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How Africa Can Ensure Its Food Security

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Severe Food Insecurity

By Professor Maurice Okoli

At least, African leaders gradually recognise the need to work collectively to ensure food security. Food supply has seriously been exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Africa’s persistent internal ethnic conflicts and a series of natural disasters. But more fascinating are the latest arguments over the interconnection between utilising resources for increasing and improving food production and taking adequate measures toward shedding import dependency.

The month of June 2023 was a busy month for African leaders. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa headed the Africa Peace Initiative to Kyiv and St. Petersburg, famous cities in Ukraine and Russia. Then later, he joined his colleagues at the New Global Financial Pact summit in Paris, France. While these trips could not be considered ordinary, the most controversial issues inseparably relate to Africa’s economic development, trade and investment, and sustainable welfare of the population.

As a development economist and researcher, scanning through several reports, Ramaphosa and his colleagues raised one significant question, among others, during their discussions in Paris. And that is the issue of ensuring food security. In practical terms, it has been part of government policy on improving food production and supply to the increasing population, especially in Africa, which stands at an estimated 1.4 billion. Of course, the world’s population is growing, but Africa’s exponential growth has acute challenges, including healthcare, employment and food security.

By halfway through this century, that is, 2050, Africa’s population is estimated to be 2.5 billion, and urban or megacities across Africa will continue experiencing enormous stress or pressure due to massive migration from under-developed parts of African countries. With Russia’s special operation in Ukraine and the sanctions in the history of mankind slammed on Russia by Western and European states, these have sufficiently been acknowledged as drivers of skyrocketing commodity prices and, ultimately, the cost of living. In effect, it’s described as a terrible global instability.

With all these trends even ceaselessly occurring now, Ramaphosa’s preferential steps toward food security, as described in his presentation, that the war has a ‘negative impact’ on the African continent and many other countries. It is, however, an acceptable fact that Africa, which generally depends on massive food imports, has suffered from all-year-round supply interruptions — diverse discussions ceaselessly awash the media landscape over these. For most African leaders, it is the question of food supply or how to sustain or preserve food import dependency. There is no alternative to reconnecting to regular supplies from Russia and Ukraine for these African countries.

During the New Global Financial Pact summit in Paris, African leaders expressed sceptical sentiments, as Ramaphosa and other leaders vehemently reiterated that external pledges and funding have unsuccessfully supported sustainable development goals, including food security in Africa.

Ramaphosa raised the structure of financial institutions, global currency, climate change and economic poverty, that there should be more cooperation and coordination, no fragmentation. There should be reforms in multinational institutions to address development issues, especially in the Global South. Africa should not be treated as beggars but as equals. It does not depend on donations and generosity. Africa should be allowed to be a key player on the global stage.

In stark reality, the global geopolitical processes are now offering the grounds to re-initiate and seek suitable alternatives that depend on century-old approaches and methods to solve national questions. Therefore, development critics may argue how the changes bring it closer to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and how it will simultaneously bolster Africa’s role in the multipolar world.

Factors Influencing Food Production

Interestingly factors negatively influencing local production, including the agricultural sector, are commonly listed and extensively discussed. Researchers, academics and politicians already recognize them as retarding expected progress and making headways in attaining that status of food self-sufficiency. Some of these factors are drought and climatic extremes, low budget allocation and inappropriate agricultural policies in Africa, poor storage and preservation facilities, poor land tenure system and reduced soil fertilities, inadequate irrigation facilities and poor methods of pest and disease control.

Some aspects of traditional African culture related to food production have become less practised in recent years. But state attitudes are not stimulating either in this direction. Across Africa, the consumption culture is tied to foreign imported products as it is widely interpreted as status-symbol, considered as belonging to a well-defined upper class in the society. Thus this consumer culture becomes a driving factor towards continuity in importing food that fills modern shopping malls in Africa.

The most popular rhetoric, more or less chorus, is that although it has abundant natural resources, Africa remains the world’s poorest and least-developed continent, resulting from various causes that may include deep-seated political corruption. According to the United Nations Human Development Report in 2003, the bottom 24 ranked nations (151st to 175th) were all African states.

Thambo Mbeki, former South African President, has argued these aspects in his reports on illicit capital flows abroad. In a recently published analysis, Mbeki underlined that loans obtained for undertaking development infrastructure, including agricultural and related industrial sectors, are siphoned back to foreign banks for politicians.

Basic geography teaches us that Africa has enormous resources, encompassing the vast landmass, vegetation, and water resources, including the lakes and rivers. The Congo, Nile, Zambezi, Niger and Lake Victoria are among its rivers. Yet the continent is the second driest in the world, with millions of Africans suffering yearly from water shortages. It requires mechanising agricultural practices, offering specialised short training and adequate support for local farmers as aspects of measures and steps toward import substitution.

Addressing food security challenges in Africa

Economists argue that possibly adopting, to some degree, import substitution policies are not directed at escaping international trade. It is an attempt to utilise, at the maximum, the untapped available resources in the production sector and, secondly, redirect budgetary finances into needy significant economic sectors. Understandably, Africa depends on food imports to feed its population. It has become a common rules-based practice across Africa.

On the other hand, potential exporting foreign states generate revenues for their budget. This is also an undeniable fact as many countries around the world make conscious efforts to increase the export of commodities to foreign markets. According to Agriculture Ministry’s AgroExport Center, Russia targets $33 billion per year (annually) as revenue through massive export of grains and meat poultry to Africa.

By increasing grain exports to African countries, Russia aims to enhance the competitiveness of Russian agricultural goods in the African market. On the contrary, several international organisations have also expressed that African leaders must adopt import substitution mechanisms and use their financial resources to strengthen agricultural production systems.

At the G7 Summit in June 2022, President Joe Biden and G7 leaders announced over $4.5 billion to address global food security, over half of which will come from the United States. This $2.76 billion in U.S. government funding will help protect the world’s most vulnerable populations and mitigate the impacts of growing food insecurity and malnutrition by building production capacity and more resilient agriculture and food systems worldwide and responding to immediate emergency food needs.

U.S. Congress allocated $336.5 million to bilateral programs for Sub-Saharan African countries, including Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and regional programs in southern Africa, west Africa, and the Sahel.

Using Zimbabwe as a Classical Example

Compared to food-importing African countries, Zimbabwe has increased wheat production, especially during the current Russia-Ukraine crisis. This achievement was attributed to efforts in mobilising local scientists to improve the crop’s production. Zimbabwe is an African country under Western sanctions for 25 years, hindering imports of much-needed machinery and other inputs to drive agriculture.

At the African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF) summit held from September 5 to 9, 2022, in Rwanda, President Emmerson Mnangagwa told the gathering that “we used to depend on importation of wheat from Ukraine in the past, but now we have been able to produce our own. To a considerable extent, the crisis in that country has not affected us. There is an urgent need to adopt a progressive approach and re-purpose food policies to address the emerging challenges affecting our entire food systems in Africa.”

As much as there are classical admirable lessons to learn from Zimbabwe, African leaders ignore these. Zimbabwe shares the same negative consequences of colonialism with many African countries. But in an additional case, it has struggled with sanctions imposed on the land, making conditions harder. Zimbabwe has been looking for foreign partners from other countries to transfer technology and industrialise its ailing economy in the southern African region.

While several African countries largely depend on Russia and Ukraine for their regular supply of wheat and grains, even despite the persistent geopolitical warring situation, Zimbabwe has recorded its highest wheat harvest during the last agricultural production in 2022. It emerges as one of the few African countries with an import substitution agricultural policy and strategically working self-sufficiency. Worth suggesting that African leaders have to learn from Zimbabwe – a landlocked southern African country.

Looking for Inside Solutions

At least over the past few years, even long before the Russia-Ukraine crisis, there have been glowing signs from two African banks calling for increased food production. African Development Bank (AfDB) and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) have gained increasing prominence for their work with the private sectors within Africa. These two banks support the agricultural sectors, but more is needed to meet the highest target.

At the Paris summit, AfDB President Akinwumi Adesina, African and European heads of government and representatives of development partners on the sidelines held discussions about the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa. The key aim is accelerating the financing of transformational climate-resilient and greener infrastructure projects in Africa and attracting new partners and financiers. Adesina, formerly Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, now the 8th President of the African Development Bank, has consistently been pushing for increased domestic agriculture to attain food self-sufficiency and ensure food security on the continent.

Of particular concern is that over 900 million people are still impoverished on the continent. Over 283 million Africans suffer from hunger, including over 216 million children who suffer from malnutrition. The situation is more serious due to climate change, including severe droughts, floods and cyclones that have devastated parts of Africa. Today, much of the Horn Africa and the Sahel last had rain several seasons ago. The resources Africa needs need to be there, explains AfDB President Akinwumi Adesina.

“I am excited about what the bank is doing to support farmers to adapt to climate change through our flagship program —Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT). It is a platform implemented through partnerships with national and regional agricultural research institutions and the private sector. It is the largest ever effort to get technologies at scale to millions of farmers across Africa,” he wrote in his report.

Over the past three years, TAAT delivered climate-resilient agricultural technologies to 25 million farmers or 62% of the 40 million farmer target. The depth of consistent work of this bank is to enhance food processing, value addition and competitiveness of agricultural supply chains across Africa. The bank is committing resources for the establishment of Special Agro-Industrial Processing Zones. With its partners (including the Islamic Development Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development), the bank has invested more than $1.5 billion to establish these zones in eleven countries.

Africa’s ability to feed nine billion people by 2050 is not a foregone conclusion; it is a call to action. We must harness our strengths, confront challenges, and work relentlessly towards our shared vision. Therefore, let us rise to this grand challenge. Let us forge ahead, knowing that our efforts today will determine the future of food in the world. It is necessary to unlock Africa’s potential in agriculture. Africa must feed itself.

The Wake-Up Bell for Action

It may take us by surprise when we know that 81% of the sub-Saharan African population lives on less than $2.50 (PPP) per day in 2023, compared with 86% for India. China and India are populous but are moving faster than Africa. China has a more substantial global economic influence than India, but Africa still needs to progress in various economic sectors.

The latest economic trend is that Africa is now at risk of being in debt once again, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries. It receives the most external funds for its development from Development funding sponsors such as the United States, Europe, China, France and Britain or multilateral blocs such as G7 states, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Other institutions and organisations, such as Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), also engage with Africa. In addition, the Asian and Arab Banks are showing practical actions. The cry for the National Development Bank of the BRICS has yet to think of Africa.

In this article, it is necessary in our discussions to appreciate the geographical facts that Africa is the world’s second-largest and second-most-populous continent, after Asia, in both aspects. Despite a wide range of natural resources, Africa is the least wealthy continent per capita and second-least wealthy by total wealth, behind Oceania. Scholars have attributed this to different factors, including geography, climate, tribalism, colonialism, neocolonialism, lack of democracy, and worse Africa-wide corruption. Despite this low concentration of wealth, recent economic expansion and the large and young population make Africa a crucial financial market in the broader global context.

In a nutshell, adopting measures for establishing food security is crucial to sustainable development. Addressing food security, therefore, is one of the keys for Africa in this 21st century. From the above perspectives, African leaders have to focus and redirect both human and financial resources toward increasing local production as the surest approach in ensuring sustainable food security for the estimated 1.4 billion population in Africa, and this most possibly falls within the framework of the Agenda 2063 of the African Union.

By Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia

Dipo Olowookere is a journalist based in Nigeria that has passion for reporting business news stories. At his leisure time, he watches football and supports 3SC of Ibadan. Mr Olowookere can be reached via [email protected]

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Mr President, Please Reconsider -No to State Police

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state police nigeria

By Abba Dukawa

Nigeria stands today at a painful and defining crossroads in its security journey. Across the nation, families live with growing fear as insecurity spreads—kidnappings, banditry, and terrorism have become harsh realities in too many communities. These threats do not respect state boundaries. Organised criminal networks move across states, leaving ordinary citizens feeling exposed and abandoned.

Nigerians are facing intertwined challenges. The anger is no longer whispered in private—it is now spoken openly with frustration and worry. Another pressing issue confronting Nigerians is the renewed debate over the creation of state police. When will the federal government strengthen the effectiveness of its security agencies? How much longer must communities endure this uncertainty?

At the same time, another urgent debate rises from the hearts of the people. In the face of this deepening crisis, should state governments be allowed to establish their own police forces to protect their citizens? Or will Nigeria continue to rely solely on a centralised system that many believe is struggling to respond quickly enough to local threats?

These are not just political questions. They are questions of safety, dignity, and the right of every Nigerian to live without fear. The nation is waiting, hoping for bold decisions that will restore trust, strengthen security, and protect the future of its people.  State police cannot be the answer to these pressing issues that bedevil federal security agencies.

Recently, the President appealed to the leadership of the National Assembly to consider constitutional amendments that would create a legal framework for state police, arguing that such reform is necessary to address Nigeria’s worsening security challenges. The fragmented policing structure could complicate efforts to combat crime effectively.

Reigniting the debate over state police comes as no surprise, given that he has long been seen as an advocate for the idea since his tenure as Governor of Lagos State. He supported the concept then and has continued to promote it as President. Many Nigerians, particularly in the South-West, have long called for state police as a means to address the country’s growing insecurity. Despite the constitutional considerations, discussions around state police continue to evoke strong emotions nationwide.

How will state police address security breaches committed by local militias or vigilante groups such as the OPC in the Southwestern states? What actions would state police take regarding the Amotekun group, which is openly endorsed by Southwest governors, if it were to commit serious violations of the rights of citizens, especially those from other parts of the country? How quickly have the proponents of state police chosen to erase from memory the horrific atrocities the OPC inflicted on the Northern community in Lagos in February 2002? The scars of that tragedy are still raw, yet some behave as though it never happened—as if the pain and the lives lost meant nothing. It is a bitter betrayal of justice and our collective conscience.

Reintroducing this issue at a time when the federal security apparatus is already strained shows a lack of sensitivity. Proponents overlook that Section 214(1) clearly states there is only one police force for the federation, the Nigeria Police Force and no other police force may be established for any part of the federation. The section does not permit the establishment of state police. Policing is on the Exclusive Legislative List, meaning only the federal government can create or control a police force.

Even today, the Nigeria Police Force, under the centralised command of the Inspector-General, faces accusations of harassment and intimidation of the weak and vulnerable citizens. If such problems persist under federal control, imagine the risks of placing police authority under state governors, who already wield significant influence over state and local structures.

Implications For The State Police Structures In The Hand Of The State Governors

I must state clearly: I do not support the establishment of state police—at least not at this stage of Nigeria’s development. Our institutions remain fragile, and introducing such a system carries significant risks of abuse. History offers reasons for caution: the Native Authority police of the past were often linked to political repression and misuse of power.

Supporters argue that state police would bring law enforcement closer to local communities and improve response to crime. However, there are serious concerns rooted in Nigeria’s social realities.

Nigeria is a diverse nation with multiple ethnic and religious sentiments. If recruitment into state police forces becomes dominated by particular groups, minority communities may feel marginalised or threatened.

State police could deepen divisions and weaken public trust. State-controlled Police could also become instruments of political intimidation, especially during election periods, potentially targeting opposition figures, critics, and journalists.

Financial capacity is another major concern. Establishing and maintaining a professional police force requires substantial investment in training, equipment, salaries, welfare, and infrastructure. Many states already struggle to pay workers and provide essential services. How, then, can they adequately fund a state police? The likely outcome is poorly trained, under-equipped personnel—conditions that often foster corruption and inefficiency.

Even under federal oversight, Nigeria’s police system struggles with weak accountability and abuse of power. Transferring these weaknesses to the state level without safeguards could have severe consequences.

A poorly structured state police force could become loyal to governors rather than the Constitution, serving political interests rather than citizens’ interests. For these reasons, introducing state police, even with the constitutional amendment, could create more problems than it solves. Sustainability, accountability, and adherence to constitutional principles are critical and will likely be violated

Nigeria must strengthen law enforcement while protecting citizens’ rights and preserving national unity.  Mr President, please reconsider your decision on state police. Nigerians want a strong, effective, and unified police force, not one that risks further dividing a system already struggling to meet its constitutional obligations.

Dukawa can be reached at ab**********@***il.com

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Measures at Ensuring Africa’s Food Sovereignty

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Africa's Food Sovereignty

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

China’s investments in Africa have primarily been in the agricultural sector, reinforcing its support for the continent to attain food security for the growing population, estimated currently at 1.5 billion people. With a huge expanse of land and untapped resources, China’s investment in agriculture, focused on increasing local production, has been described as highly appreciable.

Brazil has adopted a similar strategy in its policy with African countries; its investments have concentrated in a number of countries, especially those rich in natural resources. It has significantly contributed to Africa’s economic growth by improving access to affordable machinery, industrial inputs, and adding value to consumer goods. Thus, Africa has to reduce product imports which can be produced locally.

The China and Brazil in African Agriculture Project has just published online a series of studies concerning Chinese and Brazilian support for African agriculture. They appeared in an upcoming issue of World Development.  The six articles focusing on China are available below:

–A New Politics of Development Cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian Engagements in African Agriculture by Ian Scoones, Kojo Amanor, Arilson Favareto and Qi Gubo.

–South-South Cooperation, Agribusiness and African Agricultural Development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique by Kojo Amanor and Sergio Chichava.

–Chinese State Capitalism? Rethinking the Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa by Jing Gu, Zhang Chuanhong, Alcides Vaz and Langton Mukwereza.

–Chinese Migrants in Africa: Facts and Fictions from the Agri-food Sector in Ethiopia and Ghana by Seth Cook, Jixia Lu, Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.

–Chinese Agricultural Training Courses for African Officials: Between Power and Partnerships by Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.

–Science, Technology and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres in Africa by Xiuli Xu, Xiaoyun Li, Gubo Qi, Lixia Tang and Langton Mukwereza.

 Strategic partnerships and the way forward: African leaders have to adopt import substitution policies, re-allocate financial resources toward attaining domestic production, and sustain self-sufficiency.

Maximising the impact of resource mobilisation requires collaboration among governments, key external partners, investment promotion agencies, financial institutions, and the private sector. Partnerships must be aligned with national development priorities that can promote value addition, support industrialisation, and deepen regional and continental integration.

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Recapitalisation Without Transformation is a Risk Nigeria Cannot Afford

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CBN Gov & new Bank logo

By Blaise Udunze

In barely two weeks, Nigeria’s banking sector will once again be at a historic turning point. As the deadline for the latest recapitalisation exercise approaches on March 31, 2026, with no fewer than 31 banks having met the new capital rule, leaving out two that are reportedly awaiting verification. As exercise progresses and draws to an end, policymakers are optimistic that stronger banks will anchor financial stability and support the country’s ambition of building a $1 trillion economy.

The reform, driven by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under Governor Olayemi Cardoso, requires banks to significantly raise their capital thresholds, which are set at N500 billion for international banks, N200 billion for national banks, and N50 billion for regional lenders. According to the apex bank, 33 banks have already tapped the capital market through rights issues and public offerings; collectively, the total verified and approved capital raised by the banks amounts to N4.05 trillion.

No doubt, at first glance, the strategy definitely appears straightforward with the idea that bigger capital means stronger banks, and stronger banks should finance economic growth. But history offers a cautionary reminder that capital alone does not guarantee resilience, as it would be recalled that Nigeria has travelled this road before.

During the 2004-2005 consolidation led by former CBN Governor Charles Soludo, the number of banks in the country shrank dramatically from 89 to 25. The reform created larger institutions that were celebrated as national champions. The truth is that Nigeria has been here before because, despite all said and done, barely five years later, the banking system plunged into crisis, forcing regulatory intervention, bailouts, and the creation of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to absorb toxic assets.

The lesson from that experience is simple in the sense that recapitalisation without structural reform only postpones deeper problems.

Today, as banks race to meet the new capital thresholds, the real question is not how much capital has been raised but whether the reform will transform the fundamentals of Nigerian banking. The underlying fact is that if the exercise merely inflates balance sheets without addressing deeper vulnerabilities, Nigeria risks repeating a familiar cycle of apparent stability followed by systemic stress, as the resultant effect will be distressed banks less capable of bringing the economy out of the woods.

The real measure of success is far simpler. That is to say, stronger banks must stimulate economic productivity, stabilise the financial system, and expand access to credit for businesses and households. Anything less will amount to a missed opportunity.

One of the most critical issues surrounding the recapitalisation drive is the quality of the capital being raised.

Nigeria’s banking sector has reportedly secured more than N4.5 trillion in new capital commitments across different categories of banks. No doubt, on paper, these numbers may appear impressive. Going by the trends of events in Nigeria’s economy, numbers alone can be deceptive.

Past recapitalisation cycles revealed troubling practices, whereby funds raised through related-party transactions, borrowed money disguised as equity, or complex financial arrangements that recycled risks back into the banking system. If such practices resurface, recapitalisation becomes little more than an accounting exercise.

To avert a repeat of failure, the CBN must therefore ensure that every naira raised represents genuine, loss-absorbing capital. Transparency around capital sources, ownership structures, and funding arrangements must be non-negotiable. Without credible capital, balance sheet strength becomes an illusion that will make every recapitalisation exercise futile.

In financial systems, credibility is itself a form of capital. If there is one recurring factor behind banking crises in Nigeria, it is corporate governance failure.

Many past collapses were not triggered by global shocks but by insider lending, weak board oversight, excessive executive power, and poor risk culture. Recapitalisation provides regulators with a rare opportunity to reset governance standards across the industry.

Boards must be independent not only in structure but also in substance. Risk committees must be empowered to challenge executive decisions. Insider lending rules must be enforced without compromise because, over the years, they have proven to be an anathema against the stability of the financial sector. The stakes are high.

When governance fails, fresh capital can quickly become fresh fuel for old excesses. Without governance reform, recapitalisation risks reinforcing the very weaknesses it seeks to eliminate.

Another structural vulnerability lies in Nigeria’s increasing amount of non-performing loans (NPLs), which recently caused the CBN to raise concerns, as Nigeria experiences a rise in bad loans threatening banking stability.

Industry data suggests that the banking sector’s NPL ratio has climbed above the prudential benchmark of 5 per cent, reaching roughly 7 per cent in recent assessments. Many of these troubled loans are concentrated in sectors such as oil and gas, power, and government-linked infrastructure projects, alongside other factors such as FX instability, high interest rates, and the withdrawal of Covid-era forbearance, which threaten bank stability.

While regulatory forbearance has helped maintain short-term stability, it has also obscured deeper asset-quality concerns. A credible recapitalisation process must confront this reality directly.

Loan classification standards must reflect economic truth rather than regulatory convenience. Banks should not carry impaired assets indefinitely while presenting healthy balance sheets to investors and depositors.

Transparency about asset quality strengthens trust. Concealment destroys it. Few forces have disrupted Nigerian bank balance sheets in recent years as severely as exchange-rate volatility.

Many banks still operate with significant foreign exchange mismatches, borrowing short-term in foreign currencies while lending long-term to clients earning revenues in naira. When the naira depreciates sharply, these mismatches can erode capital faster than any credit loss.

Recapitalisation must therefore be accompanied by stricter supervision of foreign exchange exposure, as this part calls for the regulator to heighten its supervision. Banks should be required to disclose currency risks more transparently and undergo rigorous stress testing at intervals that assume adverse currency scenarios rather than best-case outcomes. In a structurally import-dependent economy, ignoring FX risk is no longer an option.

Nigeria’s banking system has long been characterised by excessive concentration in a few sectors and corporate clients, which calls for adequate monitoring and the need to be addressed quickly for the recapitalisation drive to yield maximum results.

Growth in most advanced economies comes from the small and medium-sized enterprises that are well-funded. Anything short of this undermines it, since the concentration of huge loans to large oil and gas companies, government-related entities, and major conglomerates absorbs a disproportionate share of bank lending. This has continued to pose a major threat to the system, as the case is with small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of job creation, which remain chronically underfinanced. This imbalance weakens the economy.

Recapitalisation should therefore be tied to policies that encourage credit diversification and risk-sharing mechanisms that allow banks to lend more confidently to productive sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and technology rather than investing their funds into the government’s securities. Bigger banks that remain narrowly exposed do not strengthen the economy. They amplify its fragilities.

Nigeria’s macroeconomic conditions, which are its broad economic settings, are defined by frequent and sometimes sharp changes or instability rather than stability.

Inflation shocks, interest-rate swings, fiscal pressures, and currency adjustments are not rare disruptions; but they have now become a normal part of the economic environment. Despite all these adverse factors, many banks still operate risk models that assume relative stability. Perhaps unbeknownst to the stakeholders, this disconnect is dangerous.

Owing to possible shocks, and when banks increase their capital (recapitalisation), it is required that banks adopt more sophisticated risk-management frameworks capable of withstanding severe economic scenarios, with the expectation that stronger banks should also have stronger systems to manage risks and survive economic crises. In Nigeria today, every financial institution’s stress testing must be performed in the face of the economy facing severe shocks like currency depreciation, sovereign debt pressures, and sudden interest-rate spikes.

Risk management should evolve from a compliance obligation into a strategic discipline embedded in every lending decision.

Public confidence in the banking system depends heavily on credible financial reporting.

Investors, analysts, and depositors need to be able to understand banks’ true financial positions without navigating non-transparent disclosures or creative accounting practices, which means the industry must be liberated to an extent that gives room for access to information.

Recapitalisation provides an opportunity to strengthen the enforcement of international financial reporting standards, enhance audit quality, and require clearer disclosure of capital adequacy, asset quality, and related-party transactions. Transparency should not be feared. It is the foundation of trust.

One thing that must be corrected is that while recapitalisation often focuses on financial metrics, the banking sector ultimately runs on human capital.

Another fearful aspect of this exercise for the economy is that consolidation and mergers triggered by the reform could lead to workforce disruptions if not carefully managed. Job losses, casualisation, and declining staff morale can weaken institutional culture and productivity. Strong banks are built by strong people.

If recapitalisation strengthens balance sheets while destabilising the workforce that powers the system, the reform risks undermining its own economic objectives. Human capital stability must therefore form part of the broader reform strategy.

Doubtless, another emerging shift in Nigeria’s financial landscape is the rise of digital financial platforms that are increasingly changing how people access and use money in Nigeria.

Millions of Nigerians are increasingly relying on fintech platforms for payments, microloans, and everyday financial transactions. One of the advantages it offers is that these services often deliver faster and more user-friendly experiences than traditional banks. While innovation is welcome, it raises important questions about the future structure of financial intermediation.

The point here is that the moment traditional banks retreat from retail banking while fintech platforms dominate customer interactions, systemic liquidity and regulatory oversight could become fragmented.

The CBN must see to it that the recapitalised banks must therefore invest aggressively in digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and customer experience, while cutting down costs on all less critical areas in the industry.

Nigerians should feel the benefits of recapitalisation not only in stronger balance sheets but also in faster apps, reliable payment systems, and responsive customer service.

As banks grow larger through recapitalisation and consolidation, a new challenge emerges via systemic concentration.

Nigeria’s largest banks already control a significant share of industry assets. Further consolidation could deepen the divide between dominant institutions and smaller players. This creates the risk of “too-big-to-fail” banks whose collapse could threaten the entire financial system.

To address this risk, regulators must strengthen resolution frameworks that allow distressed banks to fail without triggering systemic panic, their collapse does not damage the whole financial system, and do not require taxpayer-funded bailouts to forestall similar mistakes that occurred with the liquidation of Heritage Bank.  Market discipline depends on credible failure mechanisms.

It must be understood that Nigeria’s banking recapitalisation is not merely a financial exercise or, better still, increasing banks’ capital. It is a rare opportunity to rebuild trust, strengthen governance, and reposition the financial system as a true engine of economic development.

One fact is that if the reform focuses only on capital numbers, the country risks repeating a familiar pattern of churning out impressive balance sheets followed by another cycle of crisis.

But the actors in this exercise must ensure that the recapitalisation addresses governance failures, asset quality concerns, risk management weaknesses, and transparency gaps; and the moment this is done, the banking sector could emerge stronger and more resilient.

Nigeria does not simply need bigger banks. It needs better banks, institutions capable of financing innovation, supporting entrepreneurs, and building economic opportunity for millions of citizens.

The true capital of any banking system is not just money. It is trust. And whether this recapitalisation ultimately succeeds will depend on whether Nigerians see that trust reflected not only in financial statements but in the everyday experience of saving, borrowing, and investing in the economy. Only then will bigger banks translate into a stronger nation.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com

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