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Nigerian Elections: A Democratic Deficit

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By Omoshola Deji

First Osun, then Kano and now Kogi and Bayelsa States. The spate of violence during election brings doubt on Nigeria’s ability to get it right. Unlike other nations, Nigeria seems to have no magic formula; no means of solving a problem without creating another.

Democracy initially seemed an opportunity to annihilate tyranny, but has instead increased it. Rule of law, freedom of speech and other democratic ethics are consistently being violated by the ruling elites and “converted democrat”. Nigeria is fast becoming the worst country for democracy as franchise have become an object of attack. This piece appraises the flaws of Nigerian elections, particularly the Kogi and Bayelsa governorship poll, and the pundit’s verdict.

The people of Kogi and Bayelsa trooped out on November 16 to elect their choice for the state’s top job. The exercise which should ordinarily be civil and peaceful was marred by unprecedented violence and electoral fraud. Gun-wielding thugs, aided by the security agencies, disrupted the electoral process from which Nigeria’s democracy is supposed to grow.

Perhaps those in positions of authority misconstrued duty as favour. In a democracy, individuals are morally responsible to vote their conscience, and government is duty-bound to provide the enabling environment, ensuring the wish of the majority prevails. Once the environment is not enabling, the outcome of an important exercise such as election cannot be taken as the wish of the majority. Factoring this in, although Yahaya Bello of Kogi state and David Lyon of Bayelsa were return elected, they did not win the election. This by no means underestimate their ability to win in a credible contest.

Repression of opposition candidates, their supporters and polling agents made the elections a democratic deficit. In Kogi state, incumbent Governor Yahaya Bello of the All Progressives Congress (APC) commanded violence on his contenders. Stalwarts of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) were routinely harassed, injured and killed. Thugs invaded their homes, vandalized them, and set some ablaze. Several cars and valuables were destroyed, forcing the targets to go into hiding. This destabilized PDP and SDP from making last minutes canvassing to woo undecided voters; giving APC an unfair advantage. The attack surprisingly continued even after APC ‘won’. Thugs set the home of a PDP women leader ablaze and callously watch her burn to ashes.

Suppression of voters is also one of the unholy strategies APC employed. The party carefully studied the voting pattern of both states, ignite violence in opposition strongholds, but protected hers. In Kogi, election proceeded smoothly in the Central district where Bello hails from, while the East and West were confronted with extreme violence. In Bayelsa, people were restrained from voting in Southern Ijaw where PDP is likely to garner majority vote. The party was also stifled in Nembe. The outturn of both elections suggests APC has devised different illicit strategies for winning elections. Repression and suppression are autocratic tenets, a breach of the fundamental principle of fairness that must be adhered to in a democracy.

Disenfranchisement made the elections a democratic deficit. Violence and intimidation denied eligible voters the opportunity to cast their ballot. Fear kept people indoor while majority of those who turned up scampered for safety as thugs attack opposition strongholds in Kogi. Many lost their votes via ballot-box snatching. In Bayelsa, the Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement, popularly called YIAGA Africa reports that INEC announced falsified results and election did not hold in 24 percent of the state’s polling units. Disenfranchising such a significant percentage of the population utterly discredits the outcome of the election. How do we pacify the 24 percent whose preferred candidates lost because they were denied the opportunity to vote? Such inequity makes the election a democratic deficit.

Monetary inducement of voters and electoral officers made the elections a democratic deficit. Agents of the dominant parties, particularly the APC and PDP always offer cash for votes, and did so in Kogi and Bayelsa states. They shared between N500 to N3000, although APC outspend the PDP, being the ruling party at the federal level.

Two categories of persons should be criticized for vote-buying, but Nigerians mostly condemn one; they blame the buyers (politicians) and absolve the sellers (voters). Vote-buying has become so prevalent that majority of the electorate expect to be tipped for voting. But then, should we blame the poor voters for demanding a continuation of what the parties started? Nonetheless, Nigerians need to be enlightened that politicians are descendants of the devil; they have no free gift. Vote-buying is a business and politicians who invest in the trade must recoup their money and make extraordinary profits, hence the prevalence of under-performing governments.

Electoral fraud and INEC’s partisanship made the elections a democratic deficit. An electoral umpire must be impartial to all contending parties, but INEC fell short. In Bayelsa, election materials stolen by APC thugs surfaced during collation and INEC allegedly record the votes. The umpire announced bogus results in favor of APC in Sagbama, Ogbia, Nembe, and Southern Ijaw. It’s baffling how these troubled spots returned high votes; the Borno 2015 template was apparently revived. How could the result of Nembe – a troubled spot where people would naturally abstain from voting – reflect over 80 percent turnout, while the result of a peaceful area such as Yenagoa, the state capital reflects less than 40 percent turnout? Such result is a clear indication of electoral fraud.

Electoral fraud was rife, but INEC lacks the courage to wield the big stick, especially against APC. In Kogi state, armed thugs, aided by the security agencies, manipulated the poll in favour of APC. Ballot boxes were either carted away, destroyed, or changed with already thumb-printed ones. To Nigerians dismay, INEC counted the false votes rather than cancel the results of the affected polling units. To top it all off, bogus figures were awarded in favour of APC in crisis-ridden areas and spaces PDP has fair support. For instance, INEC claimed APC scored 112,764 votes, while PDP only garnered 139 votes in Okene local government of Kogi State. This cannot be true.

A party with structure and spread like the PDP can’t garner such a paltry vote at a time Kogites were determined to sack Bello’s failed government. The bizarre result is a reflection of the extreme rigging perpetrated in almost every area of the state. In a credible contest, even SDP’s Akpoti would garner more than 139 votes in Okene. It is perturbing PDP didn’t score such a paltry vote during the Lagos 2019 governorship election. Please bear in mind that although the revenue generated in Lagos state is incommensurable with its rate of development, Akinwunmi Ambode’s administration performed much better than that of Bello in Kogi. Yet the godfather denied him return ticket, but supported Bello.

Unprofessional and partisan conduct of the security agencies made the elections a democratic deficit. Over 60,000 police officers and crime fighting equipment were deployed for the Bayelsa and Kogi governorship elections. Yet violence prevailed. The military compromised the election in Bayelsa, while police jeopardized the exercise in Kogi. Policemen accosted gun-wielding thugs to polling units across Kogi West and East district to snatch or stuff ballot boxes, attack opposition figures, and distribute money to APC agents. The thugs moved freely with vehicles despite restriction of movement, manipulating and destabilizing the election.

APC agents operated under massive protection while that of PDP and other opposition parties were left in the cold. Recall that prior to the election, candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Natasha Akpoti’s campaign office was looted and destroyed by alleged APC thugs, but the perpetrators weren’t arrested. Take a breather to imagine how the security agencies, the state government and the presidency would have reacted if such happens to any APC secretariat.

At the venue of the Peace Accord signing meeting, Akpoti and her aides were molested, her campaign vehicles were destroyed by APC thugs, while the police looked on. The raging thugs disrupted the meeting, which had several dignitaries present, including Mohammed Adamu, the Inspector General of Police (IGP). Yet none has been prosecuted. Take another breather to imagine how the IGP would have reacted if the thugs had no state’s backing.

The military’s massacre of Shiite members who obstructed the Chief of Army Staff’s convey should give you a clear sense of how the IGP would have probably reacted, if the thugs were not operating under the authority of the powers that be. However, subjecting the personality of the IGP to ridicule in a bid to win elections is a bad precedence with devastating consequences. Politicians need to desist from sacrificing the image and efficiency of national institutions on the altar of politics.

IGP Adamu stated that the policemen that colluded with thugs to disrupt the Kogi and Bayelsa elections were fake policemen. Nigerians are wondering how fake policemen, if any, overpowered the over 60,000 trained policemen deployed for the elections. Does it imply that fake policemen have better strategy and weapon than the real police? Assuming, but not conceding that fake policemen committed the anomalies, was the police helicopter that dropped canisters and opened fire on voters in PDP strongholds piloted by fake policemen? The IGP should come up with a better excuse or apologize for failing Nigerians.

Police announced making eleven arrests, but none were paraded. Many wonders why the same police that’s always eager to parade criminal suspects is reluctant to parade the electoral offenders. Besides, was it just the eleven persons arrested that perpetrated the extreme violence reported across the 21 local governments in Kogi state? It is most disheartening that the same police that couldn’t provide adequate security in just two states reigned terror on non-violent IPOB members, Shiite devotees and Revolution Now protesters.

INEC and the security agencies failed in every respect. Their inefficiencies significantly make Nigerian elections a democratic deficit. In Kogi and Bayelsa, electoral fraud prevailed despite INEC’s promise of a free, fair and credible election. Violence prevailed despite the deployment of over 60,000 police officers and crime fighting equipment such as armoured tanks and surveillance helicopters.

Vote-buying prevailed despite the deployment of officers of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Both agencies made no arrest, despite extensive video evidences showing the face of vote buyers and sellers. Clandestine moves to disrupt the electoral process went undetected, and were freely perpetrated, despite the deployment of officers from the Department of State Security (DSS).

Election in Nigeria is one of the most expensive in the world, but far from being the most credible. No less than nine persons met their death during the Kogi and Bayelsa polls. A police officer, a youth corps member, Senator Dino Melaye’s nephew, and Kogi PDP women leader were among those unfortunate. APC needs to caution its members has the opposition parties lack federal might, a major instrument needed to perpetrate violence and electoral fraud.

Elections can’t be credible without the political will to make it happen. Nigerian government must put measures in place to forestall the use of illegal approaches to win elections. Such measures could include reducing the premium on political offices, signing the amended electoral bill into law, revamping the security architecture, and establishing an independent electoral offences commission.

Appraising the Pundit’s Verdict

It is habitual for the writer, hereafter titled Pundit, to foretell the outcome of elections. Notable among his several accurate predictions is foretelling ex-President Jonathan’s defeat in 2015. The Pundit foretold President Buhari’s re-election in 2019, against the prediction of reputable global institutions such as Williams and Associates, and The Economist. He also accurately foretold the outcome of the 2019 governorship election in 23 out of 29 states.

Despite his serial accurate predictions, the pundit’s prognosis of the elections in focus was not a totally good outing. Foreseen, but unprecedented violence and electoral fraud mainly forbid some of his predictions from coming to pass. In a piece titled “Kogi and Bayelsa 2019 Governorship Election: Foretelling the Outcome”, the Pundit predicted Duoye Diri’s (PDP) win in Bayelsa, but he lost. PDP’s Dino Melaye also failed to win the Kogi West senatorial rerun on the first vote as predicted. The election ended inconclusive. However, APC’s Yahaya Bello ‘won’ the Kogi governorship election as predicted, although not by rerun.

In truth, the pundit never saw APC’s win in Bayelsa coming. His prediction was mainly flawed by ex-president Jonathan’s secret endorsement of APC candidate, David Lyon. Although there were words on the street, the pundit believed Jonathan won’t work against his lifelong party, the PDP. This made him assert that “politics is an interest driven game; hence it is not impossible, but most unlikely that Jonathan would support APC. This is premised on the manner the party has disparaged him since he lost power in 2015.”

The pundit was wrong on Jonathan. He assumed the ex-president won’t support APC despite the dispute between him and Governor Seriake Dickson, his estranged godson. Jonathan acted like his erstwhile godfather, ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo. Despite unilaterally bringing Jonathan to power under the PDP, Obasanjo facilitated his defeat in 2015 by backing the APC. The party (APC) praised Obasanjo to high heavens, but abandoned him shortly after forming government. Jonathan’s romance with APC may also not end well. He may also get the Obasanjo treatment.

Another factor the pundit failed to consider during prediction is the (ex)militants endorsement of Lyon. Bayelsa is the den of dreaded militants who have the power to influence the outcome of elections. But then again, PDP has been governing Bayelsa since 1999, hence it is not amiss to think, in structure and strength, “PDP is in Bayelsa, what APC is in Lagos”. Moreover, the judicial invalidation of APC’s candidacy before the election naturally made winning an unattainable height, but the party pulled off a surprise.

INEC declared the Kogi West senatorial poll inconclusive with Smart Adeyemi (APC) leading Dino Melaye (PDP) with over 20,000 votes. As earlier discussed, the Kogi senatorial and governorship poll is a daylight robbery and fiery of public sovereignty. The pundit strongly stands by his prediction analysis and assertion that Melaye (PDP) would defeat Adeyemi (APC) in a free, fair and credible contest.

The pundit foretold Bello’s emergence as governor-elect in Kogi state based on his disposition to violence and electoral fraud. In the prediction piece, the pundit explicitly stated that “In a free, fair and credible contest, PDP’s Musa Wada would defeat APC’s Yahaya Bello. But the election is not going to be free; not going to be fair; and not going to be credible. Thugs would disperse voters and smash ballot boxes in Wada’s stronghold. The security agencies won’t arrest disruptors, and would be grossly partisan.” The lines came to pass exactly as foretold.

Nigerians never assumed Bello could bizarrely unleash violence on those he aspired to govern. The poor performing governor ingeniously took violence from the realm of creating inconclusive elections to straight win. His conduct ratifies the pundit’s argument that “he’s not deserving of governorship or any other position.” Bello’s insatiable thirst for power made him throw caution to the wind. He eventually got the power, but earned negative fame. The 44-year-old ruined his presidential prospect and wrote his name in the wrong page of history. Blessed is the one who defines Nigerian election as a process where thugs decide, police support, INEC declares, and the court affirm.

Omoshola Deji is a political and public affairs analyst. He wrote in via [email protected]

Modupe Gbadeyanka is a fast-rising journalist with Business Post Nigeria. Her passion for journalism is amazing. She is willing to learn more with a view to becoming one of the best pen-pushers in Nigeria. Her role models are the duo of CNN's Richard Quest and Christiane Amanpour.

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On the Gazetted Tax Laws: What if Dasuki Was Indifferent?

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Abdussamad Dasuki

By Isah Kamisu Madachi

For over a week now, flipping through the pages of Nigerian newspapers, social media, and other media platforms, the dominant issue trending nationwide has been the discovery of significant discrepancies between the gazetted version of the tax laws made available to the public and what was actually passed by the Nigerian legislature.

Since this shocking discovery by a member of the House of Representatives, opinions from tax experts, public affairs analysts, activists, civil society organisations, opposition politicians, and professional bodies have been pouring in.

Many interesting events capable of burying the tempo of the debate have recently surfaced in the media, yet the tax law discussion persists due to how deeply entrenched public interest is in the contested laws.

However, while many view the issue from angles such as a breach of public trust, a violation of legislative privilege by the executive council, the passage of an ill-prepared law and so on, I see it from a different, narrower, and governance-centred perspective.

What brought this issue to public attention was an alarm raised by Abdulsammad Dasuki, a member of the House of Representatives from Sokoto State, during a plenary on December 17, 2025. He called the attention of the House to what he identified as discrepancies between the gazetted version of the tax laws he obtained from the Federal Ministry of Information and what was actually debated, agreed upon, and passed on the floors of both the House and the Senate.

He requested that the Speaker ensure all relevant documents, including the harmonised versions, the votes and proceedings of both chambers, and the gazetted copies, are brought before the Committee of the Whole for careful scrutiny. The lawmaker expressed concern over what he described as a serious breach of his legislative privilege.

Beyond that, however, my concern is about how safe and protected Nigerians’ interests are in the hands of our lawmakers at the National Assembly. This ongoing discussion raises a critical question about representation in Nigeria. Does this mean that if Dasuki had also been indifferent and had not bothered to utilise the Freedom of Information Act 2011 to obtain the gazetted version of the laws from the Federal Ministry of Information, take time to study it, and make comparisons, there would have been no cause for alarm from any of Nigeria’s 360 House of Representatives members and 109 senators? Do lawmakers discard the confidence we reposed in them immediately after election results are declared?

This debate should indeed serve a latent function of waking us up to the reality of the glaring disconnect between public interest and the interests of our representatives. The legislature in a democratic setting is a critical institution that goes beyond routine plenaries that are often uninteresting and sparsely attended by the lawmakers. It is meant to be a space for scrutiny, deliberation, and the protection of public interest, especially when complex laws with wide social consequences are involved.

We saw Ali Ndume in a short video clip that recently swept the media, furiously saying during a verbal altercation with Adams Oshiomhole over ambassadorial screening that “the Senate is not a joke.” The Senate is, of course, not a joke, and either should the entire National Assembly be.

Ideally, it should not be a joke to us or to the legislators themselves. Therefore, we should not shy away from discussing how disinterested those entrusted with the task of representing us, and primarily protecting our interests, appear to be in our collective affairs.

It is not a coincidence that even before the current debate around the tax reform law, it had continued to generate controversy since its inception. It also does not take quantum mechanics to understand that something is fundamentally wrong when almost nobody truly understands the law. Thanks to social media, I have come across numerous skits, write-ups, and commentaries attempting to explain it, but often followed by opposing responses saying that the authors either did not understand the law themselves or did not take sufficient time to study it.

The controversy around the gazetted Tax Reform Laws should not end with public outrage or media debates alone. It should force a deeper reflection on how laws are made, checked, and defended in Nigeria’s democracy. A system that relies on the alertness of one lawmaker to prevent serious legislative discrepancies is not a resilient or reliable system. Representation cannot be occasional and vigilance cannot be optional.

Nigerians deserve a legislature that safeguards their interests, not one that notices breaches only when a few individuals choose to be different and look closely. If this ongoing debate does not lead to formidable internal checks and a renewed sense of responsibility among lawmakers, then the problem is far bigger than a flawed gazette. When legislative processes fail, it is ordinary Nigerians who bear the cost through policies they did not scrutinize and consequences they did not consent to.

Isah Kamisu Madachi is a public policy enthusiast and development practitioner. He writes from Abuja and can be reached via: [email protected]

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After the Capital Rush: Who Really Wins Nigeria’s Bank Recapitalisation?

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CBN Building Governor Yemi Cardoso

By Blaise Udunze

By any standard, Nigeria’s ongoing bank recapitalisation exercise is one of the most consequential financial sector reforms since the 2004-2005 consolidation that shrank the number of banks from 89 to 25. Then, as now, the stated objective was stability to have stronger balance sheets, better shock absorption, and banks capable of financing long-term economic growth.

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), in 2024, mandated a sweeping recapitalisation exercise compelling banks to raise substantially higher capital bases depending on their license categories. The categorisation mandated that every Tier-1 deposit money bank with international authorization is to warehouse N500 billion minimum capital base, and a national bank must have N200 billion, while a regional bank must have N50 billion by the deadline of 31st March 2026. According to the apex bank, the objectives were to strengthen resilience, create a more robust buffer against shocks, and position Nigerian banks as global competitors capable of funding a $1 trillion economy.

But in the thick of the race to comply and as the dust gradually settles, a far bigger conversation has emerged, one that cuts to the heart of how our banking system works. What will the aftermath of recapitalisation mean for Nigeria’s banking landscape, financial inclusion agenda, and real-sector development?

Beyond the headlines of rights issues, private placements, and billionaire founders boosting stakes, every Nigerians deserve a sober assessment of what has changed, and what still must change, if recapitalisation is to translate into a genuinely improved banking system.

The points are who benefits most from its evolution, and whether ordinary Nigerians will feel the promised transformation in their everyday financial lives, because history has taught us that recapitalisation is never a neutral policy. The fact remains that recapitalization creates winners and losers, restructures incentives, and often leads to unintended outcomes that outlive the reform itself.

Concentration Risk: When the Big Get Bigger

Recapitalisation is meant to make banks stronger, and at the same time, it risks making them fewer and bigger, concentrating power and risks in an ever-narrowing circle. Nigeria’s Tier-1 banks, those already controlling roughly 70 percent of banking assets, are poised to expand further in both balance sheet size and market influence. This deepens the divide between the “haves” and “have-nots” within the sector.

A critical fallout of this exercise has been the acceleration of consolidation. Stronger banks with ready access to capital markets, like Access Holdings and Zenith Bank, have managed to meet or exceed the new thresholds early by raising funds through rights issues and public offerings. Access Bank boosted its capital to nearly N595 billion, and Zenith Bank to about N615 billion.

In contrast, banks that lack deep pockets or the ability to quickly mobilise investors are lagging. The results always show that the biggest banks raise capital faster and cheaper, while smaller banks struggle to keep pace.

As of mid-2025, fewer than 14 of Nigeria’s 24 commercial banks met the required capital base, meaning a significant number were still scrambling, turning to rights issues, private placements, mergers, and even licensing downgrades to survive.

The danger here is not merely numerical. It is systemic: as capital becomes more concentrated, the banking system could inadvertently mimic oligopolistic tendencies, reducing competition, narrowing choices for customers, and potentially heightening systemic risk should one of these “too-big-to-fail” institutions falter.

Capital Flight or Strategic Expansion? The Foreign Subsidiary Question

One of the most contentious aspects of the recapitalisation aftermath has been the deployment of newly raised capital, especially its use outside Nigeria. Several banks, flush with liquidity from rights issues and injections, have signalled or executed investments in foreign subsidiaries and expansions abroad, like what we are experiencing with Nigerian banks spreading their tentacles to the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, and beyond. Zenith Bank’s planned expansion into the Ivory Coast exemplifies this outward push.

While international diversification can be a sound strategic move for multinational banks, there is an uncomfortable optics and developmental question here: why is Nigerian money being deployed abroad when millions of Nigerians remain unbanked or underbanked at home?

According to the World Bank, a large number of Nigeria’s adult population still lack access to formal financial services, while millions of SMEs, micro-entrepreneurs, and rural households remain on the edge, underserved by traditional banks that now chase profitability and scale.

Of a truth, redirecting Nigerian capital to foreign markets may deliver shareholder returns, but it does little in the short term to advance domestic financial inclusion, poverty reduction, or grassroots economic participation. The optics of capital flight, even when legal and strategic, demand scrutiny, especially in a nation still struggling with deep regional and demographic disparities.

Impact on Credit and the Real Economy

For the ordinary Nigerian, the most important question is simple: will recapitalisation make credit cheaper and more accessible?

History suggests the answer is not automatic. The tradition in Nigeria’s bank system is mainly to protect returns, and for this reason, many banks respond to higher capital requirements by tightening lending standards, raising interest rates, or focusing on low-risk government securities rather than private-sector loans, because raising capital is expensive, and banks are profit-driven institutions.  Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), often described as the engine of growth, are usually the first casualties of such risk aversion.

If recapitalisation results in stronger balance sheets but weaker lending to the real economy, then its benefits remain largely cosmetic. The economy does not grow on capital adequacy ratios alone; it grows when banks take measured risks to finance production, innovation, and consumption.

Retail Banking Retreat: Handing the Mass Market to Fintechs?

In recent years, we have witnessed one of the most striking shifts, or a gradual retreat of traditional banks from mass retail banking, particularly low-income and informal customers.

The question running through the hearts of many is whether Nigerian banks are retreating from retail banking, leaving space for fintech disruptors to fill the void.

In recent years, players like OPAY, Moniepoint, Palmpay, and a host of digital financial services arms have become de facto retail banking platforms for millions of Nigerians. They provide everyday payment services, wallet functionalities, micro-loans, and QR-enabled commerce, areas traditional banks once dominated. This trend has accelerated as banks chase corporate clients where margins are higher and risk profiles perceived as more manageable. The true picture of the financial landscape today is that the fintechs own the retail space, and banks dominate corporate and institutional finance. But it is unclear or uncertain if this model can continue to work effectively in the long term.

Despite the areas in which the Fintechs excel, whether in agility, product innovation, and customer experience, they still rely heavily on underlying banking infrastructure for liquidity, settlement, and regulatory compliance. Should the retail banking ecosystem become split between digital wallets and corporate corridors, rather than being vertically integrated within banks, systemic liquidity dynamics and financial stability could be affected.

Nigerians deserve a banking system where the comforts and conveniences of digital finance are backed by the stability, regulatory oversight, and capital strength of licensed banks, not a system where traditional banks withdraw from retail, leaving unregulated or lightly regulated players to carry that mantle.

Corporate Governance: When Founders Tighten Their Grip

The recapitalisation exercise has not been merely a technical capital-raising exercise; it has become a theatre of power plays at the top. In several banks, founders and major investors have used the exercise to increase their stakes, concentrating ownership even as they extol the virtues of financial resilience.

Prominent founders, from Tony Elumelu at UBA to Femi Otedola at First Holdco and Jim Ovia at Zenith Bank, have all been actively increasing their shareholdings. These moves raise legitimate questions about corporate governance when founders increase control during a regulatory exercise. Are they driven by confidence in their institutions, or are they fortifying personal and strategic influence amid industry restructuring?

Though there might be nothing inherently wrong with founders or shareholders demonstrating faith in their institutions, one fact remains that the governance challenge lies not simply in who holds the shares, but how decisions are made and whose interests are prioritised. Will banks maintain robust internal checks and balances, ensuring that capital deployment aligns with national development goals? The question is whether the CBN is equipped with adequate supervisory bandwidth and tools to check potential excesses if emerging shareholder concentrations translate into undue influence or risks to financial stability. These are questions that transcend annual reports; they strike at the heart of trust in the system.

Regional Disparity in Lending: Lagos Is Not Nigeria

One of the persistent criticisms of Nigerian banking is regional lending inequality. It has been said that most bank loans are still overwhelmingly concentrated in Lagos and the Southwest, despite decades of financial deepening in this region; large swathes of the North, Southeast, and other underserved regions receive disproportionately smaller shares of credit. This imbalance not only undermines inclusive growth but also fuels perceptions of economic exclusion.

Recapitalisation, in theory, should have enhanced banks’ capacity to support broader economic activity. Yet, the reality remains that loans and advances are overwhelmingly concentrated in economic hubs like Lagos.

The CBN must deploy clear incentives and penalties to encourage geographic diversification of lending. This could include differentiated capital requirements, credit guarantees, or tax incentives tied to regional loan portfolios. A recapitalised banking system that does not finance national development is a missed opportunity.

Cybersecurity, Staff Welfare, and the Technology Deficit

Beyond balance sheets and brand expansion, there is a human and technological dimension to the banking sector’s challenge. Fraud remains rampant, and one of the leading frustrations voiced by Nigerians involves failed transactions, delayed reversals, and poor digital experience. Banks can raise capital, but if they fail to invest heavily in cybersecurity, fraud detection, staff training, and welfare, the everyday customer will continue to view the banking system as unreliable.

Nigeria’s fintech revolution has thrived precisely because it has pushed incumbents to become more customer-centric, agile, and tech-savvy. If banks now flush with capital don’t channel a portion of those funds into robust IT systems, workforce development, fraud mitigation, and seamless customer service, then the recapitalisation will have achieved little beyond stronger balance sheets. In short, Nigerians should feel the difference, not merely in stock prices and market capitalisation, but in smooth banking apps, instant reversals, responsive customer care, and secure platforms.

The Banks Left Behind: Mergers, Failures, or Forced Restructuring?

With fewer than half the banks having fully complied with the recapitalisation requirements deep into 2025, a pressing question is: what awaits those that lag? Many banks are still closing capital gaps that run into hundreds of billions of naira. According to industry estimates, the total recapitalisation gap across the sector could reach as much as N4.7 trillion if all requirements are strictly enforced.

Banks that fail to meet the March 2026 deadline face a few options:

–       Forced M&A. Regulators could effectively compel weaker banks to merge with stronger ones, echoing the consolidation wave of 2005 that reduced the sector from 89 to 25 banks.

–       License downgrades or conversions. Some banks may choose to operate at a lower license category that demands a smaller capital base.

–       Exits or closures. In extreme cases, banks that can neither raise capital nor find a merger partner might be forced out of the market.

This regulatory pressure should not be construed merely as punitive. It is part of the CBN’s broader architecture of ensuring that only solvent, well-capitalised, and risk-prepared institutions operate. However, the transition must be managed carefully to prevent contagion, protect depositors, and preserve confidence.

Why Are Tier-1 Banks Still Chasing Capital?

Perhaps the most intriguing puzzle is why some Tier-1 banks, long regarded as strong and profitable, are aggressively raising capital. Even banks thought to be among the strongest, such as UBA, First Holdco, Fidelity, GTCO, and FCMB, have struggled to close their capital gaps. UBA, for instance, succeeded in raising around N355 billion toward its N500 billion target at one point and planned additional rights issues to bridge the remainder.

This reveals another reality that capital is not just numbers on paper; it is investor confidence, market appetite, and macroeconomic stability.

One can also say that the answer lies partly in ambition to expand into new markets, infrastructure financing, and compliance with stricter global standards.

However, it also reflects deeper structural pressures, including currency depreciation eroding capital, rising non-performing loans, and the substantial funding required to support Nigeria’s development needs. Even giants are discovering that yesterday’s capital is no longer sufficient for tomorrow’s challenges.

Reform Without Deception

As the Nigerian banking sector recapitalization exercise comes to a close by March 31, 2026, the ultimate test will be whether the reforms deliver on their transformational promise.

Some of the concerns in the minds of Nigerians today will be to see a system that supports inclusive growth, equitable credit distribution, world-class customer service, and resilient financial intermediation. Or will we see a sector that, despite larger capital bases, still reflects old hierarchies, geographic biases, and operational friction? The cynic might say that recapitalisation simply made big banks bigger and empowered dominant shareholders.

But a more hopeful perspective invites stakeholders, including regulators, customers, civil society, and bankers themselves, to co-design the next chapter of Nigerian banking; one that balances scale with inclusion, profitability with impact, and stability with innovation. The difference will be made not by press releases or shareholder announcements, but by deliberate regulatory action and measurable improvements in how banks serve the economy.

For now, the capital has been raised, but the true capital that counts is the confidence Nigerians place in their banks every time they log into an app, make a transfer, or deposit their life’s savings. Only when that trust is visible in everyday experience can we say that recapitalisation has truly succeeded.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]

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Ledig at One: The Year We Turned Stablecoins Into Real Liquidity for the Real World

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Ledig

Ledig, one of Africa’s leading fintech infrastructure companies, marked its first anniversary this year. The company used the anniversary to reflect on how it has approached one of the most persistent problems in cross-border finance: moving large sums of money into and out of emerging markets without the uncertainty, delays, or volatility present in emerging markets.

According to the company, many businesses operating across Africa and similar markets had long dealt with unreliable settlement timelines, opaque processes, and a lack of credible hedging options. Transactions often depended on manual coordination and informal assurances, leaving companies exposed to both operational risk and volatile exchange rates.

Ledig said this reality shaped its decision to enter the market with a focus on scale, speed, and predictability rather than small retail transfers.

The company explained that its infrastructure was designed from the outset to handle high-value flows, ranging from hundreds of thousands of dollars to several million, with settlement measured in seconds rather than days. It built an instant liquidity engine, demonstrating a two-way system that allows businesses to convert stablecoins to local currencies and local currencies back to stablecoins with equal efficiency, demonstrating that corporate cash flows frequently move in both directions, sometimes within the same week.

Ledig noted that early users typically began with smaller test transactions before increasing volumes once they saw payments settle quickly and reliably. That pattern, it said, contributed to the platform crossing $100 million in processed volume within its first year, driven largely by international companies operating across Africa and other emerging markets.

Much of the underlying complexity associated with stablecoin payments, the company added, remains intentionally hidden from users. Wallet management, local settlement rails, and an adaptive foreign exchange engine operate in the background, while clients interact through a simple dashboard or API. Ledig emphasised that users do not need to engage directly with crypto mechanics, as stablecoins function as an internal settlement layer rather than a product they must actively manage.

Beyond settlement speed, Ledig identified currency volatility as a major challenge facing businesses in emerging markets. To address this, the firm introduced a derivatives hedging protocol designed to help businesses lock in value earlier and reduce exposure to adverse exchange rate movements.

The company reported that this hedging product initially operated off-chain and still facilitated over $55 million in activity. It is now transitioning the protocol fully on-chain, with Base selected as the deployment network due to its compatibility with the stablecoins used in Ledig’s settlement flows. Ledig said the move is intended to provide greater transparency and a cleaner execution environment tailored to commercial hedging needs rather than speculative trading.

Ledig also pointed out that its relatively small team has been an advantage rather than a limitation. By avoiding excessive expansion early on, the company said it was able to focus on building modular components that work independently but integrate into a broader treasury and risk management system. These components cover stablecoin-to-fiat conversion, fiat-to-stablecoin flows, foreign exchange management, treasury support, and hedging, allowing businesses to assemble a unified setup for money movement and risk control.

While the company does not publicly disclose detailed revenue figures, it stated that its strongest indicator of growth has been repeat, high-volume usage. Ledig said clients continue to route core operational payments through its platform, including payroll, supplier settlements, and expansion-related transfers, particularly in markets where delays can disrupt entire business operations.

Looking ahead to 2026, Ledig said its priorities include scaling the on-chain deployment of its derivatives hedging protocol, expanding liquidity capacity to support even larger transactions, and strengthening its licensing and regulatory framework to accommodate more institutional partners. The company added that it remains focused on reducing friction for businesses entering or operating in emerging markets.

In closing, Ledig described its first year as an early step rather than a milestone. It reiterated that its objective remains centered on enabling fast, large-value money movement and protecting businesses from currency volatility through a proven hedging framework, while keeping the underlying technology largely invisible to users.

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