Feature/OPED
When the People Shall Have Nothing More To Eat…
By Prince Charles Dickson PhD
One who believes that the earth is chasing him, where did he put his feet while running?
The Driver
Many years ago, I was driving back from Gombe, and on the highway was this public/commercial Opel car carrying five Nigerians. It was at ‘high’ speed, but I overtook the car, blocked them in commando style and came down.
I asked the driver, “do you want to kill these passengers? Is your speed check working…” and I turned to the passengers to scold them for not warning the driver.
Before I could finish, they descended on me, “Oga, how e concern you, (what’s your business), get out of our way, bla bla and bla.”
I left them, jumped into my car and drove off; 30 minutes later, in front of me was a ghastly motor accident, two dead, others with various degrees of injuries.
The driver survived, but the car was totally damaged. Please don’t ask me how I felt and what I told the survivors or if I waited to help and all that emotional homily.
However, I can tell you that between that stretch of road were a couple of police checks and Federal Road Safety Marshals, so how they navigated all these with such speed to meet death remains the story of Nigeria, and before I forget to tell, there was no hospital of minimal standard, and the closest primary healthcare facility was not even good enough for description as a chemist.
The Gas Station
For a nation that was promising that the fuel crisis ‘may be over next year’ in 1977, it is 2023, and we still have a fuel crisis, and the unbelievable fact is that we have the same man running the Petroleum Ministry in 1977 doing it in 2023, so with fuel scarcity for the hundredth time, this is the final corner in the long eight years that promised refineries, removal of subsidies, free market for energy products, and delivered none. And here I was at the gas station to buy PMS, and for the umpteenth time, I noticed that only two of the machines were working, it was supposedly a “mega” station, and we know what mega means.
And that cost me an extra one hour on the ‘short queue’ (and yes, I must say ‘short’), and Nigerians know what I mean. The two machines that were working had only two pumps with attendants instead of four.
So, do the math; if the four machines were working, that would be eight attendants, and yet we complain of lack of jobs. Do the math, and tell me how much I have lost in time and productivity; tell me the effect on my mental health.
The Bank
Similar to the gas station was the experience at the bank, with plenty of customers and few tellers. The teller space was seven, and only three were functional with humans. I refused to use my ‘bulletproof’ influence, so I spent 40 minutes in the bank for a six minutes transaction. Add that to the whole drama of new notes, you drop the old notes at the bank and then use an ATM POINT, and it dispenses the old notes again. We are the only country that gives deadlines on matters that are civil, the fallout of decades of military rule and civil dictatorship.
Add that to some saucy and ill-mannered tellers. The reason for their frustration, as much as they vary, is clear for all to see; some have been tellers for years and are still on some very inhuman labour contracts that defy logic. They could serve us better, but how can they, when they work every day, 24 hours away from the sack from an industry that declares crazy profits every year and the economy remains bad?
We are in the digital age, but the kind of fraud and inefficiency that plagues our mobile banking is second to none yet our banking system seems to function better than our political and governance space because you could get a card that functions anywhere but cannot get a voters’ card in the same manner!
My Neighbourhood
If you have lived in the North, we call it ‘angwa’.
In my hood, my street, my angwa, there’s no water, and yet my house overlooks the water management board saddled with the responsibility of providing potable water (sic), the roads are bad, and the security is best described as ‘hmmm’.
The two DISCO transformers are often vandalized; local crooks break into houses when you leave the house without a living being or at least a dog, they pick items, and the trauma of coming home to a vandalized home is better imagined than experienced.
We blame the National Assembly, and at the local newspaper shop, we argue about the merits of that presidential candidate and the other gubernatorial candidate and demerits, and yet we are saddled with all the problems of the angwa.
We are simply blind to the problems under our noses.
Finally, Whose Business?
In the case of the driver, the road was not exactly bad. But he just would not obey the speed limits; he lost control, two lives were lost, and he was reckless; it really was not the government. It was our business, not the government’s. Not Nigeria but us.
Maybe the road safety officials’ presence on the highway could have helped, and maybe available/functional speed cameras would have saved those two lives and the carnage.
But the truth is, if the passengers valued their lives and were responsible, a collective caution from the five passengers could have done it.
Their lives as Nigerians were their business.
In the gas station and bank, the key issue was ‘us’. From investigation, both were cutting costs; they refused to employ more hands. It was about profits at the customers’ expense. It was about greed, not Nigeria.
For all the blames we put on the government, we are the government. The enterprise called Nigeria is our business, not some folks in Abuja or state governors (both those that stay in their states and those Abuja and foreign investor nation-based governors).
If my angwa is to have good roads, it is the council man/woman, chairman/woman, and state legislator who should be liable. It is about a small conglomerate of leaders close to me. It’s our business, not some ‘bullet proofers’ far away.
We can’t change if we are not the change we want. There can’t be change if banks can’t treat customers right. When gas stations cheat by a litre, by two/three naira. When banks charge some phoney verve enhancement fee amongst many mysterious charges.
We can’t complain about the government in Abuja when we don’t know who our ward councillor is and when we have never confronted local government leaders. When governors are alleged to be corrupt, we keep mute because they are our kinsmen, and when they are confirmed looters, we say leave them because we are of the same faith.
How many times have we boarded a vehicle, and the driver insisted on two in front instead of the mandated one? Did we complain and insist the right thing be done?
Have you contributed towards your local security by calling locals to enforce certain simple rules? We are the government, so Nigeria should be our business.
We pray to a Christian God at the beginning of a function and close the same with a prayer to a Muslim Allah and then, in the same function discuss how to steal because really it’s nobody’s business how anything is run.
It is not just leadership problems that worry Nigeria. No, it’s a problem for you, me and us. The ‘you’ that becomes a Minister and suddenly you need a bulletproof car, and you get two. We are plagued by our lack of simple ethics. We are willing to offer a bribe even when not asked; as often than not, we are guilty until presumed innocent. So we blame our ineptitude on every other person but us.
When the people shall have nothing more to eat, they will eat the rich… we are not there yet, to treat Nigeria as our business and not as some prodigal orphan; we may be just going around in circles, as it is, we are just a people with some personal interests, for now, is there a Nigeria, and whose business she is, remains a question–only time will tell.
By Ejiye Jimeta Ibhawoh
When the NBS rebased the Consumer Price Index in February 2025, and headline inflation fell overnight from 34.80% to 24.48%, yields compressed, and fixed income rallied. A question that should have been straightforward became almost impossible to answer: what is cash actually earning in Nigeria after inflation?
We know what the commentary said. Statistical fix or economic illusion. Cost of living still high. Basket weights shifted. All true, all well-covered. But nobody did the obvious next thing: build the bridge between the old series and the new one, then show what a continuous 15-year picture of Nigerian real returns actually looks like. We did.
The problem with two CPI series
The old NBS CPI ran from a November 2009 base, 740 items weighted by the 2003/04 Nigeria Living Standards Survey. The new methodology uses a 2024 average base, 934 items, and 2023 weights. Food and non-alcoholic beverages dropped from 51.8% to 40.1%. Restaurants and accommodation surged from 1.2% to 12.9%. A 13th COICOP division was added (Insurance and Financial Services). That alone tells you how much the consumption basket has shifted.
These are legitimate improvements. Nigeria’s spending patterns have genuinely changed since 2009. Nobody disputes that.
The problem is continuity. NBS published no officially chain-linked historical series. The old index ends in December 2024. The new one picks up in January 2025. Month-on-month rates don’t match across the boundary. Stops & Gaps documented a particularly egregious discontinuity: the rebased index implies prices fell 12.3% in a single month in December 2024. The largest actual single-month decline since 1995 was 3.5%.
For anyone maintaining a time series (pension fund benchmarking, fixed income attribution, real return measurement), the data is broken. Every analyst in Lagos knows this. Most shrugged and moved on.
Chain-linking: what we built and why
We followed the IMF CPI Manual, Chapter 9, for linking series across base-period changes. December 2024 is the overlap month where both old-base and new-base CPI levels exist. The chain-linking factor comes out at 0.11523. We rescaled the entire old series onto the new base.
The result: 204 continuous monthly CPI observations from February 2009 to January 2026. One hundred and ninety-one back-tested months on the old base, spliced to 13 live months on the new base. No interpolation. No estimation. Month-on-month rates are preserved through the splice point, and every calculation is reproducible from published NBS and CBN data.
We paired this CPI series with CBN 91-day T-bill stop rates from primary auctions to construct the VNG-CRR, the Venoble Nigeria Cash Real Return Index. Two inputs per month. NBS CPI level. CBN stop rate. Fisher equation. All compounds into an index.
The headline: over 204 months, Nigerian cash earned +9.48% annualised in nominal terms and −5.48% annualised in real terms. This is consistent, cumulative, and structural purchasing power destruction.
Put it differently. N1 million placed in 91-day T-bills in February 2009 would be worth roughly N4.7 million as of January 2026 in nominal terms. Adjust for what that money can actually buy, and the real value is closer to N380,000. The T-bill investor multiplied his digits and shrank his wealth.
Why this matters now
Start with pension fund allocation. Nigeria’s pension assets reached N26.66 trillion as of October 2025. Roughly 60% (c.N16 trillion) sits in FGN securities. If the annualised real return on government paper has been negative for 15 consecutive years, what does that mean for 10 million contributor accounts? The OECD flagged this in its 2024 pension report using 2023 data. Pension funds in Nigeria, Angola, and Egypt, where more than half of assets sit in bills and bonds, delivered negative real returns. PenCom raised equity limits in February 2026: RSA Fund I from 30% to 35%, RSA Fund II from 25% to 33% and while this is indeed a step in the right direction, it is not enough.
Then there is the visibility problem. Under the old methodology, a 91-day bill at 18% against 34.8% inflation was obviously underwater. Under the new CPI, the same bill at 15% against 15.15% inflation looks like a break-even. Did real returns improve, or did the statistical agency change the yardstick? In our view, both. Inflation has genuinely decelerated: monthly CPI growth dropped below 1.0% for several consecutive months in H2 2025. But the rebase also flatters the comparison by c.10 percentage points. Without a continuous series, you cannot separate the two effects.
And the sign has flipped. This is not speculation. From August 2025 through January 2026, the VNG-CRR recorded six consecutive months of positive real returns. January 2026 was the strongest at +4.39% real. Month-on-month CPI fell 2.88% while the nominal T-bill return was 1.38%. The real index climbed from
984 to 1,027, above its inception base of 1,000 for the first time.
After 15 years of negative returns, real returns have turned positive. Whether that holds is the question nobody can answer yet.
What we do not know
We don’t have a strong view on the persistence of the disinflation trend. The December 2025 CPI base effect is messy. The rebased December 2024 level was set at 100, which creates arithmetic distortions in year-on-year comparisons as that month rotates out. Headline YoY inflation could spike artificially in December 2025 data even if underlying prices remain stable. Anyone anchoring allocation decisions to year-on-year headline numbers will get whipsawed.
We also cannot tell you whether the new CPI basket accurately captures the cost-of-living reality for the median Nigerian. Restaurants and accommodation at 12.9% may reflect urban middle-class spending in Victoria Island and Wuse. It does not reflect what a civil servant in Kano or a smallholder farmer in Benue pays for food and transport. The CPI measures what it measures. It is not a cost-of-living index. That distinction matters more than most post-rebase commentary acknowledged, and it is the gap a continuous real return series is designed to fill.
The allocation question
Here is what the data does tell you. Over 204 months, the real return hurdle rate (what an alternative investment must beat just to match cash in purchasing-power terms) has been low. Negative, in fact. Any asset class generating positive real returns has beaten cash. Equities: the NGX ASI returned 51.19% in 2025. Real estate in Lekki and Abuja CBD. Dollar-denominated instruments accessed through NAFEM. All cleared the hurdle.
With real yields now positive, the calculus shifts. Cash is no longer guaranteed wealth destruction. But 15 years of compounded losses do not reverse in six months. The real index is at 1,027. It needs sustained positive real returns to recover the purchasing power lost over the prior decade.
For pension fund administrators and asset managers, the implication is straightforward: measure everything against the real return on cash. Not nominal yields. Not headline inflation. The actual, chain-linked, continuously compounded purchasing-power return. If your portfolio is not beating that number, you are losing money regardless of what the nominal statement says.
Why independent benchmarks matter
Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa and the largest pension assets on the continent. Its data infrastructure for institutional investors is among the weakest. South Africa has inflation-linked bonds, a real repo rate published by the SARB, and a mature index ecosystem. Nigeria has a CPI series with a structural break and no official chain-linked alternative.
The gap is not in analytical capacity. There’s no shortage of Nigerian research firms producing excellent work. The gap is infrastructure. Auditable, rules-based benchmarks that any market participant can verify.
Not commentary. Not opinions about what inflation feels like. Published, reproducible numbers.
That is what we built the VNG-CRR to provide. Two inputs. One equation. One index. Updated monthly.
Methodology published. Data downloadable. Every calculation is auditable against source data. All are completely free to the public.
The CPI rebase broke the data. We built the unbroken picture because nobody else did. Whether NBS eventually publishes its own chain-linked series, or the market continues relying on independent providers, says something about where Nigeria’s capital market infrastructure actually stands. We do not think anyone in Abuja is losing sleep over it, but maybe they should be.
E.J. Ibhawoh is the founder and CEO of Venoble Limited, an investment intelligence and capital management firm for African markets. He is a FINRA-qualified capital markets professional with a background spanning investment banking, trading, and software development.
By Abba Dukawa
Nigeria stands today at a painful and defining crossroads in its security journey. Across the nation, families live with growing fear as insecurity spreads—kidnappings, banditry, and terrorism have become harsh realities in too many communities. These threats do not respect state boundaries. Organised criminal networks move across states, leaving ordinary citizens feeling exposed and abandoned.
Nigerians are facing intertwined challenges. The anger is no longer whispered in private—it is now spoken openly with frustration and worry. Another pressing issue confronting Nigerians is the renewed debate over the creation of state police. When will the federal government strengthen the effectiveness of its security agencies? How much longer must communities endure this uncertainty?
At the same time, another urgent debate rises from the hearts of the people. In the face of this deepening crisis, should state governments be allowed to establish their own police forces to protect their citizens? Or will Nigeria continue to rely solely on a centralised system that many believe is struggling to respond quickly enough to local threats?
These are not just political questions. They are questions of safety, dignity, and the right of every Nigerian to live without fear. The nation is waiting, hoping for bold decisions that will restore trust, strengthen security, and protect the future of its people. State police cannot be the answer to these pressing issues that bedevil federal security agencies.
Recently, the President appealed to the leadership of the National Assembly to consider constitutional amendments that would create a legal framework for state police, arguing that such reform is necessary to address Nigeria’s worsening security challenges. The fragmented policing structure could complicate efforts to combat crime effectively.
Reigniting the debate over state police comes as no surprise, given that he has long been seen as an advocate for the idea since his tenure as Governor of Lagos State. He supported the concept then and has continued to promote it as President. Many Nigerians, particularly in the South-West, have long called for state police as a means to address the country’s growing insecurity. Despite the constitutional considerations, discussions around state police continue to evoke strong emotions nationwide.
How will state police address security breaches committed by local militias or vigilante groups such as the OPC in the Southwestern states? What actions would state police take regarding the Amotekun group, which is openly endorsed by Southwest governors, if it were to commit serious violations of the rights of citizens, especially those from other parts of the country? How quickly have the proponents of state police chosen to erase from memory the horrific atrocities the OPC inflicted on the Northern community in Lagos in February 2002? The scars of that tragedy are still raw, yet some behave as though it never happened—as if the pain and the lives lost meant nothing. It is a bitter betrayal of justice and our collective conscience.
Reintroducing this issue at a time when the federal security apparatus is already strained shows a lack of sensitivity. Proponents overlook that Section 214(1) clearly states there is only one police force for the federation, the Nigeria Police Force and no other police force may be established for any part of the federation. The section does not permit the establishment of state police. Policing is on the Exclusive Legislative List, meaning only the federal government can create or control a police force.
Even today, the Nigeria Police Force, under the centralised command of the Inspector-General, faces accusations of harassment and intimidation of the weak and vulnerable citizens. If such problems persist under federal control, imagine the risks of placing police authority under state governors, who already wield significant influence over state and local structures.
Implications For The State Police Structures In The Hand Of The State Governors
I must state clearly: I do not support the establishment of state police—at least not at this stage of Nigeria’s development. Our institutions remain fragile, and introducing such a system carries significant risks of abuse. History offers reasons for caution: the Native Authority police of the past were often linked to political repression and misuse of power.
Supporters argue that state police would bring law enforcement closer to local communities and improve response to crime. However, there are serious concerns rooted in Nigeria’s social realities.
Nigeria is a diverse nation with multiple ethnic and religious sentiments. If recruitment into state police forces becomes dominated by particular groups, minority communities may feel marginalised or threatened.
State police could deepen divisions and weaken public trust. State-controlled Police could also become instruments of political intimidation, especially during election periods, potentially targeting opposition figures, critics, and journalists.
Financial capacity is another major concern. Establishing and maintaining a professional police force requires substantial investment in training, equipment, salaries, welfare, and infrastructure. Many states already struggle to pay workers and provide essential services. How, then, can they adequately fund a state police? The likely outcome is poorly trained, under-equipped personnel—conditions that often foster corruption and inefficiency.
Even under federal oversight, Nigeria’s police system struggles with weak accountability and abuse of power. Transferring these weaknesses to the state level without safeguards could have severe consequences.
A poorly structured state police force could become loyal to governors rather than the Constitution, serving political interests rather than citizens’ interests. For these reasons, introducing state police, even with the constitutional amendment, could create more problems than it solves. Sustainability, accountability, and adherence to constitutional principles are critical and will likely be violated
Nigeria must strengthen law enforcement while protecting citizens’ rights and preserving national unity. Mr President, please reconsider your decision on state police. Nigerians want a strong, effective, and unified police force, not one that risks further dividing a system already struggling to meet its constitutional obligations.
Dukawa can be reached at ab**********@***il.com
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
China’s investments in Africa have primarily been in the agricultural sector, reinforcing its support for the continent to attain food security for the growing population, estimated currently at 1.5 billion people. With a huge expanse of land and untapped resources, China’s investment in agriculture, focused on increasing local production, has been described as highly appreciable.
Brazil has adopted a similar strategy in its policy with African countries; its investments have concentrated in a number of countries, especially those rich in natural resources. It has significantly contributed to Africa’s economic growth by improving access to affordable machinery, industrial inputs, and adding value to consumer goods. Thus, Africa has to reduce product imports which can be produced locally.
The China and Brazil in African Agriculture Project has just published online a series of studies concerning Chinese and Brazilian support for African agriculture. They appeared in an upcoming issue of World Development. The six articles focusing on China are available below:
–A New Politics of Development Cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian Engagements in African Agriculture by Ian Scoones, Kojo Amanor, Arilson Favareto and Qi Gubo.
–South-South Cooperation, Agribusiness and African Agricultural Development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique by Kojo Amanor and Sergio Chichava.
–Chinese State Capitalism? Rethinking the Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa by Jing Gu, Zhang Chuanhong, Alcides Vaz and Langton Mukwereza.
–Chinese Migrants in Africa: Facts and Fictions from the Agri-food Sector in Ethiopia and Ghana by Seth Cook, Jixia Lu, Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.
–Chinese Agricultural Training Courses for African Officials: Between Power and Partnerships by Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.
–Science, Technology and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres in Africa by Xiuli Xu, Xiaoyun Li, Gubo Qi, Lixia Tang and Langton Mukwereza.
Strategic partnerships and the way forward: African leaders have to adopt import substitution policies, re-allocate financial resources toward attaining domestic production, and sustain self-sufficiency.
Maximising the impact of resource mobilisation requires collaboration among governments, key external partners, investment promotion agencies, financial institutions, and the private sector. Partnerships must be aligned with national development priorities that can promote value addition, support industrialisation, and deepen regional and continental integration.
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