Feature/OPED
June 12: Abiola’s Posthumous Honour and the 2019 Election Politics
By Omoshola Deji
Nigerians assembled at the polls on June 12, 1993 to expunge dictatorship and usher in purposeful leadership. The widely acclaimed free, fair and credible presidential election, presumably won by Moshood Kashimawo Olawale (MKO) Abiola, was annulled by the Gen. Ibrahim Babangida led military regime.
Abiola was incarcerated by successive military government(s) till he died in a questionable manner on July 7, 1998. Succeeding democratic governments neither honored Abiola nor venerate the significance of June 12 to Nigeria’s democracy.
Twenty-five years on, President Muhammadu Buhari, an ex-military dictator that once flawed democracy by ousting then President Shehu Shagari, pronounced June 12 Democracy Day and posthumously conferred Nigeria’s highest honor, Grand Commander of the Order of the Federal Republic, GCFR, to Abiola. His running mate, Ambassador Babagana Kingibe and a revered human rights activist, late Chief Gani Fawehinmi, were both conferred GCON (Grand Commander of the Order of the Niger), the second highest honor in Nigeria.
This startling executive order has raked in kudos, knocks and questions from both the apolitical and the political. Weighing in, this piece appraises the rationale behind President Buhari’s decision and the effect on his 2019 re-election bid.
The annulment of Abiola’s mandate is rooted in the post-coup bigotry and ethnic superiority struggle that dates back to shortly after Nigeria became a republic in 1963. During the colonial era, Nigerian autonomists were united because they shared a common wish to end foreign rule. After achieving their goal, inter-ethnic power struggle and intra-gang feud led to mutiny. Nnamdi Azikwe’s government was ousted by the military on January 15, 1966. Through coups and counter-coups, Nigeria remained under the stern control of the military till then Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo surrendered power to a democratically elected, Shehu Shagari in 1979. Ex-president Shagari was ousted from office in 1983 by the then Major General Muhammadu Bahari, now incumbent President. In 1985, the Buhari military regime was toppled by General Ibrahim Babangida, who declared himself Military President.
Under a two-party system, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), Babangida’s military government organized the June 12, 1993 annulled election that was presumably won by SDP’s Abiola. Babangida stepped down after much pressure from the international community and pro-democracy activists. His resignation ushered in the Chief Ernest Shonekan’s Interim National Government that was deposed by late General Sanni Abacha in 1993. Abacha’s death in 1998 ushered in General Abdusalam Abubukar, who handed over power to the elected Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. Democracy has since firmed its roots in Nigeria as the successive governments of late Umar Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan and now Muhammadu Buhari emerged through election.
Buhari’s decision to honor Abiola, Kingibe and Fawehinmi is indeed a commendable show of outstanding statesmanship. The declaration of June 12 as democracy day is a double edged sword. It rights the wrongs of the junta and demeans Obasanjo and Babangida, the saboteurs of June 12 and foremost critics of the Buhari administration.
Babangida’s oust of Buhari’s military government in 1985 and the complot against his 2019 reelection would naturally make anything that would humiliate Babangida appealing to Buhari. The politics is unambiguous. Buhari served as PTF Chairman under the Abacha regime that incarcerated Abiola and he never clamored for the restoration of the June 12 mandate.
One must not over query Buhari for obeying the rules of food etiquette. You don’t talk while eating! Since elected president, Buhari has never voiced his displeasure to the annulment of June 12. Abiola wasn’t even acknowledged in the democracy day speech he delivered on May 29. More than meets the eye, Buhari’s sudden decision to venerate June 12 makes many question the sincerity of his intentions.
Obasanjo’s relentless attack on the Buhari government also makes the reviving of June 12 a political masterstroke for Buhari. It is an open secret that Obasanjo’s emergence as President in 1999 was to compensate the Southwest for the annulment of Abiola’s mandate. Nigerians were thus dismayed that Obasanjo completely distanced himself from June 12, despite being the greatest beneficiary. Obasanjo disregarded the pleas of Yoruba leaders that June 12 and the Abiola family be celebrated. He refused to honor Abiola throughout his eight years as president. Suddenly, the Buhari presidency, being discredited by Obasanjo, scored a hat-trick by honoring Abiola as the man who pillared Nigeria’s democracy.
Politics is a game of calculated gain. Honoring Abiola to shame his two prime antagonists,b Babangida and Obasanjo – was a strategic political decision Buhari gladly took.
The politics surrounding Abiola’s honor is visible to the blind. Buhari is going through some challenges that can jeopardize his reelection. He is not on good terms with the National Assembly, the Judiciary, fellow ex-Army Generals and some stalwarts in the All Progressives Congress (APC). Those against him within the APC are in two sets: the aggrieved APC (aAPC) and the PDP defectors popularly called the new PDP (nPDP). This cluster of hostile force is frustrating Buhari to take drastic measures that’ll ensure he returns elected.
For 2019, Buhari would do anything to retain the support of the Southwest that was instrumental to his electoral victory in 2015. The Southwest has the second largest amount of registered voters; the Southeast and South-South are largely anti-Buhari and; unlike the 2015 election, Buhari would have to share votes with an opposition candidate that would most likely emerge from the Northern region. Based on this arithmetic, political appointments would favor the Southwest more as the election approaches. The Southwest would be pampered and convinced to vote Buhari, but (if he wins) the region would be neglected after inauguration. Nepotism would reign supreme and the northern oligarchy would run the show. Buhari would afterwards pacify the Southwest by handpicking a successor from the region.
Some of the politically exposed persons discounting the significance of June 12 were not part of the democracy struggle. When prominent individuals like Gani Fawehinmi, Olisa Agbakoba and Beko Ransom-Kuti were being imprisoned for confronting the military to reverse the June 12 annulment, people like Senator Dino Melaye – who declared Abiola a non-Nigerian and unqualified for the GCFR honor because he is late – were either silent or abroad living the life. Unfortunately, most of the pro-democracy activists and their children are neither in power nor have the strength to finance and win an election.
The pro-democracy activists are worthy of honor than Kingibe – Abiola’s running mate and presumed vice president elect. Like the biblical Judas, Kingibe compromised when he was needed most. He abandoned the June 12 struggle to pick up a ministerial appointment under the same Abacha government that incarcerated Abiola and allegedly murdered his wife Kudirat.
History should be a compulsory course in our tertiary institutions. The students of University of Lagos (UNILAG) that kicked against ex-president Jonathan’s renaming of the institution in honor of Abiola were toddlers or unborn during the June 12 struggle. The then toddlers are the adults now on social media critiquing the government and abusing the politicians. They are unaware that the democracy Abiola died for earned them the rights and freedom of expression they are enjoying now.
Nigeria may never regain the lost ideals of June 12. Voting then was devoid of ethnic sentiments. Every tribe massively voted Abiola based on their conviction about his personality and campaign promises. In the present day, election results are largely a reflection of ethnic endorsements. The 1993 election was also void of religious sentiments. Abiola-Kingibe ticket was a Muslim-Muslim one, and Nigerians were unbothered, they voted massively for persons of the same religion to become President and Vice-President. This may never happen again. Religious sentiments have gained prominence that any party hoping to win a presidential election must balance the Muslim-Christian equation.
The 1993 election was conducted via a two-party system. Nigeria currently has over sixty political parties. Most of the parties are so syndicated and tribal fixated that they cannot merge or win a presidential election. Nigeria has also not been fortunate to have a selfless human rights lawyer and activist like Gani Fawehinmi. What we have now are gauche rights activists like a Festus Keyamo serving as spokesperson for the reelection campaign of a President flagrantly violating human rights. Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and Sambo Dasuki are still languishing in jail after the court ordered there release.
Immortalizing the dead – no matter how adored – is insubstantial to revive a political goodwill that is drowning due to poor performance. Buhari’s immortalization of June 12 would not yield the expected electoral gain in 2019. Buhari can only garner votes if his government act right to address the yearnings of the people. Nigerians yearn for a government that would (also) for political gains fix the roads; provide affordable healthcare; obey court orders; reduce petrol price; eradicate poverty; provide electricity; clean-up Ogoniland; stop kidnappings; provide employment; rejig the lopsided appointment of service chiefs; fulfill the restructuring campaign promise and; stop the killings by bandits, herdsmen and terrorists. Nigerians are of critical minds and their electoral mandate in 2019 and beyond would be given to anyone with the moral and intellectual competence to attenuate the sufferings of the masses.
This Buhari-Obasanjo-Babangida episode comes with a free lesson: never leave till tomorrow what you can do today! Buhari exploited the inaction of Obasanjo and the masterstroke won him applauds. The Abiola family would forever be grateful to Buhari for turning their shame to fame. Nigerians indeed have a reason to rejoice and be glad. Today is the future we hoped for yesterday.
Omoshola Deji is a political and public affairs analyst. He wrote in via mo******@***oo.com
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
