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BRICS+ and G20: Competing or Collaborating for Global South

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BRICS Global South Cooperation

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa heads G20, an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 sovereign countries, the European Union, and the African Union, while Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva chairs BRICS+, an association made of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with four new members and 13 partner states in a category mostly from developing countries.

At a quick glance, the G20 and BRICS+ are respectively chaired this year 2025 by South Africa and Brazil, both BRICS+ members, which makes it distinctively important development for the changing geopolitical world. In 2025, G20 and BRICS+ agenda features a pivotal role and pledge to continue making concerted strides, either in keen competition for economic revitalization or in close collaboration as development players, in the Global South.

Historically, G20 was created back in 1999 as a group of twenty of the world’s largest economies to deal primarily with multifaceted aspects of existing global economic, trade, health, climate change and political issues. Dissatisfied with the global dominance of the United States and the stack failure of leaders of developing countries, especially in Africa, to raise their economic status to an appreciable levels and improve standards of living for the largely impoverished population, BRIC appeared in 2009, in city of Yekaterinburg, Russia.

South Africa ascended in 2010, transforming it into BRICS. As popularly now referred to as BRICS+, its key objective aspiration is to support building a better economic architecture for the Global South. In addition, BRICS+, as a non-western association, operates against western hegemony and uni-polar, rules-based system. Its key priority aims at shaping a more equitable and a more balanced global order while collaborating with developing countries in raising their economic status in the Global South.

An insight into G20 and BRICS+ including its “partner states” category shows the huge economic structure, the natural and human resources necessary for the future of mankind. We have observed several discussions, at highest levels these several years, on intensifying whatever political dialogue and exchange of views, economic collaborations and interactions on bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for developing better conditions in the Global South. Bridging the economic and standards of living gap have been on the agenda for both G20 and BRICS+ during previous years.

Every year, the leaders of G20 members meet to discuss mainly economic and financial matters and coordinate policy on some other issues of mutual interest. Every year, BRICS+ members summit features extensive deliberations on the United States global dominance and hegemony, without adequately addressing economic lapses in the developing Global South. Several summit declarations have adopted in that directions, but remain purely as collective declarations.

G20 and BRICS+ agenda in 2025?

As geopolitical situation heightens, G20 and BRICS+ are championing its a fresh version of governance reforms in their ways, and further reviewing the current operations of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF)and the World Bank for developing countries in the Global South. Despite these common goals, G20 and BRICS+ still have the main points of discontention. BRICS+ shares, in its declarations, dissatisfaction over over-exploitation of resources in and rules-based approach towards developing world.

In the Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation’s media release in January 2025, titled “The G20 is made up of 13 Engagement Groups”, stated that “South Africa fully supports the approach of strengthening partnerships and expanding dialogue with a wide range of actors; including States, international organizations and civil society; to collectively shape the G20’s approach to issues requiring international cooperation.” (South Africa’s chairmanship of G20, Jan. 2025)

It further recognizes the significant strides made by the Brazilian G20 presidency (2024) in enhancing the G20 as a site of democratic global engagement. The South African presidency will continue this trajectory. In South Africa’s G20 presidency, further modalities will be developed to involve a wide range of stakeholders throughout the year, particularly on priority initiatives. Until the G20 Leaders’ Summit in November 2025, South Africa is expected to bring together representatives of the existing engagement groups and other segments of civil society that may offer meaningful contributions to the G20.

For the BRICS+ agenda, focus is placed on the need to reform the current international financial architecture to meet the global financial challenges. As already explained, the measures are to facilitate the development of the economy, international trade, and the achievement of the sustainable development goals.

In addition to the financial architecture, BRICS+ has agreed to discuss and study the feasibility of establishment of an independent cross-border settlement and depositary infrastructure, an initiative to complement the existing financial market infrastructure, as well as independent reinsurance capacity and the possibility of expanding innovative financial practices and approaches for projects and programmes, including finding acceptable mechanisms of financing in local currencies.

BRICS+ has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining a strong and effective Global Financial Safety Net with a quota-based and adequately resourced IMF at its centre. On G20, BRICS+ recognized the importance of the continued and productive functioning of the G20, based on consensus with a focus on result-oriented outcomes. In other words, both would play complimentary role in the global economy, and appreciating efforts with a focus on development trends in the Global South.

South Africa Driving Development Goals

In accepting G20 chairmanship early December in Cape Town, South Africa explicitly indicated a number of practical ways forward in consolidating G20 on the world stage as it strives to gain additional significant momentum in 2025.

South Africa, however, insisted that G20’s relations have to be compatible with development gaols of the Global South. The main argument here is that the G20 comprises many of the world’s largest developing and developed economies. Therefore, G20 has to play a critical role in influencing policies and foster economic stability to have a direct impact on the lives of all members of the global community.

It has a wide agenda that now includes trade sustainable development, health, agriculture, energy, the environment, climate change and anti-corruption. These agenda initiatives are not only to drive economic progress but also to accelerate and support long-term investment opportunities across the continents especially in Africa.

The outlook for global economic growth remains unpredictable, and many economies carry the burden of unsustainable levels of debt. Geopolitical instability, conflict and war are causing further hardship and suffering. Across the world, billions of people are affected by under-development, inequality, poverty, hunger and unemployment.

Strengthening Economic Partnership

Working together with G20 members and building partnerships across society is one the surest pathways to confront the development challenges. Exploring the development pathways, without any geopolitical discrimination but with caution, to achieve more rapid, inclusive and economic growth for future generations.

The G20 provides us with a platform to pursue these collective goals. South Africa has adopted the theme ‘Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability’ for its G20 Presidency. Through solidarity, we can create an inclusive future that advances the interests of people at the greatest risk of being left behind.

Under South Africa’s leadership, the G20 leaders have to work seriously with African Union and European Union, through this year, until its final summit which will take place in Johannesburg in November 2025. South Africa’s presidency, for the first time an African country has presided over the G20, in line with above-mentioned theme, there is the necessity to strengthen and advance consistent efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

Africa’s Noticeable Challenges

Until today, Africa faces multitude of challenges. The continent, comprising 55 States, was declared as politically independent in 1963 and yet is confronted with challenges of an excellent model of governance and exemplary leadership. Basic tenets of transfers as stipulated within framework of constitutions are usually marked by conflicts, opposition groups are frequently banned from operating in the country.

This is further simply compounded by economic under-development which impact heavily on living standards of majority of the population across the Africa. Despite huge untapped natural resources, tackling the economy requires finances which many African countries lack primarily due to inability to design national priority actions. Urban-rural development disparities have taken its characteristic shape in many geographic parts of Africa.

The local African, multilateral financial institutions, development banks and the private sector need to scale up, with a fairer and appropriate lending conditions to ensure debt sustainability for low-income countries.

In fact, Africa still needs more investment in infrastructure, healthcare, education and finance for sustaining many other development needs, and as well as to consider extending debt relief to developing economies. These are challenges for G20 and BRICS+ to champion their critical positions as engines for growth and development in Africa, and Global South.

In 2025, there is unshakeable (amplified) hope that both South Africa’s G20 directorship and Brazil’s BRICS+ chairmanship, focus would be on pursuing remarkable progress on cross-cutting development issues throughout Africa and across Global South.

Logical Expectations

In this fast-changing landscape characterized by forging new alliances, the practical implementation of the Russia’s initiatives, against the backdrop of escalated tensions, fostering cooperation not confrontation, will rather help effectively in addressing challenges. One more significant point is that there may be important linkages emerging between BRICS+ and G20. Undoubtedly, Brazil in 2025 is likely to base its priorities on some of the themes that were pursued in 2024 during its chairmanship in G20.

BRICS and G20, critical over global political developments and economic growth, but both could complement efforts as partners in tackling existing challenges, coordinate approaches and strategies. Particularly, Africa, as part of the developing Global South, has increasingly become the subject of deliberations at high-level summits and conferences, noting that more 60% of its population still wallow in abject poverty.

Understanding the puzzling paradox that Africa has huge untapped natural resources and adequate human capital to engage in development. Often asked rhetorical question why ‘the Asian tigers’ developed while ‘the African lions’ declined these past several years. South Africa, as the current G20 president, has to set the platform this 2025 for practical dialogue at G20, which includes BRICS members, to adopt collective towards Africa’s development goals including those in energy, industrialization, infrastructure and agriculture.

Logical Conclusion

As we mark the end of this first quarter century in 2025, it behoves on individual leaders, states and their stakeholders to act rather than engage in persistent criticisms and trading geopolitical rhetoric. On one hand, BRICS+ bloc is rapidly evolving as an alternative platform for global cooperation. For substantive continuity, BRICS+ apparently has to ensure that the initiatives raised during Russia’s presidency, and previous summits, members and the “partner states” maintain unwavering commitment towards their realization.

But on the other hand, G20 has to readjust and adapt its collective approach towards diverse perspectives, reform its models of operations to compliment and support development initiatives of the Global South. While appreciating in the final summary that G20 and BRICS+ platforms are created for driving global development and expected optimal economic growth, and further to engage in tackling challenges in order to register visible impact, it is highly necessary to emphasize the importance of trust and collaboration.

Moreover, the geopolitical implications are already known. But this, as a whole, becomes ultimately the greatest interest in their current deliberations. It is really a defining moment for Africa, and in general, for the Global South. Both G20 and BRICS+ have to subsequently demonstrate strategic steps in actualizing the aspirations as we move forward into the future.

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Russian Researchers Roadmap Africa’s Investment Sectors for Entrepreneurs

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Professor Irina Abramova Russian Researchers

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

The Centre for Transition Economy Studies of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences held a two-day scientific conference under the theme: “Industrial Development Strategies of African Countries” on March 18-19. The conference was opened by Professor Irina Abramova, Director of the Institute for African Studies. More than 40 researchers and experts from Russia, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and North Macedonia took part in the event.

The conference focused on a wide range of significant issues related to Africa’s industrial development, the modernisation of the African production base, and the potential for Russian-African cooperation. The in-person part of the conference focused on the development of the manufacturing and extractive industries, special economic zones, energy and transport infrastructure, digitalisation, and the agro-industrial complex. The second day of the conference was conducted as an online discussion in English, featuring African colleagues on the localisation of production chains in Africa, covering both agricultural and mineral processing.

Topics of the Conference included:

  1. Continental, regional and national programs and plans of industrial development in Africa. Prospects of continental and regional production chains.
  2. Study of the manufacturing market in African countries: manufacturing and agro-industrial complexes
  3. Energy, transport, and digitalisation: necessary infrastructure for industrial development.
  4. Interests of Multinational Corporations in Africa: conditions, forms of activities and geographical distribution. The role of free economic zones.
  5. Government policy regarding Multinational Corporations and control over export-import flows.
  6. The role of international organisations and activities of external actors.
  7. Possible areas and prospects for expanding mutually beneficial cooperation for Russian companies in Africa.

Experts in African studies from Russia, as well as representatives of the Russian government and business circles involved in trade and economic cooperation with African countries, actively participated. One of the significant outputs presented at the plenary session of the conference was the full-text on the African Development Strategy database created by Professors D. A. Degterev and A. D. Novikov, together with the staff of the IAS. The database covers more than 400 official strategic planning documents across 53 countries on the continent for the period 1997–2025. It systematises them under six thematic areas: long-term and medium-term development strategies, industrial policy, ICT, agriculture and the water sector.

The plenary session featured nine reports covering key dimensions of Africa’s industrial development. There were issues of trade and industrial potential of the continent that were highlighted in the report on the export specificity of African machine-building industries: based on ITC Trade Map data (2019–2024) that shows duties of South Africa, Tunisia, and industrial production, including on intracontinental markets.

Institutional mechanisms of Russian-African economic cooperation were reviewed in the report on the activities of Intergovernmental Commissions: the number of these ICC increased from four (4) in 2023 to nine (9) in 2025, and the volume of investment funds to support African projects is planned to increase, at least, to Rouble 5 billion for 2026–2027.

The conceptual dimension of financing industrialisation was presented through a critique of universal Western narratives and the justification for the need for an “application finance strategy”—a country model that takes into account the economy of Africa. Practical aspects of Russia’s investment presence in Africa are characterized on the example of projects in the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with an emphasis on the specific risks of the subregion (DM Sinitsyn, VEB.RF). Digitalisation and artificial intelligence development in sub-Saharan African countries were also analysed and presented at the conference.

Russian-African cooperation in the field of technologies and education was covered in the reports on the transfer of agrobiotechnologies through the Afro-Russian Centre for Technology Development in Kampala, within which, in 2025/2026, this period, in which concretely 467 citizens of African countries were trained in Russian universities (NA Goncharova, FGBU “Agroexport”).

The competitive struggle of foreign players for African markets and the possibilities of Russian participation were considered in the reports on the position of the continent on the world energy markets, supplies of ground vehicles, and activities of pharmaceuticals for Africa. The digital dimension of industrialisation was covered by the reports on the cyber potential of West Africa, the formation of data processing centres in the industrial strategy of South Africa, and the digitalisation strategies of Algeria and Morocco.

The theme of most speeches, at the conference, became a reflection on the ‘disconnection’ between the proclaimed goals of industrialisation and the actual structure of African economies: despite the widespread proliferation of pre-national strategic documents, industries in the continent’s total GDP has not exceeded 10–12% for more than two decades, and exports still comprise mainly unprocessed raw materials.

In this regard, a number of reports justify the need to transition from external financial models formed by international organisations to sovereign country strategies based on state political, industrial and human resources. Global South—including, to deepen Russian-African cooperation in the spheres of technology, education and investment.

A collective monograph is, however, planned for publication following the conference. The event included the presentation of the full-text database on African development strategies, prepared by the team of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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Court Finds Lafarge, Eight ex-Employees Guilty of Terrorism Financing

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Lafarge Africa

By Aduragbemi Omiyale

A court in Paris, France, has found notable French cement manufacturer, Lafarge, and eight of its former employees guilty of terrorism financing.

Delivering the judgment on Monday, Judge Isabelle Prevost-Desprez held that Lafarge paid some members of the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) in Syria about $6.5 million (€5.59 million; £4.83 million) between 2013 and 2014 to protect its plant operating in northern Syria.

The court said this action provided oxygen for the terror group to operate and carry out its violent acts.

The former chief executive of the company, Mr Bruno Lafont, was also found complicit and has been sentenced to six years.

“It is clear to the court that the sole purpose of the funding of a terrorist organisation was to keep the Syrian plant running for economic reasons. Payments to terrorist entities enabled Lafarge to continue its operations,” the judge said, adding that, “These payments took the form of a genuine commercial partnership with IS.”

The factory in Jalabiya, northern Syria, was bought by Lafarge in 2008 for $680 million and began operations in 2010, months before the civil war began in March 2011, following opposition to then-president Bashar al-Assad’s brutal repression of anti-government protests.

ISIS jihadists seized large swathes of Syria and neighbouring Iraq in 2014, declaring a so-called cross-border “caliphate” and implementing their brutal interpretation of Islamic law.

To keep its plant running and protect its employees, Lafarge, between 2013 and September 2014, paid about €800,000 to secure safe passage and €1.6 million to purchase source materials from quarries under the control of the jihadist groups.

According to the BBC, Lafarge acknowledged the court’s finding, which it said “concerns a legacy matter involving conduct that occurred more than a decade ago and was in flagrant violation of Lafarge’s code of conduct,” describing the decision as an “important milestone” in the company’s actions to “address this legacy matter responsibly.”

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Afreximbank Grows Assets to $48.5bn as Profit Hits $1.2bn

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Afreximbank

By Adedapo Adesanya

African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) has posted a robust financial performance for the 2025 financial year, with total assets and contingencies climbing to $48.5 billion.

This further shows its growing influence in financing trade and development across Africa and the Caribbean.

The Cairo-based multilateral lender, in its audited results released on April 9, reported a 21 per cent surge in total assets from $40.1 billion in 2024, underscoring sustained balance sheet expansion despite global economic headwinds and rating concerns.

Net loans and advances rose by 16 per cent to $33.5 billion, driven by strong disbursements into critical sectors including manufacturing, infrastructure, food security and climate adaptation, areas seen as pivotal to Africa’s long-term economic resilience.

Profitability remained strong, with net income climbing 19 per cent to $1.2 billion, up from $973.5 million in the previous year. Gross income also edged higher by 6.06 per cent to $3.5 billion, reflecting steady revenue growth supported by the bank’s expanding portfolio of trade finance and advisory services.

Afreximbank maintained solid asset quality, with its non-performing loan (NPL) ratio at 2.43 per cent, broadly stable compared to 2.33 per cent in 2024. This performance highlights disciplined risk management even as lending volumes increased across diverse markets.

Liquidity remained a key strength. Cash and cash equivalents rose significantly to $6.0 billion from $4.6 billion, while liquid assets accounted for 14 per cent of total assets, comfortably above the bank’s internal minimum threshold of 10 per cent.

Shareholders’ funds grew 17 per cent to $8.4 billion, supported by the strong profit outturn and fresh equity inflows of $299.4 million under its General Capital Increase II programme. The bank’s capital adequacy ratio stood at 23 per cent, well above regulatory benchmarks, providing a solid buffer for future growth.

Operating expenses increased to $459.2 million from $367.7 million, reflecting staff expansion and inflationary pressures. However, Afreximbank retained cost discipline, with a cost-to-income ratio of 21 per cent, still significantly below its 30 per cent ceiling.

The bank successfully tapped international capital markets, raising over $800 million through Samurai and Panda bond issuances in Japan and China during the year. The move helped counter concerns raised by some rating agencies and reaffirmed Afreximbank’s strong funding access and credibility.

Commenting on the results, Senior Executive Vice President, Mrs Denys Denya, said the performance reflects resilience and strategic execution amid a challenging global environment.

“Despite continuing global geopolitical challenges and disruptions caused by some rating actions, the Group delivered excellent financial performance in 2025,” he said.

He noted that the results cap a decade of transformative leadership under the erstwhile President, Mr Benedict Oramah, with the bank already ahead of most targets under its Sixth Strategic Plan, which runs through 2026.

Mr Denya added that newer subsidiaries, including the Fund for Export Development in Africa (FEDA) and AfrexInsure, are now profitable, contributing to earnings growth and strengthening the group’s diversified structure.

“The Group’s balance sheet is at its strongest level ever, with liquidity levels and capitalisation well above target and good asset quality,” he said.

Afreximbank said it is entering the 2026 financial year with strong momentum, positioning itself to scale impact, deepen trade integration and drive value addition across “Global Africa.”

Return metrics remained stable, with return on average equity at 15 per cent and return on average assets improving slightly to 3.04 per cent, signalling efficient use of capital.

With a fortified balance sheet, rising profitability and sustained investor confidence, Afreximbank said it is firmly on track to consolidate its role as a key engine of trade-led growth across the continent.

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