World
Africa ‘Reawakening’ In Emerging Multipolar World
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:
Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?
We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.
Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?
The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.
How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?
Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.
Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?
The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.
Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?
Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.
By Adedapo Adesanya
The President of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Mr Sidi Ould Tah, says more African countries are likely to regain or achieve investment-grade credit ratings by next year as reforms begin to deliver results and economic growth accelerates.
Several African sovereigns have already been upgraded in recent months, including Nigeria. However, Nigeria is not yet near investment-grade status.
In May, S&P Global Ratings upgraded Nigeria’s sovereign credit ratings to ‘B’ with a stable outlook, citing structural reforms under President Bola Tinubu and key drivers like higher oil production and improved fiscal revenue.
The country is still five notches from investment-grade. Under S&P’s rating scale, the progression follows— B → B+ → BB- → BB → BB+ → BBB- (investment grade).
S&P raised Morocco to investment grade last year and increased South Africa by one level to BB in November. Ghana, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Kenya have also benefited from positive rating action linked to fiscal, debt and economic reforms.
“We’re quite confident that the continent will continue to grow very strongly and that African countries will be better rated in the coming years,” Mr Ould Tah said in an interview with Bloomberg.
“We’ve seen Morocco receive investment grade during the last few months, and we expect other countries by next year to get toward that,” he added.
The outlook reflects improving fiscal positions and reforms implemented across countries on the continent, even as the conflict in the Middle East threatens to slow economic growth and raise costs for energy-importing nations. Better credit ratings can help countries borrow at lower rates and fund development projects.
The AfDB projects the continent’s gross domestic product expansion will accelerate to 4.4 per cent next year, if the conflict in the Middle East does not extend for a longer period. It expects the continent to slow to 4.2 per cent this year.
The war in Iran has benefited oil producers such as Nigeria, Angola and Gabon, while exerting pressure on the fiscal positions of net energy importers such as South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Senegal.
Mr Ould Tah said the bank is ready to support countries facing budget constraints and high debt burdens due to the impact of the Iran crisis, including increasing credit lines to them.
“The board of directors of the bank will examine in the coming days how the bank can increase the volume of resources it will provide to its member countries in this specific situation,” he said.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Within the framework of the Expert Council on Africa at Russia’s State Duma, the lower chamber of parliamentarians, during its annual round-table conference, held in late May 2026, focused concretely on food security in Africa.
Under the chairmanship of Deputy Speaker of the State Duma, Alexander Babakov, the council’s round-table session on Russian-African cooperation in the field of ensuring food security, introduction of closed cycle technologies in agricultural and bioeconomy projects, was held in the State Duma.
Opening the meeting, Alexander Babakov noted the importance of continuing cooperation with African countries already in the new convocation of the State Duma, to which elections will be held in September 2026. “I am sure that right from the beginning of the work of the new convocation, the theme of cooperation between Russia and African countries will work as an example for circulation and use in other areas,” he said.
Member of the Committee on the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, deputy chairman of the Expert Council on Africa, Nikolai Novichkov, in his speech stressed the importance of a gradual transition to trade with African high-tech countries. “Our African partners are interested in producing and processing food locally, including earning a living on it,” the parliamentarian stated.
Director of the Department of Partnership with Africa at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Tatiana Dovgalenko, drew attention to the continued importance of the humanitarian component of Russian-African cooperation, which, despite efforts, “unforeseen, including and along the lines of specialised UN agencies, the number of hungry people in the world, according to experts, has been growing over the past few years.” According to Dovgalenko, the food crisis is localised in about 10 countries, four of which are in Africa.
As first deputy chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, Alexei Chepa noted, the food crisis and a number of other serious threats on the African continent are today exacerbated by a complex international situation, with the United States and Israel versus Iran causing rising energy prices worldwide. “This has also reflected on the cost of fertilisers that needed to be purchased previously. Even if prices fall in a few months, the yield still won’t. And there will be problems in Africa. At the same time, we understand that population growth in the coming years will be at Africa’s expense,” Chepa underlined in his contribution at the meeting.
Alexei Chepa also mentioned the special role of security enhancement in Africa, including in countering extremism and terrorism.
As part of the continuation of the work of the roundtable to promote cooperation with African countries in ensuring food security, the introduction of closed-loop technologies in agricultural and bioeconomics projects was discussed. As a traditional procedure, some recommendations are addressed to the Government of the Russian Federation.
In addition to representatives of the State Duma, diplomats, scientists, experts from related fields, representatives of the Government of the Russian Federation and the business community took part in the round-table discussion.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The fourth India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-IV), originally scheduled for May 28 to May 31, 2026, in New Delhi, has been deferred to a later date due to the high risks of the Ebola virus, emerging and rapidly spreading from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in the central African region.
The African Union and Indian authorities jointly decided to postpone the summit to ensure the health safety of African leaders, stakeholders, corporate executives and entrepreneurs, amid public concerns over participants travelling from the virus-infested continent to New Delhi, India.
The India-Africa business dialogue is designed to strengthen bilateral partnerships, while facilitating networks for building not just real conversations but accessing new models of transacting corporate business and remoulding investments. It has three-fold dimensions: strategic partnerships, getting new clients and potential investors. An entirely significant collaboration that opens new markets.
Too often, businesses focus only on visibility and forget the power of relationships. But growth rarely happens alone. It happens through collaboration, trusted partnerships, and being in spaces where serious conversations happen naturally.
India-Africa has previously held a series of such high-level meetings with key trade and economic institutions in Africa as part of efforts to strengthen bilateral trade, investment cooperation and private-sector partnerships between India and Africa. These engagements aimed at identifying new economic opportunities and supporting the expansion of Indian-based companies into promising African markets.
Key Details & Context
Postponement Status: Following joint consultations, both sides mutually agreed to convene the summit at a later date. No rescheduled date has been announced at this time.
Summit Objectives: The summit, the first gathering since 2015, aims at deepening strategic multifaceted ties, focusing on South-South cooperation, technology transfers, capacity building, and healthcare resilience.
Official Information:
- Tracking the latest developments, both the Government of the Republic of India and the African Union have been working closely on the convening of the Fourth India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS IV), initially scheduled to take place in New Delhi from 28–31 May 2026.
- The two sides exchanged views on the evolving health situation in parts of Africa and reaffirmed the importance of continued cooperation in strengthening public health preparedness and response capacities across the continent, including through support to Africa CDC and relevant national institutions.
- India reaffirmed its solidarity with the peoples and Governments of Africa and expressed its readiness to contribute to Africa CDC-led efforts aimed at addressing the evolving health situation, in line with the shared commitment to an Africa-led response.
- Recognising the importance of ensuring the full participation and engagement of African leaders and stakeholders, and mindful of the emerging public health situation on the continent, consultations were held between the Government of India, the Chairperson of the African Union, and the African Union Commission regarding the holding of the Summit and associated activities.
- Following these consultations, the two sides agreed that it would be advisable to convene the Fourth India–Africa Forum Summit at a later date.
- New dates for the Summit and its associated meetings will be finalised through mutual consultations and communicated in due course.
- India and Africa reaffirmed their longstanding partnership founded on solidarity, mutual respect, South–South cooperation, and a shared commitment to peace, development, prosperity, and the well-being of their peoples.
Previous Editions of the India–Africa Forum Summit
1st India–Africa Forum Summit
New Delhi, India – 2008
The first edition was held in New Delhi from 4–8 April 2008. It marked the launch of the India–Africa strategic partnership framework and resulted in the adoption of the Delhi Declaration and the India–Africa Framework for Cooperation.
2nd India–Africa Forum Summit
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – 2011
The second edition was held in Addis Ababa in May 2011. Leaders focused on expanding cooperation in trade, infrastructure, human resource development, agriculture and peace and security.
3rd India–Africa Forum Summit
New Delhi, India – 2015
Theme: “Reinvigorated Partnership – Shared Vision” This edition was historic because all African countries were invited, making it one of India’s largest diplomatic gatherings with African leaders.
About the India–Africa Forum Summit: The first three Summits were held in New Delhi (2008 and 2015) and Addis Ababa (2011), resulting in important outcomes such as the Delhi Declaration and the Africa–India Framework for Cooperation. The India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) is the highest institutional platform for dialogue and cooperation between India and African countries, held under the leadership of the African Union.
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