Feature/OPED
Unlocking WTO Potential in Changing Geopolitical World
Professor Maurice Okoli
Moving forward with women’s empowerment, exhibiting female leadership and entrepreneurial capabilities, Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala confirmed as the sole candidate for the World Trade Organization arguably represents the voice of the Global South and concretely the voice of Africa. Okonjo-Iweala brings unique strengths that complement traditional notions of female leadership, casting away outdated stereotypes and embracing a future full of aspirations for the powerful World Trade Organization.
By her leading roles at the WTO underscores, in many ways, the assertiveness and ability of what women could contribute in their professions to the development of society, especially in the spheres of global trade. Despite these attributes, Okonjo-Iweala as head of WTO highlights the fact that women possess the same abilities to perform with effectiveness in the field of economic and trade diplomacy.
As nominations for the next Director-General closed in early November, and Okonjo-Iweala was ultimately confirmed as the sole candidate, it offers practical grounds, at least, to celebrate her previous first-term satisfactory progress and milestone achievements on the global stage as an African, as a Nigerian citizen. Her typical African name alone resonates across the global landscape, not only portraying her distinguished career but also exposing diverse experience in fostering multifaceted trade partnerships and its associated challenges between the organization’s members in the world.
According to reports, Ambassador Petter Ølberg of Norway, Chair of the General Council, informed WTO members on 9th November that no further nominations for the position of Director-General had been received by the deadline of 8th November and that the incumbent Director-General, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, is therefore the only candidate for the role.
Director-General Okonjo-Iweala confirmed her willingness to serve a second four-year term. Okonjo-Iweala’s current term comes to an end on 31 August 2025, as the first woman, the first African is the seventh Director-General of the WTO. The WTO formally commenced the process of appointing its next Director-General, with members given until 8 November to submit nominations.
In July 2024, Okonjo-Iweala garnered unprecedented support to serve a second term at the 164 member states trade organization. In an official media release after the July 22 meeting, the WTO General Council indicated that fifty-eight (58) of the 164 member states of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have voiced support for a proposal from the African Group backing incumbent Director-General, Okonjo-Iweala, to serve a second term.
As stipulated by the guidelines, the Director-General can serve two terms. Almost all members pointed to all the efforts and qualities of Okonjo-Iweala and her contributions to the organization which enhanced a lot of progress and development. Okonjo-Iweala, whose tenure as the DG due to end on 31st August 2025, revealed her plans to work with other members of the organization to restructure the global trade body.
“The African Group requests that the current Director-General make herself available to serve a second term, and has proposed that the process of reappointing the Director-General should be started as soon as possible,” according to the statement by the world trade body.
“Fifty-eight members, several speaking on behalf of groups of members, took the floor to comment and express their support for the African Group proposal. They called on DG Okonjo-Iweala to make her intentions regarding a second term known as soon as possible. Most of these members praised the DG’s hard work and her achievements during her first term,” it further added.
Okonjo-Iweala’s First-Term Achievements
(i) In the current emerging situation, the WTO’s task of changing the world’s trade is fraught with existing challenges and further hindered by geopolitics mostly by the key players. A classical example is the United States and China trade war, better considered as an economic conflict between two powers has persisted since January 2018 when Donald Trump, began setting tariffs and other trade barriers on China to force it to make changes to what the U.S. described as longstanding unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft. Washington has imposed tariffs on more than $360bn of Chinese goods, and China has retaliated with tariffs on more than $110bn of US products. WTO’s trade advocacy has had little influence in resolving this bilateral agreement initially signed by and binding on the United States and China.
(ii) As already know, the United States and Europe have a number of disagreements over economic relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics in the entire region. It was, however, expected that the trade organization work seriously and systematically to guarantee a rules-based international trading system. Despite the impasse in trade negotiations, and ways to modernize WTO rules and address the impending misunderstandings, much, unfortunately, remains to be reviewed. The European Union, for instance, continues to play a leading role in the WTO’s ongoing reform process, which was launched at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June 2022. Okonjo-Iweala has to address these persistent conflicts during her second term in office beginning in 2025.
(iii) The situation with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN is not different from other regions. Okonjo-Iweala’s accession to the leadership of WTO four years ago was viewed as a turning point in the process of the Asian region’s integration, under the export-oriented growth regime, into the world’s trading landscape. Without mincing words here, it has to be noted that APEC and ASEAN play a major role in the world’s biggest trading bloc, and are at the centre of addressing emerging economic challenges facing the global trading system, to develop actionable policy recommendations, because more than 60% of the collective trade are targeted towards western and European markets.
(vi) On July 26, 2024, during the meeting of BRICS Economy and Foreign Trade Ministers in Moscow, representatives of BRICS economies agreed to coordinate their policies within the WTO. BRICS economies are increasingly moving towards coordinating their policies on the international stage, including in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In an analytical report, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder of BRICS+ Analytics, believes that key priorities are necessary for the creation of a BRICS platform within the WTO include supporting the organization’s viability and effectiveness in resolving trade disputes (given the challenges faced in the operation of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) as well as in countering rising protectionism. The creation of a common platform in the WTO should contribute to greater economic policy coordination for BRICS economies in the trade sphere and will also allow developing economies to play a greater role in the organization’s decision-making.
Advocating further for greater policy coordination and backing away from a long-standing call to action, which has been in process and discussions since 2017, “BRICS+ countries could … form alliances in other international organizations, including the WTO, where a BRICS+ group in negotiations could complement other South-South alliances.” Indeed, “after Russia’s WTO accession all BRICS members are now in the WTO and can create partnerships within the organization to defend national interests, advance sustainable development issues and counter the spectre of rising global protectionism.”
Another area of cooperation for BRICS in the WTO may be the provision of assistance to those BRICS core economies and partners of the grouping that have not yet secured full-fledged WTO membership. While until 2023 all BRICS core economies were members of the WTO, after the 2023-2024 core expansion two new BRICS members, namely Ethiopia and Iran, were still outside of the trade organization. A number of potential members of the BRICS partnership status, such as Belarus or Algeria, are also not yet full members of the WTO. In this respect, the WTO could target coordinated measures to support the accession process of those who have not yet secured WTO membership.
WTO and the African Union
WTO members and leading reputable investors have consistently been looking forward to exploring several opportunities in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), a policy signed by African countries to make the continent a single market. The AfCFTA, the world’s largest new free trade area, is the flagship of the African Union, and its significance cannot be overstated. It certainly promises to increase intra-African trade through deeper levels of trade liberalization and enhanced regulatory harmonization and coordination. Moreover, it is expected to improve the competitiveness of African industries and enterprises through increased market access, the exploitation of economies of scale, and more effective resource allocation.
In fact, this should be one potential area of focus for Okonjo-Iweala as she heads for the second term unopposed. During her first term, she unreservedly expressed interest in dealing with these issues of strengthening partnerships and widening stronger trade relationships with Africa from the external players, and members of the WTO. There still exists controversy between the WTO and AU’s AfCFTA. A more consolidated approach to the continent’s trade policy may strengthen the role of the developing countries, especially the majority of those in Africa, in the WTO and advance the agenda of the Global South. With the emerging multipolar arrangement, it is necessary to facilitate external trade for Africa. This particularly has important positive implications for its inclusion into the world system, supports its economic power and ultimately raises its economic status closer to the Asian and Western world, and the G20.
The Group of Twenty (G20)
Over the past years, G20 economies, however, continued to introduce wide-ranging trade-facilitating measures, and increasing evidence points to enforcing unilateral trade policy decisions. Warning that these measures are creating uncertainty for the world economy, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala called on G20 governments to refrain from adopting new restrictions that could worsen the global economic outlook.
Potential investors have also indicated several times, trade facilitation and called for smooth pathways into the African continent, their involvement could be beneficial to them, including in sectors like pharmaceuticals, automobiles, agro-processing and financial technology. The G20 and Africa, regulated by the WTO policies could offer sustainable growth and symbolize an integral part and essential component in the emerging multipolar economic architecture.
Professional Experience Matches Responsibility?
In these changing times, Okonjo-Iweala’s official thoughtful testimony to pursue WTO’s Director-General responsibilities, as outlined prior to her engagement, has become uttermost necessary to review outstanding challenges and their consequences for the African continent’s development, and those in the Asia-Pacific region within the entire global trading system. Vying for Director-General, for the second term, should not be considered a ceremonial position, but entails promoting transformation, through increased market access, and increasing the relationship between Africa and Asia (South-South) in global trade, and the rest of the world.
She served two terms as Finance Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2003-2006 and 2011-2015) under the political leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo and President Goodluck Jonathan, respectively. She also briefly acted as Foreign Minister in 2006, the first woman to hold both positions. The skilled negotiator had a 25-year career at the World Bank as a development economist, rising to the number two position of Managing Director of Operations.
Biographical records show she was born into a royal family in Delta State, her father Professor Chukwuka Okonjo became the Eze (King) from the Obahai Royal Family of Ogwashi-Ukwu. With high aspirations, Okonjo-Iweala studied at prestigious Harvard University, graduating magna cum laude with an AB in Economics in 1976. In 1981, she earned her PhD in Regional Economics and Development from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) with a thesis titled Credit Policy, rural financial markets, and Nigeria’s agricultural development. She received an International Fellowship from the American Association of University Women (AAUW) that supported her doctoral studies.
Selection Procedures
On 28-29 November, the General Council will convene a special meeting aimed at advancing the process for selecting the next Director-General. Chaired by Ambassador Petter Ølberg of Norway, the meeting follows the announcement made on 9th November that no candidates for the position of Director-General had emerged by the 8th November nomination deadline other than the incumbent Director-General, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.
In his communication to members, Ambassador Ølberg said that, based on his contacts with delegations, and as has been done in past instances where the incumbent Director-General was the only candidate, he intends to convene a special formal meeting of the General Council on 28th and 29th November.
The first day of the General Council meeting would allow members to hear a presentation from DG Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala on her vision for the WTO, followed by a question-and-answer session. The second day could then provide an opportunity for members to make a decision on the appointment of the next Director-General. Okonjo-Iweala confirmed her willingness to serve a second four-year term in a letter on 16th September.
An Insight into WTO’s Future
With a solid education and broad experience, combined with her performance during the first term, 58 member-states of the WTO have already thrown their support behind her to head the Geneva-based body. The WTO is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. The goal is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. It currently has 164 members, monitoring each other’s practices and regulations against a set of standard trading rules to improve transparency and avoid protectionism.
In addition, WTO works to build the trading capacity of developing and least-developed countries, helping them integrate and benefit from the multilateral trading system. This is an essential part of the work. The trading system has to be inclusive, with the benefits of trade reaching as many as possible around the world, particularly in the poorest countries.
The WTO provides its members with a tried and tested system of shared rules and principles to support economic cooperation and thereby boost growth, development and job creation around the world. It provides a forum for members to raise, discuss and potentially solve the complex problems that they face. The organization deals with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. There is huge value in the system of the World Trade Organization.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow and lecturer at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He serves as an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club.
As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: markolconsult (at) gmail (dot) com.
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
