Feature/OPED
Ekiti 2018 Governorship Election: Foretelling the Outcome
By Omoshola Deji
Democracy is basically the right of the governed to elect who governs. The people of Ekiti State, Southwest, Nigeria, would troop out on July 14 to elect who’ll govern them for the next four years. Over 30 candidates are running, but the election is ostensibly a two-horse race between Dr John Kayode Fayemi of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and Professor Kolapo Olusola ‘Eleka’ of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
This piece sets sight on foretelling the outcome of the election. Before proceeding, the below-average logical reasoning ability of the Nigerian political class makes some clarification necessary. Foretelling an election outcome doesn’t mean the pundit has access to sacred information, rigging plot, or the election winning strategy of any candidate. Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of candidates to predict who’ll emerge is a common practice in developed nations. This doesn’t mean the pundits are compromising the electoral process or influencing the election results. Ekiti people have already decided who they’ll cast their votes for before now and nothing – not this piece – can easily change their mind.
It is also necessary to clarify that predictions not coming to pass doesn’t mean the pundit’s forecast is fictitious. Election in Nigeria goes beyond voting and counting; it is usually a battle to retain or regain power at all cost. Political parties persistently decimate each other and manipulate the electoral process. The strongest candidate is often declared winner, not the peoples’ choice. Operating in a different way, pundit’s share their verdicts after a thorough assessment of the candidate’s political strategy, leadership capacity, antecedents, manifestoes, structure, acceptability etc.
The Ekiti election is a battle of interests, relevance and political survival. The newly selected National Chairman of the APC, Comrade Adams Oshiomole, wants to prove his competence by winning Ekiti. The APC seeks to gain total control of the southwest region by winning Ekiti – the only state being governed by the PDP. Ekiti also determines the political permutations of 2019 and beyond. If APC wins, the presidency would treat the Southwest like a newly wedded wife in order to harvest votes for Buhari in 2019. Bola Tinubu’s negotiating power for 2023 presidency with the North would rise steeply if APC succeeds in Ekiti.
The Ekiti state governorship election is a political boxing rematch between Fayemi – an ex-governor seeking reelection – and Ayodele Fayose: an incumbent governor seeking to install his deputy, Olusola, as successor. In 2014, then candidate Fayose defeated the then governor Fayemi across the entire 16 local governments of the state.
Controversy however emerged when an army officer, Captain Sagir Koli, and PDP chieftain, Dr Tope Aluko revealed that the then government of ex-president Goodluck Jonathan aided Fayose’s victory with financial and military support in 2014. Power has changed hands at the centre and Fayemi now have the federal backing Fayose once had. Would Fayemi use the federal might against Fayose and his candidate?
The July 14 election is a referendum on Fayose’s popularity in Ekiti state. Fayose chance of becoming the PDP vice-presidential candidate in 2019 is high if he wins Ekiti for the party. This may unfortunately not be his lot as the APC would do all it takes to decimate him. His overconfidence, uncouth orations and vicious attacks on President Buhari has made him one of the political enemies that would be hounded before 2019. Fayose would languish in anguish after leaving office. The Buhari government would ridicule and persecute him. He would also be arraigned for allegedly using the state’s fund and the military to manipulate the 2014 Ekiti governorship election.
Fayemi hopes to repeat the history made by Fayose – deposed but later returned to office. His victory largely rests on his ability to resolve the shortcomings that made him lose power in 2014. Fayemi’s relationship with the civil servants, artisans, transport union members and teachers is not too cordial. He incurred the teachers’ wrath when his government threatened to sack those presumed incompetent and unqualified.
The fear that Fayemi would most likely abort Fayose’s stomach infrastructure handouts might make him lose again. During his first term, Fayemi was visionary and futuristic, initiating development projects, but Ekiti people want something else. They want food on their table; they want someone that understands the plights of the grassroots; someone who can rock the streets with them; someone who can give them the little things they can at least survive on now. Fayose incidentally gave them their desires and they elect him governor.
Another minus for Fayemi is the popular perception that would be running an elitist government and the state’s resources would be controlled by the Southwest political lords. The perception that Fayemi is Buhari’s boy could also work against him. The fear that the state’s anti-open grazing law could be abolished and Ekiti land awarded as a cattle colony to herdsmen might make the electorates vote against Fayemi. APC’s performance at the centre is also not convincing enough that the party has what it takes to transform Ekiti.
The arbitrary use of federal might could work against Fayemi. If the rumour that INEC’s ICT department has preload card readers and falsified results to declare Fayemi winner is not well managed, the people can revolt against him by voting en-mass for the PDP. The security agencies would also have a tough time managing crises if the mass reshuffling of police officers is to compromise the election for Fayemi.
Fayemi’s ability to reconcile with the 32 aspirants he defeated at the party’s primary largely determines his winning. The 32’s financial, human and material resources would significantly boost Fayemi’s chance of returning elected. Unfortunately, many of the 32 are still aggrieved and do not genuinely like Fayemi; they see him as a proud and cunning being that always try to outsmart everyone. The fear of being persecuted by the federal government is what still keeps most of them in the APC. Fayemi may lose if the aggrieved members of his party are not calmed and pacified to throw their weight behind him.
Fayose’s arrogance and imperiousness would affect Olusola. The Ekiti state PDP is monopolized by Fayose, who would not allow justice and fair play in the daily running of the party. The imposition of Olusola as governorship candidate has frustrated notables like Prince Dayo Adeyeye, Senator Fatimah Raji-Rasaki and other bigwigs out of the party. This would definitely dwindle Olusola’s support base and chance of winning the election.
Nonetheless, the voting arithmetic in Ekiti favours Olusola. Fayose strategically picked Olusola from the southern senatorial district that has never produced a governor. Olusola’s running mate, Mr Kazeem Ogunsakin, 39, is the former chairman of Ado-Ekiti local government and son of the state’s former Chief Imam. Olusola and Ogunsakin’s hometown, Ikere and Ado-Ekiti, have the largest number of registered voters in Ekiti State. PDP would sing victory songs if they win these areas by landslide. This would however not be easy as Fayemi’s running mate, 75-year-old Chief Bisi Egbeyemi is an influential Ado-Ekiti indigene.
Olusola would reap the gains of Fayose’s cordial relationship with the grassroots. Fayose initiated an uncommon style of governance in Nigeria. He will abandon his fleet of exotic cars and opt for a ride on okada. He regularly hangs out at spots other governors would not even near. He made the poor his friend and the street his second home. He makes the masses feel his government is theirs. Majority of the low and middle class population in Ekiti sees Fayose as their own and would most likely vote his choice candidate, Olusola. The APC has dismissed Fayose’s acceptance in the grassroots. The party argues that Fayose’s exploitation of the poor’s vulnerability for political gain and media hype would not earn Olusola votes.
The Ekiti election is going to be a very tight contest. The APC is determined to end PDP’s reign and Fayose has vowed that PDP would continue ruling Ekiti under Olusola. Let’s assess the candidates’ chance based on the factors that determines the winner of a governorship election in Nigeria.
Campaign outreach: both candidates campaigned massively across the length and breadth of Ekiti. Money: both candidates have strong financial strength. Power: Fayemi has federal might, Olusola has the state governor’s backing. Education: both candidates are well read; Fayemi holds a Doctorate, while Olusola is a Professor. Religion: both candidates have balanced the Christian-Muslim equation; Manifesto: Both candidates have no clear-cut programs, their campaigns were avenues to defame one another. Civil service votes: Fayemi owed workers salary before leaving office and Fayose owes months. A significant portion of the over 50,000 workers would most likely vote for Fayemi, but teachers would in all probability vote for Olusola.
Ethnic loyalty votes: Olusola and his running mate’s constituency have the second highest and the highest number of registered voters respectively. The security agencies: they would presumably favor the federal government’s candidate – Fayemi. But then, the APC stalwarts should be mindful that political arrests and intimidations at this moment would only generate voter’s compassion for the PDP. The alleged police harassment of Fayose is a booster for the PDP as it would earn his godson, Olusola, some sympathy-votes.
Grassroots support: Fayose’s overwhelming popularity among the poor majority would earn Olusola a substantial amount of votes. The largely populated poor who are beneficiaries of Fayose’s food distribution (stomach infrastructure) would most likely vote Olusola in order to continue getting the largess. The elites: majority of them would vote for Fayemi, but a major issue to be considered is that they are not as many as the poor. Some elites are apolitical and don’t vote.
The informal sector and the less educated population – artisans, traders and transport workers: this array of persons – that vote and stand by their votes – would most likely vote for Olusola because they see his godfather, Fayose, as pro-masses. The transport workers refusal to convey people to Fayemi’s campaign rally on 10 July, 2018 is a pointer that they are supporting PDP’s Olusola. General perception: Ekiti people know Olusola is Fayose’s stooge but might prefer to vote him than Fayemi – a Buhari loyalist that’ll most likely convert their ancestral lands into cattle colony for herdsmen. Political vengeance: rather than lose, the ‘powers-that-be’ may install Fayemi to avenge the 2014 Ekitigate scandal.
All winning indices considered, PDP’s Olusola would predictably get the highest number of votes, but APC’s Fayemi could be declared winner. Protests would emerge after the election and the election tribunal would be flooded with petitions.
Omoshola Deji is a political and public affairs analyst. He wrote in via [email protected]
By Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm
In a report filed by The Business Standard on August 8, 2026, India, the current BRICS chair, opposes a proposal for a common currency to counter the US dollar.
The Indian Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, told reporters in Jaipur, Rajasthan, northwestern India, after a two-day BRICS trade and industry meeting, that India was not in favour of a BRICS currency. He added that India did not support the introduction of any such BRICS currency scheme.
It is good these things are showing signs at this early stage of attempts by BRICS member countries to crystallise a research finding published by a British economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neil, in 2001.
None of the leaders and country members of BRICS ever conceived on record the formation of such an economic or political bloc until the research publication, which spurred leaders of the mentioned countries to marshal resources and begin a dialogue of formalisation.
The current membership that started involuntarily with just Brazil, Russia, India, and China as a concept published by a research economist, that later included South Africa, now has 10 members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia.
Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are designated partner countries that participate in framework meetings without full voting rights.
Originally, the publication by Jim O’Neil wasn’t intended or proposed as a vehicle for the political grouping that has drawn the attention of the rest of the world, as mentioned members took a step further from the appraisal or assessment paper to coalesce into a political force overflowing its original boundaries today.
For the above reasons, the initial step of early contacts was to take advantage of things in common in member countries for the stimulation of economic growth and global prosperity. At that stage, suspicions were managed, and plans didn’t consider historical political differences and disagreements as grounds for suspicion or discontinuation of cooperation.
Of course, China and India had trust issues over decades of border disputes. And in the early stages of heightened escalations of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship when India offered to mediate and broker for ceasefire and eventual peace, Russia wasn’t sceptical but took steps to host the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi.
But at the back of the mind of the Russian-Indian relationship, history was revealing about betrayals, especially after what the country endured in assassinations of leading members of the Indian National Congress, that killed Indira Gandhi and swept her son, Rajiv Gandhi, and thereafter ravaged the family dynasty with threats of violence.
These paved the way for the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist party, and its leader, Narendra Modi. The BJP is not directly responsible for the intimidation and violent campaign against the INC, a close former Soviet-era ally of Russia, but a beneficiary. There are grounds to suspect a frosty relationship with Russia, although concealed in diplomatic niceties and global market dynamics of cross-border business and trade.
India turned into the redistribution hub of Russian discounted grains and oil supplies as a third country, after sanctions were imposed on Russia in what Russia described as demilitarisation and denazification special operations in Ukraine.
India is considered by Western powers as a democracy. It was once a British colony, gaining independence on August 15, 1947. It is also a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. On a normal day, it doesn’t add or take away anything. But under these circumstances, these are serious factors to consider in arriving at a decision.
Be it as it may, China and Russia have found their way out in world trade, bypassing SWIFT. China operates the Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System, whilst Russia is running the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). India has IMPS and NEFT. In principle, these payment systems bypass SWIFT and the US dollar, nonetheless.
As the world waits to hear India back its dissenting views with supporting facts, world trade will never remain the same again.
Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm has extensive scholarly publications that establish him as a leading academic expert in regional geopolitical dynamics and diplomatic relations in Africa. Author of e-monographs on geopolitics, ethnic conflicts, and political philosophy.
Feature/OPED
What Dangote’s Reported $40bn Private-Placement Valuation Could Mean for Nigerian Investors, NGX
Dangote Petroleum Refinery could become an unusually large part of Nigeria’s stock market if its eventual IPO valuation is close to the roughly $40 billion implied by a recent private placement.
EBC Financial Group (EBC) highlights that this would value the refinery at about N54.63 trillion, using the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market rate of N1,365.6856 per USD on August 7. Against the N158.513 trillion value of companies listed on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) on the same date, adding the refinery at that value would produce a market worth about N213.14 trillion, with Dangote Refinery accounting for 25.6%.
This scenario assumes the full $40 billion equity value is reflected in NGX market capitalisation and other listed company values remain unchanged. At that size, movements in the company could become highly visible across the Nigerian equity market, although its actual influence on NGX indices may depend on the shares available for public trading and the relevant index rules.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said: “If Dangote Refinery entered the Nigerian Exchange at close to a $40 billion valuation, it could account for roughly one-quarter of the resulting NGX market value. If that valuation is difficult to support, few shares are available for public trading, or investors need to reduce other Nigerian holdings to participate, the effects could extend across Nigeria’s equity market, including existing NGX-listed companies and their shareholders.”
A Private Transaction Can Indicate Value, but Public Investors Need Financial Evidence
Based on the private transaction, $40 billion provides an indication of Dangote Refinery’s value, but it does not establish the eventual IPO price. Details published on August 4 said a $2.5 billion private placement for a 6% stake implied a valuation of roughly $40 billion. The proposed initial public offering (IPO) was reported to target about $5 billion, while the eventual IPO valuation and percentage offered to the public were not disclosed. This is important as a private transaction may produce a different valuation from the price a broad group of public investors is prepared to accept.
For context, public equity market values cited alongside the transaction were about $12 billion for Türkiye’s Tupras and $16 billion for US-listed HF Sinclair. The Dangote figure is about 3.3 times Tupras and 2.5 times HF Sinclair. They are not direct comparisons because profitability, debt, operations and growth plans differ. The gap nevertheless increases the need for audited earnings, cash flow, debt and investment plans that explain what supports the higher valuation.
The reported $5 billion fundraising target is equivalent to about N6.83 trillion at the August 7 exchange rate, or approximately 4.3% of the N158.513 trillion existing NGX market value. Proposed $5 billion raise. If new Nigerian or foreign money funds the offer, the pool of capital invested in Nigerian equities could expand. If investors sell current holdings to participate, capital could instead move away from other listed companies.
Publicly Tradable Shares and New Investment Could Shape the Wider Market Impact
NGX rules show why total company value does not tell investors how much stock they can actually trade. Main Board companies can qualify through either 20% public ownership held by at least 300 shareholders or publicly tradable shares worth at least N20 billion. The Premium Board value alternative is N40 billion. Holdings controlled by promoters, directors and close relatives, government, or strategic investors owning at least 5% are excluded from qualifying public shares.
This means a company worth tens of trillions of naira could still have a much smaller amount of stock available for regular trading if ownership remains concentrated. The key issue is therefore how much of Dangote Refinery becomes accessible to public investors and how widely those shares are held.
Regional investment could also affect the outcome. Details published on 4 August indicated engagement involving South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Ghana and Rwanda, including possible Kenyan participation of up to $500 million, although no allocations were confirmed. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange separately said Dangote Group had shown strong intent to pursue a South African listing after Nigeria. Regional participation in the Nigerian offer could bring new capital directly into Nigerian equities. A later South African listing could broaden access but would not itself increase money raised through the Nigerian IPO.
Pension funds face the same question of capital allocation. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) waived the usual existence, profitability and dividend requirements so Pension Fund Administrators can consider the IPO, while retaining internal investment policies, risk-management requirements and duties to contributors and retirees. PenCom Circular on Dangote Refiner. PenCom states that the dispensation is exceptional, one-off and specific to this proposed IPO.
Pension funds held N5.907 trillion in domestic ordinary shares at the end of June, compared with the offer’s approximately N6.83 trillion equivalent. This does not imply pension funds would finance the offer. It shows why managers must consider exposure to one company and whether participation requires reducing other investments.
Precious added, “Dangote being listed could become a turning point for Nigeria’s equity market if it brings wider public ownership and additional African capital. Investors still need clear evidence supporting the valuation, clarity on how much of the company they can trade and an explanation of where the money raised will go. Those answers will determine whether the listing expands the Nigerian equity market or concentrates more investment around one company.”
An approved prospectus should clarify the valuation, shares offered, public ownership and use of proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) said on June 23 that no IPO application had then been filed or approved and ordered unauthorised pre-marketing to stop. Details published on 4 August later said an IPO application had been submitted, with regulatory approval expected in the following weeks. Until final terms are disclosed, the test for Nigeria is whether the listing combines a supportable valuation with broad public ownership and genuinely additional investment.
Feature/OPED
Moving the Stablecoin Conversation From Hype to Utility in Africa’s Next Payments Evolution
By Rajat Mishra
For much of the past decade, discussions around stablecoins have been dominated by cryptocurrency speculation. Increasingly, however, stablecoins are emerging as practical financial infrastructure for moving money across borders, managing liquidity and improving payment efficiency.
The real opportunity lies not in choosing between traditional finance and digital assets, but in building an integrated financial ecosystem where both work together to improve efficiency, broaden financial access and deepen economic connectivity across the continent.
Despite significant advances in financial inclusion and digital payments, moving money across African borders remains far more difficult than it should be. Businesses continue to face challenges when making cross-border payments. Fragmented payment networks, multiple intermediaries, and lengthy settlement processes increase costs and create operational inefficiencies.
Remittance providers, the specialised financial services that millions rely on to send money home, face many of the same structural challenges. These providers play a critical role across the continent. In fact, 19 of Africa’s 54 countries receive remittance inflows equivalent to at least 4% of their GDP. Yet Africa remains the world’s most expensive region to send money to.
These challenges are not a reflection of remittance providers themselves, but of the fragmented banking and settlement infrastructure underpinning international money movement. Financial institutions must often manage liquidity across multiple disconnected currency markets while relying on complex correspondent banking networks and clearing systems. The result is higher costs, slower settlements, and capital that remains unnecessarily locked up.
One of the most immediate opportunities for stablecoins lies in improving cross-border settlement. Consider a Kenyan business importing goods from South Africa. Under traditional settlement models, payments often pass through multiple correspondent banking relationships, involve several foreign exchange conversions, and can take days before funds reach the intended recipient.
Stablecoin-enabled settlement rails have the potential to reduce much of this friction by enabling value to move more efficiently between financial institutions across markets. The result can be shorter settlement times, greater transparency and improved predictability for businesses operating across borders.
The benefits extend well beyond businesses. For millions of Africans working abroad, remittances remain a financial lifeline, helping families pay school fees, healthcare costs and daily living expenses. Yet sending money home often involves navigating a complex chain of money transfer operators, correspondent banks, and local payout partners, with each additional layer introducing costs and delays.
Stablecoins can help streamline the backend movement of funds between institutional participants, reducing settlement costs and improving efficiency across the value chain.
For end users, the advantage is simplicity. Recipients do not need to interact with, or even understand stablecoins directly. They continue to receive money through familiar, trusted channels, whether a local bank account or mobile money wallet, only faster and at a lower cost.
Beyond payments, stablecoins also address one of the less visible but most significant challenges in cross-border finance: liquidity management. Financial institutions operating across multiple markets must constantly ensure they have sufficient funds in the right currency, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time. Today, this often requires pre-funding accounts across multiple countries, a costly practice that traps large amounts of capital and limits financial flexibility.
Stablecoins introduce a new model for moving value across borders in near real time, enabling institutions to manage liquidity dynamically as demand arises. This can reduce the need for large pre-funded balances, improve treasury efficiency and free up capital that can be deployed more productively. Ultimately, these efficiencies can translate into faster settlements, lower costs, and better services for businesses and consumers alike.
However, the true value of stablecoins will not come from isolated blockchain networks operating independently of existing financial systems. Their long-term impact will depend on how effectively they integrate with banks, mobile money platforms, payment service providers and existing payment infrastructure. Interoperability will be critical to ensuring payment flows move seamlessly between systems, markets and currencies. The goal should be to strengthen and modernise today’s payment ecosystem, not replace it.
From experiment to infrastructure: what global moves are telling us
Some of the clearest signals that stablecoins are moving from experimentation to infrastructure are coming from card networks. Mastercard’s reported agreement to acquire BVNK, valued at up to $1.8 billion, points to a strategic investment in the settlement layer connecting stablecoin rails with traditional banking and reflects growing institutional confidence in stablecoin-enabled cross-border payments.
Visa’s expansion of stablecoin-backed cards through Stripe’s Bridge to more than 100 countries reflects a complementary strategy. Rather than acquiring infrastructure outright, Visa is leveraging its existing global network as the final distribution layer for stablecoin-funded payments.
The inclusion of African markets is particularly significant. It signals growing confidence that stablecoin-backed payment instruments can operate alongside, and in some cases complement, the mobile money ecosystems that already dominate wallet-based payments across much of the continent.
Taken together, these developments point to a broader shift. Card payment networks are moving from observing the stablecoin conversation to investing directly in the infrastructure that underpins it. For Africa, the implication is not that stablecoins will replace existing payment rails, but that success will increasingly belong to institutions capable of orchestrating multiple settlement rails – cards, bank transfers, mobile money and stablecoins- within a unified, interoperable ecosystem. Local market expertise, regulatory relationships and last-mile distribution will remain decisive competitive advantages.
Building for scale through trust and regulation
But despite their potential, stablecoins cannot operate outside the boundaries of regulated financial systems. Their long-term viability across Africa depends on clear regulatory frameworks, robust compliance standards and trusted infrastructure that supports transparency, risk management and consumer protection.
We are already seeing this evolution. In markets such as South Africa, institutions facilitating cross-border settlements must navigate increasingly sophisticated regulatory requirements, including approvals for certain offshore crypto-related activities. Globally, initiatives such as the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) and expanded Travel Rule obligations are raising expectations around reporting, tax transparency and compliance.
These developments reinforce a simple reality: stablecoin infrastructure does not reduce compliance obligations. It raises the bar for governance, transparency and institutional risk management. The objective is not to bypass regulation, but to build interoperable payment systems that can innovate confidently within it.
From the edges to the plumbing
The stablecoin conversation is steadily moving beyond speculation and towards practical implementation. What once sat at the edges of the payments debate is becoming part of the plumbing of cross-border finance rather than a parallel system to it.
The question is no longer whether stablecoins have a role to play in payments. The question is where they deliver the greatest value. In Africa, that value is increasingly clear: faster settlement, improved liquidity efficiency and more connected cross-border commerce. The winners will not be those that replace existing financial systems, but those that successfully connect stablecoin rails with the banks, mobile money networks and payment providers that already power the continent’s economy.
For pan-African payment networks such as Onafriq, the priority is ensuring that emerging technologies complement the financial infrastructure businesses and consumers already trust, rather than introducing new layers of complexity.
The opportunity lies in connecting stablecoin settlement with banks, mobile money networks and payment providers, ensuring the benefits of this new infrastructure deliver tangible outcomes for African businesses and consumers.
Rajat Mishra is the CPO for Network Product & Deputy Group CPIO at Onafriq
