World
Angola Mulls Manufacturing Russian Military Equipment
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
As it was, indeed, looking for profitable business, investment and trade rather than development aid, Angola, a south-central African republic, announced corporate plans to diversify its state business away from purchasing to fully-fledged manufacturing of Russian military equipment for the southern African market, and most possible other regions in Africa.
While heading a delegation for a four-day visit from April 2-5 on an invitation from the Kremlin, President João Lourenço, said in an exclusive interview with the local Russian media, Itar-TASS, that Angola is one of the principal buyers of Russian arms and his country wants, not only buy but also to produce them, – outlining the government’s grandiose plan.
“As for our military and technical cooperation with Russia – it will continue and be deepened. We would like to evolve from our current state of purchasers of Russian military equipment and technologies towards becoming the manufacturers and having an assembly plant of Russian military equipment in our country,” he told the news agency.
Although this was the Angolan leader’s first official visit to Russia in this capacity, he has first-hand knowledge about the Russian capital, since he studied at the Military-Political Academy in 1978-1982.
Russian Defense Ministry and Rosoboronexport have made no official comment on the alleged deals, but local Russian financial newspaper Vedomosti said, in essence, such highly military deal with Angola could offer Russia a conduit to the southern region and would cement its position as a controlling super power in the weaponry market.
Over the years, Russia has made “military-technical cooperation” as an important part of its foreign policy objectives with Africa. According to Angola’s Defense Minister Salviano de Jesus Sequeira, Russia has already delivered six SU-30K fighter jets to Angola this year and two more are expected by the end of May.
Besides, Sequeira said the country is interested in buying Russian S-400 air-defense systems, but there is no talks because of economic difficulties, and only adding that “Angolan armed forces are used to work with Russian weapons” because of that the military cooperation between the two countries will last forever.
According to Ministry of Defense website report, Russia agreed to supply arms and military equipment to Angola worth US$2.5 billion, including spare parts for the Soviet-made weaponry, light weapons, ammunition, tanks, artillery and multi-purpose helicopters.
In a research report titled “Angola: Russia and Angola – the Rebirth of a Strategic Partnership” that was released by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the authors Ana Christina Alves, Alexandra Arkhangelskaya and Vladimir Shubin acknowledged that “defense remains the most solid Russia-Angolan cooperation dimension. To date, Russia is Angola’s most strategic military partner.”
Ana Christina Alves, a Senior Researcher at the Global Powers and Africa Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), explained further to me that “the military equipment is, undoubtedly, the largest and most profitable side of Russia’s trade with Africa – which the figures unfortunately don’t feature in official bilateral trade data. If these were included, the bilateral trade volume would appear much more impressive. This is, perhaps, the strongest dimension of Russia’s dealings in Africa at present, but because of the nature of the business very little is known outside military circles, so hard to get the actual picture.”
“Of course, it is better and cheaper to have such armaments assembled in Angola than purchasing ready-made ones directly from Russia. It will enable technology transfer and improve the technical knowledge and experience of Angolans while possibly turning that country into a getaway for Russian arms and military equipment to the wider central and southern African region,” Professor Shaabani Nzori, Expert on foreign policy based in Moscow, told me in the interview discussion.
It would help Russia gain fully-fledged foothold in that market for its military industry, one of the few comparative advantages that Russia currently has over other arms’ producing countries. So, it is a win-win situation for both these two countries, he added assertively.
On the other hand, concerning trafficking and proliferation of Russian arms in Africa as a result of such cooperation between Russia and Angola, even without them at the moment, Russian, American, Chinese, European, North Korean, Iranian, Israeli arms are already in abundance in continent. But it’s expected that the Russian-Angolan deal helps to mitigate, if not exclude altogether, such a development,” Shaabani further informed.
Military-technical cooperation has long been a priority area in bilateral ties, with the Soviet Union beginning to supply weapons for guerilla units back in the 1960s, Andrei Tokarev, Head of the Center for Southern African Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, told Kommersant, a local Russian financial daily newspaper.
“However, with the fall of the apartheid regime in neighboring South Africa in 1994 and the end of the civil war in 2002, Angola has no potential enemies, so the need for arms supplies has dwindled. In recent years, Angola’s leadership has had plans to turn the country into a base to repair Soviet equipment for African countries. For its part, South Africa had similar business ideas as well. One cannot rule out that the proposal to both purchase and produce (manufacture) weapons as an attempt to outmaneuver South Africa, but the local industry is not yet ready to manufacture its own military equipment,” explained Andrei Tokarev.
Foreign experts have also expressed their concern. Professor Alex Vines, Head of the Africa Programme at Chatham House, and recently served as a member of the Commonwealth Observer Group to Ghana in 2016 and a UN election officer in Mozambique and Angola, in an emailed discussion acknowledged Russia’s military-technical cooperation with African countries.
He wrote from London that “the Angolan military partnership with Russia has been tight for many years and a significant part of the procurement through its Simportex is with Russia. This continues as Russia delivered six SU-30K fighter jets this year and is interested in procuring a Russian S-400 air defense system. The new development is seeking a partnership with Russia for manufacturing defense equipment in Angola. Russia has a series of maintenance facilities in Africa for after sales – but this would be a significant development.”
Furthermore, he said assertively that his own experience of Angola, including being a UN sanctions inspector, “is that Angolan arsenals have not been a major problem for theft, but the biggest concern was the sale of old weapons and munitions from stores to independent brokers who then sold the equipment onto sanctioned entities.”
Professor David Shinn at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia (1996-99) and Burkina Faso (1987-90), wrote in an email interview that with the latest development, particularly, SU-30K aircraft purchased by Angola, one has to ask why Angola needs such a high performance fighter aircraft and who is the potential enemy?
Undoubtedly, Russia might have proposed to help Angola develop a weapon’s manufacturing capacity, obviously drawing on Russian designs and weapons. If this assumption is correct, it therefore means that Angola will join a growing list of countries in Africa that have their own internal weapons manufacturing.
In this regard, Shinn added that South Africa has the most advanced capacity to produce military equipment followed by Egypt. Sudan, which received assistance from China and Iran in building its arms industry, and Nigeria, among others, also have the ability to produce military equipment. In this sense, what Angola proposed to do (that is to establish manufacturing plant) is not much different except that it would, reportedly, be assisted by the Russian Federation.
“Weapons produced by any country can and do appear in African conflict zones. There is plenty of documentation, for example, that weapons made in China, Russia, and Western countries are being used in ongoing conflicts in Darfur, the eastern Congo, and Somalia. In some cases, African governments have transferred the arms to rebel groups and many others have been purchased on the international arms market,” he said.
According to Professor Shinn, the SADC countries, with the notable exception of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have avoided major conflict in recent years. As a result, the movement of arms to rebel groups has not been an issue.
Professor Shinn concluded: “Should Angola become a key producer and distributor of Russian arms, there is always the possibility some of them could eventually appear outside Angola in the SADC region. One would hope this initiative must necessarily be approved by the Angolan parliament, and be of great interest for SADC, the African Union and Security Council of the United Nations.”
Kester Kenn Klomegah writes frequently about Russia, Africa and the BRICS.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
After the expiration of bilateral agreement on trade, the US Congress as well as African leaders, highly recognizing its significance, has been pursuing the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The agreement, which allows duty-free access to American markets for African exporters, expired on September 30, 2025.
The US Congress is advancing a bill to revive and extend AGOA, but South Africa’s continued inclusion remains uncertain. The trade pact still has strong bipartisan support, with the House Ways and Means Committee approving it 37-3. However, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, raised concerns about South Africa, citing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and said the administration could consider excluding the country.
This threat puts at risk the duty-free access that has significantly benefited South African automotive, agricultural, and wine exports. The debate highlights how trade policy is becoming entangled with broader diplomatic tensions, casting uncertainty over a key pillar of US-Africa economic relations.
Nevertheless, South Africa continues to lobby for inclusion. South Africa trade summary records show that the US goods and services trade with South Africa estimated at $26.2 billion in 2024. The US and South Africa signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as far back as in 2012.
The duty-free access for nearly 40 African countries has boosted development and fostered more equitable and sustainable growth in Africa. By design AGOA is a useful mechanism for improving accessibility to trade competitiveness, connectivity, and productivity. During these past 25 years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key features and benefits of AGOA:
It’s worth reiterating here that during these past several years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, as AGOA is closely working with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and with the African Union (AU), trade professionals could primarily leverage various economic sectors and unwaveringly act as bridges between the United States and Africa.
* Duty-free Access: AGOA allows eligible products from sub-Saharan African countries to enter the US market without paying tariffs.
* Promotion of Economic Growth: The program encourages economic growth by providing incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets.
* Encouraging Economic Reforms: AGOA encourages economic and political reforms in eligible countries, including the rule of law and market-oriented policies.
* Increased Trade and Investment: The program aims to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.
With the changing times, Africa is also building its muscles towards a new direction since the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was officially launched in July 2019.
In practical terms, trading under the AfCFTA commenced in January 2021. And the United States has prioritized the AfCFTA as one mechanism through which to strengthen its long-term relations with the continent. In the context of the crucial geopolitical changes, African leaders, corporate executives, and the entire business community are optimistic over the extension of AGOA, for mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the United States.
Worthy to say that AGOA, to a considerable degree, as a significant trade policy has played a crucial role in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa stands at the cusp of a transformative digital revolution. With the expansion of mobile connectivity, internet penetration, digital platforms, and financial technology, the continent’s digital economy is poised to become a significant driver of sustainable development, intra-Africa trade, job creation, and economic inclusion.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 1 (a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development), highlights the importance of leveraging technology and innovation. The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has opened a new chapter in market integration, creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of the digital economy across all sectors.
Despite remarkable progress, challenges persist. These include limited digital infrastructure, disparities in digital literacy, fragmented regulatory frameworks, inadequate access to financing for tech-based enterprises, and gender gaps in digital participation. Moreover, Africa must assert its digital sovereignty, build local data ecosystems, and secure cyber-infrastructure to thrive in a rapidly changing global digital landscape.
Against this backdrop, the 16th African Union Private Sector Forum provides a timely platform to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s digital economy to accelerate intra-Africa trade and sustainable development.
The 16th High-Level AU Private Sector forum is set to take place in Djibouti, from the 14 to 16 December 2025, under the theme “Harnessing Africa’s Digital Economy and Innovation for Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development”
The three-day Forum will feature high-level plenaries, expert panels, breakout sessions, and networking opportunities. Each day will spotlight a core pillar of Africa’s digital transformation journey.
Day 1: Digital Economy and Trade Integration in Africa
Focus: Leveraging digital platforms and technologies to enhance trade integration and competitiveness under AfCFTA.
Day 2: Innovation, Fintech, and the Future of African Economies
Focus: Driving economic inclusion through fintech, innovation ecosystems, and youth entrepreneurship.
Day 3: Building Policy, Regulatory Frameworks, and Partnerships for Digital Growth
Focus: Creating an enabling environment for digital innovation and infrastructure through effective policy, governance, and partnerships.
To foster strategic dialogue and action-oriented collaboration among key stakeholders in Africa’s digital ecosystem, with the goal of leveraging digital economy and innovation to boost intra-Africa trade, accelerate economic transformation, and support inclusive, sustainable development.
* Promote Digital Trade: Identify mechanisms and policy actions to enable seamless cross-border digital commerce and integration under AfCFTA.
* Foster Innovation and Fintech: Advance inclusive fintech ecosystems and support innovation-driven entrepreneurship, especially among youth and women.
* Policy and Regulatory Harmonization: Build consensus on regional and continental digital regulatory frameworks to foster trust, security, and interoperability.
* Encourage Investment and Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthen collaboration between governments, private sector, and development partners to invest in digital infrastructure, R&D, and skills development.
* Advance Digital Inclusion and Sustainability: Ensure that digital transformation contributes to environmental sustainability and the empowerment of marginalized communities.
The AU Private Sector Forum has held several forums, with key recommendations. These recommendations provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the African private sector and offer guidance for policymakers on how to support its growth and development.
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