Feature/OPED
Forced Evictions and Lagos State Government
By Jerome-Mario Chijioke Utomi
It was in the news recently that residents of the Oworonshoki area in Lagos State on Wednesday, August 2, 2023, protested the ongoing demolition in their area by the Lagos State Task Force, which has seen many residents lose their belongings and homes, left several women and children homeless, and forced many to seek shelter in churches and uncompleted buildings in other areas.
During the protest, which was held at the state House of Assembly complex in Alausa, Ikeja, protesters were seen with placards with inscriptions such as “Say no to land grabbers and wrong demolition”, “Please help us in Oworonshoki “ and “We plead to the government to come to our rescue.”
Even the Lagos State House of Assembly has, a while ago, in a face-saving effort, ordered the State Environmental and Special Offences Enforcement Unit known as Taskforce to stop the demolition and, in its place, set up a five-member ad-hoc committee to investigate the matter and report to the House in two weeks, there are, however, reasons that ring apprehension as to the frequency of this potentially deadly ‘culture’ of demolition/forced eviction in the state and qualify as a reality to worry about, the choice of forced eviction by the state government in its efforts to engineer the development of the state.
Aside from lacking in conventional approaches that infuse human rights principles of participation, accountability, transparency and non-discrimination towards the attainment of equity and justice in such a ‘developmental initiative’, most troubling is the awareness that the present demolition is coming barely two years after a similar thoughtless demolition/forced eviction in July 2021, at the same Oworonshoki was reportedly carried out by the same state government.
Expressly, this piece does not think that what the state government is doing presently in the name of urban renewal/upgrade or regeneration is the best way of turning ‘Slum to Neighbourhood’.
Tragically ‘interesting’ is the awareness that the state has chronically become reputed for achieving urban-related upgrades, renewal and developmental programmes more from a reactionary perspective as against proactive design of effective policies anchored on international best practices.
Take, as an illustration, demolition/forced eviction gained entrance into the state leadership lexicon in July 1990 when Raji Rasaki, in his capacity as Military Governor of Lagos State for yet-to-be-identified reasons, destroyed Maroko. Over 300,000 people that inhabited Maroko then were reportedly affected.
According to reports, Maroko was a sub-city within Lagos. It was peaceful and very popular. The places now called Oniru Royal Estate, some parts of Victoria Island and Lekki Phase 1, were formerly known as Maroko, and it was inhabited by mainly low-income earners. Over 300,000 people inhabited Maroko then. Maroko prided itself on over 150 streets and houses owned by 10,000 landlords. The people were happy people.
Nine years after the Maroko experience, democracy came on board. At each electioneering, intending governors present baskets of manifestos with the promise to make Lagos a more human-friendly, liveable state as the loudest. But contrary to that expectation, documented experience reveals that between 2003 and 2020, demolition/forced evictions of citizens without alternative accommodation characterized every administration in the state.
Beginning with Senator Ahmed Bola Tinubu (May 1999 to 2007, now President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to Babatunde Raji Fashola (SAN), 2007 to 2015. From Akinwunmi Ambode (2015 to 2019) and presently Mr Babajide Sanwolu, there was no shift in paradigm as they all stuck to the practice.
The most painful aspect of the narrative is that to achieve this heinous objective; the government has a way of tagging the targeted community as a highly populated urban residential area consisting mostly of closely packed, decrepit housing units in a situation of deteriorated or incomplete infrastructure, inhabited primarily by impoverished persons.
Under the above description/excuse, the following Lagos communities have, between 2003 and 2015, partly or wholly fallen under the bulldozers of the Lagos State Government; Makoko community, Yaba, Ijora East and Ijora Badiya, PURA-NPA Bar Beach, Ikota Housing Estate, Ogudu Ori-Oke, Mosafejo in Oshodi, Agric-Owutu communities, Ageologo-Mile 12, and some communities along Mile 2 Okokomaiko to mention but a few.
As if that was not enough trouble for the poor Lagosians, in 2016, Mr Ambode vowed to evacuate all waterfront shantytowns — a population totalling about 300,000, according to the Nigerian Slum/Informal Settlement Association.
A few months later, 30,000 people lost their homes when one of the slums, Otodo Gbame, a poor fishing community close to the upmarket southeastern district of Lekki, was razed.
During the reported demolition of the Makoko community on July 17, 2012, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) stated that a letter from the Lagos state government was served on residents the previous week, giving them 72 hours to vacate their properties.
The Lagos state authorities further noted in that Letter that the illegal constructions in Makoko constituted an “environmental nuisance, security risk and an impediment to the economic and gainful utilisation of the waterfront” and undermined the “megacity status” of Lagos.
Adding to the woes of the evictees is the government’s ‘love’ for disobeying court directives and non-fulfilment of their promises to resettle those evicted.
As another example, it was reported in the media that at the Supreme Court, Abuja, in the year 2002, the Lagos state government, through the then Lagos State Commissioner for Justice, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, the immediate past Vice President of Nigeria, accepted responsibility for demolishing Maroko community and promised the evictees 1,000 housing units every year, till the whole former house-owners of Maroko are fully resettled.
He admitted that though the government acquired Maroko town in 1972, it again relinquished the acquisition in 1977, thereby confirming that Maroko was not under government acquisition when it was demolished in 1990. But regrettably, to this day, nothing has been done by the state government or its agents to remedy the situation or fulfil the promise made.
The above sad account is an emblem of governments that are unmindful of or deliberately decided to ignore the clarification by the United Nations Independent Expert on the Right to Development, which among other remarks, noted that for a programme to be tagged development, it must require a particular process that allows the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights, and all fundamental freedoms, by expanding the capabilities and choices of the individual.
In a similar vein, the international convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Ratified by Nigeria in 1993) is one document that probably did more than anything else to capture the gully of disappointments and many sins of successive administrations in the state against the evictees.
It recognized that globally, forced eviction is a brazen violation of the right to life, the right to a fair hearing, the right to dignity of the human person, the right to a private and family life, and the rights to property guaranteed by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the African charter of Human and peoples’ Right (Ratification and Enforcement Act 1990). Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Commission Resolutions 1993/77 and 2004/28 affirm that when forced evictions are carried out, they violate a range of internationally recognised human rights.
These include the Human rights to adequate housing, security of the person, security of the home, health, food, water, work/livelihood, education, freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, freedom of movement, information, and participation and self-expression.
While it has been reported repeatedly that clearance operations should take place only when conservation arrangements and rehabilitation are not feasible, relocation measures stand made, UN Resolution 2004/28 recognized the provisions on forced evictions contained in the Habitat Agenda of 1996 and recommended that, “All Governments must ensure that any eviction that is otherwise deemed lawful is carried out in a manner that does not violate any of the human rights of those evicted.”
It will be highly rewarding if the state government internalizes these provisions and develops processes or processes that allow the realization of economic and social development of the state in a way that protects the rights of the people.
Broadly speaking, from the above accounts, it is evident that the practice of forced eviction by state actors remains a sad account of or a symbol of, governments that have consciously decided to flagrantly ignore the global framework on physical planning of liveable neighbourhoods, slum upgrade and urban regeneration.
To further buttress this claim, let’s cast a glance at how a ‘famous’ slum challenge was creatively handled in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, without displacement or eviction of the original occupants.
Instead of removing the favelas, a people initially considered/described as illegal occupants, many of the government’s policies were made to focus more on improving the infrastructure of the people/the area.
The Inter-American Development Bank, for example, funded a $180 million “slum to neighbourhood” project in 1995, which sought to integrate existing favelas into the fabric of the city through infrastructure upgrading and service development.
The project involved 253,000 residents in 73 favela neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. When a favela was selected, a master plan for upgrades was drafted, and community organizations were contacted and asked to provide their input. When the final plan was approved, incentive plans were implemented for hiring construction companies that employed local community workers.
From Brazil to Spain and South Africa, the story and experience are the same.
Comparatively, when one juxtaposes the above accounts as recorded in Brazil with that of July 1990 Maroko’s experience, there exists a gully of difference.
Essentially, aside from the imperative of drawing useful lessons from Brazil’s experience, this piece would also appreciate the Lagos state government explaining whose responsibility it is to provide infrastructures; government or the people/residents?
For me, providing an answer(s) to the above question will redefine as well as address the government’s relationships with the people on issues of physical planning and urban re-generation, usher in eviction-free co-existence while sending new lessons to other states in the country and of course the federal government reputed for practices of forced evictions.
Utomi is the Programme Coordinator (Media and Policy) for Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA) in Lagos. He can be reached via [email protected]/08032725374
Feature/OPED
Why Africa Requires Homegrown Trade Finance to Boost Economic Integration
By Cyprian Rono
Africa’s quest to trade with itself has never been more urgent. With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) gaining momentum, governments are working to deepen intra-African commerce. The idea of “One African Market” is no longer aspirational; it is emerging as a strategic pathway for economic growth, job creation, and industrial competitiveness. Yet even as infrastructure and regulatory reforms advance, one fundamental question remains; how will Africa finance its cross-border trade, across markets with diverse currencies, regulations, and standards?
Today, only 15 to 18 percent of Africa’s internal trade happens within the continent, compared to 68 percent in Europe and 59 percent in Asia. Closing this gap is essential if AfCFTA is to deliver prosperity to Africa’s 1.3 billion people.
A major constraint is the continent’s huge trade finance deficit, which exceeds USD 81 billion annually, according to the African Development Bank. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which provide more than 80 percent of the continent’s jobs, are the most affected. Many struggle with insufficient collateral, stringent risk profiling and compliance requirements that mirror international banking standards rather than the realities of African business.
To build integrated value chains, exporters and importers must operate within trusted, predictable, and interconnected financial systems. This requires strong pan-African financial institutions with both local knowledge and continental reach.
Homegrown trade finance is therefore indispensable. Pan-African banks combine deep domestic roots with extensive regional reach, making them the most credible engines for financing trade integration. By retaining financial activity within the continent, homegrown lenders reduce exposure to external shocks and keep liquidity circulating locally. They also strengthen existing regional payment infrastructure such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), developed by the Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and backed by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, enabling faster, cheaper and seamless cross-border payments across the continent.
Digital transformation amplifies this advantage. Real-time payments, seamless Know-Your-Customer (KYC) verification, automated credit scoring and consistent service delivery across markets are essential for intra-African trade. Institutions such as Ecobank, operating in 34 African countries with integrated core banking systems, demonstrate how such digital ecosystems can enable continent-wide commerce.
Platforms such as Ecobank’s Omni, Rapidtransfer and RapidCollect, together with digital account-opening services, make it much easier for traders to operate across borders. Rapidtransfer enables instant, secure payments across Ecobank’s 34-country network, reducing delays in regional trade, while RapidCollect gives cross-border enterprises the ability to receive payments from multiple African countries into a single account with real-time confirmation and automated reconciliation. Together, these solutions create an integrated digital ecosystem that lowers friction, accelerates payments, and strengthens intra-African commerce.
Trust, however, remains a significant barrier. Cross-border commerce depends on the confidence that partners will honour contracts, deliver goods as promised, pay on time, and present authentic documentation. Traders often lack reliable information on potential partners, operate under different regulatory regimes, and exchange documents that are difficult to verify across borders. This heightens the risk of fraud, non-payment, and contractual disputes, discouraging businesss from expanding beyond familiar markets.
Technology is closing this trust gap. Artificial Intelligence enables lenders to assess risk using alternative data for SMEs without formal credit histories. Distributed ledger tools make shipping documents, certificates of origin, and inspection reports tamper-proof. In addition, supply-chain visibility platforms enable real-time tracking of goods and cross-border digital KYC ensures that both buyers and sellers are verified before any transaction occurs.
Ecobank’s Single Trade Hub embodies this trust infrastructure by offering a secure digital marketplace where buyers and sellers can trade with confidence, even in markets where no prior relationships exist. The platform’s Trade Intelligence suite provides customers instant access to market data from customs information and product classification tools across 133 countries.
Through its unique features such as the classification of best import/export markets, over 25,000 market and industry reports, customs duty calculators, and local and universal customs classification codes, businesses can accurately assess market opportunities, anticipate trends, reduce compliance risks, and optimise supply chains, ultimately helping them compete and grow in regional and global markets.
SMEs need more than financing. Many operate in cash-heavy cycles where suppliers and logistics providers require upfront payment. Lenders can support these businesses with advisory services, business intelligence, compliance guidance, and platforms for secure partner verification, contract negotiation, and secure settlement of payments. Trade fairs, industry forums, and partnerships with chambers of commerce further build the trust networks needed for cross-border trade.
Ultimately, Africa’s path toward meaningful trade integration begins with financial integration. AfCFTA’s promise will only be realised when enterprises can trade with confidence, knowing that payments will be honoured, partners verified, and disputes resolved. This requires collaboration between banks, regulators, and trade institutions, alongside harmonised financial regulations, interoperable payment systems, and continent-wide verification networks.
Africa can no longer rely on external actors to finance its trade. Its economic transformation depends on strong, trusted, and digitally enabled African financial institutions that understand Africa’s unique risks and opportunities. By building an African-led trade finance ecosystem, the continent can unlock liquidity, reduce dependence on external currencies, empower SMEs, and retain more value locally. Africa’s trade revolution will accelerate when its financing is driven by African institutions, African systems, and African ambition.
Cyprian Rono is the Director of Corporate and Investment Banking for Kenya and EAC at Ecobank Kenya
Feature/OPED
Tax Reform or Financial Exclusion? The Trouble with Mandatory TINs
By Blaise Udunze
It is not only questionable but an aberration that a nation where over 38million Nigerians remain financially excluded, where trust in institutions is fragile, and where citizens are pressured under the weight of rising living costs, the use of Tax Identification Number (TIN) has been specified as the only option for their bank accounts operation from January 1, 2026 by the Federal Government of Nigeria.
In practice, the policy spearheaded by Taiwo Oyedele, Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms, is rooted in the Nigerian Tax Administration Act (NTAA), and the intention can be understood in the areas of improving tax compliance, widening the tax net, and formalizing economic activities. But in practice, the directive risks becoming yet another well-meaning reform that punishes the wrong people, disrupts financial inclusiveness, and potentially destabilises an already stressed economy.
Yes, Nigeria needs tax reforms. Yes, the country must broaden its tax base. And yes, public revenues must increase to address fiscal pressures.
But compelling citizens to obtain TINs as a condition for operating bank accounts is the wrong tool for the right objective.
Below are five core arguments against the directive, and sustainable alternatives that actually strengthen tax compliance without endangering banking access or punishing informal earners.
The Directive Risks Deepening Financial Exclusion
Nigeria still struggles with financial inclusion. According to several official assessments, over 38 million adults remain outside the formal financial system. Many of them operate small, irregular businesses, survive through subsistence earnings, or depend on cash-based livelihoods.
The Federal Government’s compulsory TIN-for-bank-accounts policy is built on the assumption that every banked Nigerian is structured, organised, and tax-ready. This is false.
For instance, the rural market woman with N30,000 in rotating savings, the okada rider who deposits cash once a week, the petty trader using a mobile POS agent account, the retiring pensioner managing a small monthly income, and the migrant worker sends small remittances to their family. These are not tax evaders; they are survivalists.
Most operate bank accounts not because they run formal businesses, but because those accounts are essential to modern financial life: receiving transfers, accessing loans, participating in digital commerce, saving against emergencies, and avoiding the risks of moving cash in insecure environments.
By creating an additional bureaucratic barrier, the directive risks pushing millions back into a cash-dominant shadow economy, precisely the opposite outcome of what Nigeria’s financial-sector reforms are trying to achieve.
Bank Accounts Are Not Proof of Taxable Income
The NTAA clarifies that the TIN requirement applies only to taxable persons, individuals engaged in trade, employment, or income-generating activities.
But herein lies the problem: banks cannot determine who is “taxable” and who is not. Banks only see deposits and withdrawals. They do not audit the source or consistency of income. They are not tax authorities.
A student may run a small online clothing resale gig. A retiree may occasionally rent out farmland.
A dependent may receive cash support from a relative abroad. A job seeker may get intermittent gifts from family.
Who decides which of these scenarios qualifies as taxable? Banks? FIRS? Or will citizens be expected to self-declare under threat of account restrictions?
The result will be confusion, over-compliance, and mass panic with banks indiscriminately demanding TINs from everyone to avoid regulatory penalties.
This not only contradicts the spirit of the law but also exposes ordinary Nigerians to harassment and arbitrary compliance requirements.
The Policy Could Trigger Disruption, Panic Withdrawals, and Cash Hoarding
Whenever Nigerians perceive threats to their access to funds, the natural reaction is withdrawal and hoarding. We saw it during:
– the 2023 Naira redesign crisis,
– the 2016 TSA-bank consolidation tightening, and multiple periods of financial instability.
Telling citizens that bank accounts may face “operational restrictions” if they do not obtain a TIN creates a predictable behavioural response: people will rush to withdraw money.
This would be disastrous for a banking system already pressured by:
– high interest rates,
– inflation eroding deposits,
– rising loan defaults, and
– declining public trust.
Any government policy that unintentionally creates an incentive for citizens to flee the formal banking system is counterproductive.
The TIN Requirement Will Become a Bureaucratic Nightmare
Even if millions of Nigerians want to comply, the system is not ready. Nigeria’s administrative infrastructure does not have the capacity to process tens of millions of TIN registrations within months without:
– long queues,
– delays,
– data mismatches,
– duplicate records, and
– systemic errors.
The National Identity Number (NIN)-SIM registration experience is a painful reminder of what happens when ambitious policy meets weak execution capacity.
– Citizens spent months in overcrowded enrolment centres.
– Millions were blocked from services.
– Data inconsistencies persisted.
– The economy suffered productivity losses.
If Nigeria could not seamlessly synchronise NIN and SIM data, how will it synchronise NIN, BVN, and TIN at a national scale without dislocation?
Forcing TIN Adoption Ignores the Real Problem: Nigeria’s Broken Tax Culture
The Federal Government’s real challenge is not that citizens lack TINs, but that they lack trust in how taxes are used.
A government cannot widen the tax net when:
– tax leakages remain widespread,
– citizens feel services do not match taxation,
– corruption perceptions are high,
– government spending lacks transparency, and
– taxpayers do not feel seen, heard, or valued.
Coercion does not build a tax culture. Engagement does. Policy does not create legitimacy. Accountability does.
If the Federal Government wants Nigerians to freely participate in the tax system, it must earn legitimacy first, not mandate compliance through financial restrictions.
What the Government Should Do Instead: A Smarter Path to Tax Reform
Instead of enforcing a policy that may backfire economically and socially, the Federal Government can adopt four smarter, people-centred alternatives.
– Automatic TIN Issuance Linked to NIN and BVN
Rather than forcing Nigerians to apply manually, the government should:
- auto-generate TINs for all existing BVN/NIN holders,
- send the TINs via SMS, email, and bank alerts,
- allow self-activation only when needed for tax obligations.
This eliminates queues, delays, and confusion.
– Build a Voluntary Tax Compliance Culture Through Transparency and Incentives
Tax morale improves when citizens see value. Government should:
- publish annual audited reports of tax revenue use,
- incentivise compliant taxpayers with benefits (priority access to government grants, credit scoring, etc.),
- simplify tax filings for small businesses.
People comply more when they feel respected, not coerced.
– Target High-Value Tax Evaders, Not Low-Income Account Holders
Nigeria’s real tax leakages come from:
- large corporations shifting profits,
- politically exposed persons,
- illicit financial flows,
- multinational tax avoidance strategies,
- the informal “big money” class operating outside the banking system.
Instead of threatening small depositors, the government should strengthen:
- FIRS intelligence and investigation units,
- inter-agency data integration (CAC, Customs, Immigration),
- beneficial ownership transparency enforcement.
The fight against tax evasion should focus on those hiding billions, not those depositing thousands.
– Strengthen Digital Tax Platforms for Easy Self-Registration and Compliance
If tax registration becomes as easy as opening a social media account, compliance will rise naturally. The government should build:
- a mobile-first tax app,
- simplified online TIN retrieval,
- one-click tax filing for gig workers and small traders.
Digital convenience can achieve what regulatory coercion cannot.
Reform Should Not Punish the Public
No doubt, tax reforms are needed urgently, but they must come with a human face, an intelligent, equitable, and aligned with the realities of ordinary Nigerians.
The TIN-for-bank-accounts policy, while well-intentioned, risks undermining financial inclusion, triggering economic instability, and imposing unnecessary burdens on millions who are not tax evaders but survival-based earners.
Good tax policy is built on trust, not fear. On transparency, not threats. On civic legitimacy, not administrative compulsion.
If the Federal Government truly wants to modernise Nigeria’s tax system, it must focus not on restricting citizens’ access to their own money, but on:
- repairing tax trust,
- digitising compliance,
- targeting the real evaders, and
- making participation easier, not harder.
Financial inclusion took Nigeria decades to build. We cannot afford a policy that carelessly reverses these gains.
A better tax system is possible, but it must start with the people, not with their bank accounts.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Dangote and Farouk: The Distance Between Capital and Conscience
By Abiodun Alade
Within the space of 48 hours, Aliko Dangote offered Nigeria a rare demonstration of what leadership looks like when power is exercised with responsibility and consequence.
First came the announcement of a N100 billion annual education support programme — a decade-long N1 trillion commitment projected to keep more than 1.3 million Nigerian children in school. Its architecture was intentional, not ornamental: girls’ education, STEM disciplines, technical skills, and those children most likely to disappear quietly into the margins of poverty were placed at the centre, not the footnotes.
Then, almost immediately, his refinery reduced the price of Premium Motor Spirit by over N100 per litre. This was not achieved through government fiat, subsidy or public funds, but through internal cost absorption, aimed at easing the pressure of inflation on households, transport operators and small businesses already stretched thin.
Two decisive interventions. One individual. Forty-eight hours.
In a country where scarcity has been normalised and excuses institutionalised; these actions stand out precisely because they are uncommon. Nigeria does not lack wealth. It lacks the nerve to use it responsibly.
Dangote’s interventions were not symbolic gestures designed for applause. They were structural acts. Education secures the future. Affordable energy steadies the present. Together, they form the foundation of any serious development strategy.
Now set this against the performance of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum regulation.
Engr Farouk Ahmed, Chief Executive of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA), presides over a sector whose policy objectives are clearly stated: support domestic refining, reduce imports, conserve foreign exchange and strengthen energy security. These goals are enshrined in the Petroleum Industry Act and reinforced by the Federal Government’s Nigeria First policy.
Yet in practice, the downstream market remains crowded with import licences, uneven enforcement and regulatory decisions that continue to weaken local refining. Even with Africa’s largest refinery operating on Nigerian soil, import dependence persists — not because capacity is lacking, but because incentives remain misaligned.
This is where comparison ends.
Dangote and Farouk Ahmed do not operate on the same economic or moral plane. One commits private capital to solve national problems. The other leads a public institution whose outcomes are increasingly questioned by industry players, economists and the public alike.
One expands supply.
The other presides over a system where scarcity recurs.
One cuts prices.
The other manages a framework in which price instability has become familiar.
One reinvests personal wealth into Nigerian children.
The other reportedly expends questionable millions of dollars on secondary education abroad, while in his home state, Sokoto, thousands of children drop out of school over tuition fees as low as N10,000.
Only in Nigeria does the arithmetic of public life so often defy reason. Where official incomes are modest, lifestyles sometimes appear imperial. Where the books are thin, the living is lavish. And where questions should naturally arise, silence frequently answers instead.
It is a country where some who labour in the open marketplace live with studied moderation, while others, known only to the payroll of the state, move with a splendour their salaries cannot reasonably sustain. Children are educated across distant borders, fees quoted in foreign currencies that mock the modest figures attached to public service, yet accountability remains elusive.
When regulators falter, it is rarely for lack of laws or mandates. More often, authority is softened by comfort, dulled by compromise, and entangled in interests it was meant to police. A regulator burdened by unanswered questions cannot stand upright; oversight weakens when conscience is clouded.
In such moments, one does not need a forensic accountant to sense disorder. A soothsayer is hardly required to see where lines have blurred, where vigilance has yielded to indulgence, and where public trust has quietly been mortgaged.
This is how institutions lose their moral centre — not always through spectacular scandal, but through a series of small indulgences that mature, unnoticed, into systemic decay.
The fuel price reduction alone deserves careful attention. In Nigeria, petrol is not merely a commodity; it is the bloodstream of the economy. When prices rise, transport fares rise. Food prices rise. School attendance drops. Small businesses shut early. Families cancel travel or risk storing petrol in jerry cans — turning highways into mobile fire hazards during festive seasons.
By reducing PMS prices by over N100 per litre, the Dangote Refinery accomplished what years of policy meetings failed to deliver. It restored breathing space. It returned dignity to commuters. It reduced pressure on traders. It saved millions of productive man-hours otherwise lost to queues, panic buying and logistical paralysis.
That this occurred alongside a historic education commitment is not accidental. It reflects an understanding that energy without education builds nothing, and education without economic stability cannot thrive.
Meanwhile, regulatory bottlenecks remain. Local refiners cite delays in approvals, vessel clearances and inconsistent enforcement. Importers continue to flourish. Arbitrage adapts. Rent-seeking survives. The system continues to reward trading over production.
This is not accidental. Systems behave exactly as they are designed to behave.
Nigeria does not suffer from a shortage of ideas. It suffers from a shortage of alignment. When private citizens act more decisively in the national interest than institutions legally mandated to do so, something fundamental is broken.
No country industrialises by frustrating its producers. No economy grows by privileging imports over domestic value creation. No regulator earns legitimacy by operating in tension with stated national objectives.
Dangote’s actions within 48 hours expose an uncomfortable truth: Nigeria’s most binding constraint is no longer capital, technology or scale. It is governance culture.
Leadership is revealed not by speeches, but by choices. In two days, one Nigerian chose to educate the future and ease the present. Others continue to curate systems that profit from delay, opacity and dependence.
History is rarely neutral.
It remembers who built.
And it remembers who stood in the way.
Abiodun, a communications specialist, writes from Lagos
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