By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In an increasingly struggle for Russia’s influence in Africa, including political, economic and humanitarian spheres, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov started 2026 with a pack of invitations for African foreign ministers, strategically as part of preliminary preparations for the next Russia-Africa summit. Armed with Russia’s policy intentions in Africa (Strategic Action Plan 2023-2026), Lavrov interacted with the same group of foreign ministers in December 2025, in Cairo, the capital of Egypt.

In pursuit of strengthening ‘political dialogue’ which features prominently, Lavrov’s high-ranking guests since the beginning of this year included the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, Karamoko Traore, with whom several bilateral documents were signed in February. In the same month, Tanzania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, Mahmoud Thabit Kombo, visited with a special focus on expanding cooperation in trade, economic, and investment spheres.

On January 14, the Minister of International Relations and Trade of the Republic of Namibia, Selma Ashipala-Musavyi, went on a working visit to Russia, held comprehensive discussions raising bilateral relations. Ashipala-Musavyi, who serves as Co-Chair of the Intergovernmental Russian-Namibian Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, was received by Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and Plenipotentiary Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev, who heads the Russian side of the IGC. The conversation focused primarily on the substantive content of the 11th IGC meeting in Windhoek.

Firstly, Russia is one of the world’s largest grain producers. And developing the port infrastructure of the Far East and the Arctic is a potential window for supplies to African countries. Secondly, with the application of state support measures, private investors are creating new large-scale fertiliser production plants. One such enterprise is the Nakhodka Mineral Fertiliser Plant in Primorye Territory, which is scheduled to reach its design capacity in 2027.

“Namibia has rich marine resources and a strategic location. Russia has the fleet, technology and experience. Together, we could maximise catch levels and expand processing. At the same time, Russian companies strive for responsible fishing, paying close attention to marine ecology and the reproduction of key fish stocks,” Zapryagayev said at the business forum that was held in mid-March, as part of the 11th meeting of the Russian-Namibian intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation.

Updated Russia-Kenya’s Experiences

On March 16, Foreign Minister Lavrov held talks with the Prime Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, Mudavadi, who was in Moscow on a working visit on March 15-18. There were detailed discussions on the current state and prospects for Russia–Kenya relations, while both parties outlined practical steps to strengthen political dialogue, and determine pathways for expanding mutually beneficial partnership in trade and the broad economic areas.

An engaged exchange of views resulted in signing a multitude of documents, updated policy interest in Russia’s experience in developing painstaking initiative projects in Kenya. It was described as being in the framework context of Russian foreign policy. In a speech boosting relations, Lavrov, with unrestrained rhetoric, underlined sectors such as energy, including nuclear, telecommunications, geological prospecting, mineral resources mining and high technologies, including space exploration, as promising areas.

Lavrov foresaw Russia’s delay in cooperating with Kenya and suggested speeding up preparations of the agreement on the establishment of a bilateral commission on economic cooperation, an instrument through which to implement economic projects. “We agreed today to expedite the work carried out for rather a long time thus far on preparation of the intergovernmental agreement for the establishment of the Russian-Kenyan commission for economic cooperation,” the minister said.

The visit of Kenya’s foreign minister to Moscow gives a new impetus to the political dialogue between the two parties and makes it possible to outline the path for further deepening of trade and economic relations, agreeing on further conscious efforts in the promising area of bilateral cooperation, at least, as a summary result after Lavrov’s talks with his Kenyan counterpart, Mudavadi.

For now, prospects remain on the table, as Russia shows readiness to offer partnership at a qualitatively new level with Kenya, so also with many African countries. The demand for Russian university education is high in the East African nation. Besides education and training, both Kenyan and Russian officials highly recognise the great potential for increasing trade and economic cooperation, which has not been realised yet. Plans to establish an intergovernmental commission to deal with these matters were announced during Lavrov’s visit to Kenya in 2023. The issue was brought up once again at a meeting between Georgy Karasin, the chairman of the Russian Federation Council’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Kathuri Murungi, the Deputy Speaker of Kenya’s Senate.

Notably, the Africa Centre for the Study of Russia (ACSOR), aimed at strengthening scientific, cultural and political ties between Russia and Kenya, opened at the University of Nairobi on February 25, according to local Russian media reports. Western-trained dominates African politics. Russia has under-leveraged its Russian-trained African professionals and specialists, compared to the extent to which the United States and China support theirs in employment structures.

Far ahead of the arrival of the Kenya delegation, Dr. Peter Mutuku Mathuki, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Kenya in the Russian Federation, told this article author that Russia’s multifaceted cooperation with Kenya has, steadily, taken on a new dimension, emphasizing the two countries look forward to concluding trade agreements under negotiation, which will open up more economic opportunities both at public and private sector levels. Kenya’s priority in the Russian Federation is to implement the objectives of our foreign policy hinged on deepening the Kenya-Russia bilateral relations across the board. However, Kenya’s economic presence in the Russian Federation is currently minimal, as manifested by a limited range of export products to the market in the Russian Federation.

Incredible Lessons from Summits

Nonetheless, before the 2019 summit, trade volume between Russia and Kenya was $397 million in 2018, compared to $625 million in 2023 and $638 million in 2024. Russia still has an opportunity to leverage the untapped potential in the continent to drive sustainable development. Investors can benefit from the diverse government incentives existing across Africa. As Africa is indiscriminately open for business, so in May 2026, Kenya will hold an investment summit for France, to position Africa as a key partner in global innovation and economic development while strengthening bilateral ties with France and advancing Africa’s collective agenda on the international stage.

Today, Russia’s engagement is largely noticeable in politics, while there is little impact on Africa’s economy, except reaping huge revenues from military and weaponry sales to African countries in persistent and endless conflicts, and raising exports of agricultural products such as grains to the continent. In addition, African leaders are excited about the emotional solidarity and harbour nostalgic Soviet-style romanticism. Over the years, African leaders’ negotiations have been one-sided, only considering Russia’s investment in Africa. Thus, until today, Africa’s economic presence is extremely low in the Russian Federation.

Policy experts and academic researchers review the current Russia-Africa relations, portraying it as a threat to Africa’s sovereignty or an opportunity to exploit resources. In the French-Speaking African countries, Russia’s agreements seek uninterrupted access to natural resources in exchange for military cooperation, maintaining security and even providing security guards to African leaders, such as in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since 2017, when Russia operated in CAR, it has hardly undertaken any infrastructure projects or invested in any productive sectors in that country, headed by Faustin-Archange Touadéra.

Russia to Study Africa’s Investment Landscape

Perhaps, and precisely, the Director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor Irina Abramova, described Russia’s connectivity with Africa explicitly, in her interview with local media African Initiative in February, first pointing to the historical fact that after the collapse of the Soviet era, Russia slammed the door on Africa. She further argued that Russia’s policy is currently full of symbolism, highly-toned rhetoric and little action on implementing agreements signed with several African countries. For now, Africa opens up the broadest economic opportunities for any external player—primarily the Chinese, followed by Indians, and now players from the Arab Gulf region, who picked up this “baton” and are strategically active on the continent.

That, however, simply means Russia has to study the investment landscape. But, constantly referring to reasons such as the lack of money is an ineffective way to deal with Africa, according to Professor Abramova. She suggested to ministry officials to “discard reciting administrative rules and regulations; make way for flexibility. And finally, the most important thing is coordination.”

But in reality, if Russia had built a normal new financial mechanism, it would not have cared. In practical terms, Russia has little foresight. Russia, simply, lacks interconnectedness with Africa and with Africans. That is, elements of psychology and elements of faith are involved. And this is an absolutely new phenomenon that is spreading across the entire world.

For approximately 15 years, Professor Abramova has reiterated that Africa must be approached in a comprehensive and coordinated way. Coordination is the most important thing. First and foremost, it is people, because personnel decide everything. Africans’ attitude towards Russia is, generally, very positive. This is genuinely felt when travelling a great deal around Africa.

Focus on Security over Development

According to researched academic reports, Russia’s weak economic presence in Africa has become research topic in educational institutions, with the Federal Committee on Economic Policy, Association of Economic Cooperation with African States (AECAS) established under the auspices of the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum (RAPF) and the Coordinating Committee on Economic Cooperation with Africa, pointing to conditions of pressure from sanctions imposed by United States. Finding excuses to cover policy weaknesses. This sole reason has prominently featured in official reports since the start of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in late February 2022. With renewed rising interests in Africa, experts also cited Russia’s weak structures in establishing effective ways of entry into the huge continent full of opportunities.

Russia has only 1% of its direct investment, due to limited financial resources, a lack of investment mechanisms, and severe competition from Chinese and Western investors. Russia focuses on arms and the export of grains to generate revenue for its budget. While Russia has forgotten billions, over 30 years ago, in Soviet-era debts to foster goodwill, this often links to new arms deals, which do not absolutely build diversified, sustainable economic integration in Africa.

Against the backdrop of intensifying relations with Africa, the percentage of collective influence (politics, economy and social, combined) varies: China holds 65%, the US – 53%, the EU – 49%, India – 38% and Russia – 29%. Trade with Africa also varies largely: China has now offered zero-tariff treatment to 52 African countries, and its trade has already reached $348 billion in 2025. India has $58 billion, and the United States has extended its AGOA agreement with Africa. Russia has nothing; at least the trade preferences that were promised over the years have remained meaningless for Africa.

A Few Significant Steps Forward

In this analysis, Russia and Africa have historically come a long way. One significant step forward is to seriously prioritise its policy architecture and turn over a new page in the history of mutually beneficial cooperation, with special attention on the development of corporate business, technology and agro-industrial complex. It has placed concrete emphasis on the importance of the active participation of Russian companies in the implementation of infrastructure projects on the African continent. Building modern distribution centres, developing port complexes and organising joint logistics solutions will be key areas of cooperation.

These ambitious steps will allow us to strengthen Russia’s ultimate position on the market, further outlining practical measures to boost dialogue in economic, trade and other fields, and to establish stable economic relations with African countries. Together, Russia will be able to realise the potential of both regions and ensure the prosperity of Africa and its people.

For multilateralism, and what Foreign Minister Lavrov has frequently mentioned, in the framework of multipolar architecture, Africa has to, without discrimination, interact and hold regular meetings with any external states it seriously considers important for its development. In practical terms, Russia has to demonstrate its preparedness to engage Africa. One fact is clear—Africa, as of today, remains a critical arena for key global powers, balancing the great-power competition and rivalry. African leaders are prepared for this so long as these players truly have adequate funds to invest, not just political rhetoric and a show of symbolism. In a continental context, that is broadly referred to as Africa’s Agenda 2063.