World
Russian Grain Politics And Africa’s Import-Dependency Syndrome
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Despite its sudden exit from the United Nations-brokered agreement that allowed Ukraine to export grains, Moscow says it will continue to consolidate efforts and deliver its grains uninterruptedly to the world markets. With most African countries in need, Moscow offered its assurances and would further negotiate agreements at the forthcoming summit in St. Petersburg.
At the media briefing, the Russian Foreign Ministry also offered similar assurances on the African leaders’ gathering. African countries will receive Moscow’s assurances concerning food supplies at the Russia-Africa summit, which will be held in St. Petersburg, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said.
“The countries in need will definitely receive the necessary assurances in their contacts with us and during the upcoming Russia-Africa summit regarding their need for agricultural products, primarily grain,” Vershinin. Russia understands concerns that its African partners might have, he said, “But I’d like to say that these concerns are not only understandable but will also be fully taken into account.”
A group of African countries led by South Africa have put forward a peace initiative to resolve the Ukrainian conflict. Meanwhile, Russia’s influence on the social and economic situation in African countries has increased in line with rising prices for food, fertilizer and energy.
Another source also indicated that the participants of the Russia-Africa Summit do not plan on making a separate statement on the situation in Ukraine, although the ongoing conflict will be discussed on the forum’s sidelines. However, a separate statement on this issue should not be expected, except there will be a general declaration dedicated to the positive bilateral agenda and a document relating to the global geopolitical situation.
At different occasions, Russian President Vladimir Putin has unreservedly stressed that “Russia is reliably fulfilling all its obligations pertaining to the supply of food, fertilisers, fuel and other products that are critically important to the countries of Africa, and ready to ensure their food security.”
On July 17, Russia rejected a further extension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, or so-called grain deal, an agreement initially concluded in Istanbul in July 2022 to ensure the safe export of Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs through humanitarian corridors in the Black Sea. Moscow said, however, that it may consider returning to the Istanbul initiative if the provisions of the deal allowing for exports of Russian agricultural products to world markets can be duly implemented.
The international community denounced Moscow’s decision, while Turkey, which had brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative jointly with the United Nations, expressed hope that the deal could be reanimated. Although upbeat statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed to prevent grain prices from soaring on major commodity exchanges, experts claimed that “the price increase was largely speculative.”
Some media reports have indicated that Putin’s latest economic assault on the West is fueling fears of a global food crisis. Business Insider’s George Glover wrote that Russia has started bombing Ukrainian ports and threatened to attack ships, and these actions have pushed prices soaring and sparked fears of a global food crisis.
When international grain prices rise, it becomes more expensive for poorer countries to import those commodities – so Russia’s withdrawal from the UN’s initiative has fueled policymakers’ fears that there could be a worldwide food crisis. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Putin has tried to squeeze commodity supplies in a bid to disrupt the global economy and hinder Kyiv’s Western allies.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the Kremlin’s decision to pull out of the grain deal would end “a lifeline for global food security” and extinguish “a beacon of hope”, while the European Union’s head of foreign policy Josep Borrell told journalists there could be a “big and huge food crisis in the world”.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) says Russia’s exit from Ukraine’s grain deal risks adding to global food inflation. An IMF spokesperson said the global lender would continue to carefully monitor ongoing developments in the region and their impact on global food insecurity.
“The discontinuation of the initiative impacts the food supply to countries that rely heavily on shipments from Ukraine, in particular in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia,” the fund said. “It worsens the food security outlook and risks adding to global food inflation, especially for low-income countries.”
Several Group of 20 members this week condemned Russia’s move to quit the United Nations-brokered Black Sea grain deal over what it called a failure to meet its demands to implement a parallel agreement easing rules for its own food and fertilizer exports.
Local Russian financial daily newspaper Kommersant reported on July 24 that despite the termination of the grain deal, where there are indications that Kyiv, Ankara and the West remain committed to resuming shipments of Ukrainian agricultural products across the Black Sea.
Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky has called an emergency meeting of the newly formed NATO-Ukraine Council, which allies have touted as an alternative to admitting the country into the alliance. For now, however, the West seems to be placing more hope in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ability to find convincing arguments in dialogue with Moscow.
The proposal to engage a third-party country to escort commercial ships across the Black Sea has been raised several times since Russia’s withdrawal from the Istanbul agreements, but no side has taken it up because all stakeholders see such a scenario as entailing a potentially serious risk of escalation.
According to the Financial Times, Washington is attempting to persuade its African partners to condemn Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal. For its part, Russia is not sitting idle and says that Moscow understands “the concerns that may arise among our African friends” and is proposing to provide free food supplies to the continent, but continues to insist that the initial Russia-related provisions of the Black Sea Grain Initiative must be implemented before there can be any return to the deal, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin noted.
These past several days, the current questions discussed most by both the Russian and foreign media were related to Russia’s threats to block Black Sea shipping, no Putin at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, and that the Western and European sanctions were insufficient.
The European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and Canada simultaneously expanded sanctions against Russian individuals and legal entities. But as Russia continues to attack Ukraine with missiles and drones, the existing sanctions are clearly not enough to hinder its weapons production, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his evening address on July 18.
Russia has started blocking Ukraine’s seaports. The recent Russian missile strike targeting Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast’s port infrastructure, has destroyed 60,000 tons of grains. Russia’s Defense Ministry has designated all ships bound for Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea as “potential carriers of military cargo,” Russian news agency RIA Novosti reported on July 19.
Russia’s air attack against Odesa highlights the country’s attitude towards food security, African nations, the UN and global hunger, Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, tweeted on July 19.
The termination of the deal would affect a number of countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia. Due to the limited transport capacity and infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe, a significant part of the land export of grain from Ukraine may get stuck in transit countries, which have local producers of this agricultural product.
The Black Sea agreement has helped keep benchmark foodstuff prices under control by boosting supply to world markets. On July 17, Russia officially withdrew from the grain agreement after an attack at the Crimean Bridge. In addition, Moscow withdrew guarantees of navigation safety in the Black Sea. The UN-brokered Black Sea grain deal expired on July 18.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
After the expiration of bilateral agreement on trade, the US Congress as well as African leaders, highly recognizing its significance, has been pursuing the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The agreement, which allows duty-free access to American markets for African exporters, expired on September 30, 2025.
The US Congress is advancing a bill to revive and extend AGOA, but South Africa’s continued inclusion remains uncertain. The trade pact still has strong bipartisan support, with the House Ways and Means Committee approving it 37-3. However, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, raised concerns about South Africa, citing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and said the administration could consider excluding the country.
This threat puts at risk the duty-free access that has significantly benefited South African automotive, agricultural, and wine exports. The debate highlights how trade policy is becoming entangled with broader diplomatic tensions, casting uncertainty over a key pillar of US-Africa economic relations.
Nevertheless, South Africa continues to lobby for inclusion. South Africa trade summary records show that the US goods and services trade with South Africa estimated at $26.2 billion in 2024. The US and South Africa signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as far back as in 2012.
The duty-free access for nearly 40 African countries has boosted development and fostered more equitable and sustainable growth in Africa. By design AGOA is a useful mechanism for improving accessibility to trade competitiveness, connectivity, and productivity. During these past 25 years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key features and benefits of AGOA:
It’s worth reiterating here that during these past several years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, as AGOA is closely working with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and with the African Union (AU), trade professionals could primarily leverage various economic sectors and unwaveringly act as bridges between the United States and Africa.
* Duty-free Access: AGOA allows eligible products from sub-Saharan African countries to enter the US market without paying tariffs.
* Promotion of Economic Growth: The program encourages economic growth by providing incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets.
* Encouraging Economic Reforms: AGOA encourages economic and political reforms in eligible countries, including the rule of law and market-oriented policies.
* Increased Trade and Investment: The program aims to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.
With the changing times, Africa is also building its muscles towards a new direction since the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was officially launched in July 2019.
In practical terms, trading under the AfCFTA commenced in January 2021. And the United States has prioritized the AfCFTA as one mechanism through which to strengthen its long-term relations with the continent. In the context of the crucial geopolitical changes, African leaders, corporate executives, and the entire business community are optimistic over the extension of AGOA, for mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the United States.
Worthy to say that AGOA, to a considerable degree, as a significant trade policy has played a crucial role in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa stands at the cusp of a transformative digital revolution. With the expansion of mobile connectivity, internet penetration, digital platforms, and financial technology, the continent’s digital economy is poised to become a significant driver of sustainable development, intra-Africa trade, job creation, and economic inclusion.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 1 (a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development), highlights the importance of leveraging technology and innovation. The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has opened a new chapter in market integration, creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of the digital economy across all sectors.
Despite remarkable progress, challenges persist. These include limited digital infrastructure, disparities in digital literacy, fragmented regulatory frameworks, inadequate access to financing for tech-based enterprises, and gender gaps in digital participation. Moreover, Africa must assert its digital sovereignty, build local data ecosystems, and secure cyber-infrastructure to thrive in a rapidly changing global digital landscape.
Against this backdrop, the 16th African Union Private Sector Forum provides a timely platform to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s digital economy to accelerate intra-Africa trade and sustainable development.
The 16th High-Level AU Private Sector forum is set to take place in Djibouti, from the 14 to 16 December 2025, under the theme “Harnessing Africa’s Digital Economy and Innovation for Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development”
The three-day Forum will feature high-level plenaries, expert panels, breakout sessions, and networking opportunities. Each day will spotlight a core pillar of Africa’s digital transformation journey.
Day 1: Digital Economy and Trade Integration in Africa
Focus: Leveraging digital platforms and technologies to enhance trade integration and competitiveness under AfCFTA.
Day 2: Innovation, Fintech, and the Future of African Economies
Focus: Driving economic inclusion through fintech, innovation ecosystems, and youth entrepreneurship.
Day 3: Building Policy, Regulatory Frameworks, and Partnerships for Digital Growth
Focus: Creating an enabling environment for digital innovation and infrastructure through effective policy, governance, and partnerships.
To foster strategic dialogue and action-oriented collaboration among key stakeholders in Africa’s digital ecosystem, with the goal of leveraging digital economy and innovation to boost intra-Africa trade, accelerate economic transformation, and support inclusive, sustainable development.
* Promote Digital Trade: Identify mechanisms and policy actions to enable seamless cross-border digital commerce and integration under AfCFTA.
* Foster Innovation and Fintech: Advance inclusive fintech ecosystems and support innovation-driven entrepreneurship, especially among youth and women.
* Policy and Regulatory Harmonization: Build consensus on regional and continental digital regulatory frameworks to foster trust, security, and interoperability.
* Encourage Investment and Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthen collaboration between governments, private sector, and development partners to invest in digital infrastructure, R&D, and skills development.
* Advance Digital Inclusion and Sustainability: Ensure that digital transformation contributes to environmental sustainability and the empowerment of marginalized communities.
The AU Private Sector Forum has held several forums, with key recommendations. These recommendations provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the African private sector and offer guidance for policymakers on how to support its growth and development.
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