Feature/OPED
Tinubu’s 15% Fuel Duty: Taxing Pain in a Broken Economy
By Blaise Udunze
When a nation is bleeding economically, with inflation at historic highs and citizens gasping for survival, one expects government policy to offer relief, not suffocation. Yet, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s approval of a 15 per cent import duty on petrol and diesel does the exact opposite for it taxing pain in a broken economy.
According to a presidential letter dated October 21, 2025, and addressed to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA), Tinubu directed the immediate implementation of the new import tariff as part of what the government described as a “market responsive import tariff framework.”
Signed by his Private Secretary, Damilotun Aderemi, the memo followed a proposal by the Executive Chairman of the FIRS, Zacch Adedeji, who claimed the measure was part of “ongoing reforms to boost local refining, ensure price stability, and strengthen the naira-based oil economy” in line with the so-called Renewed Hope Agenda.
In theory, it sounds noble with the aim to protect local refineries, promote energy security, and build a self-sustaining oil economy. But in practice, this policy is another dagger in the heart of Nigerians already crushed by the triple burden of fuel inflation, currency collapse, and dwindling purchasing power.
Because let’s face it, you cannot tax your way out of poverty when the people are already too poor to pay for survival.
The New Tariff: A Policy with Pain Written All Over It
Under the directive, importers will now pay a 15 per cent ad-valorem duty on the cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) value of imported petrol and diesel. The government argues that this will “align import costs with domestic market realities” and “protect local producers from unfair pricing.”
But industry data reveal what this truly means at current CIF levels, the new tariff will raise the landing cost of petrol by about N99.72 per litre. In other words, the already painful pump price hovering around N920 per litre in many parts of Nigeria could easily surpass N1,000 per litre within weeks.
This isn’t speculation, it is arithmetic. Depot operators have already sounded the alarm.
“As it is, the price of fuel may go above N1,000 per litre. I don’t know why the government will be adding more to people’s suffering,” one operator lamented in an interview.
Another industry source added, “Some of the importers are working in alignment with Dangote, which is why the last price increase was general. All players raised their prices at once. Without a clear framework to stabilise market forces, this import duty will worsen the hardship faced by consumers.”
So, while the government insists the duty “won’t choke supply or inflate prices beyond sustainable thresholds,” market realities tell a different story. The moment you tax importation of essential energy products in a country that barely refines any petrol domestically, you are effectively taxing the daily lives of millions who depend on that fuel to move, work, and eat.
An Economy Already in Free Fall
Nigeria’s economy today stands on the brink. The naira has lost nearly half its value since mid-2023, driving annual inflation above 34 percent, while food inflation hovers at 40 percent, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). In one of the world’s largest oil producing nations, fuel prices quintupled, increasing more than 514 percent from N175 in May 2023 to N900, transportation costs have skyrocketed with the “agbuero” extortion compounding issues, small businesses are collapsing, and households are cutting meals to survive.
When fuel prices rise, everything else follows, from food to transportation, rent, and the cost of living. The import duty therefore becomes a multiplier of misery, cascading through the economy in ways the government either underestimates or deliberately ignores.
Manufacturers who depend on diesel to power their factories will pass the extra cost to consumers. Transporters will raise fares. Traders will hike prices. Schools, hospitals, and logistics companies will all adjust their rates upward.
Within a few months, the 15 percent duty will translate into another round of inflationary spiral, deepening poverty and eroding the value of wages even further.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, over 133 million Nigerians already live-in multidimensional poverty. While the World Bank’s 139 million estimate translates to roughly six in 10 Nigerians living below poverty line. This new tax could easily push millions more into deeper deprivation.
Protecting Local Refineries or Creating a Monopoly?
The government justifies this new tariff as a way to “protect local refineries.” But this explanation exposes the deeper structural danger that Nigeria may be walking straight into a private monopoly in the petroleum sector with Dangote Refinery as the ultimate winner.
While protecting local industry is a legitimate policy goal, doing so without ensuring fair competition is economic suicide. The reality today is that Dangote Refinery dominates the refining landscape both in size and political influence.
Most of the smaller modular refineries in the Niger Delta are struggling to start production due to lack of crude supply, high financing costs, and regulatory uncertainty. The government’s import duty, therefore, does not create a level playing field; it simply tilts the market decisively in favour of Dangote.
If importers are taxed heavily while one giant refinery backed by political access and incentives controls the supply chain, the result is a monopoly, not a free market. And when one player dominates fuel production and pricing in a country of over 200 million people, the economy is at his mercy.
Dangote could dictate wholesale prices, influence market supply, and quietly shape government policy, all under the banner of “local protection.” Already, marketers allege that the last round of price increases was coordinated across the board, hinting at a shadow monopoly forming in plain sight.
This is dangerous for any economy, but for Nigeria where corruption and patronage distort every policy, it is catastrophic.
Energy Security Built on Fragile Foundations
The FIRS memo to the President claimed that the new tariff aims to “strengthen local refining capacity and ensure affordable supply.” But local refining remains largely aspirational.
As of today, Nigeria still imports nearly all its petrol, despite having four state owned refineries that are perpetually moribund. The Dangote Refinery, although a technical marvel, is still struggling to achieve full-scale petrol output and relies on imported crude for much of its operations.
The modular refineries, which were supposed to fill the gap, are barely surviving. Without access to crude oil feedstock often monopolised by larger operators, they cannot compete.
So, who exactly is being protected by this policy?
Certainly not the small modular refineries in Edo, Bayelsa, or Rivers. Not the ordinary Nigerian who will now pay N1,000 for a litre of fuel. Not even the struggling logistics sector, already crippled by high energy costs.
The only entity that benefits is a dominant private player who can withstand the short-term shock and then profit massively once competitors are priced out.
Policy Contradictions and Economic Disconnect
The tragedy of this decision lies not only in its cruelty but in its confusion. The same administration that preaches “ease of doing business” and “market freedom” is imposing tariffs that stifle competition and hurt consumers.
When President Tinubu removed fuel subsidy in May 2023, he promised that “subsidy is gone” and that market forces would drive fair pricing. But over a year later, Nigerians have learned that what replaced subsidy is not a free market but it is a managed monopoly, backed by selective protectionism and opaque pricing.
The contradiction is stark. You cannot remove subsidies on one hand and then impose punitive tariffs on the other. You cannot preach deregulation while protecting a single dominant player.
This isn’t market reform; it is economic confusion disguised as policy innovation.
The Human Cost: Everyday Nigerians Paying the Price
For the ordinary Nigerians, the macroeconomics of import tariffs mean little. What matters is survival.
A family man who spends N2,000 daily on transport now faces N3,000. A small business owner running a diesel generator must now budget twice as much for power. Food vendors, farmers, delivery riders, all are trapped in a cycle of rising costs and shrinking incomes.
Each increase in fuel price is another wound to the working class. And when government justifies it with lofty phrases like “energy security” and “local capacity protection,” it insults the intelligence of citizens who know that their suffering funds elite comfort.
The average Nigerian no longer trusts policy announcements because they have learned that every “reform” means more hardship.
Inflationary Tsunami Ahead
Economic experts have already warned that this new import duty could ignite a fresh wave of inflation. Since transportation is a key cost component in nearly every sector, a 15 percent increase in fuel import costs will ripple through the entire economy.
Analysts at SBM Intelligence estimate that transport fares could rise by another 25–30 percent, while food inflation could easily cross 45 percent by early 2026 if the policy is not reversed.
This isn’t mere speculation. We have been here before. After subsidy removal in 2023, inflation jumped from 22 percent to 34 percent within months. The difference now is that citizens have exhausted their coping mechanisms.
When people can no longer eat, they revolt. The Nigerian state risks pushing its citizens to that breaking point.
Killing Local Competition Before It is Born
Ironically, while the government claims to be “protecting local refining,” this policy will likely kill smaller refineries before they gain traction.
Most modular refineries were financed by private capital at high interest rates. They need steady cash flow and competitive margins to survive. But when the government grants one mega-refinery privileged protection and imposes heavy duties on imports, it destroys the business case for smaller players.
No investor will finance modular refineries if the regulatory environment favours one company. And when competition dies, innovation dies with it.
Nigeria could have built a diversified refining ecosystem, with multiple regional players supplying local markets and driving down costs. Instead, it is creating a single industrial empire whose influence will dwarf even that of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC).
That is not industrial policy. It is economic feudalism.
A Mirage of Regional Price Comparisons
The government argues that even with the new tariff, Nigeria’s pump prices would remain below regional averages: N964 per litre compared to Senegal’s $1.76, Côte d’Ivoire’s $1.52, and Ghana’s $1.37.
But this comparison is disingenuous. Those countries have stable power grids, working public transportation, and better social safety nets. Nigerians don’t.
In a nation where fuel directly powers homes, businesses, and schools due to epileptic electricity supply, any increase in fuel price hits far harder. Comparing Nigeria to Senegal or Ghana ignores the structural poverty and infrastructure decay that amplify every price shock.
It is like comparing a man who walks barefoot to another who drives a car and both are on the road, but one feels every stone.
Taxing Misery in the Name of Reform
Policies like this expose the moral blindness of governance in Nigeria. They treat citizens as economic statistics, not human beings.
The government sees fuel as a fiscal problem to be taxed, not a lifeline that millions depend on. It assumes that raising revenue justifies raising suffering.
But no reform can succeed if it crushes the very people it is meant to uplift.
Even from a fiscal standpoint, this duty will not deliver the revenue the government expects. Higher pump prices will reduce demand, encourage smuggling, and fuel black-market trading. The result will be less revenue, more inflation, and higher corruption.
Policy Alternatives That Make Sense
If the goal is truly to strengthen local refining and energy security, there are better, smarter paths to take.
– Provide access to crude oil for modular refineries under transparent, fair terms.
– Offer tax incentives for local refiners, not punitive import tariffs that hurt consumers.
– Encourage competition through regulatory equity, not protectionism.
– Invest in energy infrastructure, including pipelines, storage, and distribution to reduce logistics costs.
– Reform the power sector so that industries are not forced to rely on diesel for survival.
Nigeria doesn’t need more taxes; it needs intelligent policies that balance protection with affordability.
The Politics of Pain
Let’s be clear, this 15 percent duty is as political as it is economic. It serves powerful business interests cloaked in nationalist rhetoric.
Tinubu’s government has consistently framed hardship as “sacrifice” for a better future. But when sacrifice becomes perpetual, it ceases to be patriotic, it becomes exploitation.
The political cost of this decision could be severe. Nigerians who tolerated subsidy removal with the promise of reform may not tolerate another shock that pushes them into darkness.
Already, discontent is growing. Labour unions are preparing for protests, civil society groups are calling for reversal, and the opposition is mobilising public anger.
If unchecked, this could become the defining crisis of the Tinubu presidency as a symbol of reform gone wrong.
The Road Not Taken
There was an opportunity to rebuild Nigeria’s energy sector through inclusive, transparent reforms. The government could have used the subsidy savings to fix refineries, support modular operators, and invest in renewables.
Instead, it has chosen the easy route by taxing more, explaining less, and hoping for miracles.
But the laws of economics are unforgiving. You cannot squeeze revenue from an economy that is shrinking. You cannot build energy security on policies that destroy purchasing power. You cannot claim to protect the poor by enriching monopolies.
A Nation at the Crossroads
President Tinubu’s 15 percent fuel import duty is not just a fiscal measure, it is a moral test of governance.
It asks whether the Nigerian state still sees its people as citizens or merely as consumers to be taxed. Whether “Renewed Hope” means renewed hardship. Whether government policy can still reflect empathy, not elitism.
As petrol edges beyond N1,000 per litre and diesel costs strangle businesses, Nigerians are once again left to bear the consequences of decisions they did not make and cannot afford.
History will judge this administration not by its slogans, but by how it handled the suffering of its people.
And if the story of this fuel duty becomes the story of another failed reform of monopolies masquerading as markets, and citizens sacrificed for profit, then “Renewed Hope” will be remembered not as a promise, but as a warning.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional writes from Lagos, can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
