Feature/OPED
Driving Financial Inclusion for Inclusive Economic Growth
By Tolu Oyekan
Financial inclusion is increasingly becoming an area of priority across the globe among policymakers, researchers and development-oriented agencies. Its importance comes from the promise it holds as a tool for economic development, particularly in the areas of poverty reduction, employment generation, wealth creation and improved welfare and general standards of living.
The Nigerian government launched the National Financial Inclusion Strategy in 2012 (NFIS 2012), to achieve 80% inclusion by 2020. The NFIS framework was leveraged by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to effectively regulate the Nigerian financial sector. This drive necessitated the introduction of the cashless policy, the proliferation of agency banking, the growth of microfinance banks and increased adoption of fintech solutions; especially digital payment products.
However, these positive outcomes could not help achieve the target of 80% inclusion by the end of 2020. Barriers that hampered this target were irregular income, illiteracy, lack of proximity to access points, lack of required documentation, inadequate awareness, high service fees, and a high affinity for cash.
The Impact of COVID-19
In addition to the bedevilling barriers, came the COVID-19 pandemic. In its wake were the falling prices of crude, the halt in economic activities and the loss of income by many Nigerian households. The unemployment rate rose to 27.1%, inflation increased and the purchasing power of the people dropped.
Interestingly, despite these negative impacts on the economy, there was growth within the entrepreneurial sector. According to the EFInA Access to Financial Services in Nigeria 2020 Survey, about 86 million Nigerian adults’ livelihoods were negatively impacted by the pandemic.
However, the survey showed that about 49.1 million Nigerians turned the situation around to start their businesses either in agriculture or service delivery. These new businesses employed about 33.2 million Nigerians, thereby creating about 70.3 million jobs.
The Revised NFIS
While the NFIS 2012 may not have delivered the 80% inclusion target, it has however provided grounds to evaluate progress and identify the barriers and insights in developing a refreshed document for the new target. Upon review of the NFIS 2012, the CBN and its stakeholders came up with the Revised NFIS document which targets a 95% financial inclusion threshold in Nigeria by 2024.
This is ambitious given that the financial inclusion index moved from 57.3% in 2010 to 60.3% in 2012 and 63.2% in 2020, a growth of about 5.9% in 10 years. Achieving a 31.8% increment in 4 years is indeed ambitious, but not impossible.
The Revised NFIS identified five priority areas as key to achieving the new target, namely; an enabling environment for the expansion of Digital Financial Services (DFS), rapid growth of agent networks for last-mile delivery, harmonization of KYC requirements, conducive environment to serve the excluded; and incentivizing the adoption of cashless payment channels.
The Revised NFIS also examines other salient issues such as increasing awareness and knowledge of financial products, channels as well as trust. There is also the need for frequent review of the implementation of the strategy so as to take lessons faster and adjust the strategy to fit prevailing realities.
After All, Said and Done
Though the pandemic might have spelt doom for a lot of businesses and economies, it has however thrown up a few positive indicators for the financial inclusion drive in Nigeria. As earlier mentioned, while people lost their jobs, there was an upsurge of micro-businesses which created employment opportunities, thus reducing the impact of unemployment in the country.
The pandemic also led to the increased adoption of DFS and financial agent services. According to the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement Service (NIBSS) report, the monthly use of digital channels rose from 45 million transactions valued at N5.4 trillion at the end of 2017 to over 287 million valued at N23trillion in June 2021. This represents a growth of over 530% in the last 5 years. Thus, the volume of digital transactions rose from 75% in 2019 to 135% in 2020. Another report by ACI shows that digital payment transactions grew to over 1 billion, representing a growth rate of over 45%.
There has been an increased uptake of banking products and services, the banking sector being the biggest driver of the financial inclusion agenda in Nigeria. Between 2018 and 2020, the banked population grew by 5%, savings accounts by 6% and banking agents by 16%. There has also been increased adoption of non-banking products and services such as financial services agents, pension, insurance and mobile money.
To ensure that the targeted 95% inclusion is achieved by 2024 amidst the drawbacks thrown up by the pandemic and other peculiarities of the Nigerian economy, the CBN and its stakeholders have their work cut out for them. The following are some of the areas they should focus on:
Increasing access to financial services
This should be viewed from two different lenses; the consumers’ and the service providers’. From the view of the consumer, it is important that the tiered-Know Your Customer (KYC) documents be harmonized to reduce the limitation to have a transactional account. A transaction account is the bedrock of financial services.
Increased awareness for DFS and other banking products will improve access to these products and services. Banking and DFS transactional fees should be reviewed to encourage massive uptake especially among rural dwellers and the poor.
From the service providers’ perspective, the bottlenecks associated with acquiring the Payment Service Bank (PSB) license should be reduced. The process should be democratized to allow private investors other than telcos, fintech companies and banks.
The CBN should facilitate the actualization of the Shared Agents Network Facility (SANEF) to enable the proposed 500,000 agents to provide financial services in the under-served areas, especially the Northern region.
Improved Economy
More importantly, improving the economic and financial status of Nigerian households and firms will enhance the possibilities of a financially included Nigeria. With a thriving economy, the households will save and embrace other financial products services as credit, insurance and pensions.
The prevailing security challenges across the country should be addressed as it hampers economic activities and consequently the financial inclusion figures.
Capturing the over 40 million MSMEs in the formal financial sector is critical to improving the economy. This group employs over 80% of the country’s population and contributes about 50% of the country’s GDP. When formally served, progress is easier to monitor and track.
With more women being financially excluded- 41% female and 33% male- it suffices to say that concerted efforts should be channelled towards ensuring that more women are empowered to carry out more economic activities and consequent financial transactions. Efforts should be made in advancing the National Financial Inclusion Special Intervention Working Group’s (a subcommittee that looks into gender-related financial inclusion issues) recommendations. Financial products such as low-interest loans, grants and employment opportunities should be extended to women.
Collaborations
The CBN needs to collaborate with critical enablers such as the Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC). Initiatives such as the Infrastructure Companies (InfraCos) project- an initiative expected to provide broadband fibre and connectivity to every Local Government Area of the federation with a minimum speed of 10 Gbps- should be implemented to ensure delivery of services by agent banks, even in rural areas.
The Nigerian postal service’s network also provides a wide reach that the CBN can leverage to achieve last-mile delivery.
Incidentally, legislative provisions for the financial inclusion strategy could be strengthened. Collaborating with policymakers to effectively implement and track the financial inclusion strategy, makes the 95% inclusion target less daunting.
A BCG report commissioned by Telenor, a multinational telecommunications company, stipulated that a 1% increase in financial inclusion increases the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita by 3.6 per cent. This, therefore, underscores the socio-economic impact of financial inclusion as a critical driver to foster economic development, reduce poverty and achieve inclusive economic growth.
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
