World
Russia Plans New Trade, Investment Cooperation With Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Sergey Lavrov, said at his annual press conference on January 18 that Russia and Africa would hold a summit in July this year and a number of documents, including new instruments of trade and investment cooperation, were being prepared to readjust methods of interaction amid the environment of sanctions, and in the context of geopolitical changes.
“As you know, we are planning the second summit in St. Petersburg, and we are preparing a whole series of activities for it. Documents are being prepared on the readjustment of interaction mechanisms in conditions and sanctions and threats, new instruments of trade and investment cooperation, supply chain systems and payments. The transition to payments in national currencies is underway. This is not a quick process, but it is progressing and gaining momentum,” the Foreign Minister said.
Ahead of the forthcoming African leaders gathering, the South African Institute of International Affairs has put into circulation its latest policy report on Russia-African relations.
In the introductory chapter, Steven Gruzd, Samuel Ramani and Cayley Clifford – have summarized various aspects of the developments between Russia and Africa over the past few years and finally questioned the impact of Russia’s policy on Africa.
According to Steven Gruzd, Samuel Ramani and Cayley Clifford, this special far-reaching policy report includes academic research from leading Russian, African and international scholars. It addresses the dimensions of Russian power projection in Africa and new frontiers of Russian influence and provides a roadmap towards understanding how Russia is perceived in Africa.
The report highlights narratives about anti-colonialism and describes how these sources of solidarity are transmitted by Russian elites to their African public. For seeking long-term influence, Russian elites have oftentimes used elements of anti-colonialism as part of the current policy to control the perceptions of Africans and primarily as new tactics for power projection in Africa.
While it has made thousands of investment promises and signed several bilateral agreements, Russia is largely invisible in economic sectors and keeps a remote distance from participating in building critical infrastructures, investing in industrial spheres and in the newly created single market. Moscow simply builds relations on illusions and lacks the capacity and overwhelming power to realize its policy goals in Africa.
That report says Russia’s expanding influence in Africa is compelling, but a closer examination further reveals a murkier picture. Despite Putin’s lofty trade targets, Russia’s trade with Africa stands at just $20 billion, which is lower than that of India or Turkey.
Over the previous years, similar observations on the stagnation in Russia-Africa economic and trade relations were also noted by politicians and academic researchers. A publication headlined “Russian Business in Africa: Missed Opportunities and Prospects” appeared in the foreign policy journal Russia in Global Affairs, where Professor Alexei Vasilyev, former Special Representative of the Russian Federation to African Countries, wrote in that article that Russian companies are pursuing their diverse interests in Africa.
The main reason is that Africa remains an enormous and large market for technology and manufacturing of consumer goods due to the increasing population and the growing middle class. Until recently, Russians have been looking at the mining industry, and economic cooperation is steadily expanding. But, Africa still accounts for just 1.5% of Russia’s investment which is a drop in the ocean. It must be admitted that Russia’s economic policy grossly lacks dynamism in Africa.
“In fact, African countries have been waiting for us for far too long; we lost our positions in post-apartheid Africa and have largely missed new opportunities. Currently, Russia lags behind leading foreign countries in most economic parameters in this region,” he pointed out in the article.
In another Russian media headlined: “West seeks to dissuade African states from participating in Russia-Africa summit” that was published last December, Federation Council Deputy Speaker Konstantin Kosachev explicitly noted that the first Russia-Africa summit held three years ago was successful, “but, in many respects, its results remained within the dimension of politics” and were not translated into additional projects in trade, economic, scientific or humanitarian cooperation.
Russia’s increasing political dialogues have not been transformed into economic capabilities. Returning as a strategic player, Russia’s business initiatives have inconsistently been followed across Africa. Senator Kosachev,, quoting trade figures to illustrate his argument, said that “the trade turnover speaks for itself. Roughly, the European Union’s trade with Africa stands at around $300 billion, China’s – at around $150 billion, and the United States – at approximately $50-60 billion. Despite the tendency to grow, our current turnover is around $20 billion.”
Back in 2019, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov said that trade between Russia and Africa would grow as more and more African partners continued to show interest in having Russians in the economic sectors of Africa.
“Our African partners are interested in Russian business working more actively there. This provides greater competition between companies from Western countries, China, and Russia. With competition for developing mineral resources in Africa, it is easier and cheaper for our African colleagues to choose partners,” he said at the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs in early September.
“Overall, we are, of course, far from the absolute figures characterizing trade and investment cooperation between the African countries which stood at $20 billion,” he informed the fully-packed auditorium.
In May 2014, Lavrov said in a speech posted to the official website: “We attach special significance to deepening our trade and investment cooperation with the African States. Russia provides African countries with extensive preferences in trade. At the same time, it is evident that the significant potential of the economic cooperation is far from being exhausted, and much remains to be done so that Russian and African partners know more about each other’s capacities and needs.”
As far back in October 2007, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry posted an official report on its website that traditional products from least-developed countries (including Africa) would be exempted from import tariffs. The legislation stipulates that traditional goods are eligible for preferential customs and tariff treatment.
While Russia announced this preferential tariff regime for developing countries, which also granted duty-free access to African products, potential African exporters either failed to take advantage of it or were unaware of the advantageous terms for boosting trade.
Analyzing the present market landscape of Africa, Russia can export its technology and compete on equal terms with China, India and other prominent players. On the other hand, Russia lacks the competitive advantage in terms of finished industrial (manufactured) products that African consumers obtain from Asian countries such as China, India, Japan and South Korea.
Charles Robertson, Global Chief Economist at Renaissance Capital, thinks that the major problem is incentives. China has two major incentives to invest in Africa. First, China needs to buy resources, while Russia does not. Second, Chinese exports are suitable for Africa – whether it is textiles or iPads, goods made in China can be sold in Africa.
Keir Giles, an Associate Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, told me that “there are some more fundamental problems which Russia would need to overcome to boost its trade turnover with the region. The majority of this vast amount of trade with China simply cannot be competed with by Russia. A large part of African exports to China by value is made up of oil, which Russia does not need to import. And a large part of China’s exports to Africa is consumer goods, which Russia doesn’t really produce.”
He explains further that trade in foodstuffs in both directions suffers similar challenges, which are unlikely to be affected by the current politically-motivated Russian ban on foods from the European Union, the United States and Australia. In effect, in sharp contrast to China, the make-up of Russian exports has not really developed since the end of the Soviet Union and still consists mostly of oil, gas, arms and raw materials. For as long as that continues, the scope for ongoing trading with most African nations is going to be severely limited.
Academic experts, who have researched Russia’s foreign policy in Africa at the Moscow-based Institute for African Studies, have reiterated that Russia’s exports to Africa can be possible only after the country’s industrial base experiences a more qualitative change and introduces tariff preferences for trade with African partners.
“The situation in Russian-African foreign trade will change for the better if Russian industry undergoes rapid technological modernization, the state provides Russian businessmen systematic and meaningful support, and small and medium businesses receive wider access to foreign economic cooperation with Africa,” according to Professor Alexei Vasilyev, former Special Representative of the Russian Federation to African Countries.
Quite recently, Dr Gideon Shoo, Media Business Consultant based in Kilimanjaro Region in Tanzania, explained in an interview discussion with me that Russian companies need to prove their superiority in the business spheres, and African governments have to make it easier for Russian companies to set up and operate in their countries.
“Russian financial institutions can offer credit support that will allow them to localize their production in Africa’s industrial zones, especially southern and eastern African regions that show some stability and have a good investment and business incentives. In order to operate more effectively, Russians have to take risks by investing, recognize the importance of cooperation on key investment issues and work closely on the challenges and opportunities on the continent,” he added.
On the other hand, Dr Shoo noted that Russia is, so far, a closed market to many African countries. It is difficult to access the Russian market. However, African countries have to look to new emerging markets for export products and make efforts to negotiate for access to these markets. This can be another aspect of economic cooperation and a great business opportunity for both regions.
Nearly all the experts have acknowledged here that import and export trade has been slow due to multiple reasons, including inadequate knowledge of trade procedures, complicated certification procedures, expensive logistics, security and guarantee issues, rules and regulations, as well as the existing market conditions.
By looking at and revising the rules and regulations, the situation regarding Russia’s presence in Africa and Africa’s presence in Russia could change. All that is necessary here is for Russia and Africa to make consistent efforts to look for new ways, practical efforts at removing existing obstacles that have impeded trade over the years.
According to the African Development Bank, Africa’s economy is growing faster than those of any other region. Nearly half of Africa’s countries are now classified as middle-income countries, and around 380 million of Africa’s 1.3 billion people are now earning good incomes – rising consumerism – that makes trade profitable in Africa.
For decades, Russia has been looking for effective ways to promote multifaceted ties and new strategies for cooperation in economic areas in Africa. Now, Kremlin will hold the second Russia-Africa Summit on July 26-29 in St. Petersburg with high hopes of enhancing multifaceted ties, trying to reshape the existing relationships and significantly rolling out ways to increase the effectiveness of cooperation between Russia and Africa. The first Russia-Africa summit and economic forum were held in October 2019 in Sochi.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Social media platform, TikTok’s Chinese owner ByteDance has signed binding agreements with United States and global investors to operate its business in America.
Half of the joint venture will be owned by a group of investors, including Oracle, Silver Lake and the Emirati investment firm MGX, according to a memo sent by chief executive, Mr Shou Zi Chew.
The deal, which is set to close on January 22, 2026 would end years of efforts by the US government to force ByteDance to sell its US operations over national security concerns.
It is in line with a deal unveiled in September, when US President Donald Trump delayed the enforcement of a law that would ban the app unless it was sold.
In the memo, TikTok said the deal will enable “over 170 million Americans to continue discovering a world of endless possibilities as part of a vital global community”.
Under the agreement, ByteDance will retain 19.9 per cent of the business, while Oracle, Silver Lake and Abu Dhabi-based MGX will hold 15 per cent each.
Another 30.1 per cent will be held by affiliates of existing ByteDance investors, according to the memo.
The White House previously said that Oracle, which was co-founded by President Trump’s supporter Larry Ellison, will license TikTok’s recommendation algorithm as part of the deal.
The deal comes after a series of delays.
Business Post reported in April 2024 that the administration of President Joe Biden passed a law to ban the app over national security concerns, unless it was sold.
The law was set to go into effect on January 20, 2025 but was pushed back multiple times by President Trump, while his administration worked out a deal to transfer ownership.
President Trump said in September that he had spoken on the phone to China’s President Xi Jinping, who he said had given the deal the go ahead.
The platform’s future remained unclear after the leaders met face to face in October.
The app’s fate was clouded by ongoing tensions between the two nations on trade and other matters.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite the complexities posed by Russia-Ukraine crisis, United States has been taking conscious steps to improve commercial relations with Russia. Unsurprisingly, Russia, on the other hand, is also moving to restore and normalise its diplomacy, negotiating for direct connections of air-routes and passionate permission to return its diplomats back to Washington and New York.
In the latest developments, Kirill Dmitriev, Chief Executive Officer of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), has been appointed as Russian President’s Special Envoy to United States. This marked an important milestone towards raising bilateral investment and economic cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked him to exclusively promote business dialogue between the two countries, and further to negotiate for the return of U.S. business enterprises. According to authentic reports, United States businesses lost $300+ bn during this Russia-Ukraine crisis, while Russia’s estimated 1,500 diplomats were asked to return to Moscow.
Strategically in late November 2025, the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) has awarded Kirill Dmitriev, praised him for calculated efforts in promoting positive dialogue between the United States and Russia within the framework decreed by President Vladimir Putin. Chief Executive Officer of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev is the Special Representative of the Russian President for Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries. Since his appointment, his primary focus has been on United States.
“Received an American Chamber of Commerce award ‘For leadership in fostering the US-Russia dialogue,’” Dmitriev wrote on his X page, in late November, 2025. According to Dmitriev, more than 150 US companies are currently operating in Russia, with more than 70% of them being present on the Russian market for over 25 years.
In addition, Chamber President Sergey Katyrin and American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (AmCham) President Robert Agee have also been discussing alternatives pathways to raise bilateral business cooperation. Both have held series of meetings throughout this year, indicating the the importance of sustaining relations as previously. Expectedly, the Roscongress Foundation has been offered its platforms during St. Petersburg International Economic (SPIEF) for the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham).
On December 9, Sergey Katyrin and Robert Agee noted that, despite existing problems and non-economic obstacles, the business communities of Russia and the United States proceed from the necessity of maintaining professional dialogue. Despite the worsening geopolitical conditions, Sergey Katyrin and Robert Agee noted the importance of preserving stable channels of trade and pragmatic prospects for economic cooperation. These will further serve as a stabilizing factor and an instrument for building mutual trust at the level of business circles, industry associations, and the expert community.
The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) will be working in the system of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) in the Russian Federation, which currently comprises 57,000 legal entities, 130 regional chambers and a combined network of representative offices covering more than 350 points of presence.
According to reports obtained by this article author from the AmCham, promising sectors for Russian-American economic cooperation include healthcare and the medical industry, civil aviation, communications/telecom, natural resource extraction, and energy/energy equipment. The United States and Russia have, more or less, agreed to continue coordinating their work to facilitate the formation of a more favorable environment for Russian and American businesses, reduce risks, and strengthen business ties. Following the American-Russian Dialogue, a joint statement and working documents were adopted.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
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