By Abba Dukawa

Kano politics has been thrown into fresh uncertainty following reports that the Kano State Governor, Abba Yusuf, is planning to defect from the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) to the All Progressives Congress (APC).

For years, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso aspired to be Kano’s undisputed political kingmaker. He only succeeded in realizing this ambition by installing his perceived political godson as the current governor of Kano State.

His earlier attempts had failed; notably, the current governor is the only candidate Kwankwaso attempted to install twice.

Even before the recent attempt at reclaiming the political and power throne by its rightful owner, there were widespread insinuations that the relationship between the political godfather and godson was far from cordial, despite both camps publicly maintaining that all was well.

The governor’s recent move to cross over to the ruling party has been strongly opposed by the state party leadership and the NNPP’s national leader, Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso. This development has triggered internal disagreements within the NNPP, particularly between supporters of the governor and loyalists of the Kwankwasiyya movement.

Since news broke of Governor Abba’s intention to defect to the APC, claims have circulated  that he was acting with Kwankwaso’s consent.  Those who believed that Governor Abba planned to defect with Kwankwaso’s approval made a grave misjudgment.

This is not a coordinated plan; rather, it is a political conflict akin to that between a father and a son.

From a rational political standpoint, the situation reflects a deep and intense struggle—a clear attempt at reclaiming the throne between the Governor of Kano State and the leader of the Kwankwasiyya movement, Senator Rabi’u Musa Kwankwaso.

By all political indicators, the governor’s effort to reclaim the throne appears aimed at securing absolute control and liberating himself from total submission to the national leader of the Kwankwasiyya movement.

In response to the unfolding conflict, the NNPP national leader has intensified efforts to rally federal and state lawmakers, local government chairmen, and party structures to remain loyal to him. Kwankwaso’s reaction has been firm but defensive.

Kwankwaso, addressing them, reportedly stated that it was evident the governor was abandoning the NNPP for the APC and that any member wishing to follow him was free to do so. He reminded them that they won the election by divine grace alone, asking rhetorically: “Will the God who gave us power in 2023 not still be there in 2027?”

He has denied any involvement in defection plans and reaffirmed his loyalty to the NNPP and its ideology, warning supporters against what he described as “betrayal. However, events on the ground tell a different story, as several local government chairmen, along with state and federal lawmakers, appear to be gravitating toward the governor’s camp.

Ahead of his anticipated defection and in a bid to strengthen his political base, the governor has reportedly been working behind the scenes to secure the support of National Assembly members and NNPP members of the State House of Assembly and the local government council chairman.

Although no official statement has been issued by the governor’s office  since reports of the planned defection emerged, the body language of prominent government officials suggests that the plan is already in motion and that it is only a matter of time. So far, only the Speaker of the State Assembly, Yusuf Falgore, has publicly endorsed the governor’s planned defection. Sources also indicate that a significant number of local government chairmen have joined the governor’s defection train.

Blind Kwankwasiyya members ideologues fail to distinguish between political betrayal and the pursuit of independence. Politics, after all, is about survival and adaptation.

Most Kwankwasiyya members are youths. Where were they when Kwankwaso parted ways with Hamisu Musa, Musa Gwadabe, and Dauda Dangalan? Kwankwaso rose under mentorship before charting his own course. Where were they when Abubakar Rimi broke away from Aminu Kano in ’79-’80, pursuing his own path? When Abdullahi Ganduje split from Kwankwaso, he faced ridicule and insults.

These same critics should appreciate Abba Gida-Gida’s restraint in not publicly recounting the unpleasant experiences surrounding his emergence as governor under the NNPP.

The Kwankwaso–Abba conflict is, at its core, politics in its truest form—a search for solutions and self-determination. There is a clear distinction between betrayal in politics, the pursuit of solutions, and the quest for independence from total submission.

If Governor Abba succeeds in taking the bulk of NNPP’s structure to APC, it’ll be a major symbolic blow to Kwankwaso’s influence . It seems Kwankwaso’s biggest fear is Abba taking the state with him, leaving him with a movement without a state .

The plan Abba defection from the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP) to the All Progressives Congress (APC) could reshape Kano’s politics significantly- APC regains dominance in Kano, strengthening its position ahead of 2027- NNPP’s national relevance takes a hit, struggling to recover from losing its only governor Kwankwasiyya faces a tough test without state power, potentially losing influence. New alliances might emerge as Yusuf’s move triggers political recalibrations across the North.

Game of Power: Throne Reclaim

Dukawa writes from Kano and can been reached via [email protected]

By Blaise Udunze

Nigeria’s new tax identification portal goes live nationwide tomorrow, Friday, January 1, 2026, marking a pivotal moment in the country’s fiscal and financial governance. Designed to modernise tax administration and strengthen taxpayer identification, the reform reflects a decisive shift in economic strategy by a government grappling with shrinking oil revenues, rising public debt, and widening fiscal deficits.

At the centre of this shift is a deeper integration of identity systems, banking data, and tax administration, most notably the adoption of the National Identification Number (NIN) as a tax identification mechanism for operating bank accounts. In parallel, banks will also begin charging a N50 stamp duty on electronic transfers of N10,000 and above, following the implementation of the Tax Act.

Individually, these measures may appear modest, even reasonable. Collectively, however, they signal a fundamental reordering of the relationship between the state, banks, and citizens with far-reaching implications for banking business, customer trust, financial inclusion, and credit creation.

Banks at the Centre of Fiscal Enforcement

Under the new tax framework, Nigerian banks are no longer merely financial intermediaries or corporate taxpayers. They are increasingly positioned as collection agents, reporting hubs, and frontline enforcement points for government revenue policy.

The linkage of NIN to tax compliance, combined with transaction-based stamp duties, reinforces a stark reality that the banking system has become the most visible and accessible channel through which the state now extracts revenue from citizens.

This expanded role exposes banks to a new layer of risk not just financial or operational, but social, reputational, and political risks that extend far beyond balance sheets.

A Structural Shift in the Banking, Tax Relationship

Historically, banks played a facilitative role in tax compliance, primarily through payment processing and remittance support. The use of NIN as a tax identifier marks a structural departure from this model.

Bank accounts are no longer merely financial tools; they are becoming gateways to tax visibility.

This shift fundamentally alters the risk profile of the banking business. Banks are now exposed not only to credit, market, and operational risks, but also to heightened social backlash, reputational damage, and political sensitivity, arising from their expanded enforcement role.

Account Friction and Slower Customer Onboarding

One of the earliest and most visible consequences of NIN-based tax identification is increased friction in account opening and maintenance.

Consequently, in a real sense, millions of Nigerians will continue to face challenges with the NIN system, including delays in enrolment and correction, biometric mismatches as well as  inconsistencies between NIN, BVN, and bank records.

For banks, this translates into slower onboarding processes, higher rates of account restriction or rejection, and increased congestion across branches and digital platforms.

What should be a growth engine for deposit mobilisation instead becomes a bottleneck, resulting in lost customers, fewer transactions, and weakened scale advantages in an increasingly competitive banking environment.

Banks as the Face of an Unpopular Tax Regime

Perhaps the most underappreciated consequence of the new tax regime is the escalation of customer hostility toward banks.

When accounts are flagged, restricted, or subjected to enhanced scrutiny, customers rarely direct their frustration at tax authorities or policymakers. Instead, they confront the most visible institution in the chain, their bank.

Banks are increasingly blamed for account freezes, accused of colluding with government, and perceived as punitive rather than service-oriented institutions. This hostility is particularly pronounced among informal sector operators, small traders, artisans, and self-employed professionals with irregular income streams.

In a low-trust economy such as Nigeria’s, perception often outweighs regulation. Banks risk becoming the public face of coercive taxation, absorbing reputational damage for policies they neither designed nor control.

Erosion of Trust in the Banking Relationship

Banking fundamentally depends on trust that deposits are safe, transactions are private, and institutions act in customers’ best interests.

When NIN becomes a tax enforcement gateway, that trust begins to fray. Banks are no longer seen primarily as custodians of savings, enablers of enterprise, or neutral financial intermediaries. Instead, they are increasingly perceived as extensions of tax authorities, surveillance nodes, and compliance police.

Once trust erodes, customer behaviour adjust often in ways that undermine the formal financial system itself.

The Hidden Impact of the N50 Stamp Duty

The introduction of a N50 stamp duty on electronic transfers of N10,000 and above may appear trivial. In practice, it carries outsized implications.

For many Nigerians, especially low- and middle-income earners, electronic transfers are not discretionary transactions. They are salary payments, family support remittances, SME operating expenses, and routine commercial settlements.

Customers rarely distinguish between government levies and bank charges. The stamp duty will therefore be perceived as yet another bank fee, deepening resentment toward institutions already accused of excessive charges.

Behaviourally, customers may respond by breaking transactions into smaller amounts, increasing cash usage, or migrating to informal transfer channels, distorting transaction patterns and weakening the efficiency of the digital payments ecosystem.

Although banks merely collect the duty on behalf of the government, they will once again bear the reputational cost.

Threat to Deposit Mobilisation and Liquidity

Fear of tax exposure is a powerful behavioural driver. As NIN becomes closely associated with tax scrutiny and transaction charges mount, many customers are likely to reduce account balances, avoid lump-sum deposits, split transactions to stay below thresholds, or move funds outside the banking system entirely.

For banks, the consequences are clear, as these will result in slower deposit growth, volatile liquidity positions, and reduced capacity to fund loans.

Deposit mobilisation is the lifeblood of banking. Any policy that discourages formal savings weakens banks’ intermediation role and, by extension, the broader economy.

Reversal of Financial Inclusion Gains

Nigeria has invested more than a decade in expanding financial inclusion through agent banking, digital wallets, and tiered KYC frameworks. The use of NIN as a tax trigger threatens to reverse these gains.

Many newly banked individuals, particularly those at the base of the economic pyramid, may abandon formal accounts, revert to cash-based transactions, or rely on informal savings mechanisms.

The irony is stark as an identifier designed to formalise the economy may inadvertently push activity back into informality.

Rising Compliance, Legal, and Technology Costs

Operationally, integrating NIN as a tax identifier significantly increases banks’ compliance burden. However, institutions are expected to synchronise multiple databases, resolve inconsistencies at scale, implement continuous monitoring systems while also managing customer disputes arising from mismatches or wrongful flags.

The challenges inherent in these demands require heavy investment in IT infrastructure, expanded compliance teams and enhanced cybersecurity. The costs either erode profitability or are passed on to customers, further fuelling public resentment.

Credit Creation and Economic Growth at Risk

Reduced deposits, higher compliance costs, reputational strain, and customer attrition converge on a single outcome that mainly constrained lending capacity.

There is no two ways about this, banks under sustained pressure will tighten credit standards, reduce SME and consumer lending, and favour low-risk government securities. The ripple effects include slower job creation, constrained entrepreneurship, and, on a dangerous level, it leads to weaker economic growth, ultimately undermining the very revenue base the tax reform seeks to expand.

Revenue Without Ruin

No doubt, linking NIN to tax identification and expanding transaction-based levies may enhance government visibility over economic activity, but in reality they carry significant unintended consequences for banking business.

They risk weakening customer trust, undermining deposit mobilisation, reversing financial inclusion gains, increasing operational and reputational risks, and constraining credit growth.

Banks do not oppose taxation. What they caution against is turning financial inclusion infrastructure into a blunt instrument of tax enforcement without adequate safeguards.

For the policy to succeed without damaging the banking system, regulators must ensure clear thresholds and exemptions, strong data protection guarantees, phased implementation and ensure sustained public education to redirect hostility away from banks.

Ultimately, the critical question is not legislative readiness but execution, especially coordination across institutions, technological preparedness and the capacity to prevent unintended disruption to businesses and citizens alike. The authorities must understand that when revenue meets risk, wisdom lies in balance.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]

By David Okon

Nigeria’s economic story in 2025 has not been defined by a single reform or headline moment. It has been shaped by sequencing, a deliberate effort to stabilise the macroeconomy, restore institutional credibility and align security, fiscal, and market policy towards growth. At the centre of that sequencing has been the Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Wale Edun, whose framing of security, capital mobilisation, and reform discipline has increasingly influenced how investors perceive Nigeria.

The year began with the government focused on repairing the analytical foundations of economic planning. In early 2025, Nigeria completed a long-awaited rebasing of its Gross Domestic Product to a 2019 base year, a technical exercise led by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) that expanded the measured contribution of services, ICT, and the informal economy. According to the NBS, the rebasing placed nominal GDP at about ₦372.8 trillion, equivalent to roughly $240–250 billion, giving policymakers and investors a clearer picture of economic structure and scale.

That reset mattered. It framed the fiscal choices that followed, including tighter expenditure controls, tax administration reforms, and coordination with monetary authorities to slow inflation and stabilise the foreign-exchange market. By the fourth quarter of 2025, inflation which had exceeded 24 percent earlier in the year, began a steady descent, reaching about 14.45 percent by November 2025. Foreign reserves strengthened toward $47 billion, reinforcing external buffers and signalling improved balance-of-payments management, trends noted by multilateral institutions including the World Bank and Afreximbank in their 2025 outlooks for Nigeria.

By mid-year, the reform narrative shifted from stabilisation to confidence, and nowhere was that clearer than in Nigeria’s capital markets. The Nigerian Exchange closed 2025 as one of Africa’s strongest-performing bourses, with the All-Share Index up about 49 per cent year-to-date by late December. Total market capitalisation across equities, debt, and ETFs rose to nearly ₦150 trillion, driven by strong earnings, bank recapitalisation, and new listings, according to the NGX Group chairman, Umaru Kwairanga.

Banking reform was pivotal. As part of recapitalisation efforts aimed at strengthening credit transmission and financial stability, Nigerian banks raised an estimated ₦2.5 trillion in fresh capital by December 2025 through rights issues, private placements, and public offers, according to NGX filings and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approvals. The capital raising reinforced balance sheets and helped drive the market rally, underscoring the link between prudential reform and investor confidence.

Debt markets told a similar story. Between April and October 2025, companies raised over ₦753 billion through commercial paper issuances to finance short-term working capital needs across manufacturing, energy, and agriculture. “These figures are not just numbers; they represent confidence in our regulatory framework and the resilience of our market architecture,” said Emomotimi Agama, Director-General of the SEC, in a public briefing on capital-raising approvals. Landmark transactions, including a ₦500 billion climate-linked SPV and a ₦200 billion Elektron Finance bond, pointed to growing appetite for infrastructure and sustainable finance.

Corporate earnings reinforced the macro signal. MTN Nigeria Communications Plc, one of the Exchange’s largest listed companies, delivered one of the year’s most striking turnarounds. By the first nine months of 2025, the telecoms giant reported revenues of ₦3.73 trillion, up 57 per cent year-on-year, and profit after tax of about ₦750 billion, reversing prior losses. Capital expenditure exceeded ₦565 billion in the first half of the year alone, underscoring confidence in Nigeria’s digital future and the policy direction of the telecoms sector. Other blue-chip firms, including Dangote Cement, posted strong earnings with profit after tax exceeding ₦520 billion, reinforcing the sense that reform was translating into corporate resilience rather than contraction.

Amid these developments, Nigeria’s fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) sector also began to reflect the macroeconomic stabilisation delivered by policy reforms. After several years of losses driven by foreign-exchange volatility and inflationary pressures, major FMCG firms recorded a notable rebound in 2025 as currency conditions improved. The sector posted 54.1 per cent value growth in 2025, up from 34.3 per cent in 2024, according to a report by global data and analytics firm NielsenIQ.

Nigerian consumers continued to underpin demand, lifting the FMCG market to an estimated value of $25 billion, the second largest in Africa after South Africa’s $27.5 billion market. Across the continent, the five largest FMCG markets; South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco and Kenya, together account for about $42 billion in total value.

Nigeria’s growth rate outpaced its peers. Egypt expanded by 23.1 per cent to $10.2 billion, Morocco grew 7.6 per cent to $7.5 billion, and Kenya increased 5.5 per cent to $3.3 billion, highlighting Nigeria’s outsized contribution to regional momentum.

At the company level, Nestlé Nigeria Plc returned to profitability, posting a ₦88.4 billion pre-tax profit in the first half of 2025, compared with a ₦252.5 billion loss in the same period a year earlier. The turnaround was supported by a 43 per cent increase in revenue to ₦581.1 billion and more stable cost structures.

Broader market data reflected the recovery. FMCG stocks delivered strong performances on the Nigerian Exchange, with the consumer goods index posting solid gains and several stocks recording returns of more than 100 per cent over the year as investor confidence returned to the sector.

“Nigeria’s FMCG story is one of grit and innovation,” said Dr Tayo Ajayi, a Lagos-based consumer market analyst. “Even when the economy is under pressure, Nigerians adjust their spending habits rather than stop spending. That adaptability is what keeps the sector alive.”

Energy and industrial policy formed the next layer of the reform arc. The Dangote Refinery, already operating at 650,000 barrels per day, confirmed plans to expand capacity to 1.4 million barrels per day, a move analysts say could significantly reduce fuel imports, ease pressure on foreign exchange, and strengthen Nigeria’s trade balance. The refinery has become emblematic of the government’s push to support large-scale local production as a substitute for imports and a magnet for global capital.

At the national level, NNPC Ltd continued its post-commercialisation reset. Group Chief Executive Bayo Ojulari said recent operational improvements reflected structural reforms within the company, noting that oil production rose from about 1.5 million barrels per day in 2024 to over 1.7 million barrels per day in 2025. He also highlighted the strategic importance of the 614-kilometre Ajaokuta–Kaduna–Kano (AKK) gas pipeline, designed to transport 2.2 billion standard cubic feet of gas per day, in unlocking industrial growth in northern Nigeria. Ojulari said the company’s focus for 2026 would be attracting new investments, lifting output to at least 1.8 million barrels per day, and supporting President Bola Tinubu’s directive for NNPC to help attract $30 billion in investments by 2030.

Infrastructure and future-facing sectors rounded out the year. Progress continued on the Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway, with financing of approximately $1.126 billion secured by the Ministry of Finance and the Economy for Phase 1, Section 2 of the road, a signature project of the Tinubu administration. President Tinubu stated: “This is a major achievement, and closing this transaction means the Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway will continue unimpeded. Our administration will continue to explore available funding opportunities to execute critical economic and priority infrastructural projects across the country”.

Port decentralisation plans in southern Nigeria, along with digital-skills programmes under the Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy including the 3 Million Technical Talent (3MTT) initiative led by Minister Bosun Tijani, complemented the infrastructure drive (FMOCDE). The creative economy, encompassing film, music, fashion, and digital content, remained a fast-growing source of jobs and exports, increasingly recognised in policy circles as a serious economic asset.

The year’s most sensitive test of investor confidence came in its final week. On 25 December, US forces conducted targeted airstrikes against Islamic State-linked camps in Sokoto State, in coordination with Nigerian authorities. The government moved quickly to frame the action as part of a broader stability agenda. In a statement released on 28 December, Wale Edun stressed that “security and economic stability are inseparable,” describing the operation as “precise, intelligence-led and focused exclusively on terrorist elements that threaten lives, national stability, and economic activity.” He added that Nigeria “is not at war with itself or any nation, but is confronting terrorism alongside trusted international partners,” a distinction aimed squarely at markets and multilateral partners.

That framing captured the essence of Nigeria’s 2025 reform story. Security was not presented as an isolated military matter, but as an economic input, a prerequisite for investment, production, and growth. As Edun noted, “Every effort to safeguard Nigerians is, by definition, pro-growth and pro-investment,” a message calibrated for investors as markets prepared to reopen.

Nigeria enters 2026 with risks still evident, but with clearer direction. The proposed ₦58.18 trillion federal budget for 2026, anchored on revenue mobilisation, infrastructure spending, and deficit restraint, reflects an effort to consolidate gains rather than reset strategy. For investors, the signal from 2025 is not perfection, but coherence: policy, security, and markets increasingly moving in the same direction.

For an economy long defined by stops and starts, that alignment may prove the most valuable reform of all.

David Okon is a marketing communications and policy consultant at Quadrant MSL, a part of the Publicis Groupe and Troyka+InsightRedefini Group