Feature/OPED
Why Nigeria’s Banks Still on Shaky Ground with Big Profits, Weak Capital
By Blaise Udunze
Despite the fragile 2024 economy grappling with inflation, currency volatility, and weak growth, Nigeria’s banking industry was widely portrayed as successful and strong amid triumphal headlines. The figures appeared to signal strength, resilience, and superior management as the Tier-1 banks such as Access Bank, Zenith Bank, GTBank, UBA, and First Bank of Nigeria, collectively reported profits approaching, and in some cases exceeding, N1 trillion. Surprisingly, a year later, these same banks touted as sound and solid are locked in a frenetic race to the capital markets, issuing rights offers and public placements back-to-back to meet the Central Bank of Nigeria’s N500 billion recapitalisation thresholds.
The contradiction is glaring. If Nigeria’s biggest banks are so profitable, why are they unable to internally fund their new capital requirements? Why have no fewer than 27 banks tapped the capital market in quick succession despite repeated assurances of balance-sheet robustness? And more fundamentally, what do these record profits actually say about the real health of the banking system?
The recapitalisation directive announced by the CBN in 2024 was ambitious by design. Banks with international licences were required to raise minimum capital to N500 billion by March 2026, while national and regional banks faced lower but still substantial thresholds ranging from N200 billion to N50 billion, respectively. Looking at the policy, it was sold as a modern reform meant to make banks stronger, more resilient in tough times, and better able to support major long-term economic development. In theory, strong banks should welcome such reforms. In practice, the scramble that followed has exposed uncomfortable truths about the structure of bank profitability in Nigeria.
At the heart of the inconsistency is a fundamental misunderstanding often encouraged by the banks themselves between profits and capital. Unknown to many, profitability, no matter how impressive, does not automatically translate into regulatory capital. Primarily, the CBN’s recapitalisation framework actually focuses on money paid in by shareholders when buying shares, fresh equity injected by investors over retained earnings or profits that exist mainly on paper.
This distinction matters because much of the profit surge recorded in 2024 and early 2025 was neither cash-generative nor sustainably repeatable. A significant portion of those headline banks’ profits reported actually came from foreign exchange revaluation gains following the sharp fall of the naira after exchange-rate unification. The industry witnessed that banks’ holding dollar-denominated assets their books showed bigger numbers as their balance sheets swell in naira terms, creating enormous paper profits without a corresponding improvement in underlying operational strength. These gains inflated income statements but did little to strengthen core capital, especially after the CBN barred banks from using FX revaluation gains for dividends or routine operations. In effect, banks looked richer without becoming stronger.
Beyond FX effects, Nigerian banks have increasingly relied on non-interest income fees, charges, and transaction levies to drive profitability. While this model is lucrative, it does not necessarily deepen financial intermediation or expand productive lending. High profits built on customer charges rather than loan growth offer limited support for long-term balance-sheet expansion. They also leave banks vulnerable when macroeconomic conditions shift, as is now happening.
Indeed, the recapitalisation exercise coincides with a turning point in the monetary cycle. The extraordinary conditions that supported bank earnings in 2024 and 2025 are beginning to unwind. Analysts now warn that Nigerian banks are approaching earnings reset, as net interest margins the backbone of traditional banking profitability, come under sustained pressure.
Renaissance Capital, in a January note, projects that major banks including Zenith, GTCO, Access Holdings, and UBA will struggle to deliver earnings growth in 2026 comparable to recent performance.
In a real sense, the CBN is expected to lower interest rates by 400 to 500 basis points because inflation is slowing down, and this means that banks will earn less on loans and government bonds, but they may not be able to quickly lower the interest they pay on deposits or other debts. The cash reserve requirements are still elevated, which does not earn interest; banks can’t easily increase or expand lending investments to make up for lower returns. The implications are significant. Net interest margin, the difference between what banks earn on loans and investments and what they pay on deposits, is poised to contract. Deposit competition is intensifying as lenders fight to shore up liquidity ahead of recapitalisation deadlines, pushing up funding costs. At the same time, yields on treasury bills and bonds, long a safe and lucrative haven for banks are expected to soften in a lower-rate environment. The result is a narrowing profit cushion just as banks are being asked to carry far larger equity bases.
Compounding this challenge is the fading of FX revaluation windfalls. With the naira relatively more stable in early 2026, the non-cash gains that once flattered bank earnings have largely evaporated. What remains is the less glamorous reality of core banking operations: credit risk management, cost efficiency, and genuine loan growth in a sluggish economy. In this new environment, maintaining headline profits will be far harder, even before accounting for the dilutive impact of recapitalisation.
That dilution is another underappreciated consequence of the capital rush. Massive share issuances mean that even if banks manage to sustain absolute profit levels, earnings per share and return on equity are likely to decline. Zenith, Access, UBA, and others are dramatically increasing their share counts. The same earnings pie is now being divided among many more shareholders, making individual returns leaner than during the pre-recapitalisation boom. For investors, the optics of strong profits may soon give way to the reality of weaker per-share performance.
Yet banks have pressed ahead, not only out of regulatory necessity but also strategic calculation.
During this period of recapitalization, investors are interested in the stock market with optimism, especially about bank shares, as banks are raising fresh capital, and this makes it easier to attract investments. This has become a season for the management teams to seize the moment to raise funds at relatively attractive valuations, strengthen ownership positions, and position themselves for post-recapitalisation dominance. In several cases, major shareholders and insiders have increased their stakes, as projected in the media, signalling confidence in long-term prospects even as near-term returns face pressure.
There is also a broader structural ambition at play. Well-capitalised banks can take on larger single obligor exposures, finance infrastructure projects, expand regionally, and compete more credibly with pan-African and global peers. From this perspective, recapitalisation is not merely about compliance but about reshaping the competitive hierarchy of Nigerian banking. What will be witnessed in the industry is that those who succeed will emerge larger, fewer, and more powerful. Those that fail will be forced into consolidation, retreat, or irrelevance.
For the wider economy, the outcome is ambiguous. Stronger banks with deeper capital buffers could improve systemic stability and enhance Nigeria’s ability to fund long-term development. The point is that while merging or consolidating banks may make them safer, it can also harm the market and the economy because it will reduce competition, let a few banks dominate, and encourage them to earn easy money from bonds and fees instead of funding real businesses. The truth be told, injecting more capital into the banks without complementary reforms in credit infrastructure, risk-sharing mechanisms, and fiscal discipline, isn’t enough as the aforementioned reforms are also needed.
The rush as exposed in this period, is that the moment Nigerian banks started raising new capital, the glaring reality behind their reported profits became clearer, that profits weren’t purely from good management, while the financial industry is not as sound and strong as its headline figures. The fact that trillion-naira profit banks must return repeatedly to shareholders for fresh capital is not a sign of excess strength, but of structural imbalance.
With the deadline for banks to raise new capital coming soon, by 31 March 2026, the focus has shifted from just raising N500 billion. N200 billion or N50 billion to think about the future shape and quality of Nigeria’s financial industry, or what it will actually look like afterward. Will recapitalisation mark a turning point toward deeper intermediation, lower dependence on speculative gains, and stronger support for economic growth? Or will it simply reset the numbers while leaving underlying incentives unchanged?
The answer will define the next chapter of Nigerian banking long after the capital market roadshows have ended and the profit headlines have faded.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
By Nafisat Damisa
Introduction
The proliferation of generative AI has transformed Nigeria’s cybercrime landscape, enabling deepfake fraud, automated social engineering, and AI-enhanced phishing at scale. In early 2024, scammers using AI-generated deepfake videos impersonating a company’s CFO defrauded a Hong Kong finance worker of $25.6 million. As similar threats emerge in Nigeria’s fintech sector, this article examines whether the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015 (as amended 2024) is legally adequate, or whether Nigeria’s evidentiary and accountability frameworks are too weak to support effective prosecution of AI-driven cybercrime
Current Legal Landscape
Nigeria’s primary legal framework on preventing cybercrime is the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015, amended in 2024 to address cryptocurrency transactions, cyberbullying and various forms of digital misconduct. Complementary frameworks include the National Information Technology Development Agency Act 2007, the Nigerian Data Protection Act 2023, and sectoral regulations such as the CBN’s Risk-Based Cybersecurity Framework. However, the majority of these frameworks were issued far before now, and emerging risks like AI-driven threats are not really being addressed. The Act nowhere mentions “artificial intelligence,” “algorithm,” or “autonomous system.” Notably, the National Artificial Intelligence Commission (Establishment) Bill, 2025, is currently pending before the Senate. If passed, it would establish a dedicated commission to coordinate AI strategy, research, and ethical deployment. However, the Bill in its present form focuses primarily on development and innovation promotion, with limited provisions on criminal liability, evidence handling, or enforcement against AI-facilitated cybercrime, leaving the core accountability and evidentiary gaps largely unaddressed.
AI as a Double-Edged Sword
AI paradoxically enables both defence and attack. Nigerian financial institutions deploy AI for real-time fraud detection and pattern recognition. Conversely, cybercriminals exploit generative AI for deepfake creation, automated credential stuffing, and convincing phishing tailored to Nigerian English and Pidgin. The same technology that powers fraud detection systems can be weaponised to evade them. Take justice delivery as an example, the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended 2023) admits computer-generated evidence under Section 84, but remains silent on AI’s capacity to seamlessly generate or alter electronic records, creating “doctored AI-generated evidence”. These and many more issues await Nigeria’s digital space in the coming years.
The Legal Gaps
There are multiple critical gaps that undermine AI governance. For this article, three are considered. First, no framework attributes criminal liability when an autonomous AI commits an offence. The question of whether the developer, user, or owner should bear criminal responsibility for the acts of an autonomous system remains entirely unanswered under Nigerian law, leaving prosecutors without a clear legal theory of culpability.
Second, Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 governs computer-generated evidence but does not address AI-generated outputs. The Act’s definition of “computer” excludes AI’s cognitive processing capabilities, creating a statutory blind spot where evidence produced by generative or autonomous systems falls outside the existing admissibility framework.
Third, Nigeria lacks any framework for mandatory AI-generated content labelling, impeding deepfake traceability. Computer-generated evidence under Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 remains admissible if unchallenged at trial, a dangerous precedent for AI evidence, as opposing parties may lack the technical capacity to mount any challenge at all.
Comparative Jurisdictions: Rich Laws, Tangible Results
Jurisdictions with advanced AI laws demonstrate clear outcomes. The EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) mandates transparency obligations, requiring synthetic content labelling and informing individuals when interacting with AI systems; non-compliance triggers significant penalties. The US Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2023 is a proposed Act that will require impact assessments for high-risk AI systems in housing, credit, and employment, with FTC enforcement and a public repository. China implemented mandatory measures for the Identification of AI-generated (Synthetic) content. These rules, mandated by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and others, require explicit (visible labels) and implicit (watermarks/metadata) identification for all AI-generated text, images, audio, video, and virtual scenes to ensure transparency, traceability, and combat disinformation. These laws contribute to measurable results: forensic traceability, expedited prosecution of deepfake fraud, and clear liability chains. Nigeria has none of these.
Hope or Illusion?
Without legislative intervention, AI’s promise against cybercrime remains an illusion. Nigeria requires the following to boost its hope:
- Amendment of the Cybercrimes Act to include AI-specific offences and mandatory content provenance standards;
- Revision of Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 to address AI-generated evidence credibility, not merely admissibility;
- Investment in digital forensic capabilities is currently hampered by inadequate enforcement, weak forensic capabilities, and a lack of specialised personnel; and
- A risk-based framework drawing from EU and US models.
- Review of both secondary and tertiary education curricula to address the knowledge gap in AI and prepare the next generation for the AI-driven future.
Conclusion
AI can help curb cybercrime in Nigeria, but only if legal capacity catches up with technical capability. The Cybercrimes Act 2024 amendments were a step forward, but they did not address AI accountability, algorithmic transparency, or evidentiary credibility. The pending National Artificial Intelligence Commission Bill, 2025, signals legislative awareness, but without substantive provisions on liability, evidence, and enforcement, it cannot fill the existing gaps. The effectiveness of existing frameworks remains a question. An optimistic but cautious path exists, but until Nigeria enacts AI-specific legislation, whether through amending the Cybercrimes Act, revising the Evidence Act, or strengthening the pending Bill, weak laws will remain unable to support strong technology.
Nafisat Damisa is a Legal Research Associate in Olives and Candles – Legal Practitioners. For further information, enquiries, or clarification, please contact Nafisat via: [email protected] or [email protected]
By Isah Kamisu Madachi
As of April 30, 2026, the crude price is said to have reached $125 in the global market. The all-time high price per barrel was recorded in 2008, when it surged to $147. It is obvious that the price is heading in that direction or even towards what experts have predicted — crude reaching a new all-time high of $150 in the near future if crude passages remain closed in the Middle East, which would ultimately come with several disproportionate challenges for businesses and households.
In Nigeria, what began as a mild adjustment in the price of gasoline and other refined crude products has not stopped anywhere until it reached N1,400 per litre of petrol at filling stations. When the price was surging, experts in energy, economics, marketing, business and other relevant fields tried to come up with explanations for how Nigeria, despite housing the largest petrochemicals refinery in Africa and being one of the largest oil-exporting countries on the continent, would continue to absorb this shock.
Despite our advantages, Nigeria recorded the world’s second-highest surge in petrol prices following the escalating geopolitical tension in the Middle East. In Africa, Nigeria has the highest spike, with many sources citing it at 39.5% and above. Even non-oil-producing countries in Africa, and countries that do not refine a drop of oil, did not experience this surge. Also, African countries like South Africa at 1%, Morocco at 2.1%, and Tanzania at 2.7% experienced far smaller increases that are nowhere near Nigeria’s.
To put it in context, South Korea, Japan, and China are among the foremost dependents on the Strait of Hormuz, whose closure escalated the crude price, but none of these countries has recorded even a 20% increase in their petrol prices. Nigeria does not import its crude through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, as an oil-exporting nation, we have suffered some of the sharpest petrol price increases in Africa.
What went wrong in Nigeria to warrant this surge is not the primary focus of this piece. What lies ahead is. As a result of the increase in petrol prices, Nigerians have been disproportionately affected. Life has become unbearably difficult, with sharp increases in transportation costs, rising food prices, and higher costs of goods and services. Even charging points that used to collect N150 for charging a phone or battery now charge N300 or more.
As it stands, the gap between the current crude price and the predicted new all-time high is about $25. This means that if the passages continue to remain closed, we are not far from another historic price peak. It is even said that reopening the passages may not immediately stabilise prices, as crude tankers would still take time to reach their destinations.
What this means for Nigeria is another sharp increase in refined petroleum product prices, which could trigger another wave of stagflation. Already struggling, Nigerians do not deserve this. They are only just adapting to the post-subsidy era, yet are being hit again by another round of global geopolitical tensions. Many are already in deep energy poverty, with businesses struggling due to unstable electricity supply.
Therefore, as crude oil prices hover above $125 per barrel and threaten to reach the predicted $150 if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist, Nigeria must act decisively to shield its citizens. The Dangote Refinery exists. Nigeria refines oil. What the federal government owes Nigerians at this point is a deliberate policy decision to make that the refinery serve domestic needs first, with pricing that does not mirror whatever is happening in the global market. That is not complicated; other oil-producing countries do exactly this.
The NMDPRA has the authority to act on this. The question is whether there is a political will to act before another price wave hits and Nigerians are once again left to absorb what their counterparts elsewhere never have to.
Sub-national governments also have something to do. Commercial motorcyclists and small business owners are the people who feel every petrol price increase the hardest and the fastest. Pushing CNG and LPG adoption among this group beyond the FCT and Lagos, with genuine support, would cushion a significant part of the next shock. Expanding solar access in underserved communities would do the same. A shop owner running on solar is not at the mercy of the next diesel price spike.
These solutions are quite feasible. Nigeria has attempted versions of them before. Where we often seem to get it wrong is in execution, and Nigeria has to treat this with the same urgency and seriousness as given to elections, for the well-being of its citizens. The only thing that has never matched the problem is the seriousness of the response.
Isah Kamisu Madachi is a policy analyst and development practitioner. He writes via [email protected]
By Gbolahan Oluyemi
In 2025, the National Pension Commission (PenCom) directed all Licensed Pension Fund Operators (LPFOs) to demand a Pension Clearance Certificate (PCC) from service providers before engaging their services. This new policy typically affects various types of entities, including small and medium-scale enterprises, most of which are not usually compliance-driven. Following this directive, the PCC has become an essential compliance document for both large, medium and small-scale firms. This article provides a guide on what a PCC is, why it matters, and how it can be obtained.
What is a Pension Clearance Certificate (PCC)?
A Pension Clearance Certificate (PCC) is an official document issued by PenCom confirming that an organisation has complied with the provisions of the Pension Reform Act. It is an annual document that must be renewed every year at no cost. The yearly renewal is intended to ensure that organisations treat compliance as a continuous activity rather than a one-off act.
Why is a PCC Important?
The PCC is important because it demonstrates that an organisation is compliant with the provisions of the Pension Reform Act, especially as it relates to employee pension contributions under Section 4 (1) of the Pension Reform Act and subscription to group life insurance under Section 4 (5) of the Pension Reform Act. It is also required for certain transactions, such as government contracts and engagements with compliance-sensitive partners. In essence, a PCC assures investors, partners, and clients that your business is properly structured and compliant with regulatory requirements.
Who Needs a Pension Clearance Certificate?
Under Nigerian law, companies with three or more employees are required to participate in the Contributory Pension Scheme (CPS). If your organisation employs at least three staff members and provides or intends to provide services to Licensed Pension Fund Operators (LPFOs) or other regulated entities, you are expected to obtain a PCC annually.
How Do I Obtain a PCC?
PenCom issues the PCC electronically and at no cost through its web portal: https://pcc.pencom.gov.ng/. Please note that Applicants who are just beginning compliance and remitting employees’ pensions are required to first obtain an employer code from a Pension Fund Administrator (PFA). This code is necessary to initiate the PCC application on the PenCom portal.
Upon logging into the portal, you will be required to complete your company profile by providing your date of incorporation, contact details, and website (if applicable), as well as uploading your CAC documents.
Next, you will upload an Excel schedule (using the template provided on the website) containing your employee list. After this, you will be required to upload Excel sheets detailing pension contributions. You will also need to upload your organisation’s group life insurance documentation and payment instrument.
Finally, you will review your application and submit it for further processing by PenCom. Before commencing an application, ensure you have the following:
- Certificate of Incorporation (CAC documents)
- Group Life Insurance Policy for employees
- Evidence of Pension Fund Administrator (PFA) registration for employees
- Three years’ proof of monthly pension remittances, including penalties for any defaults (where applicable). For companies less than three years old, provide proof of remittances from the date of incorporation
- A valid Tax Identification Number (TIN)
- An employee schedule showing staff details and contributions (usually in Excel format) Templates are available on the PenCom portal
Also note that for the portal to accept employee details and remittance records, employees must have completed their data capture with their respective Pension Fund Administrator and updated their records to reflect their current employer.
Conclusion
Obtaining a Pension Clearance Certificate in Nigeria may seem technical at first, but once proper processes are established, it becomes routine. The key is consistency in remittance, maintenance of accurate records and prioritisation of compliance in overall operations.
For many Nigerian businesses, the PCC is more than a regulatory requirement; it is a mark of credibility. In a competitive environment, that credibility can make all the difference.
Gbolahan Oluyemi is a Legal Practitioner and currently leads Olives and Candles – Legal Practitioners. For further information, enquiries, or clarification, please contact Gbolahan via: [email protected] or [email protected]
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