Feature/OPED
PIA: Pollution and Host Communities
By Jerome-Maeario Utomi
Like every new invention which comes with opportunities and challenges, the passage by the National Assembly and signing into law of the Petroleum Industry Bill about two years ago by the President Muhammadu Buhari-led federal government, after about 17 years of protracted back-and-forth debates, was greeted with mixed feelings. While some hailed the development, others welcomed it with scepticism.
Aside from the belief that the coming of PIA will make innovation possible within the petroleum sector, those who expressed happiness about the coming of the Act predicated their joys on the fact that the provisions, as sighted in PIA, will assist straddle the middle ground in the nation’s petroleum sector which has for a very long time manifested, proved to be a sector with neither primed nor positioned potentials.
Supporting this assertion is the graphic description by PIA advocates of how the new Act will locate, harmonize and strategically engineer prosperity among the operators of the up, mid and downstream sectors of the oil industry while turning the host communities into a zone of peace and democratized development via the 3% allocation to the host communities as captured in Chapter 3 of the Act.
In the opinion of this piece, this joy expressed by stakeholders for reasons qualifies as apposite, especially when one commits to mind the fact that for decades, the operational templates of the players within the industry, particularly the International Oil Companies (IOCs), have for decades been reputed for non-compliance to set rules and devoid of international best practices.
In fact, industry watchers have, at different times, and places argued that before the advent of PIA, the sector was confronted by the following weaknesses; the existence of multiple but obsolete regulatory frameworks which characterize the oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria.
Secondly, the federal government failed to get the nations’ refineries back to full refining capacity. Thirdly, the Petroleum Ministry’s inability to get committed to making IOCs adhere strictly to the international best practices as it relates to their operational environment.
Fourth and final is the non-existence of clear responsibility/work details and action plans for government agencies and parastatals functioning, monitoring/regulating the sector.
The above failures have, as a direct consequence; cast a long dark shadow on both the ministry and the sector.
To further explain these points beginning with the first challenge, it is worth noting that the business of crude oil exploration and issues of oil production in the country is regulated by multiple but very weak laws and Acts- of which most of these laws are not only complicate enforcement but curiously too old-fashioned for the changing demands of time. Thereby, creating loopholes for operators, especially the IOCs, to exploit both the government and host communities.
Some of these laws/Acts in question operated for over five decades without achieving purposes, and they include but are not limited to; the Petroleum Act of 1969, The Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Positions etc), Act 1988, Mineral Oil Safety Regulation 1963, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 (Subsidiary Legislation to The Petroleum Act), The off-shore Oil Revenue (Registration of Grants)Act 1971, Oil in Navigable Act 1968, Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act 1975, Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979, Associated Gas Re-injection (continued Flaring of Gas) Regulation, Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Decree 1985, Oil Pipeline Act Chapter (CAP) 338, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (L.F.N.) 1990, and Gas Flare prohibition and punishment) Act 2016 among others.
Even as the above remains lamentable, facts have since emerged that instead of providing the anticipated legal, governance, regulatory and fiscal framework for the Nigerian petroleum industry and the host communities, the Petroleum Industry Act (Act), like the other failed laws that it came to replace, has contrary to expectation become different things to different peoples.
To many, PIA is not only an evil wind that blows nobody any good but a toothless bulldog that neither bites nor barks. To others, it is but is a palliative that cures the effect of sickness while leaving the root cause to thrive.
To the host and impacted communities, the Act has become a first line of conflict between crude oil prospecting, exploration companies and their host communities. It is a law that has come to steal, kill and destroy. Members of this group have come to a sudden realization that nothing has changed.
Without going into specifics, concepts, provisions and definitions, there is also greater evidence that points to the fact that the underlying premise behind PIA enactment has been defeated, the eliciting reason for concern that what is currently happening between oil companies and their host communities may no longer be the first half of a reoccurring circle, but, rather the beginning of something negatively new and different.
Take, as an illustration, if PIA is fundamentally effective and efficient, why is it not providing a strong source of remedy for individuals and communities negatively affected by oil exploration and production in the coastal communities? If these frameworks exist and have been comprehensive as a legal solution to the issues of oil-related violations, why are the IOCs operating in the country indulging in selective implementation of the Act?
Why is the Act not enforced by the federal government and other relevant agencies? Why are these hosts and impacted communities still suffering at the hands of the crude oil exploration and production companies operating in the Niger Delta region?
While answers to the above questions are expected, this piece, however, believes that there are reasons why these issues raised about PIA failures and failings cannot be described as unfounded.
The facts are there and speak for it.
On 28th of March 2023, the people of Kantu/Odidi, host communities to Odidi Flow station, OML 42 in Gbaramatu kingdom, Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta State, staged a peaceful protest against the non-implementation of PIA.
While calling for holistic repair works on the Trans Forcados Pipeline (TFP), which runs through OML 42 in Warri South West LGA to Forcados Terminal in Burutu LGA of Delta State, the protesting communities gave the operators a 7-day ultimatum to commence genuine implementation of the PIA process and payment of the 3% of 2022 operating expenses as stipulated by the PIA with immediate effect to enable the communities to resume implementation of developmental projects in the communities, warning that failure to do so may lead to the shutdown of operational activities in the OML 42 Asset.
Lamenting that the TFP pipeline was constructed in the early 1960s and has outlived its lifespan long ago, leading to continuous pollution of the environment and destruction of the ecosystem, creating hardship for the locals, the communities stressed that TFP is one of the major pipelines destroying the environment because it has expired and cannot withstand the pressure of crude oil transported through it.
They, therefore, demanded full replacement of the said pipeline instead of the sectional repair works being planned by NEPL/NECONDE without recourse to its negative implications on communities and the environment, particularly since sectional repair works will not stop further leakages.
Kantu/Odidi protest occurred at a time when the dust raised by the 14 days ultimatum/threat issued to another oil company by the oil-rich community of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) in Warri North Local Government Area of Delta State was yet to settle.
In that particular ‘event’, the people of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) also threatened to shut down ongoing exploration activities of Conoil Producing Limited if the company failed to reach a definite agreement with the community on the implementation of Chapter 3 of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) for the Tsekelewu bloc of communities, supports this assertion.
The Host Community lamented that they adopted the option due to the seemingly snobbish attitude of the management of Conoil Producing, as the company’s management had refused to honour letters asking for a meeting with the TCDA on the issue of the PIA implementation.
Away from the persistent highhandedness of the IOCs, this piece is also of the position that PIA is as weak, defective and insufficient as the laws/Acts it was enacted to replace when it comes to pollution prevention, monitoring and control within the sector.
In fact, it will not be characterized as an overstatement to say that it shares the same body and spirit with the now rested Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Positions etc), Act 1988. The major defect with the referenced Act was signposted in its definition of harmful substance based solely on its impact on human beings and does not include its impacts on the environment and animals.
It focused only on the commission of any action or omission by persons without lawful authority. Thus, where an organization has a license to store waste resulting from production, they are seemingly omitted from the ambit of the Act, but the law failed to take into consideration the inadequate storage or inadequate waste management system by licensed firms or groups. Such failure or oversight is glaring and inherent in PIA.
Adding context to the colossal damage harmful substances arising from crude oil production have caused the nation, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency NOSDRA reports show that oil spill incidents occurred 921 times in 2015, resulting in a loss of 47,714 barrels of oil, the highest within the period under review. In 2016, 688 cases of oil spills occurred, culminating in a volume of 42,744 barrels of oil. In 2017 and 2018, 596 and 706 cases of oil spills occurred and resulted in the spillage of 34,887 and 27,985 barrels of oil, respectively. Oil spills occurred on 732 occasions, spewing 41,381 barrels of oil in 2019, and 455 cases were recorded in 2020 with 23,526 barrels of oil. In 2021, companies reported 388 incidents, resulting in 23,956 barrels of oil.
The report also observed that oil spills should be closed off within 24 hours. And oil companies are required to fund the clean-up of each spill and pay compensation to local communities affected if the incident was the company’s fault.
Despite these beautiful provisions, there exists no appreciable instance within the period under review where such obligations to host communities have been obeyed. This piece also holds the opinion that under the PIA regime, no operator can claim a clean hand when it comes to obeying such laws in Nigeria, and the regulatory agencies have never bothered to hold them accountable for such failures.
Still on inefficiency and insufficiency of PIA provisions to effectively control pollution arising from crude oil exploration and production, this author, in a similar intervention, after a visit to the Niger Delta region, stated that a tour by boat of creeks and coastal communities of Warri South West and Warri North Local Government Areas of Delta state would amply reveal that the much-anticipated end in sight of gas flaring is actually not in sight. In the same manner, a journey by road from Warri via Eku-Abraka to Agbor, and another road trip from Warri through Ughelli down to Ogwuashi Ukwu in Aniocha Local Government of the state, shows an environment where people cannot properly breathe as it is littered by gas flaring points.
To a large extent, the above confirms as true the recently published report, which among other concerns, noted that Nigeria has about 139 gas flare locations spread across the Niger Delta both in onshore and offshore oil fields where gas which constitutes about 11 per cent of the total gas produced are flared.
Apart from the health implication of flared gases on humanity, their adverse impact on the nation’s economy is equally weighty. For instance, a parallel report published a while ago underlined that about 888 million standard cubic feet of gas were flared daily in 2017. The flared gas, it added, was sufficient to light up Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa, generate 2.5 gigawatts (Gw) of power or produce 50 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) or produce 600,000 metric tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) per year, produce 22 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2), feed two-three liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains, generate 300,000 jobs, able to attract $3.5 billion investment into Nigeria and has $350 million carbon credit value’. This is an illustrative pointer as to why the nation economically gropes and stumbles.
Banking on what experts are saying, the major reason for the flaring of gases is that when crude oil is extracted from onshore and offshore oil wells, it brings with it raw natural gas to the surface and where natural gas transportation, pipelines, and infrastructure are lacking, like in the case of Nigeria, this gas is instead burned off or flared as a waste product as this is the cheapest option.
It, therefore, remains an ugly narrative that the choice to flare gas in the country is largely predicated on economies. This has been going on since the 1950s when crude oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria.
While Nigeria and Nigerians persist in encountering gas flaring in the country, even so, has, successive administrations in the country made both feeble and deformed attempts to get it arrested.
In 2016, before the advent of PIA, President Muhammadu Buhari led administration enacted Gas Flare Prohibition and Punishment), an act that, among other things, made provisions to prohibit gas flaring in any oil and gas production operation, blocks, fields, onshore or offshore, and gas facility treatment plants in Nigeria.
On Monday, September 2, 2018, Dr Ibe Kachikwu, Minister of State for Petroleum (as he then was), while speaking at the Buyers’ Forum/stakeholders’ Engagement organized by the Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria in Abuja, among other things, remarked thus; ‘I have said to the Department of Petroleum Resources, beginning from next year (2019 emphasis added), we are going to get quite frantic about this (ending gas flaring in Nigeria) and companies that cannot meet with extended periods –the issue is not how much you can pay in terms of fines for gas flaring, the issue is that you would not produce. We need to begin to look at the foreclosing of licenses’. That threat has since ended in the frames, as there has been little or nothing to get the threat actualized.
The administration also launched the now abandoned National Gas Flare Commercialization Programme (NGFCP), a programme, according to the federal government, aimed at achieving the flares-out agenda/zero routine gas flaring in Nigeria by 2020. Again, like a regular trademark, it failed.
Away from Buhari’s administration, in 1979, the then federal government, in a similar style, came up with the Associated Gas Re-injection Act, which summarily prohibited gas flaring and also fixed the flare-out deadline for January 1, 1984. It failed in line with the leadership philosophy in the country.
Similar feeble and deformed attempts were made in 2003, 2006, and 2008. In the same style and span, precisely on July 2, 2009, the Nigerian Senate passed a Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2009 (SB 126) into law, fixing the flare-out deadline for December 31, 2010- a date that slowly but inevitably failed.
Not stopping at this point, the FG made another attempt in this direction by coming up with the Petroleum Industry Bill, which fixed the flare-out deadline for 2012. The same Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) got protracted till 2021 when it completed its gestation and was subsequently signed into law by President Buhari as Petroleum Industry Act (PIA).
To win, the nation must borrow a ‘soul in order to raise a body’. They must seek solutions from the countries that are presently doing well in these areas where we are facing challenges. Part of that effort will require going beyond PIA to recognise the region as a special area for purposes of development. This demand cannot be described as unfounded as it is historically based, logical and factually supported.
Recall that the colonial government, long before independence turned down the demand for a Calabar/Ogoja/Rivers (COR) region/state. But identified the Niger Delta as a troubled spot and recommended to the then Federal Government that the region be regarded as a special area for purposes of development.
Without any shadow of a doubt, I hold an opinion that the federal government’s inability to treat the region as such set the stage for and nourished the restiveness in both the region and the sector.
Most importantly, the people of the region must be directly involved in the management of their resources.
Jerome-Mario is the programme coordinator (Media and Public Policy) at the Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA). He can be reached via Je*********@***oo.com/08032725374.
Feature/OPED
5 Wealth-Building Strategies for Nigerian Women-led Businesses
By Chinwe Iwobi
In Nigeria, women are the backbone of our economy. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows that women own approximately 40% of small and medium-sized enterprises across the country (NBS Country Data Overview 2023). Yet despite their outsized contribution to GDP, women-led businesses continue to face systemic barriers to the capital and financial infrastructure needed to scale.
The cost of that gap is not abstract. When these entrepreneurs are held back, the ripple effect runs deep, from household stability to the education of the next generation. But the narrative is shifting. Nigerian women are proving, consistently, that they are not just resilient; they are sophisticated, high-earning innovators building businesses that deserve serious financial strategy.
Here are five foundational strategies every women-led business should be deploying to build lasting, generational wealth.
- Separate Business and Personal Finances Without Exception
Mixing personal funds with business cash is one of the most common and most damaging financial habits I see among growing entrepreneurs. It obscures your true profit margins, makes tax planning nearly impossible and, critically, disqualifies you from accessing formal credit when you need it most.
The discipline of separation is not just administrative. It is the first signal you send to the financial system that your business is serious. Open a dedicated business account, maintain clean transaction records, and treat your business finances with the same rigour you would expect from any enterprise operating at scale. Clarity on your numbers is the foundation on which every other strategy here depends.
- Build Both an Emergency Fund and an Opportunity Fund
Most financial advice stops at the emergency fund, which is three to six months of operating expenses set aside for lean periods. That is necessary, but insufficient. The entrepreneurs I have watched grow most aggressively also maintain what I call an opportunity fund: accessible liquidity specifically reserved to move fast when a prime supplier deal, an expansion location, or a bulk inventory discount appears.
In an unpredictable market like Nigeria’s, the businesses that scale are rarely the ones with the best products alone. They are the ones with the financial readiness to act decisively. Products like FairMoney’s FairSave are designed precisely for this, keeping your funds accessible while earning competitive daily interest so your idle cash is working even when you are not. Build both buffers, and build them before you think you need them.
- Invest Profits Back into Revenue-Generating Assets
Surplus cash sitting in a current account is a slow leak. Inflation erodes it, and opportunity costs compound quietly. The discipline here is to consistently channel profits back into assets that grow your revenue capacity, whether that is new equipment, improved technology, better inventory systems, or staff training.
For capital you do not need immediately, consider locking it into a fixed-term savings product that offers higher interest returns. The psychological benefit is as important as the financial one: ring-fencing that capital removes it from day-to-day spending temptation and ensures it is preserved and grown for a defined purpose. Discipline in capital allocation separates businesses that plateau from those that compound.
- Diversify Your Revenue Streams Intentionally
Single-stream businesses are inherently fragile. If your sole revenue source is disrupted by market shifts, a supply chain breakdown, or a change in consumer behaviour, your entire operation is exposed. Resilience is built by design, not by accident.
If you are in retail, consider adding a service-based arm. If you are service-led, explore whether digital products or training offerings could create passive income alongside your core work. Beyond product diversification, consider how you accept payments. Building a verified, diverse transaction history through formal payment channels also quietly strengthens your credit profile, an asset that pays dividends when you approach lenders for growth financing. FairMoney’s Business POS infrastructure, for instance, allows entrepreneurs to expand their payment reach while simultaneously building that financial track record.
- Invest Beyond the Business
This is the strategy most women entrepreneurs delay for too long, and it is the one I feel most strongly about. Relying entirely on your business for your net worth is a high-risk position, no matter how well that business is performing. Businesses face cycles; personal wealth should not.
As your business stabilises, begin systematically moving a portion of your profits into personal investment vehicles such as long-term savings accounts, money market funds, or other instruments that sit entirely outside the business cycle. Automate it if you can, so the decision is made once and executed consistently. The goal is to build a personal financial foundation that remains intact regardless of what your business goes through in any given quarter. True wealth is not what your business is worth on paper. It is what you own independently of it.
The Bigger Picture
For female entrepreneurs in Nigeria, wealth-building is not simply a personal ambition; it is an economic argument. When women-led businesses scale, communities stabilise, households invest in education, and local economies deepen. The strategies above are not complicated, but they require consistency and the right financial infrastructure to execute well.
The tools exist. The opportunity is real. What remains is the decision to treat your business, and your personal wealth, with the long-term seriousness both deserve.
Chinwe Iwobi is the Head of Wealth Management at FairMoney Microfinance Bank
Feature/OPED
Nigeria’s ‘Cheap’ Petrol: A Misleading Narrative in a Time of Global Oil Crisis
By Nasiru Ibrahim
The Iran–USA–Israel conflict, now in its fourth week, continues to significantly impact the global economy. The war has taken a new dimension after the US President Donald Trump, on Saturday, gave Iran 48 hours to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping or face the destruction of its energy infrastructure. Iran is set to impose a $2 million penalty per tanker passing through the strait, according to reports yesterday. This development is adding pressure to the global oil crisis and could potentially push the world toward a global recession, especially as many major economies are already experiencing slowing or contracting GDP growth.
This contraction happens through clear economic channels. First, higher oil prices increase production and transportation costs, which reduces business profits and discourages investment. Second, households face higher fuel and food prices, reducing their real income and consumption. Third, uncertainty from geopolitical tension discourages trade and capital flows. All these factors combine to slow economic activity and, in some cases, lead to negative GDP growth.
At the same time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has raised concerns about the impact of the Iran war on global inflation and output. The IMF said it is closely monitoring the situation and confirmed that no country has yet requested emergency financial assistance related to the conflict. The IMF chief spokesperson stated: “If prolonged, higher energy prices will lead to higher headline inflation.”
While much of the global analysis focuses on these macroeconomic shocks, a more insidious narrative has taken hold in policy circles: that Nigerians are somehow insulated from this crisis because they enjoy some of the cheapest petrol in the world. This article aims to debunk that misleading claim.
A proper analysis shows that low nominal petrol prices in Nigeria do not translate to affordability. Instead, they mask deep structural problems—low wages, high inflation, and cripplingly low purchasing power—that leave the average Nigerian more vulnerable to global oil shocks than citizens of countries paying far more at the pump.
Defining the Metrics That Matter
Before comparing petrol prices, it is essential to define the metrics that provide a true picture of the economic burden. A single price per litre is meaningless without context. The following metrics offer a more accurate reflection of a nation’s economic reality.
Minimum Wage and Income Levels
The minimum wage represents the legally mandated floor for earnings. It is a direct measure of the lowest-income worker’s capacity to purchase essentials. If a country’s minimum wage is low, even modestly priced goods become a significant financial burden. Nigeria’s monthly minimum wage stands at N70,000. At the prevailing exchange rate of N1,353.85 per US dollar, this translates to roughly $40 to $50 per month. This figure is the baseline for understanding affordability.
Purchasing Power Parity (via Time to Earn)
Purchasing power is best understood not by currency conversion, but by the time a worker must labour to earn a given sum. The time required to earn $2 is a critical metric because it strips away currency fluctuations and reveals the real labour cost of a transaction. For a Nigerian minimum-wage worker, earning $2 takes approximately 460 minutes, or nearly 7.7 hours. This contrasts starkly with developed economies. In the United States, where the federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour, earning $2 takes about 16.5 minutes. In the United Kingdom, with a minimum wage of £12.21 per hour, it takes roughly 7 minutes. This metric directly links global commodity prices to the lived experience of the workforce.
Cost of Living (Meal Cost Proxy)
The cost of a meal at a local restaurant serves as a proxy for the general cost of living. It reflects the price of food, labour, and utilities in a given economy. When compared to income, it shows whether basic survival needs are affordable. For example, a meal in Nigeria costs between $2 and $4. While this appears low in absolute terms, it represents a significant portion of a daily wage for a minimum-wage earner.
Petrol Cost as a Percentage of Income
This is the most revealing metric. By calculating the cost of a fixed quantity of petrol—50 litres, a typical monthly consumption for an urban household—as a percentage of the monthly minimum wage, we see the true weight of energy costs on a family budget. This measure accounts for both nominal price and earnings, providing a direct comparison of energy poverty across nations.
The Data: A Country-by-Country Breakdown
Petrol Prices in US Dollars and Naira
A nominal comparison of petrol prices per litre shows Nigeria among the lowest globally, but this is where the myth begins:
▪︎ Nigeria: $0.88 (N1,191.39)
▪︎ United States: $1.075 (N1,455.39)
▪︎ India: $1.095 (N1,482.47)
▪︎ United Kingdom: $1.874 (N2,537.11)
▪︎ France: $2.152 (N2,913.49)
▪︎ Ghana: $1.240 (N1,678.77)
▪︎ Egypt: $0.45 (N609.20)
▪︎ Algeria: $0.35 (N473.80)
▪︎ Libya: $0.023 (N31.13)
At this level, Nigeria appears cheaper than the US, UK, and France. However, this is the point where the analysis must pivot from nominal prices to real-world economic factors.
Time Required to Earn $2
This metric reveals the true cost of labour and exposes the fragility of low-income households:
▪︎ Nigeria: 460 minutes (7.7 hours) — based on a monthly minimum wage of N70,000
▪︎ India: 340 to 400 minutes (5.7 to 6.7 hours) — based on a monthly wage of $60 to $70
▪︎ China: 50 to 80 minutes — based on a monthly wage of $250 to $380
▪︎ Japan: 15 to 18 minutes — based on an hourly wage of $6.80 to $8.10
▪︎ United States: 16.5 minutes — based on a federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour
▪︎ United Kingdom: 7 minutes — based on a minimum wage of £12.21 per hour
▪︎ France: 8.9 minutes — based on a minimum wage of €11.65 per hour
▪︎ Ghana: 30 to 35 minutes — based on a daily base rate of GHS 21 to 22
The implication is stark. A Nigerian worker must labour for over seven hours to earn what a British worker earns in seven minutes. This is not an issue of currency; it is a fundamental difference in economic structure and productivity.
Average Meal Cost as a Cost-of-Living Proxy
The cost of a meal at an inexpensive local restaurant, converted to US dollars, shows the following:
▪︎ United Kingdom: $18 to $22
▪︎ United States: $15 to $20
▪︎ France: $15 to $18
▪︎ Japan: $6 to $12
▪︎ China: $3 to $6
▪︎ Ghana: $3 to $10
▪︎ India: $2 to $5
▪︎ Nigeria: $2 to $4
Again, Nigeria’s meal cost is at the lower end globally. However, when measured against the time required to earn that amount, the burden is disproportionate. A minimum-wage worker in Nigeria would need to work for several hours to afford a single $4 meal, whereas a worker in the US would need to work for less than 20 minutes to afford a $20 meal.
Petrol Cost as a Percentage of Monthly Minimum Wage
This is the most damning metric for the “cheap oil” narrative. Assuming a household consumes 50 litres of petrol per month, the cost as a percentage of the minimum wage reveals the true affordability crisis:
▪︎ Nigeria: 88% to 110% — The 50-litre cost of $44 can exceed the entire monthly minimum wage of $40 to $50.
▪︎ India: 78% to 91% — A similarly crushing burden, with 50 litres costing $54.75 against a wage of $60 to $70.
▪︎ China: 19% to 48% — A significant but manageable expense, with 50 litres costing $75 to $120 against a wage of $250 to $380.
▪︎ Japan: 34% to 40% — While petrol is expensive nominally, wages are high enough to absorb the cost.
▪︎ United States: 4.6% — A 50-litre cost of $53.75 is a minor expense against a monthly wage of $1,160.
▪︎ United Kingdom: 5.5% to 5.7% — $93.70 for 50 litres is a small fraction of a $1,650 to $1,700 monthly wage.
▪︎France: 8% — $107.60 for 50 litres is manageable against a $1,350 monthly wage.
▪︎Ghana: 52% to 59% — A heavy burden, with $62 for 50 litres against a wage of $105 to $120.
Debunking the Myth: Four Core Arguments
First, a low nominal petrol price does not equal affordability.
The raw price per litre in Nigeria ($0.88) is only one variable. The critical variable is the ratio of that price to income. Because Nigerian wages are so low, the effective cost of petrol is higher for a Nigerian worker than for a worker in any developed country, despite the latter paying more in absolute terms.
Second, purchasing power is the true measure of economic well-being.
The time-to-earn-$2 metric proves this. A Nigerian worker spends over seven hours to earn what a British worker earns in seven minutes. Any conversation about “cheap” goods must be framed within this reality. When petrol is measured in “hours of labour,” it is among the most expensive in the world for the Nigerian minimum-wage earner.
Third, the cost of living is a web of interconnected burdens.
The low cost of a meal in Nigeria ($2 to $4) is not a sign of a low cost of living; it is a sign of suppressed wages and a struggling informal economy. When combined with petrol costs that can consume an entire month’s wage, the composite burden on a Nigerian household is extreme. Inflation, currently high in Nigeria, further erodes any nominal advantage.
Fourth, exchange rate volatility distorts international comparisons.
The Naira price of petrol (N1,191.39 per litre) is the price Nigerians actually pay. Converting this to dollars creates a misleading sense of global parity. A more relevant comparison is the local currency price against local currency income. By this measure, Nigeria’s petrol is not cheap; it is a primary driver of economic hardship.
Structural Problems and a Path Forward
The narrative of “cheap oil” distracts from the structural problems that make Nigeria’s energy sector a source of economic fragility rather than strength. Decades of fuel subsidies, designed to keep prices low, have created a system of dependency. These subsidies strain government finances, crowd out investment in public goods like health and education, and create opportunities for rent-seeking and smuggling. The recent removal of subsidies, while economically necessary, has exposed the underlying vulnerability of a population that was never truly protected by low prices—only sheltered from their true cost.
To move forward, a multi-pronged strategy is required, one that acknowledges that energy policy is inseparable from poverty alleviation.
First, implement targeted subsidies rather than universal price controls.
Instead of subsidising petrol for all consumers, which disproportionately benefits higher-income households who consume more fuel, the government should implement direct cash transfers or vouchers for the most vulnerable populations. This approach, often called a “social safety net,” would protect the poor from price shocks while allowing market prices to reflect true supply and demand, discouraging waste and smuggling.
Second, accelerate the transition to compressed natural gas (CNG) for transportation.
Nigeria is a gas-rich nation that has historically flared its gas while importing refined petrol. A national programme to convert vehicles—particularly the mass transit buses, trucks, and tricycles used by low-income Nigerians—to CNG would provide a cheaper, domestically sourced alternative to petrol. CNG-powered trucks would reduce the cost of transporting goods across the country, directly lowering food prices. This would decouple the cost of transportation from the volatile global oil market and the geopolitical risks exemplified by the Iran–Israel conflict.
Third, invest in public transport and logistics infrastructure.
The heavy burden of petrol costs is amplified by poor infrastructure. Inefficient road networks, a lack of rail connectivity for freight, and an over-reliance on personal vehicles for commuting force households to consume more fuel than necessary. A strategic investment in urban mass transit systems and the rehabilitation of rail lines for cargo would reduce the demand for petrol at the household level, insulating citizens from price volatility.
Fourth, reform the domestic refining sector.
The perennial issue of importing refined petroleum products adds layers of cost, currency risk, and logistical inefficiency. While the Dangote Refinery represents a potential turning point, the broader policy must ensure that deregulation is paired with competition. A competitive, functional domestic refining industry would reduce the link between the Naira exchange rate and petrol prices, stabilising the energy market and allowing for more predictable pricing.
Conclusion
The claim that Nigerians benefit from “cheap oil” is a misleading narrative that ignores the fundamental economic reality of low wages, poor purchasing power, and a high cost of living relative to income. As the global economy faces renewed shocks from geopolitical conflict in the Middle East, it is more important than ever to base policy on accurate metrics. The data show that for the average Nigerian minimum-wage worker, petrol is not cheap; it is an expense that can consume more than an entire month’s income.
True economic relief will not come from maintaining the illusion of low prices, but from structural reforms that address the root causes of energy poverty. A strategy of targeted subsidies, a decisive shift to compressed natural gas for transport, investment in public infrastructure, and the development of domestic refining capacity would build a more resilient economy. Such reforms would decouple Nigerian livelihoods from the volatility of global geopolitics and finally deliver the energy security that low nominal prices have long promised but never provided.
Ibrahim is a graduate of Economics and an early-career Economist, Data Analyst, and Policy Analyst, presently working as an M&E and Research Assistant at Tazaar Management Consultants. He can be reached via na*********@***il.com or 08169677065
Feature/OPED
Refining Without Relief: How Global Oil Wars, Market Structure, and Monopoly Risks Still Drive Fuel Prices in Nigeria
By Blaise Udunze
The vision was bold. The expectation was clear. And the promise was powerful. When the Dangote Refinery began operations, it was hailed as Nigeria’s long-awaited escape from decades of energy contradiction, which involves exporting crude oil while importing refined fuel at high costs. It was meant to guarantee supply, stabilise prices, conserve foreign exchange, and most importantly, deliver relief to ordinary Nigerians.
What appears to be a distinct contradiction is that, despite months into its operation, a different reality is emerging, with fuel prices rising sharply. Inflationary pressures are intensifying. This occurrence has forced Nigerians to ask a difficult question once again, one that calls for an urgent answer. Why does a country that produces and refines crude oil still suffer the consequences of global oil shocks?
Looking at the trend, it is clear that the answer lies not just in geopolitics, but in the deeper structure of Nigeria’s oil economy, where global pricing, policy gaps, and now the looming risk of monopoly intersect.
With the recent development, the latest alarming surge in petrol prices has been driven largely by escalating tensions in the Middle East. This is particularly the U.S-Israel strikes on Iran and retaliatory measures from Tehran. A well-known fact is that at the centre of the crisis is the Strait of Hormuz, a vital oil transit route through which a significant portion of global supply flows. Any disruption, even a speculative one, triggers immediate spikes in crude prices.
Within a week, oil prices jumped from the mid-$60 range to nearly $120 per barrel. For global markets, this is expected. For Nigeria, it is devastatingly ironic. Because, despite having crude oil in abundance and despite refining it locally, Nigeria remains fully exposed, and this has continued to re-echo the same ironic question.
In a rare moment of corporate candour, the refinery’s leadership acknowledged this reality. The plant is deeply affected by global shocks. Crude oil, even when sourced locally, is priced at international benchmarks. Shipping costs have surged dramatically, from about $800,000 per tanker to as high as $3.5 million. Insurance premiums have climbed, and logistics have become significantly more expensive, with total costs further driving higher.
Even more revealing is the refinery’s sourcing structure. Only about 30 per cent – 35 per cent of crude comes from the Nigerian government supply under the crude-for-naira framework. A significant portion is still purchased in U.S. dollars on the open market, while another 30 per cent – 40 per cent is sourced internationally, including from the United States and other regions. This means the refinery is not insulated; it is integrated into the global oil system. The implication is unavoidable as local refining has not translated into local pricing control.
The impact on Nigerians has been immediate and severe, as petrol prices have surged from under N800 earlier in the year to over N1,200, and in some regions, it is even more alarming when the prices skyrocketed close to N1,400 per litre. Within weeks, multiple price increases have been recorded, driven largely by global crude price spikes and rising logistics costs. Doubtless, the country has witnessed the consequences ripple across the economy as transport fares rise, food prices increase, businesses struggle with higher operating costs, and inflation accelerates.
The development has attracted the attention of the labour unions and the organised private sector, prompting them to raise concerns and alarm about the consequences of job losses, business closures, and worsening hardship if the trend continues with each passing day, witnessing a daily increase and causing possible artificial scarcity.
Nigeria remains trapped in a painful contradiction. It produces crude oil. It refines crude oil. Yet it cannot protect its citizens from global oil volatility. As Aliko Dangote himself acknowledged, Nigeria has no direct role in the conflict driving these price increases, yet it bears the consequences due to global economic interdependence.
In a real sense, this is the deeper tragedy, as Nigeria has achieved capacity without control.
At the heart of the issue is a structural reality: crude oil is priced globally, not locally. Even under the crude-for-naira arrangement, pricing is benchmarked against international rates. This means refineries pay global crude prices, fuel prices reflect global market conditions, and domestic consumers absorb international shocks. In essence, Nigeria has moved refining home without bringing pricing sovereignty with it.
To be fair, the Dangote Refinery has played a stabilising role. Nigeria still enjoys relatively lower petrol prices compared to many global markets. In several countries, supply disruptions have led to panic buying and rationing, while Nigeria has maintained a consistent supply. As the refinery’s CEO aptly noted, what is worse than $120 oil is no oil. The refinery has prevented scarcity, but it has not prevented high prices. Availability, in this case, has not equated to affordability, which is the painful part for the citizens.
While much of the current debate focuses on pricing, another critical issue is quietly taking shape, which is the risk of market concentration. Dangote Refinery deserves credit for its scale and ambition, but scale brings power, and power demands oversight. If fuel importers are gradually pushed out and no competing refineries emerge at scale, Nigeria could find itself transitioning from a public sector monopoly to a private sector dominance led by a single player.
Nigeria has seen this pattern before. In the cement industry, increased domestic production did not necessarily translate into lower prices. Limited competition allowed prices to remain elevated despite local capacity. The same risk now looms in the downstream oil sector. Without competition, price-setting power becomes concentrated, supply risks increase, and consumer protection weakens. In a country with fragile regulatory institutions, this is not a theoretical concern; it is a real and present danger.
No one should perceive this wrongly, because it is important, however, not to misplace blame. It should be made known that the Dangote Refinery is not a charity; it is a private enterprise operating within market realities. It must recover its investment, manage costs, and deliver returns. Its exposure to global pricing is not a failure of intent but a function of the system within which it operates.
The real issue lies in the structure of the market and the absence of sufficient competition.
It is no longer news that Nigeria’s downstream sector is now largely deregulated following the removal of fuel subsidies. While deregulation has reduced government fiscal burden and encouraged private investment, it has also exposed consumers to price volatility and limited the scope for intervention, as this has continued to cause pain. Markets, in theory, deliver efficiency, but in practice, they require competition and effective regulation to function properly. Without these, deregulation can simply replace one form of inefficiency with another.
Nigeria does not need to weaken Dangote Refinery; it needs to multiply it. The goal should be to build a competitive refining ecosystem to replace one dominant structure with another. The truth is not far from this, as part of a lasting solution, it requires encouraging new refinery investments, removing bottlenecks for players such as BUA and modular refineries, ensuring transparent crude allocation, providing open access to pipelines and storage infrastructure, and enforcing strong antitrust regulations.
Competition remains the most effective regulator of price, which is sacrosanct, and it protects consumers, strengthens supply security, and reduces systemic risk.
This must also be perceived beyond competition, which calls for the government to act strategically. The fact is that when supplying crude to local refineries at discounted or stabilised rates, expanding naira-based transactions, and introducing temporary relief measures during global crises are all viable options that must be put into consideration. Energy is too critical to be left entirely to market forces, especially in a developing economy where millions are highly vulnerable to economic shocks.
It is time that Nigerians understood that the nation’s refining crisis has been decades in the making, and it cannot be solved by a single refinery, no matter how large. If asked, it will be said that this is a fact that can’t be argued. The Dangote Refinery is undoubtedly a turning point, but it will only remain so if it is embedded within broader systemic reform. Otherwise, Nigeria risks replacing one form of dependency with another, from import dependence to domestic concentration.
The question is no longer whether Nigeria can refine crude oil. It can. The real question is whether Nigeria can build a system that ensures fair pricing, competitive markets, consumer protection, and economic resilience, as these are exactly the core answers.
If global conflicts continue to dictate local fuel prices, if monopoly risks go unchecked, and if citizens remain vulnerable despite abundant resources, then the promise of local refining will remain unfulfilled, as it will bring no expected relief.
What is playing out is the well-known fact that in refining, as in democracy, concentration of power is dangerous. And in both, the strongest safeguard remains the same: competition, transparency, and institutions that serve the public interest.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
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