Feature/OPED
How Africa Can Ensure Its Food Security
By Professor Maurice Okoli
At least, African leaders gradually recognise the need to work collectively to ensure food security. Food supply has seriously been exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Africa’s persistent internal ethnic conflicts and a series of natural disasters. But more fascinating are the latest arguments over the interconnection between utilising resources for increasing and improving food production and taking adequate measures toward shedding import dependency.
The month of June 2023 was a busy month for African leaders. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa headed the Africa Peace Initiative to Kyiv and St. Petersburg, famous cities in Ukraine and Russia. Then later, he joined his colleagues at the New Global Financial Pact summit in Paris, France. While these trips could not be considered ordinary, the most controversial issues inseparably relate to Africa’s economic development, trade and investment, and sustainable welfare of the population.
As a development economist and researcher, scanning through several reports, Ramaphosa and his colleagues raised one significant question, among others, during their discussions in Paris. And that is the issue of ensuring food security. In practical terms, it has been part of government policy on improving food production and supply to the increasing population, especially in Africa, which stands at an estimated 1.4 billion. Of course, the world’s population is growing, but Africa’s exponential growth has acute challenges, including healthcare, employment and food security.
By halfway through this century, that is, 2050, Africa’s population is estimated to be 2.5 billion, and urban or megacities across Africa will continue experiencing enormous stress or pressure due to massive migration from under-developed parts of African countries. With Russia’s special operation in Ukraine and the sanctions in the history of mankind slammed on Russia by Western and European states, these have sufficiently been acknowledged as drivers of skyrocketing commodity prices and, ultimately, the cost of living. In effect, it’s described as a terrible global instability.
With all these trends even ceaselessly occurring now, Ramaphosa’s preferential steps toward food security, as described in his presentation, that the war has a ‘negative impact’ on the African continent and many other countries. It is, however, an acceptable fact that Africa, which generally depends on massive food imports, has suffered from all-year-round supply interruptions — diverse discussions ceaselessly awash the media landscape over these. For most African leaders, it is the question of food supply or how to sustain or preserve food import dependency. There is no alternative to reconnecting to regular supplies from Russia and Ukraine for these African countries.
During the New Global Financial Pact summit in Paris, African leaders expressed sceptical sentiments, as Ramaphosa and other leaders vehemently reiterated that external pledges and funding have unsuccessfully supported sustainable development goals, including food security in Africa.
Ramaphosa raised the structure of financial institutions, global currency, climate change and economic poverty, that there should be more cooperation and coordination, no fragmentation. There should be reforms in multinational institutions to address development issues, especially in the Global South. Africa should not be treated as beggars but as equals. It does not depend on donations and generosity. Africa should be allowed to be a key player on the global stage.
In stark reality, the global geopolitical processes are now offering the grounds to re-initiate and seek suitable alternatives that depend on century-old approaches and methods to solve national questions. Therefore, development critics may argue how the changes bring it closer to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and how it will simultaneously bolster Africa’s role in the multipolar world.
Factors Influencing Food Production
Interestingly factors negatively influencing local production, including the agricultural sector, are commonly listed and extensively discussed. Researchers, academics and politicians already recognize them as retarding expected progress and making headways in attaining that status of food self-sufficiency. Some of these factors are drought and climatic extremes, low budget allocation and inappropriate agricultural policies in Africa, poor storage and preservation facilities, poor land tenure system and reduced soil fertilities, inadequate irrigation facilities and poor methods of pest and disease control.
Some aspects of traditional African culture related to food production have become less practised in recent years. But state attitudes are not stimulating either in this direction. Across Africa, the consumption culture is tied to foreign imported products as it is widely interpreted as status-symbol, considered as belonging to a well-defined upper class in the society. Thus this consumer culture becomes a driving factor towards continuity in importing food that fills modern shopping malls in Africa.
The most popular rhetoric, more or less chorus, is that although it has abundant natural resources, Africa remains the world’s poorest and least-developed continent, resulting from various causes that may include deep-seated political corruption. According to the United Nations Human Development Report in 2003, the bottom 24 ranked nations (151st to 175th) were all African states.
Thambo Mbeki, former South African President, has argued these aspects in his reports on illicit capital flows abroad. In a recently published analysis, Mbeki underlined that loans obtained for undertaking development infrastructure, including agricultural and related industrial sectors, are siphoned back to foreign banks for politicians.
Basic geography teaches us that Africa has enormous resources, encompassing the vast landmass, vegetation, and water resources, including the lakes and rivers. The Congo, Nile, Zambezi, Niger and Lake Victoria are among its rivers. Yet the continent is the second driest in the world, with millions of Africans suffering yearly from water shortages. It requires mechanising agricultural practices, offering specialised short training and adequate support for local farmers as aspects of measures and steps toward import substitution.
Addressing food security challenges in Africa
Economists argue that possibly adopting, to some degree, import substitution policies are not directed at escaping international trade. It is an attempt to utilise, at the maximum, the untapped available resources in the production sector and, secondly, redirect budgetary finances into needy significant economic sectors. Understandably, Africa depends on food imports to feed its population. It has become a common rules-based practice across Africa.
On the other hand, potential exporting foreign states generate revenues for their budget. This is also an undeniable fact as many countries around the world make conscious efforts to increase the export of commodities to foreign markets. According to Agriculture Ministry’s AgroExport Center, Russia targets $33 billion per year (annually) as revenue through massive export of grains and meat poultry to Africa.
By increasing grain exports to African countries, Russia aims to enhance the competitiveness of Russian agricultural goods in the African market. On the contrary, several international organisations have also expressed that African leaders must adopt import substitution mechanisms and use their financial resources to strengthen agricultural production systems.
At the G7 Summit in June 2022, President Joe Biden and G7 leaders announced over $4.5 billion to address global food security, over half of which will come from the United States. This $2.76 billion in U.S. government funding will help protect the world’s most vulnerable populations and mitigate the impacts of growing food insecurity and malnutrition by building production capacity and more resilient agriculture and food systems worldwide and responding to immediate emergency food needs.
U.S. Congress allocated $336.5 million to bilateral programs for Sub-Saharan African countries, including Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and regional programs in southern Africa, west Africa, and the Sahel.
Using Zimbabwe as a Classical Example
Compared to food-importing African countries, Zimbabwe has increased wheat production, especially during the current Russia-Ukraine crisis. This achievement was attributed to efforts in mobilising local scientists to improve the crop’s production. Zimbabwe is an African country under Western sanctions for 25 years, hindering imports of much-needed machinery and other inputs to drive agriculture.
At the African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF) summit held from September 5 to 9, 2022, in Rwanda, President Emmerson Mnangagwa told the gathering that “we used to depend on importation of wheat from Ukraine in the past, but now we have been able to produce our own. To a considerable extent, the crisis in that country has not affected us. There is an urgent need to adopt a progressive approach and re-purpose food policies to address the emerging challenges affecting our entire food systems in Africa.”
As much as there are classical admirable lessons to learn from Zimbabwe, African leaders ignore these. Zimbabwe shares the same negative consequences of colonialism with many African countries. But in an additional case, it has struggled with sanctions imposed on the land, making conditions harder. Zimbabwe has been looking for foreign partners from other countries to transfer technology and industrialise its ailing economy in the southern African region.
While several African countries largely depend on Russia and Ukraine for their regular supply of wheat and grains, even despite the persistent geopolitical warring situation, Zimbabwe has recorded its highest wheat harvest during the last agricultural production in 2022. It emerges as one of the few African countries with an import substitution agricultural policy and strategically working self-sufficiency. Worth suggesting that African leaders have to learn from Zimbabwe – a landlocked southern African country.
Looking for Inside Solutions
At least over the past few years, even long before the Russia-Ukraine crisis, there have been glowing signs from two African banks calling for increased food production. African Development Bank (AfDB) and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) have gained increasing prominence for their work with the private sectors within Africa. These two banks support the agricultural sectors, but more is needed to meet the highest target.
At the Paris summit, AfDB President Akinwumi Adesina, African and European heads of government and representatives of development partners on the sidelines held discussions about the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa. The key aim is accelerating the financing of transformational climate-resilient and greener infrastructure projects in Africa and attracting new partners and financiers. Adesina, formerly Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, now the 8th President of the African Development Bank, has consistently been pushing for increased domestic agriculture to attain food self-sufficiency and ensure food security on the continent.
Of particular concern is that over 900 million people are still impoverished on the continent. Over 283 million Africans suffer from hunger, including over 216 million children who suffer from malnutrition. The situation is more serious due to climate change, including severe droughts, floods and cyclones that have devastated parts of Africa. Today, much of the Horn Africa and the Sahel last had rain several seasons ago. The resources Africa needs need to be there, explains AfDB President Akinwumi Adesina.
“I am excited about what the bank is doing to support farmers to adapt to climate change through our flagship program —Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT). It is a platform implemented through partnerships with national and regional agricultural research institutions and the private sector. It is the largest ever effort to get technologies at scale to millions of farmers across Africa,” he wrote in his report.
Over the past three years, TAAT delivered climate-resilient agricultural technologies to 25 million farmers or 62% of the 40 million farmer target. The depth of consistent work of this bank is to enhance food processing, value addition and competitiveness of agricultural supply chains across Africa. The bank is committing resources for the establishment of Special Agro-Industrial Processing Zones. With its partners (including the Islamic Development Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development), the bank has invested more than $1.5 billion to establish these zones in eleven countries.
Africa’s ability to feed nine billion people by 2050 is not a foregone conclusion; it is a call to action. We must harness our strengths, confront challenges, and work relentlessly towards our shared vision. Therefore, let us rise to this grand challenge. Let us forge ahead, knowing that our efforts today will determine the future of food in the world. It is necessary to unlock Africa’s potential in agriculture. Africa must feed itself.
The Wake-Up Bell for Action
It may take us by surprise when we know that 81% of the sub-Saharan African population lives on less than $2.50 (PPP) per day in 2023, compared with 86% for India. China and India are populous but are moving faster than Africa. China has a more substantial global economic influence than India, but Africa still needs to progress in various economic sectors.
The latest economic trend is that Africa is now at risk of being in debt once again, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries. It receives the most external funds for its development from Development funding sponsors such as the United States, Europe, China, France and Britain or multilateral blocs such as G7 states, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Other institutions and organisations, such as Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), also engage with Africa. In addition, the Asian and Arab Banks are showing practical actions. The cry for the National Development Bank of the BRICS has yet to think of Africa.
In this article, it is necessary in our discussions to appreciate the geographical facts that Africa is the world’s second-largest and second-most-populous continent, after Asia, in both aspects. Despite a wide range of natural resources, Africa is the least wealthy continent per capita and second-least wealthy by total wealth, behind Oceania. Scholars have attributed this to different factors, including geography, climate, tribalism, colonialism, neocolonialism, lack of democracy, and worse Africa-wide corruption. Despite this low concentration of wealth, recent economic expansion and the large and young population make Africa a crucial financial market in the broader global context.
In a nutshell, adopting measures for establishing food security is crucial to sustainable development. Addressing food security, therefore, is one of the keys for Africa in this 21st century. From the above perspectives, African leaders have to focus and redirect both human and financial resources toward increasing local production as the surest approach in ensuring sustainable food security for the estimated 1.4 billion population in Africa, and this most possibly falls within the framework of the Agenda 2063 of the African Union.
By Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia
By Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm
In a report filed by The Business Standard on August 8, 2026, India, the current BRICS chair, opposes a proposal for a common currency to counter the US dollar.
The Indian Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, told reporters in Jaipur, Rajasthan, northwestern India, after a two-day BRICS trade and industry meeting, that India was not in favour of a BRICS currency. He added that India did not support the introduction of any such BRICS currency scheme.
It is good these things are showing signs at this early stage of attempts by BRICS member countries to crystallise a research finding published by a British economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neil, in 2001.
None of the leaders and country members of BRICS ever conceived on record the formation of such an economic or political bloc until the research publication, which spurred leaders of the mentioned countries to marshal resources and begin a dialogue of formalisation.
The current membership that started involuntarily with just Brazil, Russia, India, and China as a concept published by a research economist, that later included South Africa, now has 10 members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia.
Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are designated partner countries that participate in framework meetings without full voting rights.
Originally, the publication by Jim O’Neil wasn’t intended or proposed as a vehicle for the political grouping that has drawn the attention of the rest of the world, as mentioned members took a step further from the appraisal or assessment paper to coalesce into a political force overflowing its original boundaries today.
For the above reasons, the initial step of early contacts was to take advantage of things in common in member countries for the stimulation of economic growth and global prosperity. At that stage, suspicions were managed, and plans didn’t consider historical political differences and disagreements as grounds for suspicion or discontinuation of cooperation.
Of course, China and India had trust issues over decades of border disputes. And in the early stages of heightened escalations of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship when India offered to mediate and broker for ceasefire and eventual peace, Russia wasn’t sceptical but took steps to host the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi.
But at the back of the mind of the Russian-Indian relationship, history was revealing about betrayals, especially after what the country endured in assassinations of leading members of the Indian National Congress, that killed Indira Gandhi and swept her son, Rajiv Gandhi, and thereafter ravaged the family dynasty with threats of violence.
These paved the way for the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist party, and its leader, Narendra Modi. The BJP is not directly responsible for the intimidation and violent campaign against the INC, a close former Soviet-era ally of Russia, but a beneficiary. There are grounds to suspect a frosty relationship with Russia, although concealed in diplomatic niceties and global market dynamics of cross-border business and trade.
India turned into the redistribution hub of Russian discounted grains and oil supplies as a third country, after sanctions were imposed on Russia in what Russia described as demilitarisation and denazification special operations in Ukraine.
India is considered by Western powers as a democracy. It was once a British colony, gaining independence on August 15, 1947. It is also a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. On a normal day, it doesn’t add or take away anything. But under these circumstances, these are serious factors to consider in arriving at a decision.
Be it as it may, China and Russia have found their way out in world trade, bypassing SWIFT. China operates the Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System, whilst Russia is running the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). India has IMPS and NEFT. In principle, these payment systems bypass SWIFT and the US dollar, nonetheless.
As the world waits to hear India back its dissenting views with supporting facts, world trade will never remain the same again.
Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm has extensive scholarly publications that establish him as a leading academic expert in regional geopolitical dynamics and diplomatic relations in Africa. Author of e-monographs on geopolitics, ethnic conflicts, and political philosophy.
Feature/OPED
What Dangote’s Reported $40bn Private-Placement Valuation Could Mean for Nigerian Investors, NGX
Dangote Petroleum Refinery could become an unusually large part of Nigeria’s stock market if its eventual IPO valuation is close to the roughly $40 billion implied by a recent private placement.
EBC Financial Group (EBC) highlights that this would value the refinery at about N54.63 trillion, using the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market rate of N1,365.6856 per USD on August 7. Against the N158.513 trillion value of companies listed on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) on the same date, adding the refinery at that value would produce a market worth about N213.14 trillion, with Dangote Refinery accounting for 25.6%.
This scenario assumes the full $40 billion equity value is reflected in NGX market capitalisation and other listed company values remain unchanged. At that size, movements in the company could become highly visible across the Nigerian equity market, although its actual influence on NGX indices may depend on the shares available for public trading and the relevant index rules.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said: “If Dangote Refinery entered the Nigerian Exchange at close to a $40 billion valuation, it could account for roughly one-quarter of the resulting NGX market value. If that valuation is difficult to support, few shares are available for public trading, or investors need to reduce other Nigerian holdings to participate, the effects could extend across Nigeria’s equity market, including existing NGX-listed companies and their shareholders.”
A Private Transaction Can Indicate Value, but Public Investors Need Financial Evidence
Based on the private transaction, $40 billion provides an indication of Dangote Refinery’s value, but it does not establish the eventual IPO price. Details published on August 4 said a $2.5 billion private placement for a 6% stake implied a valuation of roughly $40 billion. The proposed initial public offering (IPO) was reported to target about $5 billion, while the eventual IPO valuation and percentage offered to the public were not disclosed. This is important as a private transaction may produce a different valuation from the price a broad group of public investors is prepared to accept.
For context, public equity market values cited alongside the transaction were about $12 billion for Türkiye’s Tupras and $16 billion for US-listed HF Sinclair. The Dangote figure is about 3.3 times Tupras and 2.5 times HF Sinclair. They are not direct comparisons because profitability, debt, operations and growth plans differ. The gap nevertheless increases the need for audited earnings, cash flow, debt and investment plans that explain what supports the higher valuation.
The reported $5 billion fundraising target is equivalent to about N6.83 trillion at the August 7 exchange rate, or approximately 4.3% of the N158.513 trillion existing NGX market value. Proposed $5 billion raise. If new Nigerian or foreign money funds the offer, the pool of capital invested in Nigerian equities could expand. If investors sell current holdings to participate, capital could instead move away from other listed companies.
Publicly Tradable Shares and New Investment Could Shape the Wider Market Impact
NGX rules show why total company value does not tell investors how much stock they can actually trade. Main Board companies can qualify through either 20% public ownership held by at least 300 shareholders or publicly tradable shares worth at least N20 billion. The Premium Board value alternative is N40 billion. Holdings controlled by promoters, directors and close relatives, government, or strategic investors owning at least 5% are excluded from qualifying public shares.
This means a company worth tens of trillions of naira could still have a much smaller amount of stock available for regular trading if ownership remains concentrated. The key issue is therefore how much of Dangote Refinery becomes accessible to public investors and how widely those shares are held.
Regional investment could also affect the outcome. Details published on 4 August indicated engagement involving South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Ghana and Rwanda, including possible Kenyan participation of up to $500 million, although no allocations were confirmed. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange separately said Dangote Group had shown strong intent to pursue a South African listing after Nigeria. Regional participation in the Nigerian offer could bring new capital directly into Nigerian equities. A later South African listing could broaden access but would not itself increase money raised through the Nigerian IPO.
Pension funds face the same question of capital allocation. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) waived the usual existence, profitability and dividend requirements so Pension Fund Administrators can consider the IPO, while retaining internal investment policies, risk-management requirements and duties to contributors and retirees. PenCom Circular on Dangote Refiner. PenCom states that the dispensation is exceptional, one-off and specific to this proposed IPO.
Pension funds held N5.907 trillion in domestic ordinary shares at the end of June, compared with the offer’s approximately N6.83 trillion equivalent. This does not imply pension funds would finance the offer. It shows why managers must consider exposure to one company and whether participation requires reducing other investments.
Precious added, “Dangote being listed could become a turning point for Nigeria’s equity market if it brings wider public ownership and additional African capital. Investors still need clear evidence supporting the valuation, clarity on how much of the company they can trade and an explanation of where the money raised will go. Those answers will determine whether the listing expands the Nigerian equity market or concentrates more investment around one company.”
An approved prospectus should clarify the valuation, shares offered, public ownership and use of proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) said on June 23 that no IPO application had then been filed or approved and ordered unauthorised pre-marketing to stop. Details published on 4 August later said an IPO application had been submitted, with regulatory approval expected in the following weeks. Until final terms are disclosed, the test for Nigeria is whether the listing combines a supportable valuation with broad public ownership and genuinely additional investment.
Feature/OPED
Moving the Stablecoin Conversation From Hype to Utility in Africa’s Next Payments Evolution
By Rajat Mishra
For much of the past decade, discussions around stablecoins have been dominated by cryptocurrency speculation. Increasingly, however, stablecoins are emerging as practical financial infrastructure for moving money across borders, managing liquidity and improving payment efficiency.
The real opportunity lies not in choosing between traditional finance and digital assets, but in building an integrated financial ecosystem where both work together to improve efficiency, broaden financial access and deepen economic connectivity across the continent.
Despite significant advances in financial inclusion and digital payments, moving money across African borders remains far more difficult than it should be. Businesses continue to face challenges when making cross-border payments. Fragmented payment networks, multiple intermediaries, and lengthy settlement processes increase costs and create operational inefficiencies.
Remittance providers, the specialised financial services that millions rely on to send money home, face many of the same structural challenges. These providers play a critical role across the continent. In fact, 19 of Africa’s 54 countries receive remittance inflows equivalent to at least 4% of their GDP. Yet Africa remains the world’s most expensive region to send money to.
These challenges are not a reflection of remittance providers themselves, but of the fragmented banking and settlement infrastructure underpinning international money movement. Financial institutions must often manage liquidity across multiple disconnected currency markets while relying on complex correspondent banking networks and clearing systems. The result is higher costs, slower settlements, and capital that remains unnecessarily locked up.
One of the most immediate opportunities for stablecoins lies in improving cross-border settlement. Consider a Kenyan business importing goods from South Africa. Under traditional settlement models, payments often pass through multiple correspondent banking relationships, involve several foreign exchange conversions, and can take days before funds reach the intended recipient.
Stablecoin-enabled settlement rails have the potential to reduce much of this friction by enabling value to move more efficiently between financial institutions across markets. The result can be shorter settlement times, greater transparency and improved predictability for businesses operating across borders.
The benefits extend well beyond businesses. For millions of Africans working abroad, remittances remain a financial lifeline, helping families pay school fees, healthcare costs and daily living expenses. Yet sending money home often involves navigating a complex chain of money transfer operators, correspondent banks, and local payout partners, with each additional layer introducing costs and delays.
Stablecoins can help streamline the backend movement of funds between institutional participants, reducing settlement costs and improving efficiency across the value chain.
For end users, the advantage is simplicity. Recipients do not need to interact with, or even understand stablecoins directly. They continue to receive money through familiar, trusted channels, whether a local bank account or mobile money wallet, only faster and at a lower cost.
Beyond payments, stablecoins also address one of the less visible but most significant challenges in cross-border finance: liquidity management. Financial institutions operating across multiple markets must constantly ensure they have sufficient funds in the right currency, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time. Today, this often requires pre-funding accounts across multiple countries, a costly practice that traps large amounts of capital and limits financial flexibility.
Stablecoins introduce a new model for moving value across borders in near real time, enabling institutions to manage liquidity dynamically as demand arises. This can reduce the need for large pre-funded balances, improve treasury efficiency and free up capital that can be deployed more productively. Ultimately, these efficiencies can translate into faster settlements, lower costs, and better services for businesses and consumers alike.
However, the true value of stablecoins will not come from isolated blockchain networks operating independently of existing financial systems. Their long-term impact will depend on how effectively they integrate with banks, mobile money platforms, payment service providers and existing payment infrastructure. Interoperability will be critical to ensuring payment flows move seamlessly between systems, markets and currencies. The goal should be to strengthen and modernise today’s payment ecosystem, not replace it.
From experiment to infrastructure: what global moves are telling us
Some of the clearest signals that stablecoins are moving from experimentation to infrastructure are coming from card networks. Mastercard’s reported agreement to acquire BVNK, valued at up to $1.8 billion, points to a strategic investment in the settlement layer connecting stablecoin rails with traditional banking and reflects growing institutional confidence in stablecoin-enabled cross-border payments.
Visa’s expansion of stablecoin-backed cards through Stripe’s Bridge to more than 100 countries reflects a complementary strategy. Rather than acquiring infrastructure outright, Visa is leveraging its existing global network as the final distribution layer for stablecoin-funded payments.
The inclusion of African markets is particularly significant. It signals growing confidence that stablecoin-backed payment instruments can operate alongside, and in some cases complement, the mobile money ecosystems that already dominate wallet-based payments across much of the continent.
Taken together, these developments point to a broader shift. Card payment networks are moving from observing the stablecoin conversation to investing directly in the infrastructure that underpins it. For Africa, the implication is not that stablecoins will replace existing payment rails, but that success will increasingly belong to institutions capable of orchestrating multiple settlement rails – cards, bank transfers, mobile money and stablecoins- within a unified, interoperable ecosystem. Local market expertise, regulatory relationships and last-mile distribution will remain decisive competitive advantages.
Building for scale through trust and regulation
But despite their potential, stablecoins cannot operate outside the boundaries of regulated financial systems. Their long-term viability across Africa depends on clear regulatory frameworks, robust compliance standards and trusted infrastructure that supports transparency, risk management and consumer protection.
We are already seeing this evolution. In markets such as South Africa, institutions facilitating cross-border settlements must navigate increasingly sophisticated regulatory requirements, including approvals for certain offshore crypto-related activities. Globally, initiatives such as the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) and expanded Travel Rule obligations are raising expectations around reporting, tax transparency and compliance.
These developments reinforce a simple reality: stablecoin infrastructure does not reduce compliance obligations. It raises the bar for governance, transparency and institutional risk management. The objective is not to bypass regulation, but to build interoperable payment systems that can innovate confidently within it.
From the edges to the plumbing
The stablecoin conversation is steadily moving beyond speculation and towards practical implementation. What once sat at the edges of the payments debate is becoming part of the plumbing of cross-border finance rather than a parallel system to it.
The question is no longer whether stablecoins have a role to play in payments. The question is where they deliver the greatest value. In Africa, that value is increasingly clear: faster settlement, improved liquidity efficiency and more connected cross-border commerce. The winners will not be those that replace existing financial systems, but those that successfully connect stablecoin rails with the banks, mobile money networks and payment providers that already power the continent’s economy.
For pan-African payment networks such as Onafriq, the priority is ensuring that emerging technologies complement the financial infrastructure businesses and consumers already trust, rather than introducing new layers of complexity.
The opportunity lies in connecting stablecoin settlement with banks, mobile money networks and payment providers, ensuring the benefits of this new infrastructure deliver tangible outcomes for African businesses and consumers.
Rajat Mishra is the CPO for Network Product & Deputy Group CPIO at Onafriq
