Feature/OPED
Banks Cash Out, Economy Loses Out: How Nigerian Banks’ N5.05trn Government Securities Boom is Stifling Real Growth
By Blaise Udunze
In a year when Nigeria’s economy continues to groan under the weight of inflation, unemployment, and weak purchasing power, the banking sector has once again recorded a massive windfall, not from lending to the real economy or financing innovation, but from investing in government securities.
According to data compiled by MoneyCentral, Nigerian Tier-1 banks collectively realized N5.05 trillion in income from investment securities in the first nine months of 2025 represents a staggering 42.28 percent increase over the N3.55 trillion recorded in the same period of 2024.
At first glance, this performance might seem like a testament to the banking industry’s resilience and financial ingenuity. But beneath the lustrous profit sheets lies a deeper economic dilemma that reveals how Nigeria’s banks are making more money by lending to government than by lending to people, small businesses, and industries which are the very arteries that sustain productive economic life.
It is no secret that Nigeria’s commercial banks have long found comfort in the safe, predictable yields of government securities such as treasury bills, bonds, and promissory notes. These instruments are virtually risk-free, backed by sovereign guarantees, and often deliver attractive returns in a high-interest-rate environment. For the banks, it is a perfect business model where depositors’ funds flow in at low cost, and those funds are easily parked in high-yield government paper with minimal risk or operational hassle. There is no need to worry about non-performing loans, credit analysis, or the painstaking process of supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
But for the economy, it is a tragedy of misaligned priorities. While the banks luxuriate in “safe profits,” the productive sectors like agriculture, manufacturing, transport, housing, and creative industries remain starved of credit. Nigeria’s SMEs, which account for over 80 percent of employment and nearly half of GDP, face prohibitive interest rates, limited access to capital, and chronic underfunding. The result is economic stagnation disguised as stability.
The data below tells the story clearly:
– Zenith Bank realized N1.14 trillion from income from short-term government securities, which is 55.49 percent higher than 2024’s N734.14 billion.
– Access Bank made N1.13 trillion income from investment securities as at September 2025 which is 36 percent higher than 2024’s N838.14 billion.
– GTCO realized N547.77 billion income from government bonds, which is 45.68 percent higher than 2024’s N376 billion.
– United Bank for Africa (UBA) saw its income from short-term government securities rise 29.77 percent to N973.12 billion in the period under review, up from N750.48 billion the previous year.
– FirstHoldco’s income from investment securities increased 33.70 percent to N720.15 billion in September 2025, from N538.59 billion in September 2024.
Collectively, these numbers paint a clear picture of the real economy struggling to breathe, while the financial sector is growing fat on sovereign debt. This is not banking as development finance; it is banking as arbitrage. And the scale of this investment obsession is enormous. In the past teo years alone, the top 10 listed banks have channeled at least N20.4 trillion into investment securities and this huge capital could have financed millions of jobs, supported thousands of small businesses, and accelerated growth in Nigeria’s productive sectors.
This has now caught the attention of Nigeria’s tax authorities. The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) recently directed banks, stockbrokers, and other financial institutions to deduct a 10 percent withholding tax on interest earned from investments in short-term securities. Prior to this directive, short-term bills were tax-exempt to boost returns for investors. The new rule requires tax to be deducted at the point of payment on instruments such as treasury bills, corporate bonds, promissory notes, and bills of exchange.
It remains unclear how much the government expects to generate from this withholding tax. However, the FIRS clarified that investors will receive tax credits for the amounts withheld unless the deduction represents a final tax. Notably, interest on federal government bonds remains exempt from the levy. “All relevant interest-payers are required to comply with this circular to avoid penalties and interest as stipulated in the tax law,” FIRS Executive Chairman Zacch Adedeji said in the official notice.
Yield-hungry investors including banks are likely to be the most affected by this directive. In the first half of 2025 alone, Nigeria’s biggest banks realized N3.03 trillion in income from treasury bills, which represents a 60.40 percent increase from N1.89 trillion recorded in the corresponding period of 2024. GTCO, Zenith Bank Plc, United Bank for Africa Plc, Access Holdings Plc, FirstHoldco Plc, FCMB Plc, Fidelity Bank Plc, and Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc have been in the habit of buying up domestic government bonds that offer among the highest yields in emerging markets.
By introducing this withholding tax, the FIRS aims to reduce excessive speculative investment in short-term securities and redirect liquidity into more productive parts of the economy. Whether this policy shift achieves that goal remains to be seen. In theory, taxing government securities could make lending to the private sector relatively more attractive. In practice, unless accompanied by broader structural reforms such as reducing credit risk, improving collateral enforcement, and stabilizing the macroeconomic environment, banks may simply adjust their margins and continue business as usual.
Nigeria is witnessing a growing disconnect between financial growth and economic growth. On one side is the booming financial economy, driven by banks’ trading gains, FX revaluation, and investment returns. On the other side is the struggling real economy, where factories close, youth unemployment rises, and SMEs collapse under the weight of credit starvation. The banks’ balance sheets may glitter, but the nation’s balance of welfare is grim.
As inflation eased slightly to 18.02 percent in September 2025, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) cut the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) from 27.5 percent to 27 percent. While this move signals a dovish tone, it does little to change the fact that the cost of credit remains astronomically high. Commercial lending rates hover between 25 percent and 35 percent, which is completely out of reach for most small businesses. Meanwhile, banks can earn double-digit, risk-free returns on treasury bills. Faced with that choice, which banker would lend to a farmer or manufacturer?
Beyond the figures, this trend has human consequences. Every SME denied a loan represents jobs not created, taxes not paid, and innovations never realized. Every startup that shuts down for lack of funding represents a family’s dashed hopes. Every manufacturer operating below capacity because of working capital shortages translates into lost exports and higher import dependence. When banks turn away from development finance, the ripple effect touches every household ranging from the market woman running a petty trade to the tech entrepreneurs across the country.
Several factors explain why banks prefer the comfort of government securities to the challenge of real-sector lending. Many SMEs operate informally, without proper records or collateral, making them unattractive to traditional lenders. Nigeria’s judicial system often makes loan recovery slow and uncertain, discouraging risk-taking. Exchange rate instability and inflation distort business forecasts, making long-term lending risky. Banks also find it easier to meet liquidity and capital adequacy ratios by holding government paper. Executive bonuses and performance metrics are tied to quarterly profits, not long-term economic impact. These factors form an entrenched ecosystem of incentives that rewards speculation over production, in a system where financial stability comes at the cost of real growth.
If Nigeria must break free from this cycle, a paradigm shift is needed, one that redefines the purpose of banking in national development. The CBN and fiscal authorities must create differentiated incentives for banks that channel a higher percentage of their loan portfolio to productive sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, renewable energy, and technology. Tax rebates, lower cash reserve ratios, or credit guarantees can help de-risk these loans. Nigeria’s collateral registry, credit bureaus, and bankruptcy laws need modernization to reduce perceived risk, while the legal system must guarantee faster resolution of credit disputes.
Government, through the Bank of Industry (BOI) or similar agencies, can establish a blended-finance vehicle that matches public capital with private lending, allowing banks to co-finance SME projects with shared risk. Many small businesses fail to access credit because they lack proper documentation or business plans. A coordinated financial literacy program, supported by banks and chambers of commerce, could improve their readiness for formal credit. Ultimately, change must come from the top. Bank CEOs and boards must see themselves not just as profit managers but as nation builders. The sustainability of their profits depends on the health of the economy that surrounds them.
If this imbalance persists, Nigeria risks becoming a country where banks thrive and industries die. The long-term cost is profound. Economic growth will remain consumption-driven rather than production-led. Unemployment will worsen as SMEs fold up. Government borrowing will continue to crowd out private investment. The naira will weaken due to import dependence and weak export diversification. Financial capitalism, without developmental conscience, will only deepen inequality and discontent.
The time has come for Nigeria’s banking industry, regulators, and policymakers to make a collective choice: between easy profits and enduring prosperity. It is not enough to celebrate trillion-naira incomes if the nation remains trapped in jobless growth. It is not enough to report record balance sheets while millions of Nigerians remain unbanked and unemployed. True financial innovation lies not in exploiting yields, but in empowering people. The banks that will define the next decade are those that look beyond treasury bills, especially those that find value in the dreams of Nigerian entrepreneurs, in the resilience of its farmers, and in the creativity of its youth.
The story of Nigeria’s N5.05 trillion securities income is not just about numbers; it is about choices and their consequences. It reveals a financial system that has lost sight of its developmental mission, a government too dependent on debt, and an economy where growth has become disjointed from human progress. Yet, it is not too late to change course. The recent 10 percent tax on short-term securities should be the first step toward a deeper reform as one that forces a reallocation of capital from paper to people, from speculation to production.
As yields fall and monetary policy adjusts, the smart banks will be those that read the writing on the wall knowing that the future of finance in Nigeria lies not in government debt, but in the real economy because it is the only economy that truly matters. Because in the end, a nation cannot prosper when its banks are rich and its people are poor.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]
By Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm
In a report filed by The Business Standard on August 8, 2026, India, the current BRICS chair, opposes a proposal for a common currency to counter the US dollar.
The Indian Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, told reporters in Jaipur, Rajasthan, northwestern India, after a two-day BRICS trade and industry meeting, that India was not in favour of a BRICS currency. He added that India did not support the introduction of any such BRICS currency scheme.
It is good these things are showing signs at this early stage of attempts by BRICS member countries to crystallise a research finding published by a British economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neil, in 2001.
None of the leaders and country members of BRICS ever conceived on record the formation of such an economic or political bloc until the research publication, which spurred leaders of the mentioned countries to marshal resources and begin a dialogue of formalisation.
The current membership that started involuntarily with just Brazil, Russia, India, and China as a concept published by a research economist, that later included South Africa, now has 10 members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia.
Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are designated partner countries that participate in framework meetings without full voting rights.
Originally, the publication by Jim O’Neil wasn’t intended or proposed as a vehicle for the political grouping that has drawn the attention of the rest of the world, as mentioned members took a step further from the appraisal or assessment paper to coalesce into a political force overflowing its original boundaries today.
For the above reasons, the initial step of early contacts was to take advantage of things in common in member countries for the stimulation of economic growth and global prosperity. At that stage, suspicions were managed, and plans didn’t consider historical political differences and disagreements as grounds for suspicion or discontinuation of cooperation.
Of course, China and India had trust issues over decades of border disputes. And in the early stages of heightened escalations of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship when India offered to mediate and broker for ceasefire and eventual peace, Russia wasn’t sceptical but took steps to host the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi.
But at the back of the mind of the Russian-Indian relationship, history was revealing about betrayals, especially after what the country endured in assassinations of leading members of the Indian National Congress, that killed Indira Gandhi and swept her son, Rajiv Gandhi, and thereafter ravaged the family dynasty with threats of violence.
These paved the way for the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist party, and its leader, Narendra Modi. The BJP is not directly responsible for the intimidation and violent campaign against the INC, a close former Soviet-era ally of Russia, but a beneficiary. There are grounds to suspect a frosty relationship with Russia, although concealed in diplomatic niceties and global market dynamics of cross-border business and trade.
India turned into the redistribution hub of Russian discounted grains and oil supplies as a third country, after sanctions were imposed on Russia in what Russia described as demilitarisation and denazification special operations in Ukraine.
India is considered by Western powers as a democracy. It was once a British colony, gaining independence on August 15, 1947. It is also a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. On a normal day, it doesn’t add or take away anything. But under these circumstances, these are serious factors to consider in arriving at a decision.
Be it as it may, China and Russia have found their way out in world trade, bypassing SWIFT. China operates the Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System, whilst Russia is running the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). India has IMPS and NEFT. In principle, these payment systems bypass SWIFT and the US dollar, nonetheless.
As the world waits to hear India back its dissenting views with supporting facts, world trade will never remain the same again.
Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm has extensive scholarly publications that establish him as a leading academic expert in regional geopolitical dynamics and diplomatic relations in Africa. Author of e-monographs on geopolitics, ethnic conflicts, and political philosophy.
Feature/OPED
What Dangote’s Reported $40bn Private-Placement Valuation Could Mean for Nigerian Investors, NGX
Dangote Petroleum Refinery could become an unusually large part of Nigeria’s stock market if its eventual IPO valuation is close to the roughly $40 billion implied by a recent private placement.
EBC Financial Group (EBC) highlights that this would value the refinery at about N54.63 trillion, using the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market rate of N1,365.6856 per USD on August 7. Against the N158.513 trillion value of companies listed on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) on the same date, adding the refinery at that value would produce a market worth about N213.14 trillion, with Dangote Refinery accounting for 25.6%.
This scenario assumes the full $40 billion equity value is reflected in NGX market capitalisation and other listed company values remain unchanged. At that size, movements in the company could become highly visible across the Nigerian equity market, although its actual influence on NGX indices may depend on the shares available for public trading and the relevant index rules.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said: “If Dangote Refinery entered the Nigerian Exchange at close to a $40 billion valuation, it could account for roughly one-quarter of the resulting NGX market value. If that valuation is difficult to support, few shares are available for public trading, or investors need to reduce other Nigerian holdings to participate, the effects could extend across Nigeria’s equity market, including existing NGX-listed companies and their shareholders.”
A Private Transaction Can Indicate Value, but Public Investors Need Financial Evidence
Based on the private transaction, $40 billion provides an indication of Dangote Refinery’s value, but it does not establish the eventual IPO price. Details published on August 4 said a $2.5 billion private placement for a 6% stake implied a valuation of roughly $40 billion. The proposed initial public offering (IPO) was reported to target about $5 billion, while the eventual IPO valuation and percentage offered to the public were not disclosed. This is important as a private transaction may produce a different valuation from the price a broad group of public investors is prepared to accept.
For context, public equity market values cited alongside the transaction were about $12 billion for Türkiye’s Tupras and $16 billion for US-listed HF Sinclair. The Dangote figure is about 3.3 times Tupras and 2.5 times HF Sinclair. They are not direct comparisons because profitability, debt, operations and growth plans differ. The gap nevertheless increases the need for audited earnings, cash flow, debt and investment plans that explain what supports the higher valuation.
The reported $5 billion fundraising target is equivalent to about N6.83 trillion at the August 7 exchange rate, or approximately 4.3% of the N158.513 trillion existing NGX market value. Proposed $5 billion raise. If new Nigerian or foreign money funds the offer, the pool of capital invested in Nigerian equities could expand. If investors sell current holdings to participate, capital could instead move away from other listed companies.
Publicly Tradable Shares and New Investment Could Shape the Wider Market Impact
NGX rules show why total company value does not tell investors how much stock they can actually trade. Main Board companies can qualify through either 20% public ownership held by at least 300 shareholders or publicly tradable shares worth at least N20 billion. The Premium Board value alternative is N40 billion. Holdings controlled by promoters, directors and close relatives, government, or strategic investors owning at least 5% are excluded from qualifying public shares.
This means a company worth tens of trillions of naira could still have a much smaller amount of stock available for regular trading if ownership remains concentrated. The key issue is therefore how much of Dangote Refinery becomes accessible to public investors and how widely those shares are held.
Regional investment could also affect the outcome. Details published on 4 August indicated engagement involving South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Ghana and Rwanda, including possible Kenyan participation of up to $500 million, although no allocations were confirmed. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange separately said Dangote Group had shown strong intent to pursue a South African listing after Nigeria. Regional participation in the Nigerian offer could bring new capital directly into Nigerian equities. A later South African listing could broaden access but would not itself increase money raised through the Nigerian IPO.
Pension funds face the same question of capital allocation. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) waived the usual existence, profitability and dividend requirements so Pension Fund Administrators can consider the IPO, while retaining internal investment policies, risk-management requirements and duties to contributors and retirees. PenCom Circular on Dangote Refiner. PenCom states that the dispensation is exceptional, one-off and specific to this proposed IPO.
Pension funds held N5.907 trillion in domestic ordinary shares at the end of June, compared with the offer’s approximately N6.83 trillion equivalent. This does not imply pension funds would finance the offer. It shows why managers must consider exposure to one company and whether participation requires reducing other investments.
Precious added, “Dangote being listed could become a turning point for Nigeria’s equity market if it brings wider public ownership and additional African capital. Investors still need clear evidence supporting the valuation, clarity on how much of the company they can trade and an explanation of where the money raised will go. Those answers will determine whether the listing expands the Nigerian equity market or concentrates more investment around one company.”
An approved prospectus should clarify the valuation, shares offered, public ownership and use of proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) said on June 23 that no IPO application had then been filed or approved and ordered unauthorised pre-marketing to stop. Details published on 4 August later said an IPO application had been submitted, with regulatory approval expected in the following weeks. Until final terms are disclosed, the test for Nigeria is whether the listing combines a supportable valuation with broad public ownership and genuinely additional investment.
Feature/OPED
Moving the Stablecoin Conversation From Hype to Utility in Africa’s Next Payments Evolution
By Rajat Mishra
For much of the past decade, discussions around stablecoins have been dominated by cryptocurrency speculation. Increasingly, however, stablecoins are emerging as practical financial infrastructure for moving money across borders, managing liquidity and improving payment efficiency.
The real opportunity lies not in choosing between traditional finance and digital assets, but in building an integrated financial ecosystem where both work together to improve efficiency, broaden financial access and deepen economic connectivity across the continent.
Despite significant advances in financial inclusion and digital payments, moving money across African borders remains far more difficult than it should be. Businesses continue to face challenges when making cross-border payments. Fragmented payment networks, multiple intermediaries, and lengthy settlement processes increase costs and create operational inefficiencies.
Remittance providers, the specialised financial services that millions rely on to send money home, face many of the same structural challenges. These providers play a critical role across the continent. In fact, 19 of Africa’s 54 countries receive remittance inflows equivalent to at least 4% of their GDP. Yet Africa remains the world’s most expensive region to send money to.
These challenges are not a reflection of remittance providers themselves, but of the fragmented banking and settlement infrastructure underpinning international money movement. Financial institutions must often manage liquidity across multiple disconnected currency markets while relying on complex correspondent banking networks and clearing systems. The result is higher costs, slower settlements, and capital that remains unnecessarily locked up.
One of the most immediate opportunities for stablecoins lies in improving cross-border settlement. Consider a Kenyan business importing goods from South Africa. Under traditional settlement models, payments often pass through multiple correspondent banking relationships, involve several foreign exchange conversions, and can take days before funds reach the intended recipient.
Stablecoin-enabled settlement rails have the potential to reduce much of this friction by enabling value to move more efficiently between financial institutions across markets. The result can be shorter settlement times, greater transparency and improved predictability for businesses operating across borders.
The benefits extend well beyond businesses. For millions of Africans working abroad, remittances remain a financial lifeline, helping families pay school fees, healthcare costs and daily living expenses. Yet sending money home often involves navigating a complex chain of money transfer operators, correspondent banks, and local payout partners, with each additional layer introducing costs and delays.
Stablecoins can help streamline the backend movement of funds between institutional participants, reducing settlement costs and improving efficiency across the value chain.
For end users, the advantage is simplicity. Recipients do not need to interact with, or even understand stablecoins directly. They continue to receive money through familiar, trusted channels, whether a local bank account or mobile money wallet, only faster and at a lower cost.
Beyond payments, stablecoins also address one of the less visible but most significant challenges in cross-border finance: liquidity management. Financial institutions operating across multiple markets must constantly ensure they have sufficient funds in the right currency, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time. Today, this often requires pre-funding accounts across multiple countries, a costly practice that traps large amounts of capital and limits financial flexibility.
Stablecoins introduce a new model for moving value across borders in near real time, enabling institutions to manage liquidity dynamically as demand arises. This can reduce the need for large pre-funded balances, improve treasury efficiency and free up capital that can be deployed more productively. Ultimately, these efficiencies can translate into faster settlements, lower costs, and better services for businesses and consumers alike.
However, the true value of stablecoins will not come from isolated blockchain networks operating independently of existing financial systems. Their long-term impact will depend on how effectively they integrate with banks, mobile money platforms, payment service providers and existing payment infrastructure. Interoperability will be critical to ensuring payment flows move seamlessly between systems, markets and currencies. The goal should be to strengthen and modernise today’s payment ecosystem, not replace it.
From experiment to infrastructure: what global moves are telling us
Some of the clearest signals that stablecoins are moving from experimentation to infrastructure are coming from card networks. Mastercard’s reported agreement to acquire BVNK, valued at up to $1.8 billion, points to a strategic investment in the settlement layer connecting stablecoin rails with traditional banking and reflects growing institutional confidence in stablecoin-enabled cross-border payments.
Visa’s expansion of stablecoin-backed cards through Stripe’s Bridge to more than 100 countries reflects a complementary strategy. Rather than acquiring infrastructure outright, Visa is leveraging its existing global network as the final distribution layer for stablecoin-funded payments.
The inclusion of African markets is particularly significant. It signals growing confidence that stablecoin-backed payment instruments can operate alongside, and in some cases complement, the mobile money ecosystems that already dominate wallet-based payments across much of the continent.
Taken together, these developments point to a broader shift. Card payment networks are moving from observing the stablecoin conversation to investing directly in the infrastructure that underpins it. For Africa, the implication is not that stablecoins will replace existing payment rails, but that success will increasingly belong to institutions capable of orchestrating multiple settlement rails – cards, bank transfers, mobile money and stablecoins- within a unified, interoperable ecosystem. Local market expertise, regulatory relationships and last-mile distribution will remain decisive competitive advantages.
Building for scale through trust and regulation
But despite their potential, stablecoins cannot operate outside the boundaries of regulated financial systems. Their long-term viability across Africa depends on clear regulatory frameworks, robust compliance standards and trusted infrastructure that supports transparency, risk management and consumer protection.
We are already seeing this evolution. In markets such as South Africa, institutions facilitating cross-border settlements must navigate increasingly sophisticated regulatory requirements, including approvals for certain offshore crypto-related activities. Globally, initiatives such as the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) and expanded Travel Rule obligations are raising expectations around reporting, tax transparency and compliance.
These developments reinforce a simple reality: stablecoin infrastructure does not reduce compliance obligations. It raises the bar for governance, transparency and institutional risk management. The objective is not to bypass regulation, but to build interoperable payment systems that can innovate confidently within it.
From the edges to the plumbing
The stablecoin conversation is steadily moving beyond speculation and towards practical implementation. What once sat at the edges of the payments debate is becoming part of the plumbing of cross-border finance rather than a parallel system to it.
The question is no longer whether stablecoins have a role to play in payments. The question is where they deliver the greatest value. In Africa, that value is increasingly clear: faster settlement, improved liquidity efficiency and more connected cross-border commerce. The winners will not be those that replace existing financial systems, but those that successfully connect stablecoin rails with the banks, mobile money networks and payment providers that already power the continent’s economy.
For pan-African payment networks such as Onafriq, the priority is ensuring that emerging technologies complement the financial infrastructure businesses and consumers already trust, rather than introducing new layers of complexity.
The opportunity lies in connecting stablecoin settlement with banks, mobile money networks and payment providers, ensuring the benefits of this new infrastructure deliver tangible outcomes for African businesses and consumers.
Rajat Mishra is the CPO for Network Product & Deputy Group CPIO at Onafriq
