By Prince Charles Dickson, PhD

The inability to pronounce the letter r is called rhotacism—a quiet irony in speech pathology, where sufferers lack the tongue to name their condition. Nigeria today appears afflicted by a similar policy disorder: an incapacity to articulate the real threats to learning, safety, and development, while endlessly announcing their symptoms. The reflexive closure of schools across states, often with the Federal Government’s blessing, is not merely a security response; it is a linguistic failure of governance. We cannot pronounce the problem, so we silence the classroom.

At surface level, school closures masquerade as prudence. No leader wants abducted children, grieving parents, viral outrage. But development practice teaches us to distrust surface logic. If classrooms are unsafe, what calculus deems campuses secure? If primary schools are closed in the name of vulnerability, why do lecture halls hum, convocation grounds fill, churches and mosques swell, markets bustle, and political rallies roar? The policy geometry is incoherent. Risk does not dissolve with age brackets or academic levels; it migrates along opportunity lines. Violence, like water, flows where barriers are weakest—not where regulations are loudest.

The headline figures tell a damning story. Over 42,000 schools categorized as vulnerable. A $30 million Safe School Initiative announced, lauded, and then largely evaporated into PowerPoint memory. What exactly has closure achieved in this arithmetic? If risk prompted closure, closure must prompt mitigation. Yet what we witness is substitution, not solution. Strategy is replaced by symbolism. Doors are shut to demonstrate action while the engines of threat, the logistics, financing, intelligence gaps, and ungoverned spaces remain scandalously intact.

The first ethical question is not poetic distrust; it is arithmetic ethics. How many days of learning are lost per closure? How many children drift permanently out of school into child labor, early marriage, recruitment pipelines, or migration traps? Empirical evidence across fragile contexts, from the Sahel to Northeast Nigeria, shows that prolonged closures fracture educational trajectories irreversibly. A classroom shut today becomes a livelihood foreclosed tomorrow. When education systems stall, insecurity does not retreat; it recruits.

Development is not administered by press statements. It is built through boring, relentless infrastructure—data infrastructure, trust infrastructure, and response infrastructure. Consider Community Early Warning Systems (CEWS). Where they exist and function, attacks are anticipated, routes mapped, and escalation interrupted. Where they are absent, closure becomes the blunt instrument of last resort. Yet how many states have meaningfully integrated CEWS into school security architecture? How many have empowered bodies to convene multi-actor protection coalitions that include women, youth, traditional leaders, transport unions, and faith networks? The chalk does not hold risk; the cheque does. And the cheque has been shamefully mute.

Security is not the absence of pupils; it is the presence of intelligence. Closing schools without opening data is policy rhotacism. We cannot pronounce “threat mapping,” so we mouth “shutdown.” We cannot say “transport node vulnerability,” so we say “holiday.” We cannot articulate “perimeter hardening and community interception routes,” so we declare “postponement.” The oxygen of risk—enrolment points, travel corridors, marketplaces abutting school fences requires monitoring in real time. If threat mapping did not intensify the moment schools closed, then the threat merely changed address, not behavior.

The contradiction deepens when worship spaces remain open. Christian Association of Nigeria congregations gather. Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs convenes faithful. If the doctrine is crowd risk, the exemptions are indefensible. If the doctrine is youth vulnerability, then universities must not be exempt. If the doctrine is intelligence deficit, then closure is an admission of systemic failure. You cannot claim safety by relocating learning into chaos. Faith spaces recognize a truth policy forgets: protection flows from relationship density. The congregation knows its strangers. Does the school gate?

Globally, contexts plagued by school-related violence have moved in the opposite direction—not toward retreat, but toward smart hardening. Drone reconnaissance over school corridors. AI-assisted risk scoring that fuses incident data, weather, market days, and movement patterns. Platforms to defuse land, grazing, and community disputes before they metastasize into school-adjacent violence. Psychosocial resilience units embedded in schools. Community rangers trained, insured, and supervised, not as vigilantes but as guardians accountable to law. Transparent pilots with public dashboards. Sanctions for local leaders who ignore warning signals. None of this is theoretical.

Because closure is administratively convenient. It transfers responsibility from execution to explanation. Once schools are shut, failure becomes abstract. Metrics blur. When exactly did the risk reduce? Who measures it? At what threshold does reopening occur? Without benchmarks, closure becomes the chief KPI of insecurity governance. That is not security architecture; it is security bureaucracy—forms without force, memos without muscle.

Local Government Areas on volatile frontiers—whether in Niger State or Kogi are living laboratories of conciliation culture. Traditional dispute resolution, faith mediation, women-led early warning, youth intelligence networks; these are not weaknesses to be ignored until Abuja’s biro approves boots on the ground. They are strengths to be funded, trained, and supervised. Development practice demands co-design. Are LGA leaders co-authoring protection protocols, or passively awaiting circulars? Centralization kills time; time kills children’s futures.

The opportunity costs of closure are staggering and gendered. Girls pay first and longest. Distance learning fantasies collapse where electricity, devices, and safety at home are uneven. Boys drift into non-state labor or armed networks promising income and belonging. Teachers disengage. Trust between communities and state frays further. When schools finally reopen—if they do—the damage is cumulative. Closure does not pause risk; it compounds it.

There is also a moral hazard. Normalizing closure teaches adversaries what works. Disrupt learning to extract concessions. Threaten the symbol to paralyze the system. Deterrence requires resilience. A state that keeps schools open while hardening them sends a different signal: intimidation will not erase futures.

To be clear, this is not romantic defiance. There are moments when temporary closure is warranted. But temporary requires temporality: timelines, triggers, alternatives. Closure without an accompanying surge in intelligence, infrastructure, and accountability is futility dressed as care. It is rhotacism—the inability to name and thus cure the disease.

So, the unperfumed questions must persist. What exactly is being done differently today that was not urgent yesterday? Where are the transparent pilots funded by the Safe School Initiative? Who owns the dashboards? Which perimeters were hardened, which routes monitored, which sanctions enforced? Who measures risk reduction, and when is bureaucracy upgraded into architecture?

Shutting schools may shelter minds briefly. But without strategy that attacks the root—financing of violence, data blindness, local exclusion, and accountability gaps—it only shelters the conscience of policy. Until answers arrive with evidence of execution, Nigeria’s schools are not closed for safety. They are closed for convenience. And convenience, like rhotacism, leaves us unable to pronounce the truth. May Nigeria win.

By Blaise Udunze

Nigeria’s national mood is tense. The country is facing economic hardship, insecurity, public distrust in institutions, and an increasingly widening gap between citizens and their government. Yet, in the midst of this fragility, a quiet administrative action by the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) has sparked a storm of public concern, political accusations, and renewed debate over who truly controls Nigeria’s revenue system.

The controversy began when the FIRS quietly announced the appointment of Xpress Payment Solutions Limited, a fast-rising Nigerian fintech company, as a Treasury Single Account (TSA) collecting agent, effectively giving the company authority to process federal government tax payments through the TaxPro Max platform. With this appointment, taxpayers can now remit Company Income Tax, Value Added Tax, Withholding Tax, and other federal payments using XpressPay or the company’s in-branch e-Cashier platform.

At first glance, the move appears technical and harmless, perhaps even a necessary step to modernize Nigeria’s digital tax infrastructure. But almost immediately, outrage erupted across political, civil society, and economic circles. And within hours, the debate had escalated into what is now being framed as a national question: Is Nigeria witnessing the quiet re-emergence of a revenue cartel, this time on a federal scale?

A Tax Gatekeeper Emerges Silently

Xpress Payments is not an unfamiliar name in Nigeria’s fintech landscape. Incorporated in 2016, the company has grown steadily, offering secure payment gateways, switching services, and enterprise financial solutions. Its Acting Managing Director, Wale Olayisade, expressed delight at the appointment, describing it as a major milestone, “We are honoured to be selected by FIRS. Our systems are built to ensure ease, speed, and security for every transaction.”

He insisted that taxpayers would enjoy a seamless, transparent, and reliable experience.

Ordinarily, such remarks should settle nerves. But the public response was anything but calm. Citizens and political stakeholders immediately raised a torrent of questions:

–       Why was this appointment announced quietly, without public consultation?

–       What new value does Xpress Payments add that existing TSA channels, such as Remita, do not already provide?

–       Were there competitive bids?

–       What are the contract terms, and who benefits financially?

–       Why concentrate such a sensitive national function in private hands at a time when transparency is already strained?

The silence from government circles only deepened the suspicion. In governance, especially around revenue, silence is not neutrality; it is oxygen for mistrust.

Atiku Abubakar Explodes: “This Is Lagos-Style State Capture”

The loudest reaction came from former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who issued one of his most forceful statements in recent years. Atiku accused the Federal Government of attempting to replicate the same at a national scale. The controversial Lagos revenue model was dominated for years by Alpha Beta, a private firm accused of enjoying a monopoly over the state’s revenue pipeline.

In his words, “This is the resurrection of the Alpha Beta revenue cartel. What we are witnessing now is an attempt to nationalise that template.”

Atiku warned that the move could concentrate power around politically connected private actors, enabling them to sit at the centre of federal revenue flows. He questioned the timing, calling it insensitive given the nationwide grief over insecurity, “When a nation is mourning, leadership should show empathy, not expand private revenue pipelines.”

He issued five demands:

1. Immediate suspension of the Xpress Payments appointment
2. Full disclosure of contract terms and beneficiaries
3. A comprehensive audit of TSA operations
4. A legal framework preventing private proxies from controlling public revenue
5. A shift in national priorities toward security and transparent governance

His final warning was blunt, “Nigeria’s revenues are not political spoils. They are the lifeblood of our national survival.”

The Ghost of Alphabeta: Why Nigerians Are Worried

For many Nigerians, this controversy triggers painful memories of earlier private-sector dominance over public revenue. The “Alphabeta era” in Lagos is widely remembered, fairly or unfairly, as a time when a single private company appeared to dominate the state’s tax collection landscape, shrouded in secrecy and controversy.

Nigeria’s fear is simple:

–       If revenue collection becomes controlled by one or two private companies, transparency dies, and corruption flourishes.

–       Allowing private entities to sit between taxpayers and government can create:

• Monopoly power
• Inflated service fees
• Data privacy concerns
• Political weaponization of revenue information
• Institutional dependency
• Centralization of sensitive national data

Each of these risks has real consequences for economic stability.

FIRS’ Defence: “It Is Only an Additional Option”

To be fair, the FIRS insists that Xpress Payments is only one of several available channels, not the exclusive gatekeeper. Remita and other payment service providers remain operational.

According to FIRS, the move is part of a broader effort to modernize and expand taxpayer options within the TSA. In a functional environment, this would be welcomed as healthy competition. But Nigerians are not reacting to the announcement; they are reacting to the pattern:

–       Sudden appointments

–       Lack of transparency

–       Political undertones

–       Private-sector centralization of public revenue

–       Timing that coincides with widespread economic strain

The concern is not the company itself; it is the impenetrability surrounding how such decisions are made.

The Big Tax Picture: Major Reforms Coming in January 2026

While the Xpress Payments controversy rages, Nigeria is simultaneously preparing for the most ambitious tax reform in decades, one that may change how individuals and businesses perceive taxation entirely.

The reforms, spearheaded by the Presidential Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms Committee, chaired by Mr. Taiwo Oyedele, will take effect in January 2026, and they promise sweeping changes.

1. Drastic Reduction of Tax Burden on 98 percent of Nigerians

Oyedele has repeatedly emphasized, “You will pay less or no tax if you are in the bottom 98 percent of income earners.” Under the new regime:

–       Workers earning below N800,000 annually pay zero personal income tax.

–       Basic food, healthcare, education, and public transport become VAT-exempt, lowering living costs.

–       Small companies (turnover ≤ N100m) will pay zero corporate tax, zero capital gains tax, and be exempt from the new 4 percent development levy.

2. Consolidation of Multiple Tax Laws

The reform merges numerous existing laws, CITA, PITA, VAT Act, CGT Act, into a unified tax code. This eliminates duplication, confusion, and overlapping mandates that have plagued Nigeria for decades.

3. Increased CGT for Companies, Fairer Rates for Individuals

–       Companies now pay 30 percent CGT.

–       Individuals pay CGT based on their income band.

4. Tax on Digital and Virtual Asset Profits

The reforms modernize the tax base to include digital transactions and virtual assets.

5. Export Incentives

Profits from goods exported will now be income tax-free, provided proceeds are repatriated legally.

6. Stronger Tax Institutions

A new Nigeria Revenue Service (NRS) will become the sole federal tax collector, while the Tax Ombudsman will resolve disputes.

7. President Tinubu Sets Up an Implementation Committee

To ensure smooth rollout, President Tinubu has approved the National Tax Policy Implementation Committee (NTPIC) chaired by Joseph Tegbe and supervised by Minister of Finance, Wale Edun.

The goal:

Improve compliance, reduce leakages, and reinforce fiscal sustainability.

So, Why Are Nigerians Still Worried?

Because reform alone does not guarantee trust. Nigerians welcome the promise of lower taxes, simpler laws, and less harassment. But they fear that while the tax burden may be reduced, the control over tax collection may be quietly shifting into private hands.

The unsettling question persists:

–       How can a nation modernize its tax system while simultaneously outsourcing its revenue gateways?

–       What Exactly Is the Risk?

1. Over-Centralization of Revenue Gateways

Even if Xpress Payments is “an option,” such appointments can slowly evolve into de facto monopolies, especially in Nigeria, where political influence often determines market dominance.

2. Data Privacy and National Security

Tax data is deeply sensitive. It reveals income patterns, business operations, sectoral flows, and strategic economic information. Consolidating such data under private firms raises major cybersecurity concerns.

3. Potential for Political Capture

The fear is not that Xpress Payments lacks capacity; the company is reputable, but that future actors may exploit such arrangements for political financing or influence.

4. Risk of Middlemen Profiting from Public Revenue

If service fees or transaction charges apply, taxpayers may indirectly fund private intermediaries for basic access to government services.

5. Erosion of Public Trust

A tax system must be trusted to function. When people sense secrecy, they resist compliance.

What Nigeria Needs Now: Full Transparency, Not Silence

To rebuild confidence, the federal government must take immediate steps:

1. Publish All Contract Details

Service fees, revenue-sharing models, data access permissions, contracts’ duration, and ownership disclosures must be made public.

2. Conduct an Independent Audit of TSA Payment Providers

This should include Remita, Xpress Payments, and all other agents.

3. Prevent Monopolies in Revenue Collection

No single company should control more than 30 percent of federal tax traffic.

4. Strengthen FIRS Capacity

Modern digital tax administration should rely primarily on state capacity, not outsourcing.

5. Establish a Legal Framework for Digital Tax Contractors

To regulate:

–       Data usage

–       Infrastructure standards

–       Profit margins

–       Conflict-of-interest rules

Without such laws, Nigeria remains vulnerable.

A Nation at a Revenue Intersection

Nigeria stands at a defining moment. The 2026 tax reforms promise hope: lower taxes, simpler rules, better compliance, and reduced harassment. They present an opportunity to reset the social contract around taxation.

But that promise is threatened by the unsettling perception that tax collection is quietly being privatized, again. The public narrative is now locked in a dangerous contradiction; the government promises tax relief, while citizens fear revenue capture.

Until transparency is restored, the controversy surrounding Xpress Payments will not disappear. It has grown beyond a payment gateway issue. It has become a test of Nigeria’s commitment to:

–       Accountability

–       Institutional integrity

–       Democratic oversight

–       And the protection of national revenue

A country cannot modernize its tax system while leaving its revenue gateways in the shadows. Nigerians want answers. They want openness. And they want assurance that the era of revenue cartels, real or perceived, will never return. Anything short of full disclosure leaves the nation with a painful question: Who is truly controlling Nigeria’s money?

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]

By Blaise Udunze

On December 2, 2025, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced a policy that significantly departs from the cash-restriction measures Nigerians have faced lately. The apex bank abolished restrictions on cash deposits. Increased the weekly cash withdrawal limits to N500,000 for individuals and N5 million for corporates while substituting the earlier monthly limits of N5 million and N10 million respectively. These modifications, which will be effective from January 1, 2026, represent what the CBN describes as the necessity to “streamline provisions to reflect present-day realities.”

Authorized by the Director of Financial Policy & Regulation, Dr. Rita I. Sike, the policy overhaul aims to lower cash-management expenses, improve security, and lessen money-laundering threats related to Nigeria’s significant dependence on physical cash. Daily ATM withdrawal limits stay fixed at N100,000 and count toward the total cap. Withdrawals exceeding the limits incur charges of three percent for individuals and five percent for companies, with the revenues divided: 40 percent to the CBN and 60 percent to the banks.

This update comes three years following the disputed 2022-2023 cash redesign crisis at a time characterized by extreme cash deficits, extended lines at banks, and devastating impacts on the informal economy. Consequently, the newest order generates responses: praise from individuals who consider it delayed aid, disapproval from those perceiving it as a bewildering backtrack, and concern from those apprehensive about potential enduring hazards.

Experts Applaud a More Realistic Modification

For economists, in a publication by Nairametrics showed that the action taken by the CBN signifies much-needed practicality. Dr. Salisu Ahmed, an economist based in Abuja, refers to the updated limits as “a step,” praising the CBN for gaining a clearer insight into “cash management practices in a predominantly informal economy.”

He stated that the changes will alleviate the difficulties faced by families and small enterprises due to restrictions. Rigid withdrawal caps had limited transactions, made small-scale commerce more difficult, and caused numerous businesses to experience cash-flow problems. “This adjustment signifies a response from the CBN recognizing the challenges Nigerians face daily and easing rules that previously hindered commerce and individual management,” he clarified.

Banking analyst, David Omale, echoes this view, seeing the CBN’s action as a sign of responsiveness. He points out that higher limits could “enhance liquidity for firms facing challenges from inflation, supply-chain issues and unpredictable cash flows.”

In an economy in which over 60 percent of trade is informal and where the adoption of digital payments varies across different socio-economic groups, experts suggest the updated limits correspond more accurately to real-world conditions. These limits offer businesses flexibility to reinstate transactional liberty and may help recover public confidence diminished by previous cash shortages.

Critics Caution About Continuing Disparities and New Threats

However, the praise is not universally shared. Numerous specialists and industry participants contend that the modifications, although appreciated, are inadequate or might even be detrimental.

Financial strategist Nnenna Okafor contends that the updated limits are insufficient for traders and micro-businesses that depend largely on cash to sustain their operations amid challenges. Due to increasing product prices, logistical difficulties, and unreliable digital banking services in regions, she asserts that numerous Nigerians will still need more liquidity than the new thresholds to stay viable.

Within PoS operators’ players, in Nigeria’s payment system, the response is notably divided.

PoS Operators Split

Certain PoS agents appreciate the modifications, anticipating that they will:

–       Reduce friction with banks over “flagged” transactions

–       Facilitate processes for clients requiring withdrawals

–       Rebuild trust after months of cash shortages

Others convey concern. A PoS operator in Lagos cautions that greater cash availability could hinder the adoption of payments. “While easier access to cash can address problems, it may also decrease dependence on PoS terminals and other digital payment solutions that provide long-term security and efficiency,” she remarked.

She argues that if the CBN does not combine the policy with targeted incentives to encourage payment uptake, Nigeria runs the risk of regressing into deep-rooted reliance on cash.

Another operator in Abuja points out a different issue that has to do with unstable cash supply at numerous commercial banks. He insists that simply boosting withdrawal limits does not automatically fix supply shortages. “If banks cannot consistently provide cash, raising limits fails to solve the issue,” he stated.

Other operators also caution that the new setting might push fintech firms out of the market, which possibly allows monopolies to form since only big payment firms can endure the transition back to increased cash usage.

Experts in Security Alert to Increasing Threats, from Crime

Apart from operational issues, security experts have expressed concerns about the dangers linked to greater cash flow.

Abas Ogendengbe, a security expert at Anold Consulting Ltd., warns that increased access to amounts without strict controls “opens up risks for theft, fraud and money laundering.” He contends that without improvements in surveillance transaction tracking and reporting frameworks by banks, criminal groups might take advantage of the restrictions.

Nigeria continues to confront:

–       High rates of petty theft

–       Organised criminal cash-for-goods networks

–       Ransom-based criminality

–       Fraudulent cash-flow manipulation

He contends that a policy boosting the amount of currency in circulation should consequently be accompanied by enhanced institutional protections, rather than diminished ones.

Advantages of the New Policy: Relief, Liquidity, and Business Freedom

Although it has faced criticism, the CBN’s decision carries benefits:

1. Increased Liquidity for the Informal Sector

Small-scale merchants, farm producers, haulers, craftsmen, and market participants relying significantly on cash will experience ease in transferring money, purchasing stock, and expanding their businesses.

2. Reduced Transaction Friction

Companies that once faced limiting restrictions now recover agility, enhancing business continuity and lowering administrative challenges.

3. Restoration of Public Trust

After the trauma of the cash scarcity era, easing restrictions may slowly rebuild confidence in the banking system and encourage more people to save and transact through formal channels.

4. Policy Simplicity

The updated limits, while still restricted, are more straightforward and less administrative compared to the special-authorization system.

The Disadvantages: Policy Volatility, Inflationary Risks, and Stunted Digitalisation

Nonetheless, the policy change is also accompanied by drawbacks:

1. Weakening of Monetary Policy Credibility

Regular significant reversals indicate instability and undermine confidence. A central bank needs to be consistent and foreseeable; Nigeria’s policy environment has shifted in the contrary.

2. Potential for More Money Laundering

Unlimited cash deposits and increased withdrawal limits are inconsistent with standards for preventing illegal financial transactions.

3. Undermining Digital Payment Growth

The increase in fintech was expedited amidst cash availability. A return to reliance on cash might hinder innovation. Dampen the use of safer trackable digital methods.

4. Increased Risk of Robbery and Cash-Based Crime

An increased amount of cash in use results in tangible currency to be stolen additional opportunities for criminals and amplified operational difficulties for the police.

5. Higher Costs of Cash Management

The processes of currency production, circulation, and safeguarding place financial strains on the banking sector and the CBN.

Policy Details and Operational Complexities

The CBN’s circular offers instructions for operations:

–       Excess withdrawal charges:

3 percent for individuals

5 percent for corporates

–       Revenue sharing:

40 percent to CBN, 60 percent to banks

–       Withdrawals from ATMs and PoS terminals contribute to the limit, highlighting the importance for customers to monitor where their withdrawals originate.

–       ATMs can now be loaded with all denominations, although third-party cheque cashing is still limited to N100,000.

–       Exemptions are maintained for government revenue accounts, microfinance banks, and primary mortgage banks.

–       The removal of exemptions for embassies and donor agencies is a move that some parties consider diplomatically risky.

The CBN frames this policy change as a balance, boosting liquidity while still maintaining the nation’s goal of a cashless economy. Nevertheless, its effectiveness depends on the ability of the government and financial institutions to encourage payments while addressing the security challenges posed by greater cash circulation.

A Relief Today, a Question Mark Tomorrow

The CBN’s updated cash-policy structure provides support for families, small enterprises, and the informal sector. It addresses some of the severe effects of previous policies and shows a readiness, though delayed, to adjust to practical realities.

However, the enduring consequences are complex. The policy creates openings, as money laundering hampers progress in payments, increases security threats, and shows a regulatory environment grappling with achieving stability and trustworthiness.

Nigeria is at an intersection. While cash can relieve hardships, it cannot shape the future economic landscape. The current task is to apply this policy without hindering progress, undermining financial integrity, or jeopardizing monetary stability.

The question of whether this constitutes a liberalisation or an expensive withdrawal will in the end hinge on a single element, the CBN’s ability to pair increased liquidity with stronger oversight, steadfast policy direction, and sustained digital-payment incentives.

Only then can Nigeria avoid sliding backward and instead build a financial system that truly reflects the realities of its people, its economy, and its future.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]