Feature/OPED
Warri, a Distressed and a Dying City
By Michael Owhoko, PhD
Who will restore Warri back to its glorious days? A city that was once the pride of all Wafarians, is now a shadow of itself, rusty and reeking with aroma of poverty occasioned by systemic decline with people cocooned in deprivation and squalor.Warri is allusively known as Wafi, making the people and residents of the city identified as Wafarians.
I was close to tears during my recent visit where I toured the length and breadth of Warri, covering Deco Road, Okumagba Avenue, Okere Road, McCiver, Odion Road, Market Road, Cemetery Road, Iyara, McDermott Road, Warri-Sapele Road, Upper and Lower Erejuwa, Ajamogha, Esisi, and Warri Port. I stayed for over two months, the longest since my relocation to Lagos in 1984.
All I saw was a distressed and a dying city with shattered dreams, shrinking hopes, and diminished opportunities induced by capital flight and economic disorders. It is a metaphor for youth unemployment, dwindling aspirations, and social chaos, where people just labour under profound deficit constrained by rationed resources, owing to lack of fresh capital from investors.
Indeed, Warri is choking from severe economic dehydration, with all available spaces in front of buildings converted into small shops where people engaged in petty trading and POS businesses, making the whole streets look like mini-markets. This is further worsened by the large number of keke tricycles almost outstripping the populace with attendant heavy noise emission. Even the dead have no peace in Warri as the entrance to the only cemetery in the town has been overtaken by petty traders, and keke tricycles mechanics, leaving a small gate forentry.
How did such a once vibrant cosmopolitan city that attracted global presence, including investors, and played host to several notable national and international events, degenerated into a rural enclave with dilapidated structures? What went wrong, and who created the mess which have betrayed the values and ideals that once held Wafarians together in unity and love?
While it is easy to link Warri’s stunted growth to the unending ethnic rivalry among the Itsekiris, Urhobos and Ijaws, for posterity, it is also important to specifically identify those, whose actions, directly or indirectly,have contributed to the city’s appalling condition, which has brought shame and embarrassment to the collective psyche of Wafarians.
First, the opposition of Warri as capital of Delta State at the creation by Itsekiri leaders, led by His Royal Majesty, the Olu of Warri, AtuwatseII, have done more harm to the general good of Warri, and setting the city backward. The deficit outcome has made the motive designed to protect the Itsekiri’s ethnic interests pale into insignificance.
What is the gain of this stand within the context of development, other than fear of Urhobo domination, and the need to thwart it? This was an obvious delusion, and no amount of rationalization can justify the mess that has eclipsed Warri. It was a miscalculation. Sacrificing the city’s progress on the altar of narrow ethnic interest was a tragedy.
Unfortunately, former military President, Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) further complicated the matter when he failed to demonstrate objective governance, taking advantage of the Itsekiri’s disapproval of Warri as capital to illogically site the capital of Delta State in Asaba, hometown of his wife. It was the height of absurdity in decision making, and a study in bad leadership.Had the ethnic trust deficit in Warri been bridged and the ethnic groups unite to demand Warri as capital, the city would have been better transformed with infrastructural advantage typical of a modern capital city, attracting foreign investors, to the benefit of all.
Second, the unending contention over ownership of Warri township among Urhobos, Itsekiris and Ijaws, over the years, have continued to promote ethnic animosity and discord, contributing immensely to the backwardness of the city. Those who started this tussle have since passed on, without adding any value to their respective ethnic groups.Sadly, this bitter ethnic rivalry is being passed on to succeeding generations, who have foolishly continued in this trajectory to spread hate, rather than live in harmony as neighbours, to achieve enduring peace and development in Warri.
It should be noted that these ownership claims are exercise in futility, as either of these ethnic groups, can practically dislodge one another to take physical possession of any habitation. For example, just as it is practically impossible for the Urhobos to evict the Itsekiris from Okere, it is also unrealistic for the Itsekiris to dispossess the Ijaws of Ogbe-Ijaw land.
And so, brandishing colonial and post-colonial court judgements and papers as proof of ownership, is insignificant and waste of energies. The three ethnic groups must bury their pride and ego, and live together peacefully as Wafarians, bound by common cultural affinity, so that Warri can experience peace and progress again.
Third, ethnic leaders that directly or indirectly encourage and incite their youth to resort to violence, and sometimes, carry arms to threaten, destroy or kill their neighbours over land, have nothing to gain other than misery and poverty. Ironically, it is the innocent children of the poor that are used for such senseless conflict, while the children of the rich, enjoy comfort in safe haven in faraway Lagos, Abuja, London, USA or Canada.
Besides, the parents of most of these gullible youth being used to perpetuate these crimes, have no ancestral root, and properties in Warri township. Destruction and mayhem only leave in their trail, economic decline, unemployment, anguish, suffering, hardship and poverty, as investors will flee with their capital from a hostile environment, as shown with the exit of numerous companies in the city.
Lessons ought to have been learnt from the Ijaw-Itsekiri conflict which lasted from 1997 to 1999 over siting of Warri South West Local Government Area Headquarters. At the end of that war, both parties counted only losses, no benefit, no value addition, and no reward. Regrettably, companies that were hitherto sources of sustained fresh capital in Warri, relocated to other cities, bringing lackand despair to Warri and its environs. There must not be a repeat of such a senseless ethnic war, as Warri may never survive a second experience.
The effect of the Ijaw-Itsekiri fight led to exit of companies like Pan Ocean, Schlumberger, Halliburton, Shell Petroleum Development Company, (SPDC), ELF, Conoco-Phillips, Agip, WEAFRI, NISSCO, Globestar, McDermott, DBN, WESCO, Hercules Offshore Nigeria, Nigeria Dredging & Marine, LAMNALCO, and Dunlop.
Others include Saipem, Seismograph Services Limited, Snamprogetti, Dowell, Anadrill, Baroid, Santafe, Oceaneering, Kingsway, Leventis, West Minster Dredging, John Holt, SCOA, Glorylux, United African Company (UAC), Mandillas, Nestoil together with maritime and shipping firms located inside the Nigerian Ports Authority, Warri.
The companies not only left with their investment; they also left behind high unemployment rate of approximately 80 per cent in Warri. Except for Chevron Nigeria Limited, and perhaps, recently, Tantita Security Services Limited, through which fresh funds are being injected into the economy of Warri, the condition of the town would have been catastrophic.
Fourth, those that engage in collection of “deve” (development) fee as precondition for commencement of project, and also, who forcefully demand employment and contract slots from companies, have also contributed to the poor condition of Warri. By their actions, companies, including small business enterprises and individuals, are frustrated and discouraged from establishing businesses in the city, thereby compounding the unemployment burden.
Fifth, the non-operational Warri Port has also added to the economic hardship in Warri. Ocean-going vessels that used to berth, servicing business interests in neighbouring Effurun, Udu, Benin City, Onitsha, Asaba, and the environs, are no more. This is further worsened by the collapse of adjoining companies like the Delta Steel Company, Owvian-Aladja and Warri Refinery and Petrochemical Company, Ekpan, which has taken a huge toll on Warri life.
It is, therefore, imperative for the ethnic groups to redirect their energies to promote peace and unity, in order to restore investors’ confidence.The Ijaws, Urhobos and Itsekiris’ leaders can also leverage their common cultural ties, as expressed in food, clothes, trade, history, and festivals to boost Warri’s economy. For example, Warri cultural celebrations like Agbassa Juju (Idju Owhurie Festival) and Okere Juju (Awankere Festival) can be bolstered and turned into major tourists’ destination, as part of strategy to make Warri great again.
Dr Mike Owhoko, Lagos-based public policy analyst, author, and journalist, can be reached at www.mikeowhoko.com, and followed on X {formerly Twitter} @michaelowhoko.
By Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm
In a report filed by The Business Standard on August 8, 2026, India, the current BRICS chair, opposes a proposal for a common currency to counter the US dollar.
The Indian Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, told reporters in Jaipur, Rajasthan, northwestern India, after a two-day BRICS trade and industry meeting, that India was not in favour of a BRICS currency. He added that India did not support the introduction of any such BRICS currency scheme.
It is good these things are showing signs at this early stage of attempts by BRICS member countries to crystallise a research finding published by a British economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neil, in 2001.
None of the leaders and country members of BRICS ever conceived on record the formation of such an economic or political bloc until the research publication, which spurred leaders of the mentioned countries to marshal resources and begin a dialogue of formalisation.
The current membership that started involuntarily with just Brazil, Russia, India, and China as a concept published by a research economist, that later included South Africa, now has 10 members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia.
Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are designated partner countries that participate in framework meetings without full voting rights.
Originally, the publication by Jim O’Neil wasn’t intended or proposed as a vehicle for the political grouping that has drawn the attention of the rest of the world, as mentioned members took a step further from the appraisal or assessment paper to coalesce into a political force overflowing its original boundaries today.
For the above reasons, the initial step of early contacts was to take advantage of things in common in member countries for the stimulation of economic growth and global prosperity. At that stage, suspicions were managed, and plans didn’t consider historical political differences and disagreements as grounds for suspicion or discontinuation of cooperation.
Of course, China and India had trust issues over decades of border disputes. And in the early stages of heightened escalations of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship when India offered to mediate and broker for ceasefire and eventual peace, Russia wasn’t sceptical but took steps to host the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi.
But at the back of the mind of the Russian-Indian relationship, history was revealing about betrayals, especially after what the country endured in assassinations of leading members of the Indian National Congress, that killed Indira Gandhi and swept her son, Rajiv Gandhi, and thereafter ravaged the family dynasty with threats of violence.
These paved the way for the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist party, and its leader, Narendra Modi. The BJP is not directly responsible for the intimidation and violent campaign against the INC, a close former Soviet-era ally of Russia, but a beneficiary. There are grounds to suspect a frosty relationship with Russia, although concealed in diplomatic niceties and global market dynamics of cross-border business and trade.
India turned into the redistribution hub of Russian discounted grains and oil supplies as a third country, after sanctions were imposed on Russia in what Russia described as demilitarisation and denazification special operations in Ukraine.
India is considered by Western powers as a democracy. It was once a British colony, gaining independence on August 15, 1947. It is also a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. On a normal day, it doesn’t add or take away anything. But under these circumstances, these are serious factors to consider in arriving at a decision.
Be it as it may, China and Russia have found their way out in world trade, bypassing SWIFT. China operates the Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System, whilst Russia is running the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). India has IMPS and NEFT. In principle, these payment systems bypass SWIFT and the US dollar, nonetheless.
As the world waits to hear India back its dissenting views with supporting facts, world trade will never remain the same again.
Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm has extensive scholarly publications that establish him as a leading academic expert in regional geopolitical dynamics and diplomatic relations in Africa. Author of e-monographs on geopolitics, ethnic conflicts, and political philosophy.
Feature/OPED
What Dangote’s Reported $40bn Private-Placement Valuation Could Mean for Nigerian Investors, NGX
Dangote Petroleum Refinery could become an unusually large part of Nigeria’s stock market if its eventual IPO valuation is close to the roughly $40 billion implied by a recent private placement.
EBC Financial Group (EBC) highlights that this would value the refinery at about N54.63 trillion, using the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market rate of N1,365.6856 per USD on August 7. Against the N158.513 trillion value of companies listed on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) on the same date, adding the refinery at that value would produce a market worth about N213.14 trillion, with Dangote Refinery accounting for 25.6%.
This scenario assumes the full $40 billion equity value is reflected in NGX market capitalisation and other listed company values remain unchanged. At that size, movements in the company could become highly visible across the Nigerian equity market, although its actual influence on NGX indices may depend on the shares available for public trading and the relevant index rules.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said: “If Dangote Refinery entered the Nigerian Exchange at close to a $40 billion valuation, it could account for roughly one-quarter of the resulting NGX market value. If that valuation is difficult to support, few shares are available for public trading, or investors need to reduce other Nigerian holdings to participate, the effects could extend across Nigeria’s equity market, including existing NGX-listed companies and their shareholders.”
A Private Transaction Can Indicate Value, but Public Investors Need Financial Evidence
Based on the private transaction, $40 billion provides an indication of Dangote Refinery’s value, but it does not establish the eventual IPO price. Details published on August 4 said a $2.5 billion private placement for a 6% stake implied a valuation of roughly $40 billion. The proposed initial public offering (IPO) was reported to target about $5 billion, while the eventual IPO valuation and percentage offered to the public were not disclosed. This is important as a private transaction may produce a different valuation from the price a broad group of public investors is prepared to accept.
For context, public equity market values cited alongside the transaction were about $12 billion for Türkiye’s Tupras and $16 billion for US-listed HF Sinclair. The Dangote figure is about 3.3 times Tupras and 2.5 times HF Sinclair. They are not direct comparisons because profitability, debt, operations and growth plans differ. The gap nevertheless increases the need for audited earnings, cash flow, debt and investment plans that explain what supports the higher valuation.
The reported $5 billion fundraising target is equivalent to about N6.83 trillion at the August 7 exchange rate, or approximately 4.3% of the N158.513 trillion existing NGX market value. Proposed $5 billion raise. If new Nigerian or foreign money funds the offer, the pool of capital invested in Nigerian equities could expand. If investors sell current holdings to participate, capital could instead move away from other listed companies.
Publicly Tradable Shares and New Investment Could Shape the Wider Market Impact
NGX rules show why total company value does not tell investors how much stock they can actually trade. Main Board companies can qualify through either 20% public ownership held by at least 300 shareholders or publicly tradable shares worth at least N20 billion. The Premium Board value alternative is N40 billion. Holdings controlled by promoters, directors and close relatives, government, or strategic investors owning at least 5% are excluded from qualifying public shares.
This means a company worth tens of trillions of naira could still have a much smaller amount of stock available for regular trading if ownership remains concentrated. The key issue is therefore how much of Dangote Refinery becomes accessible to public investors and how widely those shares are held.
Regional investment could also affect the outcome. Details published on 4 August indicated engagement involving South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Ghana and Rwanda, including possible Kenyan participation of up to $500 million, although no allocations were confirmed. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange separately said Dangote Group had shown strong intent to pursue a South African listing after Nigeria. Regional participation in the Nigerian offer could bring new capital directly into Nigerian equities. A later South African listing could broaden access but would not itself increase money raised through the Nigerian IPO.
Pension funds face the same question of capital allocation. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) waived the usual existence, profitability and dividend requirements so Pension Fund Administrators can consider the IPO, while retaining internal investment policies, risk-management requirements and duties to contributors and retirees. PenCom Circular on Dangote Refiner. PenCom states that the dispensation is exceptional, one-off and specific to this proposed IPO.
Pension funds held N5.907 trillion in domestic ordinary shares at the end of June, compared with the offer’s approximately N6.83 trillion equivalent. This does not imply pension funds would finance the offer. It shows why managers must consider exposure to one company and whether participation requires reducing other investments.
Precious added, “Dangote being listed could become a turning point for Nigeria’s equity market if it brings wider public ownership and additional African capital. Investors still need clear evidence supporting the valuation, clarity on how much of the company they can trade and an explanation of where the money raised will go. Those answers will determine whether the listing expands the Nigerian equity market or concentrates more investment around one company.”
An approved prospectus should clarify the valuation, shares offered, public ownership and use of proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) said on June 23 that no IPO application had then been filed or approved and ordered unauthorised pre-marketing to stop. Details published on 4 August later said an IPO application had been submitted, with regulatory approval expected in the following weeks. Until final terms are disclosed, the test for Nigeria is whether the listing combines a supportable valuation with broad public ownership and genuinely additional investment.
Feature/OPED
Moving the Stablecoin Conversation From Hype to Utility in Africa’s Next Payments Evolution
By Rajat Mishra
For much of the past decade, discussions around stablecoins have been dominated by cryptocurrency speculation. Increasingly, however, stablecoins are emerging as practical financial infrastructure for moving money across borders, managing liquidity and improving payment efficiency.
The real opportunity lies not in choosing between traditional finance and digital assets, but in building an integrated financial ecosystem where both work together to improve efficiency, broaden financial access and deepen economic connectivity across the continent.
Despite significant advances in financial inclusion and digital payments, moving money across African borders remains far more difficult than it should be. Businesses continue to face challenges when making cross-border payments. Fragmented payment networks, multiple intermediaries, and lengthy settlement processes increase costs and create operational inefficiencies.
Remittance providers, the specialised financial services that millions rely on to send money home, face many of the same structural challenges. These providers play a critical role across the continent. In fact, 19 of Africa’s 54 countries receive remittance inflows equivalent to at least 4% of their GDP. Yet Africa remains the world’s most expensive region to send money to.
These challenges are not a reflection of remittance providers themselves, but of the fragmented banking and settlement infrastructure underpinning international money movement. Financial institutions must often manage liquidity across multiple disconnected currency markets while relying on complex correspondent banking networks and clearing systems. The result is higher costs, slower settlements, and capital that remains unnecessarily locked up.
One of the most immediate opportunities for stablecoins lies in improving cross-border settlement. Consider a Kenyan business importing goods from South Africa. Under traditional settlement models, payments often pass through multiple correspondent banking relationships, involve several foreign exchange conversions, and can take days before funds reach the intended recipient.
Stablecoin-enabled settlement rails have the potential to reduce much of this friction by enabling value to move more efficiently between financial institutions across markets. The result can be shorter settlement times, greater transparency and improved predictability for businesses operating across borders.
The benefits extend well beyond businesses. For millions of Africans working abroad, remittances remain a financial lifeline, helping families pay school fees, healthcare costs and daily living expenses. Yet sending money home often involves navigating a complex chain of money transfer operators, correspondent banks, and local payout partners, with each additional layer introducing costs and delays.
Stablecoins can help streamline the backend movement of funds between institutional participants, reducing settlement costs and improving efficiency across the value chain.
For end users, the advantage is simplicity. Recipients do not need to interact with, or even understand stablecoins directly. They continue to receive money through familiar, trusted channels, whether a local bank account or mobile money wallet, only faster and at a lower cost.
Beyond payments, stablecoins also address one of the less visible but most significant challenges in cross-border finance: liquidity management. Financial institutions operating across multiple markets must constantly ensure they have sufficient funds in the right currency, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time. Today, this often requires pre-funding accounts across multiple countries, a costly practice that traps large amounts of capital and limits financial flexibility.
Stablecoins introduce a new model for moving value across borders in near real time, enabling institutions to manage liquidity dynamically as demand arises. This can reduce the need for large pre-funded balances, improve treasury efficiency and free up capital that can be deployed more productively. Ultimately, these efficiencies can translate into faster settlements, lower costs, and better services for businesses and consumers alike.
However, the true value of stablecoins will not come from isolated blockchain networks operating independently of existing financial systems. Their long-term impact will depend on how effectively they integrate with banks, mobile money platforms, payment service providers and existing payment infrastructure. Interoperability will be critical to ensuring payment flows move seamlessly between systems, markets and currencies. The goal should be to strengthen and modernise today’s payment ecosystem, not replace it.
From experiment to infrastructure: what global moves are telling us
Some of the clearest signals that stablecoins are moving from experimentation to infrastructure are coming from card networks. Mastercard’s reported agreement to acquire BVNK, valued at up to $1.8 billion, points to a strategic investment in the settlement layer connecting stablecoin rails with traditional banking and reflects growing institutional confidence in stablecoin-enabled cross-border payments.
Visa’s expansion of stablecoin-backed cards through Stripe’s Bridge to more than 100 countries reflects a complementary strategy. Rather than acquiring infrastructure outright, Visa is leveraging its existing global network as the final distribution layer for stablecoin-funded payments.
The inclusion of African markets is particularly significant. It signals growing confidence that stablecoin-backed payment instruments can operate alongside, and in some cases complement, the mobile money ecosystems that already dominate wallet-based payments across much of the continent.
Taken together, these developments point to a broader shift. Card payment networks are moving from observing the stablecoin conversation to investing directly in the infrastructure that underpins it. For Africa, the implication is not that stablecoins will replace existing payment rails, but that success will increasingly belong to institutions capable of orchestrating multiple settlement rails – cards, bank transfers, mobile money and stablecoins- within a unified, interoperable ecosystem. Local market expertise, regulatory relationships and last-mile distribution will remain decisive competitive advantages.
Building for scale through trust and regulation
But despite their potential, stablecoins cannot operate outside the boundaries of regulated financial systems. Their long-term viability across Africa depends on clear regulatory frameworks, robust compliance standards and trusted infrastructure that supports transparency, risk management and consumer protection.
We are already seeing this evolution. In markets such as South Africa, institutions facilitating cross-border settlements must navigate increasingly sophisticated regulatory requirements, including approvals for certain offshore crypto-related activities. Globally, initiatives such as the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) and expanded Travel Rule obligations are raising expectations around reporting, tax transparency and compliance.
These developments reinforce a simple reality: stablecoin infrastructure does not reduce compliance obligations. It raises the bar for governance, transparency and institutional risk management. The objective is not to bypass regulation, but to build interoperable payment systems that can innovate confidently within it.
From the edges to the plumbing
The stablecoin conversation is steadily moving beyond speculation and towards practical implementation. What once sat at the edges of the payments debate is becoming part of the plumbing of cross-border finance rather than a parallel system to it.
The question is no longer whether stablecoins have a role to play in payments. The question is where they deliver the greatest value. In Africa, that value is increasingly clear: faster settlement, improved liquidity efficiency and more connected cross-border commerce. The winners will not be those that replace existing financial systems, but those that successfully connect stablecoin rails with the banks, mobile money networks and payment providers that already power the continent’s economy.
For pan-African payment networks such as Onafriq, the priority is ensuring that emerging technologies complement the financial infrastructure businesses and consumers already trust, rather than introducing new layers of complexity.
The opportunity lies in connecting stablecoin settlement with banks, mobile money networks and payment providers, ensuring the benefits of this new infrastructure deliver tangible outcomes for African businesses and consumers.
Rajat Mishra is the CPO for Network Product & Deputy Group CPIO at Onafriq
