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Africa ‘Reawakening’ In Emerging Multipolar World

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Gustavo de Carvalho

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:

Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?

We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.

Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?

The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.

How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?

Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.

Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?

The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.

Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?

Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.

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Bridge Awards Symbolize a Definitive Choice of Life in Russia—Sammy Kotwani

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Sammy Kotwani

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

Under the presidential decree, authorising an initiative to tap the best brains and professionals from abroad to integrate into Russian society, the Agency for Strategic Development plans to hold its first Bridge Awards, which honour the contributions of foreign citizens and repatriates who have made a definitive life choice in favour of Russia. The Bridge Awards was founded by entrepreneur Philip Hutchinson and public figure Guy Eames.

Launched in February 2026, the competition for the awards has attracted a lot of potential candidates from more than 40 countries competing for victory across 12 categories. The highest number of applications came from the United States, totalling 18. There are also a number of candidates from Europe, Asia, and Africa. The “Business” category proved to be the most geographically diverse, drawing applicants from 12 countries.

The Bridge Awards recognise the valuable contributions of foreign citizens and repatriates to the Russian society. It is also dedicated to raising awareness, recognising achievements, and building strong connections with the international community.

According to the official reports made available, among the winning applicants and world-renowned celebrities for the Business Category were Sammy Manoj Kotwani, President, Indian Business Alliance; President, SITA/Indian National Cultural Centre; President, Overseas Friends of BJP Russia; and Founder, Imperial Tailoring Company.

In this conversation, Sammy Kotwani talks about how he has lived and worked in Russia for more than three decades, his entrepreneurial achievements, and his contributions to Russian society. Here are the interview excerpts:

What really motivates you to participate in the first competition for Bridge Awards?

For me, the Bridge Awards are not only a competition. They are a recognition of a life journey. I have lived and worked in Russia for more than three decades. Russia gave me the opportunity to build my business, serve the Indian community, promote Indian culture, and create real business connections between India and Russia.

My motivation is very simple: I want to show that a foreign citizen can love Russia, respect its people, contribute to its economy, and at the same time remain deeply connected to his own roots and motherland.

Through the Indian Business Alliance, through cultural activities, through India–Russia business forums, through meetings with governors and regional leaders, my work has always been to build bridges — not only between governments, but between people, entrepreneurs, regions, cultures, and families.

So, when I heard about the Bridge Awards, I felt that this platform represents exactly what I have tried to do for many years: turn friendship into action, and respect into real cooperation.

You were selected by the Jury for the business category. What are the implications of this category?

Being selected in the business category is a very meaningful honour because business is where friendship becomes practical.

India and Russia already have strong political trust, historic goodwill, and a strategic partnership. But the real question today is: how do we convert this goodwill into trade, investment, joint ventures, logistics solutions, industrial cooperation, and regional development?

That is why the business category is important. It recognises those who are not only speaking about cooperation, but actually working on the ground to make it happen.

For me personally, it reflects the work of the Indian Business Alliance in connecting Indian entrepreneurs with Russian regions, supporting business missions, encouraging investment, discussing opportunities with governors, and identifying practical sectors such as textiles, pharmaceuticals, logistics, food processing, energy, technology, education, tourism, and skilled manpower.

This category is not only about personal achievement. It is about responsibility. It means we must continue to create platforms where Indian and Russian businesses can meet, trust each other, and build long-term partnerships.

Do you think the “Time to Live in Russia” programme has good future prospects for foreign citizens who choose to relocate and live in Russia?

Yes, I believe the “Time to Live in Russia” programme has strong future potential, provided it remains practical, transparent, and welcoming.

Many foreign professionals, entrepreneurs, investors, teachers, doctors, engineers, cultural workers, and skilled specialists are looking for countries where they can build a meaningful life. Russia has space, resources, education, culture, business opportunities, and strong regional potential.

But relocation is not only about visas or documents. A person who comes to Russia needs guidance, integration, language support, business orientation, community support, and confidence that he or she can build a stable future.

This is where such a programme can become very powerful. If it helps talented foreigners understand Russia better, settle smoothly, respect Russian society, and contribute to the economy, then it can become a serious instrument of international cooperation.

From the Indian perspective, I see strong potential. Many Indians are skilled in technology, medicine, education, trade, textiles, pharmaceuticals, engineering, hospitality, and entrepreneurship. If the right mechanism is created, India and Russia can benefit greatly from this human bridge.

How would you characterise the International Bridge Awards by the Agency for Strategic Initiatives and decreed by President Vladimir Putin?

I would characterise the Bridge Award as a timely and visionary initiative. In today’s world, countries need more than formal diplomacy. They need people who understand both sides, who can translate culture into trust, and trust into practical cooperation.

The Bridge Award gives recognition to such people — foreign citizens and repatriates who have chosen Russia not only as a place to live, but as a place to contribute.

For me, this award carries a very important message: Russia values those who sincerely work for its development, its international friendships, and its multicultural society.

The involvement of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives gives the award a serious institutional direction. It shows that this is not just a symbolic gesture, but part of a larger vision — to make Russia a place where international talent, entrepreneurs, cultural leaders, and public figures can participate in national development.

I believe this award can become a powerful platform for public diplomacy. It can show the world that Russia is open to sincere partners, serious professionals, and people who are ready to build, not just observe.

For me, as an Indian who has lived in Russia for many years, the word “bridge” is very personal. A bridge connects two banks. It allows people to cross, meet, understand, and build together. That is exactly what India and Russia need today—more bridges, more trust, more implementation, and more human connection.

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Russia-Africa Dialogue: Untapped Prospects for Economic Cooperation

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Russia-Africa Dialogue SPIEF-2026

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum 2026, the traditional “Russia-Africa Business Dialogue”, which was initiated in 2016, will deliberate aspects of forging economic cooperation between Russia and African countries. For a decade since its creation, this platform has practically discussed most pertinent roadblocks, highlighted the economic sectors, and outlined the prospects. The significant issues have also been treated at the first and second Russia-Africa summits.

As Moscow prepares to hold the next Russia-Africa summit in October, it is quite clear that Russia has still not worked out financial mechanisms to support its investments across Africa. Generally, the federal strategy for this area has been mapped out, Russian investors understand where to invest in Africa, but lacks extremely the financial motivation and approach to integrate young people into the business environment. Other constraining factors include a lack of financial support instruments the suitable environment for experience sharing and collaboration. At the same time, there are reports that point to a broad range of factors that hinder the development of youth entrepreneurship.

Historically, Russia–Africa relations have evolved through distinct phases after phases. The latest phase began from the first Russia-Africa summit through the second, and is currently moving to the third summit in October. As part of the strategic preparations, Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan was the guest of Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. Russia and Tanzania have had good relations, but it has been more than a century since the last state visit of a Tanzanian leader to Russia. From the historical records, Mwalimu Nyerere visited in 1969. As a result, Samia Hassan’s official working visit had a special historic significance for the bilateral relations. “We see this as a very positive sign,” noted Putin. Further to that, Samia Hassan was decorated with an honorary doctorate degree (Doctor Honoris Causa) at the Russian Peoples Friendship University, expressed gratitude for the political solidarity, and underlined Russia for the great contribution which it provided during the African political liberation in the 60s.

Tanzania’s Distinctive Profile

Sergei Kiriyenko, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration who oversees the department, visited Tanzania after the November 2025 elections. In addition, Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov called Tanzania “one of the key partners on the African continent,” recalling that it is home to approximately 70 million people. Samia’s visit to Russia is a victory for Russian diplomacy in Africa, as Tanzania is one of those allies that strengthen Moscow, says Andrey Maslov, Director of the HSE Centre for African Studies. According to the expert, cooperation is based on mutual benefit, and Tanzania does not require assistance. The country is among the continent’s economic leaders, distinguished by high growth rates, a stable political system, and a friendly attitude towards Russia. Russia’s interest in Tanzania is largely due to its geographic location and access to the Indian Ocean. The port of Dar es Salaam is considered a key transport hub in East Africa, serving transit routes to the East African Community (EAC) countries, along with the Kenyan port of Mombasa. Given Tanzania’s population, the EAC’s combined market represents over 300 million people, and the potential for expanding trade lies primarily in agricultural products, fertilisers, and basic industrial goods.

Africa’s participation at the St Petersburg 29th forum is very unique, with the majority from East and Southern Africa. The Director General of the Tanzania Investment and Special Economic Zones Authority (TISEZA), Gilead J. Teri, noted that the Tanzanian delegation has a unique opportunity to advance its agenda and strengthen bilateral relations. The forum gave a powerful boost to trade and economic cooperation. Tanzania presented its investment potential to the Russian business community. Therefore, it could be said that bilateral relations between Russia and Tanzania are flourishing and developing dynamically today.

Eastern and Southern Africa’s Dimensions

While it envisages strengthening ties in a broad range of fields, targeting the Eastern and Southern regions by utilising Tanzania as the gateway, Russia shows that the key partners in that part of Africa. Russia’s attributes for raising investment relations are clear: stability, untapped resources and human capital.

Putin’s meeting with Tanzania’s Samia Hassan, aiming at lifting up bilateral cooperation, which symbolises a new qualitative stage or a new chapter in the relations between Russia, Tanzania and the entire SADC. “Africa is an important partner for Russia, a participant in the emerging and sustainable polycentric architecture of the world order. Our relations with the states of that continent are valuable in their own right and should not be subject to the fluctuations on the international arena,” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also said long time ago at the Russia-Africa civil/public gathering held in 2018, in attendance was Stergomena Lawrence Tax, who headed the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

“We are aware that our African friends hold the same views. Relying on the accumulated experience of productive cooperation, Russian diplomats seek to pursue a consistent policy for deepening the range of Russia-Africa relations,” he added. Lavrov said it is necessary to maximise the potential of public, cultural and business diplomacy in the interests of strengthening and expanding the mutually beneficial ties between Russia and African states while invariably adhering to the principle of African solutions to African problems, formulated by the Africans themselves.

Stergomena Lawrence, however, observed that Russia has not been that visible in the region as compared to China, India or Brazil. But it is encouraging that Russia has made the decision to reposition itself as a major partner with Southern Africa. She expressed gratitude that Russia has launched a plan aimed at improving direct trade with the continent/region beyond the traditional sectors like mining, seeking to invest in areas like agriculture, industrial production, high technology and transport.

The Russian Federation’s priorities are also in line with SADC priorities, as evidenced by the priorities of the Foreign Economic Strategy in the region, as indicated below:

Prospecting, mining, oil, construction and mining, purchasing gas, oil, uranium, and bauxite assets (Angola, Namibia and South Africa);

Construction of power facilities—hydroelectric power plants on the River Congo (Angola, Namibia and Zambia) and nuclear power plants (South Africa);

Creating a floating nuclear power plant, and South African participation in the international project to build a nuclear enrichment centre in Russia;

Railway Construction (Angola);

Creation of Russian trade houses for the promotion and maintenance of Russian engineering products (South Africa).

Participation of Russian companies in the privatisation of industrial assets, including those created with technical assistance from the former Soviet Union (Angola).

In the Russian Federation, 10 SADC member countries have their diplomatic offices, namely: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Final Words of Wisdom

In pursuit of following Putin’s policy to strengthen ties with the Global South, including Africa, Russia has to re-strategise and take up the existing critical challenges. Despite a noticeable increase in activity, Russia’s strategy on the continent faces several persistent structural limitations that require thoughtful responses. As geopolitical changes heat up, Russia has to understand the necessity to move ahead, back away from tectonic rhetoric and symbolism of diplomacy. By 2025–2026, the African continent had firmly established itself as a key area of ​​global competition and, simultaneously, one of the most important reserves of economic growth. For Russia, this is important to change the very logic of its African ties. It is logical to walk the talk. In other words, Russia’s relations with African countries have to shift from historical rhetoric to a more practical architecture of interests.

On December 19–20, 2025, the second ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum was held in Cairo, with the Roscongress Foundation acting as the operator on the Russian side. The conference was attended by the heads of the African foreign ministries and the leaders of the continent’s integration associations. That conference has been defined as a key stage in the preparations for the third Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for October 2026. As noted by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, the meeting is intended to “give additional impetus to the development of the Russian-African partnership and the strengthening of its truly strategic nature.”

For Moscow, institutionalising the format is crucial given the overall transformation of global politics. And ultimately, Africa is becoming a space where external players’ ability to not only declare respect for sovereignty but also propose practical mechanisms for cooperation is being tested. Russia’s strategy is built on combining political rhetoric about multipolarity with concrete areas of cooperation—from trade to energy, and food security to personnel training and military-technical cooperation. Economic spheres and building infrastructures are important for Africa, which is ready for foreign investors with adequate funds and not just geopolitical rhetoric. It has to be noted that Africa is a space of competition between external players.

The continent is an arena of intense competition, with China, the European Union, the United States, Turkey, India, and the Gulf states all operating simultaneously, each offering its models of interaction: from large-scale infrastructure financing to military cooperation and religious and cultural influence. African states are becoming increasingly pragmatic and multi-vector—they are consistently expanding their foreign policy space, weighing the conditions, benefits, and political costs.

In such an environment, the sustainability of Russia’s presence is determined by its ability to offer a concrete and replicable set of advantages. Anti-colonial rhetoric and appeals to historical legacy remain important, but they no longer provide a long-term advantage on their own. Each competitive proposition must be backed by institutional support.

At the St. Petersburg forum, there was a genuine international community of like-minded partners practically united by a common goal: networking and developing business cooperation. “The continued participation confirms the demand for building relationships of business trust and confidence with foreign partners from different regions, including the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa,” said Alexander Stuglev, Chairman of the Board and CEO of the Roscongress Foundation. The Roscongress Foundation held the 29th St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) from 3 to 6 June 2026.

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CANAL+ Eyes MultiChoice Turnaround as Stocks Debut on JSE

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CANAL+ JSE

By Adedapo Adesanya

CANAL+ has expressed confidence in its ability to turn around the fortunes of struggling broadcaster MultiChoice as it marks a milestone by becoming the first French company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).

The secondary listing of CANAL+ signals strong international confidence in South Africa’s capital markets and reinforces the JSE’s role as a conduit between global capital and African growth opportunities, it said in a statement.

CANAL+ enhances the JSE’s sectoral diversity and provides local investors with direct, rand-denominated exposure to a globally diversified media and entertainment business with a significant African footprint. CANAL+ listed on the London Stock Exchange in December 2024.

The group’s listing on the JSE aligns with its long-term strategy to expand its presence in high-growth markets, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where rising connectivity, a young and growing population (expected to increase by 800 million by 2050), strong GDP growth (4.5 per cent growth expected between 2026 and 2030) and accelerating demand for content and connectivity continue to drive sector growth.

The JSE listing will increase CANAL+ liquidity and enable African investors to benefit from CANAL+ growth.

According to Mr Maxime Saada, CEO of CANAL+ said, “Joining the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is a statement of our ambition and illustrates our belief in Africa’s future and its creative industry.

“We are proud to become the first French company ever to list in Johannesburg and the only global media and entertainment company listed on the exchange.

“Following our listing on the London Stock Exchange 18 months ago, this dual listing reinforces our ambition to be a bridge between Europe and Africa and anchors our dual-continental approach, consolidating our unique position in the global media and entertainment industry,” he said.

He noted that CANAL+ serves more than 40 million subscribers and generates €9bn in annual revenue.

“Africa will be our growth engine for years to come, and we are dedicated to creating value on the continent and sharing it with our African partners, investors and the creative community. By welcoming African investors, we deepen our roots, diversify our investor base and lay the foundation for the next phase of our growth.”

Commenting on the listing, Ms Valdene Reddy, Group CEO of the JSE, said, “We are proud to welcome CANAL+ to the JSE and to mark the first listing of a French company on our exchange.

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