Feature/OPED
Africa Beyond Russia’s Grains Partnerships
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Until sustainable food security is established through modernizing agriculture and ensuring adequate support for local farmers, Russia’s grain supply would be a soft geostrategic bait (i) to reinforce the existing time-tested relationships with Africa and (ii) to solicit an endorsement for the unprovoked war in Ukraine.
In a speech delivered on March 20, 2023, during the interparliamentary conference ‘Russia-Africa’ held in Moscow, President Vladimir Putin described six African countries as the least developed and poorest in the world that are urgently in need grains, alternatively referred to as humanitarian aid, to feed its population.
The beneficiary African countries – Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Mali, Somalia and Zimbabwe – have warm-heartedly expressed their highest gratitude for the wonderful ‘food-gift’ that was promised, and was chorused in a speech in July 2023 at the second Russia-Africa summit held in St. Petersburg.
During that Russia-Africa summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin promised what was referred to as ‘grains at no-cost delivery’ (when it was first announced to an ear-deafening applause at the inter-parliamentary conference on March 20), and as expected, the Russian Agriculture Ministry has accomplished that mission by despatching a total of 200,000 metric tonnes as humanitarian aid to these African countries. (For further detailed information on this, read the transcript on the Kremlin’s website)
“After the Russia-Africa summit, we have been maintaining relations with African countries and building cooperation,” Patrushev told Putin during the Kremlin meeting. “As a result, we were able to deliver this volume of wheat to these countries quite quickly.” He also told Putin that Russia expected to export up to 70 million metric tonnes of grain in the 2023-2024 agricultural year. In the previous season, Russia shipped 66 million tonnes worth almost $16.5 billion.
This 200,000 metric tonnes of humanitarian aid to Africa has been given unprecedented worldwide publicity. Russian state TV in the past month showed white bags of wheat marked “gift from the Russian Federation to Burkina Faso” and printed with the flags of both countries. “It shows Russia’s solidarity for the Burkinabe people and the good, strong relations between our two countries,” Nandy Some-Diallo, Burkina Faso’s minister for solidarity and humanitarian action, said at a ceremony to mark the donation in January.
TASS state news agency put it most bluntly: “Russia has completed delivery of wheat to six poorest African countries. At the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit, Putin vowed to supply Russian grain free of charge to African countries most in need.“
Since the first announcement in March, followed by the second in July 2023, it several months to deliver to Africa which officials blamed logistics. “The first ship departed on November 7, 2023. The average travel time stood at 30-40 days. The last vessel arrived in Somalia in late January and the unloading of its cargo was completed on February 17,” Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev said, adding that “this is the first time that our country carried out such a large-scale humanitarian operation,” according to Russian state news agency TASS.
Many observers, however, say the Kremlin’s grain gift is a ‘strategic’ move as Putin’s African alliance broadens. “It’s strategic in the sense that Russia realizes these countries are in need and takes advantage of that specific need,” said Zimbabwean development economist Godfrey Kanyenze.
“It is geopolitics at play … the major string is to control or get a head start ahead of other rivals or competitors,” Kanyenze, who is a founding director of the Labor and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe, told CNN in February 2024, adding that Africa has become a very critical playing ground, further suggested that Russia could be playing the long game to emerge as Africa’s preferred global partner.
Notwithstanding that, African countries generally have goodwill towards Russia, and this has noticeably reflected in their avoidance of criticizing the war in Ukraine which began on February 24, 2022.
While many took a neutral stance, Eritrea voted against a UN General Assembly resolution demanding that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukraine. Reports say the Kremlin is steadily making inroads, taking advantage of instability in countries that used to rely on former colonial ties with Europe. Leaders of those countries have vehemently criticized former colonial relations, moved to cut ties with the West — mainly France — and often narrative fact that Russia never colonized African countries.
The foreign and local media posts on Russia’s humanitarian grain to the six African countries have interestingly received millions of readers and viewers. Some news outlets ran headlines praising Russia for feeding Africa but terribly failed to analyze the implications including the incapacity of these African countries to modernize agriculture instead of settling for food packages. That business often goes beyond humanitarian aid. Almost half of the African continent imports, at least, their wheat from both Russia and Ukraine. Besides wheat and grains, Russia does excellent business with security assistance and arms supplies, mostly in exchange for mineral concessions and uninterrupted access to natural resource deposits in Africa.
Despite frequent complaints against the United States and Europe over global (dis)order and hegemony, further blaming them for over-exploiting Africa, Russia is now at the frontline, unquestionably fighting neo-colonialism on behalf of Africa. Without much doubt, Russian flags have become an acceptable symbol of anti-Western sentiment across Africa. But in practical terms, it rather exposes the collective weaknesses, inability to sharpen development priorities, gross mismanagement and incompetencies of African leaders. In a nutshell, African leaders pay lip service in pursuit of working towards attaining their economic sovereignty.
The system of governance, lack of strategies and poor development policies are largely hindering sustainable development. African leaders have opened faultlines: globe throttling for humanitarian aid at international conferences and summits, switching investment partners, taking their mines and natural resources from one foreign player and passing them on to another foreign player – in the name of fighting neo-colonialism.
The Global Development Index shows that African governments continue to pursue trivial development questions, poor governance and deep-seated corruption. In fact, 80% of Africa’s population still lives in abject poverty, the state development is shabby. And yet blamed the United States and Europe for their under-development and exploitation. The neo-colonialism topic is a source of much discussion at all levels around the world. After pivoting away from the much-disparaged United States and Europe, several African leaders have found new ‘friends’ in the so-called East, enthusiastically bartering their gold and diamond mines.
Often said that Africans have to use their wisdom, and prioritize continental unity and development, especially in the context of the current rapidly changing global architecture. Strict compliance and respecting the policy guidelines of regional and continental organizations, and this step will in turn make them stronger on the international stage.
Better target critical institutional reforms inside Africa, and take strict measures to prevent foreign ‘friends’ from exploiting loopholes in these state institutions. Regardless of the facts, African issues are still very lamentable, and leaders are excited at Africa being described as the poorest in the world, on the one hand. Then, on the other hand, Africa is described as uniquely endowed with enormous untapped resources. The dichotomy of the present day Africa.
What really makes these countries – Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Mali, Somalia and Zimbabwe – poor? As it is well-known, Zimbabwe, with roughly 15 million people as per the 2022 census, claims to have recorded its highest wheat harvest during the agricultural production year. Thus, Zimbabwe emerges as one of the few African countries which has adopted import substitution agricultural policy and strategically working towards self-sufficiency. Consequently, this could be a great lesson for Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Mali and Somalia.
Besides the humanitarian grains, Russia plans to earn an estimated revenue amounting to $33 billion by exporting food to African countries. In sharp contrast to food-importing African countries, Zimbabwe has increased wheat production, especially during this crucial time of the current Russia-Ukraine crisis. This achievement was attributed to efforts in mobilizing local scientists to improve the crops’ production. Zimbabwe is an African country that has been under Western sanctions for 25 years, hindering imports of much-needed machinery and other inputs to drive agriculture.
Some experts and international organizations have also expressed the fact that African leaders have to adopt import substitution mechanisms and use their financial resources to strengthen agricultural production systems. Establishing food security is important for millions of people facing hunger in Africa and is crucial for sustainable economic development and the long-term prosperity of the continent.
In this discussion, it is worth to underline that Africa is the world’s second-largest with a huge landscape for agriculture. Despite this low concentration of wealth, recent economic expansion and its young population make Africa an important economic market in the broader global context. But why Africa remains the world’s poorest and least-developed continent? And be running around for food packages? Interesting loans and investment capital have been diverted and siphoned off back to Europe. Africa is now at risk of being in debt, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries.
Addressing food security, therefore, is key for a rising Africa in the 21st century. With the geopolitics intensifying, Africa can only gain contentious economic strength by confronting challenges, handling emerging opportunities, fine-tuning strategies and importantly – utilizing much of its own abundant human and natural resources. It is about time to halt Africa’s dreamy Western and European circus. In a nutshell, take cognizance of the necessity to acknowledge the popular saying ‘African problems, African solutions’ and/or the ‘Africa We Want’ within the parameters of Agenda 2063 as widely propagated by the African Union.
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
