World
Russia Plans New Trade, Investment Cooperation With Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Sergey Lavrov, said at his annual press conference on January 18 that Russia and Africa would hold a summit in July this year and a number of documents, including new instruments of trade and investment cooperation, were being prepared to readjust methods of interaction amid the environment of sanctions, and in the context of geopolitical changes.
“As you know, we are planning the second summit in St. Petersburg, and we are preparing a whole series of activities for it. Documents are being prepared on the readjustment of interaction mechanisms in conditions and sanctions and threats, new instruments of trade and investment cooperation, supply chain systems and payments. The transition to payments in national currencies is underway. This is not a quick process, but it is progressing and gaining momentum,” the Foreign Minister said.
Ahead of the forthcoming African leaders gathering, the South African Institute of International Affairs has put into circulation its latest policy report on Russia-African relations.
In the introductory chapter, Steven Gruzd, Samuel Ramani and Cayley Clifford – have summarized various aspects of the developments between Russia and Africa over the past few years and finally questioned the impact of Russia’s policy on Africa.
According to Steven Gruzd, Samuel Ramani and Cayley Clifford, this special far-reaching policy report includes academic research from leading Russian, African and international scholars. It addresses the dimensions of Russian power projection in Africa and new frontiers of Russian influence and provides a roadmap towards understanding how Russia is perceived in Africa.
The report highlights narratives about anti-colonialism and describes how these sources of solidarity are transmitted by Russian elites to their African public. For seeking long-term influence, Russian elites have oftentimes used elements of anti-colonialism as part of the current policy to control the perceptions of Africans and primarily as new tactics for power projection in Africa.
While it has made thousands of investment promises and signed several bilateral agreements, Russia is largely invisible in economic sectors and keeps a remote distance from participating in building critical infrastructures, investing in industrial spheres and in the newly created single market. Moscow simply builds relations on illusions and lacks the capacity and overwhelming power to realize its policy goals in Africa.
That report says Russia’s expanding influence in Africa is compelling, but a closer examination further reveals a murkier picture. Despite Putin’s lofty trade targets, Russia’s trade with Africa stands at just $20 billion, which is lower than that of India or Turkey.
Over the previous years, similar observations on the stagnation in Russia-Africa economic and trade relations were also noted by politicians and academic researchers. A publication headlined “Russian Business in Africa: Missed Opportunities and Prospects” appeared in the foreign policy journal Russia in Global Affairs, where Professor Alexei Vasilyev, former Special Representative of the Russian Federation to African Countries, wrote in that article that Russian companies are pursuing their diverse interests in Africa.
The main reason is that Africa remains an enormous and large market for technology and manufacturing of consumer goods due to the increasing population and the growing middle class. Until recently, Russians have been looking at the mining industry, and economic cooperation is steadily expanding. But, Africa still accounts for just 1.5% of Russia’s investment which is a drop in the ocean. It must be admitted that Russia’s economic policy grossly lacks dynamism in Africa.
“In fact, African countries have been waiting for us for far too long; we lost our positions in post-apartheid Africa and have largely missed new opportunities. Currently, Russia lags behind leading foreign countries in most economic parameters in this region,” he pointed out in the article.
In another Russian media headlined: “West seeks to dissuade African states from participating in Russia-Africa summit” that was published last December, Federation Council Deputy Speaker Konstantin Kosachev explicitly noted that the first Russia-Africa summit held three years ago was successful, “but, in many respects, its results remained within the dimension of politics” and were not translated into additional projects in trade, economic, scientific or humanitarian cooperation.
Russia’s increasing political dialogues have not been transformed into economic capabilities. Returning as a strategic player, Russia’s business initiatives have inconsistently been followed across Africa. Senator Kosachev,, quoting trade figures to illustrate his argument, said that “the trade turnover speaks for itself. Roughly, the European Union’s trade with Africa stands at around $300 billion, China’s – at around $150 billion, and the United States – at approximately $50-60 billion. Despite the tendency to grow, our current turnover is around $20 billion.”
Back in 2019, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov said that trade between Russia and Africa would grow as more and more African partners continued to show interest in having Russians in the economic sectors of Africa.
“Our African partners are interested in Russian business working more actively there. This provides greater competition between companies from Western countries, China, and Russia. With competition for developing mineral resources in Africa, it is easier and cheaper for our African colleagues to choose partners,” he said at the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs in early September.
“Overall, we are, of course, far from the absolute figures characterizing trade and investment cooperation between the African countries which stood at $20 billion,” he informed the fully-packed auditorium.
In May 2014, Lavrov said in a speech posted to the official website: “We attach special significance to deepening our trade and investment cooperation with the African States. Russia provides African countries with extensive preferences in trade. At the same time, it is evident that the significant potential of the economic cooperation is far from being exhausted, and much remains to be done so that Russian and African partners know more about each other’s capacities and needs.”
As far back in October 2007, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry posted an official report on its website that traditional products from least-developed countries (including Africa) would be exempted from import tariffs. The legislation stipulates that traditional goods are eligible for preferential customs and tariff treatment.
While Russia announced this preferential tariff regime for developing countries, which also granted duty-free access to African products, potential African exporters either failed to take advantage of it or were unaware of the advantageous terms for boosting trade.
Analyzing the present market landscape of Africa, Russia can export its technology and compete on equal terms with China, India and other prominent players. On the other hand, Russia lacks the competitive advantage in terms of finished industrial (manufactured) products that African consumers obtain from Asian countries such as China, India, Japan and South Korea.
Charles Robertson, Global Chief Economist at Renaissance Capital, thinks that the major problem is incentives. China has two major incentives to invest in Africa. First, China needs to buy resources, while Russia does not. Second, Chinese exports are suitable for Africa – whether it is textiles or iPads, goods made in China can be sold in Africa.
Keir Giles, an Associate Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, told me that “there are some more fundamental problems which Russia would need to overcome to boost its trade turnover with the region. The majority of this vast amount of trade with China simply cannot be competed with by Russia. A large part of African exports to China by value is made up of oil, which Russia does not need to import. And a large part of China’s exports to Africa is consumer goods, which Russia doesn’t really produce.”
He explains further that trade in foodstuffs in both directions suffers similar challenges, which are unlikely to be affected by the current politically-motivated Russian ban on foods from the European Union, the United States and Australia. In effect, in sharp contrast to China, the make-up of Russian exports has not really developed since the end of the Soviet Union and still consists mostly of oil, gas, arms and raw materials. For as long as that continues, the scope for ongoing trading with most African nations is going to be severely limited.
Academic experts, who have researched Russia’s foreign policy in Africa at the Moscow-based Institute for African Studies, have reiterated that Russia’s exports to Africa can be possible only after the country’s industrial base experiences a more qualitative change and introduces tariff preferences for trade with African partners.
“The situation in Russian-African foreign trade will change for the better if Russian industry undergoes rapid technological modernization, the state provides Russian businessmen systematic and meaningful support, and small and medium businesses receive wider access to foreign economic cooperation with Africa,” according to Professor Alexei Vasilyev, former Special Representative of the Russian Federation to African Countries.
Quite recently, Dr Gideon Shoo, Media Business Consultant based in Kilimanjaro Region in Tanzania, explained in an interview discussion with me that Russian companies need to prove their superiority in the business spheres, and African governments have to make it easier for Russian companies to set up and operate in their countries.
“Russian financial institutions can offer credit support that will allow them to localize their production in Africa’s industrial zones, especially southern and eastern African regions that show some stability and have a good investment and business incentives. In order to operate more effectively, Russians have to take risks by investing, recognize the importance of cooperation on key investment issues and work closely on the challenges and opportunities on the continent,” he added.
On the other hand, Dr Shoo noted that Russia is, so far, a closed market to many African countries. It is difficult to access the Russian market. However, African countries have to look to new emerging markets for export products and make efforts to negotiate for access to these markets. This can be another aspect of economic cooperation and a great business opportunity for both regions.
Nearly all the experts have acknowledged here that import and export trade has been slow due to multiple reasons, including inadequate knowledge of trade procedures, complicated certification procedures, expensive logistics, security and guarantee issues, rules and regulations, as well as the existing market conditions.
By looking at and revising the rules and regulations, the situation regarding Russia’s presence in Africa and Africa’s presence in Russia could change. All that is necessary here is for Russia and Africa to make consistent efforts to look for new ways, practical efforts at removing existing obstacles that have impeded trade over the years.
According to the African Development Bank, Africa’s economy is growing faster than those of any other region. Nearly half of Africa’s countries are now classified as middle-income countries, and around 380 million of Africa’s 1.3 billion people are now earning good incomes – rising consumerism – that makes trade profitable in Africa.
For decades, Russia has been looking for effective ways to promote multifaceted ties and new strategies for cooperation in economic areas in Africa. Now, Kremlin will hold the second Russia-Africa Summit on July 26-29 in St. Petersburg with high hopes of enhancing multifaceted ties, trying to reshape the existing relationships and significantly rolling out ways to increase the effectiveness of cooperation between Russia and Africa. The first Russia-Africa summit and economic forum were held in October 2019 in Sochi.
World
Russia Expands Military-Technical Cooperation With African Partners
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite geopolitical complexities, tensions and pressure, Russia’s military arms and weaponry sales earned approximately $15 billion at the closure of 2025, according to Kremlin report. At the regular session, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin on Jan. 30, the Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries analyzed the results of its work for 2025, and defined plans for the future.
It was noted that the system of military-technical cooperation continued to operate in difficult conditions, and with increased pressure from the Western countries to block business relations with Russia. The meeting, however, admitted that export contracts have generally performed sustainably. Russian military products were exported to more than 30 countries last year, and the amount of foreign exchange exceeded $15 billion.
Such results provide an additional opportunity to direct funds to the modernization of OPC enterprises, to the expansion of their production capacities, and to advanced research. It is also important that at these enterprises a significant volume of products is civilian products.
The Russian system of military-technical cooperation has not only demonstrated effectiveness and high resilience, but has created fundamental structures, which allow to significantly expand the “geography” of supplies of products of military purpose and, thus strengthen the position of Russia’s leader and employer advanced weapons systems – proven, tested in real combat conditions.
Thanks to the employees of the Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation and Rosoboronexport, the staff of OPC enterprises for their good faith. Within the framework of the new federal project “Development of military-technical cooperation of Russia with foreign countries” for the period 2026-2028, additional measures of support are introduced. Further effective use of existing financial and other support mechanisms and instruments is extremely important because the volumes of military exports in accordance with the 2026 plan.
Special attention would be paid to the expansion of military-technological cooperation and partnerships, with 14 states already implementing or in development more than 340 such projects.
Future plans will allow to improve the characteristics of existing weapons and equipment and to develop new promising models, including those in demand on global markets, among other issues – the development of strategic areas of military-technical cooperation, and above all, with partners on the CIS and the CSTO. This is one of the priority tasks to strengthen both bilateral and multilateral relations, ensuring stability and security in Eurasia.
From January 2026, Russia chairs the CSTO, and this requires working systematically with partners, including comprehensive approaches to expanding military-technical relations. New prospects open up for deepening military-technical cooperation and with countries in other regions, including with states on the African continent. Russia has been historically strong and trusting relationships with African countries. In different years even the USSR, and then Russia supplied African countries with a significant amount of weapons and military equipment, trained specialists on their production, operation, repair, as well as military personnel.
Today, despite pressure from the West, African partners express readiness to expand relations with Russia in the military and military-technical fields. It is not only about increasing supplies of Russian military exports, but also about the purchase of other weapons, other materials and products. Russia has undertaken comprehensive maintenance of previously delivered equipment, organization of licensed production of Russian military products and some other important issues. In general, African countries are sufficient for consideration today.
World
Trump Picks Kevin Warsh to Succeed Jerome Powell as Federal Reserve Chair
By Adedapo Adesanya
President Donald Trump has named Mr Kevin Warsh as the successor to Mr Jerome Powell as the Federal Reserve chair, ending a prolonged odyssey that has seen unprecedented turmoil around the central bank.
The decision culminates a process that officially began last summer but started much earlier than that, with President Trump launching a criticism against the Powell-led US central bank almost since he took the job in 2018.
“I have known Kevin for a long period of time, and have no doubt that he will go down as one of the GREAT Fed Chairmen, maybe the best,” Mr Trump said in a Truth Social post announcing the selection.
US analysts noted that the 55-year old appear not to ripple market because of his previous experience at the apex bank as Governor, with others saying he wouldn’t always do the bidding of the American president.
If approved by the US Senate, Mr Warsh will take over the position in May, when Mr Powell’s term expires.
Despite having argued for reductions recently, “Warsh has a long hawkish history that markets have not forgotten,” one analyst told Bloomberg.
President Trump has castigated Mr Powell for not lowering interest rates more quickly. His administration also launched a criminal investigation of Powell and the Federal Reserve earlier this month, which led Mr Powell to issue an extraordinary rebuke of President Trump’s efforts to politicize the independent central bank.
World
BRICS Agenda, United States Global Dominance and Africa’s Development Priorities
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Donald Trump has been leading the United States as its president since January 2025. Washington’s priority is to Make America Great Again (MAGA). Trump’s tariffs have rippled many economies from Latin America through Asian region to the continent of Africa. Trump’s Davos speech has explicitly revealed building a ‘new world order’ based on dominance rather than trust. He has also initiated whirlwind steps to annex Greenland, while further created the Board of Peace, aimed at helping end the two-year war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and to oversee reconstruction. Trump is handling the three-year old Russia-Ukraine crisis, and other deep-seated religious and ethnic conflicts in Africa.
These emerging trends, at least in a considerable short term, are influencing BRICS which has increased its geopolitical importance, and focusing on uniting the countries in the Global East and Global South. From historical records, BRICS, described as non-western organization, and is loosing its coherence primarily due to differences in geopolitical interests and multinational alignments, and of course, a number of members face threats from the United States while there are variations of approach to the emerging worldwide perceptions.
In this conversation, deputy director of the Center for African Studies at Moscow’s National Research University High School of Economics (HSE), Vsevolod Sviridov, expresses his opinions focusing on BRICS agenda under India’s presidency, South Africa’s G20 chairmanship in 2024, and genegrally putting Africa’s development priorities within the context of emerging trends. Here are the interview excerpts:
What is the likely impact of Washington’s geopolitics and its foreign policy on BRICS?
From my perspective, the current Venezuela-U.S. confrontation, especially Washington’s tightened leverage over Venezuelan oil revenue flows and the knock-on effects for Chinese interests, will be read inside BRICS as a reminder that sovereign resources can still be constrained by financial chokepoints and sanctions politics. This does not automatically translate into BRICS taking Venezuela’s side, but it does strengthen the bloc’s long-running argument for more resilient South-South trade settlement, diversified energy chains, and financing instruments that reduce exposure to coercive measures, because many African and other developing economies face similar vulnerabilities around commodities, shipping, insurance, and correspondent banking. At the same time, BRICS’ expansion makes consensus harder: several members maintain significant ties with the U.S., so the most likely impact is a technocratic push rather than a loud political campaign.
And highlighting, specifically, the position of BRICS members (South Africa, Ethiopia and Egypt, as well as its partnering African States (Nigeria and Uganda)?
Venezuela crisis urges African members to demand that BRICS deliver usable financial and trade tools. For South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the Venezuela case is more about the precedent: how quickly external pressure can reshape a country’s fiscal room, debt dynamics, and even investor perceptions when energy revenues and sanctions compliance collide. South Africa will likely argue that BRICS should prioritize investment, industrialization, and trade facilitation. Ethiopia and Egypt, both debt-sensitive and searching for FDI, will be especially attentive to anything that helps de-risk financing, while avoiding steps that could trigger secondary-sanctions anxieties or scare off diversified investors.
Would the latest geopolitical developments ultimately shape the agenda for BRICS 2026 under India’s presidency?
India’s 2026 chairmanship is already framed around “Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” and Venezuela’s shock (paired with broader sanction/market-volatility lessons) will likely sharpen the resilience part. From an African perspective, that is an opportunity: South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt can press India to translate the theme into deliverables that matter on the ground: food and fertilizer stability, affordable energy access, infrastructure funding. India, in turn, has incentives to keep BRICS focused on economic problem-solving rather than becoming hostage to any single flashpoint. So the Venezuela episode may function as a cautionary case study that accelerates practical cooperation where African members have the most to gain. And I would add: the BRICS agenda will become increasingly Africa-centered simply because Africa’s weight globally is rising, and recent summit discussions have repeatedly highlighted African participation as a core Global South vector. South Africa’s G20 chairmanship last year explicitly framed around putting Africa’s development priorities high on the agenda, further proves this point.
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