven by a desire for transparency and fairness in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector or private business interests. Did Dangote genuinely want to fight the corruption going on in the sector?, Will Dangote refinery operate for the common good or seek market dominance? Did Farouk Ahmad act in the public interest or obstruct the refinery for hidden oil interests? Will the Dangote Refinery Maintain Its Momentum in the Post-Farouk Era?The dispute between Dangote and Farouk Ahmad remains shrouded in mystery, with the ICPC investigation likely to uncover the truth
To many, the government faces a delicate balancing act: protecting local refiners while ensuring fair competition. While some argue that Dangote’s success shouldn’t come at the expense of smaller players, others see it episodes like this reveal persistent contradictions: powerful interests, fragile institutions, and blurred lines between regulation and politics.The Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) promised a new era of clarity, efficiency, and accountability, but its implementation has been slow. The PIA’s success hinges on addressing these challenges.
What benefits one party can indeed threaten another. Despite entering the sector with good intentions, Dangote has faced relentless pushback, all eyes are on whether the refinery can sustain its momentum. Analysts and commentators are sharing their perspectives based on available data from relevant institutions. If anyone spreads false information, the truth will eventually come out
Dukawa is a journalist, public‑affairs analyst, and political commentator. He can be reached at [email protected]
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