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G20-Africa Challenging Geopolitics, Innovating Agenda for Global South’s Development

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Tandiwe Thelma Mgxwati

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In an interview (Q&A) in mid-August 2025, Ms Tandiwe Thelma Mgxwati, Minister Plenipotentiary and Charge d’Affaires a.i. at the South African Embassy, discussed South Africa’s presidency of G20 and its influence on Africa, in the context of geopolitical changes. Tandiwe Mgxwati further underlined the African Union’s full membership in the G20 as an important organisational instrument through which to seriously seek G20’s support for infrastructure development, digital transformation, industrialisation, and innovation ecosystems—key elements of both Agenda 2063 and national development plans. Here are the interview excerpts:

What is the significance of South Africa’s presidency of the G20 in 2025?

South Africa’s presidency of the G20 in 2025 is of profound historical and geopolitical significance. It marks the first time an African country leads the G20 at Summit level since its inception in 1999, and it coincides with the African Union’s recent inclusion as a permanent G20 member in 2023. The South African presidency symbolises a growing recognition of Africa’s role in the global economy and affirms the need for more inclusive and representative international governance frameworks. For South Africa, the presidency is a platform to assert the voice of the Global South and demonstrate leadership in shaping multilateral responses to shared challenges including inequality, climate change, debt, and technology governance.

In institutional terms, South Africa’s presidency strengthens Africa’s ability to influence G20 policy outcomes and reform debates, particularly regarding the international financial architecture. It also consolidates South Africa’s profile as a credible bridge-builder between developed and developing economies. With the G20 Johannesburg Summit scheduled for 22-23 November 2025, this presidency presents an opportunity for Africa to shape global discussions on sustainable development and resilience in a time of polycrisis, while promoting solidarity between emerging economies and major powers. For the very same reasons, we are taking our G20 presidency to the African continent in three separate events planned for Egypt (on Food Security), Ethiopia (on the Compact with Africa) and Nigeria (on Industrialisation and Agriculture) later this year.

How does South Africa plan to push its own and that of Africa’s development ambitions within the context of the G20?

South Africa has defined the overarching theme of its presidency as “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability”, capturing the urgent need to address historical development imbalances, promote inclusive growth, and respond to existential threats such as climate change. The country has identified three core Task Forces in the following fields : (1) Inclusive economic growth, industrialisation, and employment creation; (2) Food security (a critical issue for Africa); and (3) The governance and application of artificial intelligence and innovation for sustainable development. These priorities are fully aligned with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

To ensure alignment with African development objectives, South Africa has established a structured engagement process with the African Union Commission and African institutions such as the African Development Bank. The G20 Africa Advisory Group, revitalised under South African leadership, serves as a platform for advancing African priorities within the G20 Sherpa Track. Furthermore, South Africa is promoting coordination with BRICS partners, G77 members, and regional economic communities of Africa  to build a unified voice on key issues including debt restructuring, concessional finance, and technology transfer. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is also being mainstreamed into G20 trade and investment discussions under South Africa’s chairmanship.

In the Finance track, we have also established a team to work on the Review of the Cost of Capital – a very important issue that needs special attention due to the heavy load carried by so many African countries when it comes to debt and the cost of serving it.

What are your assessment on the questions relating to G20 members boosting economic partnership with Africa?

There is growing recognition within the G20 that Africa must be seen as a partner for mutual prosperity rather than a passive recipient of aid. South Africa strongly supports the evolution of G20–Africa economic relations toward long-term, transformative partnerships that deliver industrial capacity, human capital development, and infrastructure integration. South Africa advocates for increased investment in regional value chains, climate-resilient agriculture, and sustainable energy systems, while pushing for fairer access to capital for African economies through multilateral development banks and reformed global rating systems.

In its role as G20 president, South Africa is actively encouraging G20 members to deepen their engagement with Africa by focusing on co-investment models, risk-sharing mechanisms, and blended finance arrangements that crowd in private capital. Africa’s demographic dividend and natural resource base present long-term opportunities for strategic economic partnerships. The Compact with Africa (CwA) initiative, launched under Germany’s G20 presidency in 2017, is being reviewed and revitalised under South African leadership to ensure it better aligns with African-led priorities and supports AfCFTA implementation. In this regard, we aim to further boost the CwA when we host a G20 event in Addis Ababa during the first week of September to focus exclusively on boosting the CwA work and membership of African countries in the Compact.

Do you think there is the possibility of tackling Africa’s challenges under South Africa’s G20 presidency?

Yes, some of the answers above already address this question.  South Africa’s presidency is expressly designed to address structural challenges faced by African countries and other developing nations. These include limited access to affordable long-term finance, vulnerability to climate and disaster shocks, constrained industrial development, and exclusion from global technology governance. Through both the Sherpa and Finance Tracks, South Africa is placing these issues at the centre of G20 deliberations and calling for stronger coordination with the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and regional institutions.

Specifically, the South African presidency is pushing for tangible G20 outcomes in areas such as debt relief for low-income countries, increased concessional climate finance, and support for developing countries in leveraging critical minerals for sustainable growth. The inclusion of digital public infrastructure and AI governance in the G20 agenda is another innovation, allowing for African perspectives on ethical technology development to be reflected. These efforts are being anchored through a G20-Africa Action Plan that sets clear deliverables and timelines.

What are Africa’s expectations from G20 members?

Africa’s expectations are based on principles of fairness, equity, and mutual interest. African countries expect G20 members to support reform of the international financial architecture, particularly around voting rights in Bretton Woods institutions, sovereign debt restructuring, and access to concessional finance. In addition, Africa seeks increased support for infrastructure development, digital transformation, industrialisation, and innovation ecosystems—key elements of both Agenda 2063 and national development plans.

There is also a strong expectation that G20 members will enhance investment in Africa’s energy transition, including natural gas as a transitional fuel, and provide resources for climate adaptation and resilience. The continent expects partnerships that create jobs, enable local value addition, and facilitate integration into global supply chains. Africa’s voice in setting international rules—whether in trade, AI, climate, or finance—must be amplified, and the African Union’s full membership in the G20 must now translate into institutional reforms that deliver concrete results.

Do you think the changing South Africa–United States diplomacy will influence these expectations?

South Africa’s foreign policy remains grounded in constitutional values, respect for sovereignty, multilateralism, and a commitment to global equity. While the current United States administration under President Donald Trump has adopted a more protectionist stance—including the imposition of 30% tariffs on selected South African exports—South Africa continues to engage constructively with all G20 partners, including the United States, through diplomatic, trade, and multilateral channels. The participation of the USA in our G20 calendar of events remain important to us as we believe that the entire G20 family should take ownership of the work and outcomes of our presidency, in addition, the USA will take over the G20 presidency from us and hence we need to have them onboard.

The South African government has taken note of the Trump administration’s critical rhetoric toward South Africa, particularly on domestic policies related to land reform, BRICS cooperation, and its posture on global geopolitical issues. However, these differences do not alter the continent’s structural development needs or the core agenda South Africa is advancing through the G20 and other formations such as BRICS and IBSA. Africa’s expectations—such as fairer trade rules, access to concessional finance, value addition in the supply chain processes, climate adaptation support, and inclusive technology governance—are long-standing and are shaped by collective African positions, not bilateral tensions. As G20 president, South Africa is committed to building consensus across ideological divides and ensuring that global economic governance delivers balanced outcomes, even amidst evolving bilateral dynamics. We believe that in this challenging geo-political climate, South Africa is the best country to lead the G20 group at this stage, our experience in shaping an inclusive democratic society in the early 1990’s is now serving us well.

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Trump Picks Kevin Warsh to Succeed Jerome Powell as Federal Reserve Chair

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Kevin Warsh

By Adedapo Adesanya

President Donald Trump has named Mr Kevin Warsh as the successor to Mr Jerome Powell as the Federal Reserve chair, ending a prolonged odyssey that has seen unprecedented turmoil around the central bank.

The decision culminates a process that officially began last summer but started much earlier than that, with President Trump launching a criticism against the Powell-led US central bank almost since he took the job in 2018.

“I have known Kevin for a long period of time, and have no doubt that he will go down as one of the GREAT Fed Chairmen, maybe the best,” Mr Trump said in a Truth Social post announcing the selection.

US analysts noted that the 55-year old appear not to ripple market because of his previous experience at the apex bank as Governor, with others saying he wouldn’t always do the bidding of the American president.

If approved by the US Senate, Mr Warsh will take over the position in May, when Mr Powell’s term expires.

Despite having argued for reductions recently, “Warsh has a long hawkish history that markets have not forgotten,” one analyst told Bloomberg.

President Trump has castigated Mr Powell for not lowering interest rates more quickly. His administration also launched a criminal investigation of Powell and the Federal Reserve earlier this month, which led Mr Powell to issue an extraordinary rebuke of President Trump’s efforts to politicize the independent central bank.

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BRICS Agenda, United States Global Dominance and Africa’s Development Priorities

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Vsevolod Sviridov BRICS Agenda

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

Donald Trump has been leading the United States as its president since January 2025. Washington’s priority is to Make America Great Again (MAGA). Trump’s tariffs have rippled many economies from Latin America through Asian region to the continent of Africa. Trump’s Davos speech has explicitly revealed building a ‘new world order’ based on dominance rather than trust. He has also initiated whirlwind steps to annex Greenland, while further created the Board of Peace, aimed at helping end the two-year war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and to oversee reconstruction. Trump is handling the three-year old Russia-Ukraine crisis, and other deep-seated religious and ethnic conflicts in Africa.

These emerging trends, at least in a considerable short term, are influencing BRICS which has increased its geopolitical importance, and focusing on uniting the countries in the Global East and Global South. From historical records, BRICS, described as non-western organization, and is loosing its coherence primarily due to differences in geopolitical interests and multinational alignments, and of course, a number of members face threats from the United States while there are variations of approach to the emerging worldwide perceptions.

In this conversation, deputy director of the Center for African Studies at Moscow’s National Research University High School of Economics (HSE), Vsevolod Sviridov, expresses his opinions focusing on BRICS agenda under India’s presidency, South Africa’s G20 chairmanship in 2024, and genegrally putting Africa’s development priorities within the context of emerging trends. Here are the interview excerpts:

What is the likely impact of Washington’s geopolitics and its foreign policy on BRICS?

From my perspective, the current Venezuela-U.S. confrontation, especially Washington’s tightened leverage over Venezuelan oil revenue flows and the knock-on effects for Chinese interests, will be read inside BRICS as a reminder that sovereign resources can still be constrained by financial chokepoints and sanctions politics.  This does not automatically translate into BRICS taking Venezuela’s side, but it does strengthen the bloc’s long-running argument for more resilient South-South trade settlement, diversified energy chains, and financing instruments that reduce exposure to coercive measures, because many African and other developing economies face similar vulnerabilities around commodities, shipping, insurance, and correspondent banking. At the same time, BRICS’ expansion makes consensus harder: several members maintain significant ties with the U.S., so the most likely impact is a technocratic push rather than a loud political campaign.

And highlighting, specifically, the position of BRICS members (South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt, as well as its partnering African States (Nigeria and Uganda)?

Venezuela crisis urges African members to demand that BRICS deliver usable financial and trade tools. For South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the Venezuela case is more about the precedent: how quickly external pressure can reshape a country’s fiscal room, debt dynamics, and even investor perceptions when energy revenues and sanctions compliance collide. South Africa will likely argue that BRICS should prioritize investment, industrialization, and trade facilitation. Ethiopia and Egypt, both debt-sensitive and searching for FDI, will be especially attentive to anything that helps de-risk financing, while avoiding steps that could trigger secondary-sanctions anxieties or scare off diversified investors.

Would the latest geopolitical developments ultimately shape the agenda for BRICS 2026 under India’s presidency?

India’s 2026 chairmanship is already framed around “Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” and Venezuela’s shock (paired with broader sanction/market-volatility lessons) will likely sharpen the resilience part. From an African perspective, that is an opportunity: South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt can press India to translate the theme into deliverables that matter on the ground: food and fertilizer stability, affordable energy access, infrastructure funding. India, in turn, has incentives to keep BRICS focused on economic problem-solving rather than becoming hostage to any single flashpoint. So the Venezuela episode may function as a cautionary case study that accelerates practical cooperation where African members have the most to gain. And I would add: the BRICS agenda will become increasingly Africa-centered simply because Africa’s weight globally is rising, and recent summit discussions have repeatedly highlighted African participation as a core Global South vector.  South Africa’s G20 chairmanship last year explicitly framed around putting Africa’s development priorities high on the agenda, further proves this point.

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Afreximbank Terminates Credit Relationship With Fitch Amid Rating Tension

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Afreximbank

By Adedapo Adesanya

African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) has has officially terminated its credit rating relationship with Fitch Ratings, indicating friction between both firms.

According to a statement on Friday, the Cairo-based African lender said the decision follows a review of the relationship, and its firm belief that the credit rating exercise no longer reflects a good understanding of the bank’s Establishment Agreement, its mission, and its mandate.

“Afreximbank’s business profile remains robust, underpinned by strong shareholder relationships and the legal protections embedded in its Establishment Agreement, signed and ratified by its member states,” the statement added.

Business Post reports that Fitch had cut Afreximbank’s credit rating to one notch above ‘junk’ Status last year and currently has it on a ‘negative outlook’, which is a rating agency’s terminology for another downgrade warning.

Lower rating means higher borrowing costs for Afreximbank, which could directly impact its ability to lend and the low rates at which it does so.

Recall that Fitch in its report published in June 2025, had estimated Afreximbank’s non-performing loans at 7.1 per cent by the end of 2024, exceeding Fitch’s 6 per cent “high risk” threshold.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) contested Fitch’s assessment and argued that Fitch confused loan restructuring requests from South Sudan, Zambia, and Ghana by considering them as defaults, claiming this was inconsistent with the 1993 treaty establishing Afreximbank.

African policymakers have raised worries about the ratings by foreign rating agencies like Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P among others. This has increased call for an African focused agency, which is expected to have commenced but continues to face delays.

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