Feature/OPED
How Policy Missteps Weigh Down Nigeria’s Fragile Banking Giants
By Blaise Udunze
Nigeria’s banking sector has always stood at the center of the nation’s economic hopes. Yet, instead of fueling growth and wealth creation, the sector finds itself trapped in a cycle of fragility, weighed down by policies that appear more punitive than progressive. At the heart of this malaise is the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) reliance on blunt instruments such as the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR), a policy tool that has tied down bank capital in idle vaults rather than channeling it into the real sector economy.
The logic of the CBN is clear enough, which is to mop up liquidity to curb inflation. But the consequences are undeniable. When banks are compelled to warehouse huge reserves that could otherwise be deployed into productive ventures, the real sector, especially small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), suffers. These are the very businesses that create jobs, drive innovation, and power inclusive growth. Instead, they are starved of credit because funds remain sterilized at the apex bank in the name of macroeconomic stability.
In times of economic turbulence, inflation control is often the rallying cry of central bankers. In Nigeria, that battle has become an almost singular obsession of the CBN. The preferred weapon? The blunt tightening of monetary policy, raising interest rates and locking away massive portions of banks’ deposits under the CRR. While this might look decisive on paper, in practice it creates collateral damage, leaving banks unable to finance the very sectors that drive jobs, innovation, and long-term growth, most critically, SMEs and entrepreneurs.
The reality is simple, all in the name of fighting inflation, it should not mean strangling credit creation. There are smarter, targeted tools available, and many countries have deployed them with success. Around the world, regulators employ a mix of interest rate adjustments, open market operations, and forward guidance to curb inflation without choking off credit to the real economy. Nigeria must learn from these models and adapt them to its peculiar circumstances.
To tame inflation without choking growth, the CBN could pivot to more sophisticated instruments. Selective credit windows can guarantee lending to SMEs, agriculture, and manufacturing, even under tighter conditions. Differentiated reserve requirements can reward banks’ lending to productive sectors while penalizing speculative lending. Granular open market operations can absorb excess liquidity without suffocating the economy. Macroprudential tools can target bubbles in consumer lending or real estate speculation instead of blanket credit strangulation. And crucially, there must be fiscal-monetary coordination, because inflation driven by food insecurity, energy costs, and government overspending cannot be solved by monetary tightening alone.
Yet Nigeria’s banking fragility cannot be laid at the feet of monetary policy alone. The system’s weaknesses are also rooted in weak governance structures, insider abuses, poor risk management, and an idle treasury management culture. Corporate governance in many banks is treated as a box-ticking exercise rather than a framework for accountability. Boards often lack independence, while regulatory oversight is reactive instead of preventive. This creates fertile ground for insider abuse as directors and their cronies secure loans and contracts without due process or repayment discipline.
The evidence is stark. For eight of the country’s largest Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), total non-performing loans (NPLs) doubled in just one year from about N1.29 trillion in 2023 to N2.59 trillion in 2024. Their average NPL ratio climbed from 3.82 percent in 2023 to 4.99 percent in 2024. Across the industry, the CBN reported an NPL ratio of around 4.5 percent by the end of 2024, only for it to spike to 5.62 percent by April 2025, above the regulatory ceiling of 5 percent. Much of this surge reflects reclassified loans after stricter risk assessments, but it underlines a disturbing trend, showing that fragility is deepening, not abating.
For instance, a customer of the defunct Heritage Bank that was recently liquidated by President Bola Tinubu’s administration, who happened to be the publisher of one of the daily newspapers, was heavily indebted to the bank to the tune of several billions. Following his death during the COVID era, the newspaper outfit struggled to meet its obligations until the eventual shutdown of the bank. Among many cases, this episode shows how a single borrower’s collapse can trigger wider institutional vulnerabilities, worsening the sector’s fragility.
If just one of these economic heavyweights were to collapse, the domino effect could topple multiple banks at once. This is not the hallmark of a robust financial system; it is the mark of fragility. Equally troubling is the poor risk management culture. Credit assessments are often weak, operational risks underestimated, and stress testing neglected until crisis hits. To this is added an idle treasury management culture where banks prefer to park funds in low-yield assets or leave them sterilized under regulatory compulsion instead of channeling them into productive ventures. In a country battling unemployment, weak industrial growth, and inflation, idle treasuries are nothing short of economic sabotage.
One of the starkest contradictions in Nigeria’s economic management lies in the government’s heavy borrowing from the very banking system that the CBN seeks to discipline in the name of fighting inflation. On the one hand, the CBN raises CRR levels and applies other restrictive measures, effectively locking away banking capital to limit credit expansion. On the other, the federal government consistently turns to the same banks to finance its deficit through bonds, Treasury bills, and the now-controversial Ways & Means facility.
The scale of this borrowing is staggering. A Premium Times investigation revealed that CBN advances to the federal government surged by about 2,900 percent in just seven years, peaking at N23.8 trillion, spanning Ways & Means and other credit lines. In one stretch, the government borrowed an additional N3.8 trillion in only six months through the Ways & Means window. Although the CBN has recently reduced such lending by 59 percent in a bid to enforce monetary discipline, the damage to credibility is already done.
Legal borrowing caps, which tie government advances to revenue, have been repeatedly breached with little consequence. To ease pressure, the government has resorted to securitizing parts of this debt, most notably converting the N23.7 trillion Ways & Means facility into longer-term instruments. While this may buy time, it does not erase the contradiction that the CBN sterilizes liquidity with one hand, only for the federal government to pump it back into circulation with the other.
This practice has two damaging consequences. First, it inflates the money supply by redirecting liquidity back into circulation through government borrowing, negating the CBN’s inflation-control measures. Second, it crowds out private sector borrowers, especially SMEs, who are already starved of affordable credit. The result is a distorted system where banks prefer risk-free lending to the government over financing the real economy.
Such policy misalignment undermines trust in the financial system. Stakeholders see a regulator trying to sterilize liquidity while the government injects it back, a tug-of-war that signals confusion rather than coherence. The broader implication is that Nigeria’s inflationary pressures are not merely monetary but structural, requiring coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities. Without such alignment, the fight against inflation becomes self-defeating, eroding confidence in the apex bank’s credibility and deepening economic fragility.
The way forward is not to keep banks in chains but to align policy with growth. Free up productive capital. Enforce strict sanctions on insider abusers and delinquent big borrowers. Strengthen governance and risk management frameworks. And above all, embrace smarter, more dynamic monetary tools that fight inflation without suffocating the economy. Nigeria cannot grow if its banking system remains fragile. And the banking system cannot thrive if the very policies meant to strengthen it are the ones cutting off its oxygen supply.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional writes from Lagos, can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
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