By Blaise Udunze

It is not only questionable but an aberration that a nation where over 38million Nigerians remain financially excluded, where trust in institutions is fragile, and where citizens are pressured under the weight of rising living costs, the use of Tax Identification Number (TIN) has been specified as the only option for their bank accounts operation from January 1, 2026 by the Federal Government of Nigeria.

In practice, the policy spearheaded by Taiwo Oyedele, Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms, is rooted in the Nigerian Tax Administration Act (NTAA), and the intention can be understood in the areas of improving tax compliance, widening the tax net, and formalizing economic activities. But in practice, the directive risks becoming yet another well-meaning reform that punishes the wrong people, disrupts financial inclusiveness, and potentially destabilises an already stressed economy.

Yes, Nigeria needs tax reforms. Yes, the country must broaden its tax base. And yes, public revenues must increase to address fiscal pressures.

But compelling citizens to obtain TINs as a condition for operating bank accounts is the wrong tool for the right objective.

Below are five core arguments against the directive, and sustainable alternatives that actually strengthen tax compliance without endangering banking access or punishing informal earners.

The Directive Risks Deepening Financial Exclusion

Nigeria still struggles with financial inclusion. According to several official assessments, over 38 million adults remain outside the formal financial system. Many of them operate small, irregular businesses, survive through subsistence earnings, or depend on cash-based livelihoods.

The Federal Government’s compulsory TIN-for-bank-accounts policy is built on the assumption that every banked Nigerian is structured, organised, and tax-ready. This is false.

For instance, the rural market woman with N30,000 in rotating savings, the okada rider who deposits cash once a week, the petty trader using a mobile POS agent account, the retiring pensioner managing a small monthly income, and the migrant worker sends small remittances to their family. These are not tax evaders; they are survivalists.

Most operate bank accounts not because they run formal businesses, but because those accounts are essential to modern financial life: receiving transfers, accessing loans, participating in digital commerce, saving against emergencies, and avoiding the risks of moving cash in insecure environments.

By creating an additional bureaucratic barrier, the directive risks pushing millions back into a cash-dominant shadow economy, precisely the opposite outcome of what Nigeria’s financial-sector reforms are trying to achieve.

Bank Accounts Are Not Proof of Taxable Income

The NTAA clarifies that the TIN requirement applies only to taxable persons, individuals engaged in trade, employment, or income-generating activities.

But herein lies the problem: banks cannot determine who is “taxable” and who is not. Banks only see deposits and withdrawals. They do not audit the source or consistency of income. They are not tax authorities.

A student may run a small online clothing resale gig. A retiree may occasionally rent out farmland.

A dependent may receive cash support from a relative abroad. A job seeker may get intermittent gifts from family.

Who decides which of these scenarios qualifies as taxable? Banks? FIRS? Or will citizens be expected to self-declare under threat of account restrictions?

The result will be confusion, over-compliance, and mass panic with banks indiscriminately demanding TINs from everyone to avoid regulatory penalties.

This not only contradicts the spirit of the law but also exposes ordinary Nigerians to harassment and arbitrary compliance requirements.

The Policy Could Trigger Disruption, Panic Withdrawals, and Cash Hoarding

Whenever Nigerians perceive threats to their access to funds, the natural reaction is withdrawal and hoarding. We saw it during:

–       the 2023 Naira redesign crisis,

–       the 2016 TSA-bank consolidation tightening, and multiple periods of financial instability.

Telling citizens that bank accounts may face “operational restrictions” if they do not obtain a TIN creates a predictable behavioural response: people will rush to withdraw money.

This would be disastrous for a banking system already pressured by:

–       high interest rates,

–       inflation eroding deposits,

–       rising loan defaults, and

–       declining public trust.

Any government policy that unintentionally creates an incentive for citizens to flee the formal banking system is counterproductive.

The TIN Requirement Will Become a Bureaucratic Nightmare

Even if millions of Nigerians want to comply, the system is not ready. Nigeria’s administrative infrastructure does not have the capacity to process tens of millions of TIN registrations within months without:

–       long queues,

–       delays,

–       data mismatches,

–       duplicate records, and

–       systemic errors.

The National Identity Number (NIN)-SIM registration experience is a painful reminder of what happens when ambitious policy meets weak execution capacity.

–       Citizens spent months in overcrowded enrolment centres.

–       Millions were blocked from services.

–       Data inconsistencies persisted.

–       The economy suffered productivity losses.

If Nigeria could not seamlessly synchronise NIN and SIM data, how will it synchronise NIN, BVN, and TIN at a national scale without dislocation?

Forcing TIN Adoption Ignores the Real Problem: Nigeria’s Broken Tax Culture

The Federal Government’s real challenge is not that citizens lack TINs, but that they lack trust in how taxes are used.

A government cannot widen the tax net when:

–       tax leakages remain widespread,

–       citizens feel services do not match taxation,

–       corruption perceptions are high,

–       government spending lacks transparency, and

–       taxpayers do not feel seen, heard, or valued.

Coercion does not build a tax culture. Engagement does. Policy does not create legitimacy. Accountability does.

If the Federal Government wants Nigerians to freely participate in the tax system, it must earn legitimacy first, not mandate compliance through financial restrictions.

What the Government Should Do Instead: A Smarter Path to Tax Reform

Instead of enforcing a policy that may backfire economically and socially, the Federal Government can adopt four smarter, people-centred alternatives.

–       Automatic TIN Issuance Linked to NIN and BVN

Rather than forcing Nigerians to apply manually, the government should:

• auto-generate TINs for all existing BVN/NIN holders,
• send the TINs via SMS, email, and bank alerts,
• allow self-activation only when needed for tax obligations.

This eliminates queues, delays, and confusion.

–       Build a Voluntary Tax Compliance Culture Through Transparency and Incentives

Tax morale improves when citizens see value. Government should:

• publish annual audited reports of tax revenue use,
• incentivise compliant taxpayers with benefits (priority access to government grants, credit scoring, etc.),
• simplify tax filings for small businesses.

People comply more when they feel respected, not coerced.

–       Target High-Value Tax Evaders, Not Low-Income Account Holders

Nigeria’s real tax leakages come from:

• large corporations shifting profits,
• politically exposed persons,
• illicit financial flows,
• multinational tax avoidance strategies,
• the informal “big money” class operating outside the banking system.

Instead of threatening small depositors, the government should strengthen:

• FIRS intelligence and investigation units,
• inter-agency data integration (CAC, Customs, Immigration),
• beneficial ownership transparency enforcement.

The fight against tax evasion should focus on those hiding billions, not those depositing thousands.

–       Strengthen Digital Tax Platforms for Easy Self-Registration and Compliance

If tax registration becomes as easy as opening a social media account, compliance will rise naturally. The government should build:

• a mobile-first tax app,
• simplified online TIN retrieval,
• one-click tax filing for gig workers and small traders.

Digital convenience can achieve what regulatory coercion cannot.

Reform Should Not Punish the Public

No doubt, tax reforms are needed urgently, but they must come with a human face, an intelligent, equitable, and aligned with the realities of ordinary Nigerians.

The TIN-for-bank-accounts policy, while well-intentioned, risks undermining financial inclusion, triggering economic instability, and imposing unnecessary burdens on millions who are not tax evaders but survival-based earners.

Good tax policy is built on trust, not fear. On transparency, not threats. On civic legitimacy, not administrative compulsion.

If the Federal Government truly wants to modernise Nigeria’s tax system, it must focus not on restricting citizens’ access to their own money, but on:

• repairing tax trust,
• digitising compliance,
• targeting the real evaders, and
• making participation easier, not harder.

Financial inclusion took Nigeria decades to build. We cannot afford a policy that carelessly reverses these gains.

A better tax system is possible, but it must start with the people, not with their bank accounts.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]

By Abiodun Alade

Within the space of 48 hours, Aliko Dangote offered Nigeria a rare demonstration of what leadership looks like when power is exercised with responsibility and consequence.

First came the announcement of a N100 billion annual education support programme — a decade-long N1 trillion commitment projected to keep more than 1.3 million Nigerian children in school. Its architecture was intentional, not ornamental: girls’ education, STEM disciplines, technical skills, and those children most likely to disappear quietly into the margins of poverty were placed at the centre, not the footnotes.

Then, almost immediately, his refinery reduced the price of Premium Motor Spirit by over N100 per litre. This was not achieved through government fiat, subsidy or public funds, but through internal cost absorption, aimed at easing the pressure of inflation on households, transport operators and small businesses already stretched thin.

Two decisive interventions. One individual. Forty-eight hours.

In a country where scarcity has been normalised and excuses institutionalised; these actions stand out precisely because they are uncommon. Nigeria does not lack wealth. It lacks the nerve to use it responsibly.

Dangote’s interventions were not symbolic gestures designed for applause. They were structural acts. Education secures the future. Affordable energy steadies the present. Together, they form the foundation of any serious development strategy.

Now set this against the performance of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum regulation.

Engr Farouk Ahmed, Chief Executive of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA), presides over a sector whose policy objectives are clearly stated: support domestic refining, reduce imports, conserve foreign exchange and strengthen energy security. These goals are enshrined in the Petroleum Industry Act and reinforced by the Federal Government’s Nigeria First policy.

Yet in practice, the downstream market remains crowded with import licences, uneven enforcement and regulatory decisions that continue to weaken local refining. Even with Africa’s largest refinery operating on Nigerian soil, import dependence persists — not because capacity is lacking, but because incentives remain misaligned.

This is where comparison ends.

Dangote and Farouk Ahmed do not operate on the same economic or moral plane. One commits private capital to solve national problems. The other leads a public institution whose outcomes are increasingly questioned by industry players, economists and the public alike.

One expands supply.

The other presides over a system where scarcity recurs.

One cuts prices.

The other manages a framework in which price instability has become familiar.

One reinvests personal wealth into Nigerian children.

The other reportedly expends questionable millions of dollars on secondary education abroad, while in his home state, Sokoto, thousands of children drop out of school over tuition fees as low as N10,000.

Only in Nigeria does the arithmetic of public life so often defy reason. Where official incomes are modest, lifestyles sometimes appear imperial. Where the books are thin, the living is lavish. And where questions should naturally arise, silence frequently answers instead.

It is a country where some who labour in the open marketplace live with studied moderation, while others, known only to the payroll of the state, move with a splendour their salaries cannot reasonably sustain. Children are educated across distant borders, fees quoted in foreign currencies that mock the modest figures attached to public service, yet accountability remains elusive.

When regulators falter, it is rarely for lack of laws or mandates. More often, authority is softened by comfort, dulled by compromise, and entangled in interests it was meant to police. A regulator burdened by unanswered questions cannot stand upright; oversight weakens when conscience is clouded.

In such moments, one does not need a forensic accountant to sense disorder. A soothsayer is hardly required to see where lines have blurred, where vigilance has yielded to indulgence, and where public trust has quietly been mortgaged.

This is how institutions lose their moral centre — not always through spectacular scandal, but through a series of small indulgences that mature, unnoticed, into systemic decay.

The fuel price reduction alone deserves careful attention. In Nigeria, petrol is not merely a commodity; it is the bloodstream of the economy. When prices rise, transport fares rise. Food prices rise. School attendance drops. Small businesses shut early. Families cancel travel or risk storing petrol in jerry cans — turning highways into mobile fire hazards during festive seasons.

By reducing PMS prices by over N100 per litre, the Dangote Refinery accomplished what years of policy meetings failed to deliver. It restored breathing space. It returned dignity to commuters. It reduced pressure on traders. It saved millions of productive man-hours otherwise lost to queues, panic buying and logistical paralysis.

That this occurred alongside a historic education commitment is not accidental. It reflects an understanding that energy without education builds nothing, and education without economic stability cannot thrive.

Meanwhile, regulatory bottlenecks remain. Local refiners cite delays in approvals, vessel clearances and inconsistent enforcement. Importers continue to flourish. Arbitrage adapts. Rent-seeking survives. The system continues to reward trading over production.

This is not accidental. Systems behave exactly as they are designed to behave.

Nigeria does not suffer from a shortage of ideas. It suffers from a shortage of alignment. When private citizens act more decisively in the national interest than institutions legally mandated to do so, something fundamental is broken.

No country industrialises by frustrating its producers. No economy grows by privileging imports over domestic value creation. No regulator earns legitimacy by operating in tension with stated national objectives.

Dangote’s actions within 48 hours expose an uncomfortable truth: Nigeria’s most binding constraint is no longer capital, technology or scale. It is governance culture.

Leadership is revealed not by speeches, but by choices. In two days, one Nigerian chose to educate the future and ease the present. Others continue to curate systems that profit from delay, opacity and dependence.

History is rarely neutral.

It remembers who built.

And it remembers who stood in the way.

Abiodun, a communications specialist, writes from Lagos

By Blaise Udunze

Nigeria today faces a sobering dual reality: a deepening security crisis and an entrenched financial-crime ecosystem that quietly feeds, sustains, and normalises that crisis. Across the North, Middle Belt, and parts of the South, kidnappers, bandits, insurgent cells, political actors, compromised security agents, and a complex chain of financial facilitators operate within a shadow economy of violence, one that generates billions, claims thousands of lives, and steadily erodes the authority of the state.

For over a decade, security experts and Nigeria’s international partners have warned that no meaningful progress will be made against insecurity unless the financial oxygen sustaining violence is cut off. Yet the country continues to prosecute its anti-terrorism efforts largely through military responses, as though the conflict could be resolved solely on the battlefield. What remains missing is a decisive, transparent, and politically courageous confrontation with the economic networks that make insecurity profitable.

This war is not only about guns and bullets. It is about money.

Money moves fighters.

Money buys weapons.

Money fuels political desperation.

Money underwrites chaos.

Until Nigeria addresses the financial pipelines behind its insecurity, the crisis will continue to reproduce itself.

Kidnapping: The Lucrative ‘War Fund’ Sustaining Insurgency

The rise in mass kidnappings is neither accidental nor spontaneous. It has evolved into a rational, structured, revenue-generating enterprise.

Appearing on Channels TV’s Politics Today in October 2025, Yusuf Datti Baba-Ahmed warned that insurgent and bandit groups now treat ransom payments as reliable “war funds.” The data support his claim.

A 2024 survey by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) found that Nigerians paid N2.2 trillion in ransom between May 2023 and April 2024. This astonishing sum does not account for unreported payments made through informal negotiators, mobile transfers, or unregulated community channels.

Kidnapping has matured into a fully formed economy with well-defined roles: negotiators, informants, logistics providers, cash couriers, and security collaborators. Proceeds are reinvested in weapons, motorcycles, communication devices, safe houses, and even land acquisitions.

In the words of a security analyst, “Every successful kidnapping is a fundraiser.”

Sabotage from Within: Keffi’s Explosive Memo and a System Built to Fail

If Nigeria’s external security threats are troubling, the internal compromises are even more alarming.

A leaked memo by Major General Mohammed Ali Keffi accused senior government and military officials of diverting billions of naira earmarked for arms procurement under former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai. Keffi’s allegations included:

–       Weapons paid for but never delivered

–       Falsified battlefield reports

–       Civilian casualties mislabelled to justify inflated expenditures

–       Political interference obstructing investigations into terror financing

His claims echoed the earlier warning by Gen. T.Y. Danjuma, who accused sections of the military of working in concert with armed groups and abandoning vulnerable communities.

Keffi’s memo became even more consequential following the 2025 detention of former Attorney General Abubakar Malami by the EFCC over allegations of money laundering, terrorism financing and suspicious financial activity linked to 46 bank accounts.

Together, these revelations paint a disturbing picture: even as Nigerians endure mass abductions, elements within the political and security elite appear to be enabling or shielding the financial networks behind the violence.

Why the Crisis Persists: A Financial Crime Lens

Nigeria’s insecurity cannot be divorced from the environment in which illicit finance thrives. Key enablers include:

1. Informal Economies and Unregulated Cash Flows

With over 70 percent of rural transactions still cash-based, terror groups exploit:

–       Hawala networks

–       POS and mobile-money agents

–       Cattle markets and mining sites

–       Barter systems centred on livestock and grains

These channels operate beyond the reach of AML/CFT systems.

2. Identity Fraud and Weak KYC Enforcement

–       Criminal networks routinely open accounts with:

–       Fake NINs

–       Compromised SIM cards

–       Recycled BVNs

–       Mule identities

3. Collusion within Financial Institutions

The EFCC estimates that up to 70 percent of financial crimes involve bank personnel, primarily through:

–       Unauthorised cash withdrawals

–       Suppressed Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs)

–       Manipulated internal alerts

4. Weak Prosecution and Political Interference

Cases drag on for years, and many evaporate entirely before reaching court often due to political considerations.

5. Ungoverned Spaces

Large territories across the North serve as hubs for:

–       Arms trafficking

–       Illegal mining

–       Kidnap-for-ransom camps

–       Cross-border smuggling

Public Patience Thins: NLC Moves to the Streets

Public frustration is reaching a boiling point. On December 10, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) announced a nationwide protest scheduled for December 17, citing the “degenerating security situation” and the rise in mass abductions.

The NLC condemned the November 17 abduction of female students in Kebbi, noting that security personnel had been withdrawn from the school shortly before the attack. The union called the act “dastardly and criminal” and directed all affiliates and civil-society partners to fully mobilise for the protest.

This marks a significant shift. For the first time in years, Nigeria’s most influential labour body is placing insecurity at the centre of national mobilization, further underscoring the argument that the current crisis is not simply a security failure but a systemic breakdown of governance, accountability, and financial integrity.

The Financial Engine of Terror: The 23 Suspects Who Moved Billions

A Sahara Reporters investigation uncovered a network of 20 Nigerians and three foreign nationals allegedly linked to the financing of Boko Haram and ISWAP. Their transactions, running into hundreds of billions, were quietly channeled through personal and corporate accounts.

Among those named:

–       Alhaji Saidu Ahmed, Zaria businessman: N4.8bn inflows

–       Usaini Adamu, Kano trader with 111 accounts: N43bn inflows, N50bn outflows

–       Muhammad Sani Adam, forex and precious stones dealer: N54bn across 41 accounts

–       Yusuf Ghazali, a forex trader linked to UAE-convicted terrorists, operated 385 accounts

–       Ladan Ibrahim, a Sokoto official, is accused of diverting public funds

–       Foreign actors included the late Tribert Ayabatwa (N67bn inflows) and Nigerien arms dealer Aboubacar Hima, who moved over $1.19 million.

Strikingly, several of the suspects arrested in 2021 were quietly released without trial, continuing a pattern of impervious investigations and political bottlenecks.

This network confirms a painful truth: Nigeria’s insecurity is not driven solely by men wielding rifles in the bush. It is sustained by individuals in cities, businesses, and bureaucracies, people with access, influence, and remarkable financial mobility.

The Political Dimension: Irabor’s Revelation and the Unnamed Sponsors

The political undertone of Nigeria’s insecurity was reinforced by the former Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Lucky Irabor (rtd), who admitted that politicians were among those financing terror groups. According to him, some trials were conducted “away from public consumption.”

His statement revived key questions:

–       Why is the state shielding the identities of terror sponsors?

–       Who benefits from the secrecy?

–       What political consequences are being avoided?

Security sources told TruthNigeria that Nigeria’s published list of 19 terror financiers in 2024 represented only a fraction of the full network.

Baba-Ahmed’s accusation that former Kaduna Governor Nasir El-Rufai was part of the political forces that aggravated Northern insecurity, an accusation the former governor has previously denied, adds further urgency to demands for transparency.

The Human Cost: Expanding Killing Fields

Despite repeated assurances, violence continues to spread:

–       303 students and 12 teachers abducted in Niger State

–       38 worshippers kidnapped in Kwara

–       Simultaneous raids across Plateau, Kaduna, Benue, and Niger

–       Whole communities uprooted by weekly attacks

As Amnesty International observed, “In many rural communities, only the graveyards are expanding.”

SBM Intelligence now describes large portions of the North as “open killing fields,” areas where the state’s influence has collapsed, and community vigilantes have become the default security providers.

Expert Voices: Why Nigeria Must Finally Follow the Money

Security experts converge on a single message: Nigeria cannot defeat terrorism without dismantling its financial infrastructure. Dr. Friday Agbo, a security researcher, disclosed, “Terror groups survive because their financial lifelines remain untouched.”

Jonathan Asake, analyst and former SOKAPU president, said, “Publish the full Dubai list. Without transparency, impunity will remain the norm.”

Gen. Irabor (rtd.) revealed, “There are politicians involved. The conflict is multi-layered: ideology, criminality, and political manipulation.”

These assessments underscore one reality: ideology is secondary. Money is primary. It is the oxygen of Nigeria’s terror landscape.

What Must Change

Nigeria must elevate financial crime to the level of a national-security emergency. Key reforms include:

–       Integrating BVN-NIN-SIM identity databases and upgrading real-time monitoring

–       Targeting illicit markets: illegal mining hubs, cattle markets, unregulated border posts

–       Deploying AI-driven analytics to detect layered transactions, mule networks, and ransom flows

–       Strengthening bank compliance units and protecting whistleblowers

–       Improving inter-agency intelligence sharing (EFCC, NFIU, DSS, NDLEA, Police, CBN)

–       Criminalising unexplained wealth, especially in conflict zones

–       Investing in safe-school infrastructure, rural policing, and local reporting channels

Choosing Truth Over Convenience

Nigeria’s two-front war is neither mysterious nor new. It is a well-documented, financially engineered crisis protected by silence, vested interests, and institutional decay. The NLC’s mobilisation signals a turning point; citizens are unwilling to accept official evasions while insecurity intensifies. To end this crisis, Nigeria must:

–       Expose and prosecute terror financiers

–       Purge corrupt insiders in the security system

–       Dismantle ransom economies

–       Strengthen financial intelligence

–       End political protection for criminal networks

Until these reforms are pursued with integrity, billions will continue to move, weapons will continue to flow, and Nigeria will continue to bleed.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]