Feature/OPED
Nigerian Elections: A Democratic Deficit
By Omoshola Deji
First Osun, then Kano and now Kogi and Bayelsa States. The spate of violence during election brings doubt on Nigeria’s ability to get it right. Unlike other nations, Nigeria seems to have no magic formula; no means of solving a problem without creating another.
Democracy initially seemed an opportunity to annihilate tyranny, but has instead increased it. Rule of law, freedom of speech and other democratic ethics are consistently being violated by the ruling elites and “converted democrat”. Nigeria is fast becoming the worst country for democracy as franchise have become an object of attack. This piece appraises the flaws of Nigerian elections, particularly the Kogi and Bayelsa governorship poll, and the pundit’s verdict.
The people of Kogi and Bayelsa trooped out on November 16 to elect their choice for the state’s top job. The exercise which should ordinarily be civil and peaceful was marred by unprecedented violence and electoral fraud. Gun-wielding thugs, aided by the security agencies, disrupted the electoral process from which Nigeria’s democracy is supposed to grow.
Perhaps those in positions of authority misconstrued duty as favour. In a democracy, individuals are morally responsible to vote their conscience, and government is duty-bound to provide the enabling environment, ensuring the wish of the majority prevails. Once the environment is not enabling, the outcome of an important exercise such as election cannot be taken as the wish of the majority. Factoring this in, although Yahaya Bello of Kogi state and David Lyon of Bayelsa were return elected, they did not win the election. This by no means underestimate their ability to win in a credible contest.
Repression of opposition candidates, their supporters and polling agents made the elections a democratic deficit. In Kogi state, incumbent Governor Yahaya Bello of the All Progressives Congress (APC) commanded violence on his contenders. Stalwarts of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) were routinely harassed, injured and killed. Thugs invaded their homes, vandalized them, and set some ablaze. Several cars and valuables were destroyed, forcing the targets to go into hiding. This destabilized PDP and SDP from making last minutes canvassing to woo undecided voters; giving APC an unfair advantage. The attack surprisingly continued even after APC ‘won’. Thugs set the home of a PDP women leader ablaze and callously watch her burn to ashes.
Suppression of voters is also one of the unholy strategies APC employed. The party carefully studied the voting pattern of both states, ignite violence in opposition strongholds, but protected hers. In Kogi, election proceeded smoothly in the Central district where Bello hails from, while the East and West were confronted with extreme violence. In Bayelsa, people were restrained from voting in Southern Ijaw where PDP is likely to garner majority vote. The party was also stifled in Nembe. The outturn of both elections suggests APC has devised different illicit strategies for winning elections. Repression and suppression are autocratic tenets, a breach of the fundamental principle of fairness that must be adhered to in a democracy.
Disenfranchisement made the elections a democratic deficit. Violence and intimidation denied eligible voters the opportunity to cast their ballot. Fear kept people indoor while majority of those who turned up scampered for safety as thugs attack opposition strongholds in Kogi. Many lost their votes via ballot-box snatching. In Bayelsa, the Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement, popularly called YIAGA Africa reports that INEC announced falsified results and election did not hold in 24 percent of the state’s polling units. Disenfranchising such a significant percentage of the population utterly discredits the outcome of the election. How do we pacify the 24 percent whose preferred candidates lost because they were denied the opportunity to vote? Such inequity makes the election a democratic deficit.
Monetary inducement of voters and electoral officers made the elections a democratic deficit. Agents of the dominant parties, particularly the APC and PDP always offer cash for votes, and did so in Kogi and Bayelsa states. They shared between N500 to N3000, although APC outspend the PDP, being the ruling party at the federal level.
Two categories of persons should be criticized for vote-buying, but Nigerians mostly condemn one; they blame the buyers (politicians) and absolve the sellers (voters). Vote-buying has become so prevalent that majority of the electorate expect to be tipped for voting. But then, should we blame the poor voters for demanding a continuation of what the parties started? Nonetheless, Nigerians need to be enlightened that politicians are descendants of the devil; they have no free gift. Vote-buying is a business and politicians who invest in the trade must recoup their money and make extraordinary profits, hence the prevalence of under-performing governments.
Electoral fraud and INEC’s partisanship made the elections a democratic deficit. An electoral umpire must be impartial to all contending parties, but INEC fell short. In Bayelsa, election materials stolen by APC thugs surfaced during collation and INEC allegedly record the votes. The umpire announced bogus results in favor of APC in Sagbama, Ogbia, Nembe, and Southern Ijaw. It’s baffling how these troubled spots returned high votes; the Borno 2015 template was apparently revived. How could the result of Nembe – a troubled spot where people would naturally abstain from voting – reflect over 80 percent turnout, while the result of a peaceful area such as Yenagoa, the state capital reflects less than 40 percent turnout? Such result is a clear indication of electoral fraud.
Electoral fraud was rife, but INEC lacks the courage to wield the big stick, especially against APC. In Kogi state, armed thugs, aided by the security agencies, manipulated the poll in favour of APC. Ballot boxes were either carted away, destroyed, or changed with already thumb-printed ones. To Nigerians dismay, INEC counted the false votes rather than cancel the results of the affected polling units. To top it all off, bogus figures were awarded in favour of APC in crisis-ridden areas and spaces PDP has fair support. For instance, INEC claimed APC scored 112,764 votes, while PDP only garnered 139 votes in Okene local government of Kogi State. This cannot be true.
A party with structure and spread like the PDP can’t garner such a paltry vote at a time Kogites were determined to sack Bello’s failed government. The bizarre result is a reflection of the extreme rigging perpetrated in almost every area of the state. In a credible contest, even SDP’s Akpoti would garner more than 139 votes in Okene. It is perturbing PDP didn’t score such a paltry vote during the Lagos 2019 governorship election. Please bear in mind that although the revenue generated in Lagos state is incommensurable with its rate of development, Akinwunmi Ambode’s administration performed much better than that of Bello in Kogi. Yet the godfather denied him return ticket, but supported Bello.
Unprofessional and partisan conduct of the security agencies made the elections a democratic deficit. Over 60,000 police officers and crime fighting equipment were deployed for the Bayelsa and Kogi governorship elections. Yet violence prevailed. The military compromised the election in Bayelsa, while police jeopardized the exercise in Kogi. Policemen accosted gun-wielding thugs to polling units across Kogi West and East district to snatch or stuff ballot boxes, attack opposition figures, and distribute money to APC agents. The thugs moved freely with vehicles despite restriction of movement, manipulating and destabilizing the election.
APC agents operated under massive protection while that of PDP and other opposition parties were left in the cold. Recall that prior to the election, candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Natasha Akpoti’s campaign office was looted and destroyed by alleged APC thugs, but the perpetrators weren’t arrested. Take a breather to imagine how the security agencies, the state government and the presidency would have reacted if such happens to any APC secretariat.
At the venue of the Peace Accord signing meeting, Akpoti and her aides were molested, her campaign vehicles were destroyed by APC thugs, while the police looked on. The raging thugs disrupted the meeting, which had several dignitaries present, including Mohammed Adamu, the Inspector General of Police (IGP). Yet none has been prosecuted. Take another breather to imagine how the IGP would have reacted if the thugs had no state’s backing.
The military’s massacre of Shiite members who obstructed the Chief of Army Staff’s convey should give you a clear sense of how the IGP would have probably reacted, if the thugs were not operating under the authority of the powers that be. However, subjecting the personality of the IGP to ridicule in a bid to win elections is a bad precedence with devastating consequences. Politicians need to desist from sacrificing the image and efficiency of national institutions on the altar of politics.
IGP Adamu stated that the policemen that colluded with thugs to disrupt the Kogi and Bayelsa elections were fake policemen. Nigerians are wondering how fake policemen, if any, overpowered the over 60,000 trained policemen deployed for the elections. Does it imply that fake policemen have better strategy and weapon than the real police? Assuming, but not conceding that fake policemen committed the anomalies, was the police helicopter that dropped canisters and opened fire on voters in PDP strongholds piloted by fake policemen? The IGP should come up with a better excuse or apologize for failing Nigerians.
Police announced making eleven arrests, but none were paraded. Many wonders why the same police that’s always eager to parade criminal suspects is reluctant to parade the electoral offenders. Besides, was it just the eleven persons arrested that perpetrated the extreme violence reported across the 21 local governments in Kogi state? It is most disheartening that the same police that couldn’t provide adequate security in just two states reigned terror on non-violent IPOB members, Shiite devotees and Revolution Now protesters.
INEC and the security agencies failed in every respect. Their inefficiencies significantly make Nigerian elections a democratic deficit. In Kogi and Bayelsa, electoral fraud prevailed despite INEC’s promise of a free, fair and credible election. Violence prevailed despite the deployment of over 60,000 police officers and crime fighting equipment such as armoured tanks and surveillance helicopters.
Vote-buying prevailed despite the deployment of officers of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Both agencies made no arrest, despite extensive video evidences showing the face of vote buyers and sellers. Clandestine moves to disrupt the electoral process went undetected, and were freely perpetrated, despite the deployment of officers from the Department of State Security (DSS).
Election in Nigeria is one of the most expensive in the world, but far from being the most credible. No less than nine persons met their death during the Kogi and Bayelsa polls. A police officer, a youth corps member, Senator Dino Melaye’s nephew, and Kogi PDP women leader were among those unfortunate. APC needs to caution its members has the opposition parties lack federal might, a major instrument needed to perpetrate violence and electoral fraud.
Elections can’t be credible without the political will to make it happen. Nigerian government must put measures in place to forestall the use of illegal approaches to win elections. Such measures could include reducing the premium on political offices, signing the amended electoral bill into law, revamping the security architecture, and establishing an independent electoral offences commission.
Appraising the Pundit’s Verdict
It is habitual for the writer, hereafter titled Pundit, to foretell the outcome of elections. Notable among his several accurate predictions is foretelling ex-President Jonathan’s defeat in 2015. The Pundit foretold President Buhari’s re-election in 2019, against the prediction of reputable global institutions such as Williams and Associates, and The Economist. He also accurately foretold the outcome of the 2019 governorship election in 23 out of 29 states.
Despite his serial accurate predictions, the pundit’s prognosis of the elections in focus was not a totally good outing. Foreseen, but unprecedented violence and electoral fraud mainly forbid some of his predictions from coming to pass. In a piece titled “Kogi and Bayelsa 2019 Governorship Election: Foretelling the Outcome”, the Pundit predicted Duoye Diri’s (PDP) win in Bayelsa, but he lost. PDP’s Dino Melaye also failed to win the Kogi West senatorial rerun on the first vote as predicted. The election ended inconclusive. However, APC’s Yahaya Bello ‘won’ the Kogi governorship election as predicted, although not by rerun.
In truth, the pundit never saw APC’s win in Bayelsa coming. His prediction was mainly flawed by ex-president Jonathan’s secret endorsement of APC candidate, David Lyon. Although there were words on the street, the pundit believed Jonathan won’t work against his lifelong party, the PDP. This made him assert that “politics is an interest driven game; hence it is not impossible, but most unlikely that Jonathan would support APC. This is premised on the manner the party has disparaged him since he lost power in 2015.”
The pundit was wrong on Jonathan. He assumed the ex-president won’t support APC despite the dispute between him and Governor Seriake Dickson, his estranged godson. Jonathan acted like his erstwhile godfather, ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo. Despite unilaterally bringing Jonathan to power under the PDP, Obasanjo facilitated his defeat in 2015 by backing the APC. The party (APC) praised Obasanjo to high heavens, but abandoned him shortly after forming government. Jonathan’s romance with APC may also not end well. He may also get the Obasanjo treatment.
Another factor the pundit failed to consider during prediction is the (ex)militants endorsement of Lyon. Bayelsa is the den of dreaded militants who have the power to influence the outcome of elections. But then again, PDP has been governing Bayelsa since 1999, hence it is not amiss to think, in structure and strength, “PDP is in Bayelsa, what APC is in Lagos”. Moreover, the judicial invalidation of APC’s candidacy before the election naturally made winning an unattainable height, but the party pulled off a surprise.
INEC declared the Kogi West senatorial poll inconclusive with Smart Adeyemi (APC) leading Dino Melaye (PDP) with over 20,000 votes. As earlier discussed, the Kogi senatorial and governorship poll is a daylight robbery and fiery of public sovereignty. The pundit strongly stands by his prediction analysis and assertion that Melaye (PDP) would defeat Adeyemi (APC) in a free, fair and credible contest.
The pundit foretold Bello’s emergence as governor-elect in Kogi state based on his disposition to violence and electoral fraud. In the prediction piece, the pundit explicitly stated that “In a free, fair and credible contest, PDP’s Musa Wada would defeat APC’s Yahaya Bello. But the election is not going to be free; not going to be fair; and not going to be credible. Thugs would disperse voters and smash ballot boxes in Wada’s stronghold. The security agencies won’t arrest disruptors, and would be grossly partisan.” The lines came to pass exactly as foretold.
Nigerians never assumed Bello could bizarrely unleash violence on those he aspired to govern. The poor performing governor ingeniously took violence from the realm of creating inconclusive elections to straight win. His conduct ratifies the pundit’s argument that “he’s not deserving of governorship or any other position.” Bello’s insatiable thirst for power made him throw caution to the wind. He eventually got the power, but earned negative fame. The 44-year-old ruined his presidential prospect and wrote his name in the wrong page of history. Blessed is the one who defines Nigerian election as a process where thugs decide, police support, INEC declares, and the court affirm.
Omoshola Deji is a political and public affairs analyst. He wrote in via mo******@***oo.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
