World
Discussing Food Security in Ethiopia and other Poorest Nations in the Horn of Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
By geographical definition, Ethiopia is located in East Africa. It is landlocked in the Horn of Africa and shares borders with Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. With its long chequered history, Ethiopia is discussed from different and divergent perspectives, including its geography, politics, economy and culture. Many politicians, academic experts and researchers also look at Ethiopia’s role within the region and its external relations on the global stage.
Ethiopia has been, these several years, in the news media. In May 1998, a border dispute with Eritrea led to the Eritrean–Ethiopian War, which lasted until June 2000 and cost both countries an estimated $1 million a day. This had a negative effect on Ethiopia’s economy but strengthened the ruling coalition. In early November, Ethiopia and one of its ethnic groups, the Tigray, were desperately looking for a peace deal that sent them to South Africa.
For his efforts in ending the 20-year-long war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel prize for peace in 2019. After taking office in April 2018, 46-year-old Abiy released political prisoners, promised fair elections for 2019 and announced sweeping economic reforms.
With approximately 115 million population, the majority is still impoverished despite its huge land and other natural resources. Within Ethiopia is a vast highland complex of mountains and dissected plateaus divided by the Great Rift Valley, which generally runs southwest to northeast and is surrounded by lowlands, steppes, or semi-desert. There is a great diversity of terrain with wide variations in climate, soils, natural vegetation and settlement patterns.
Ethiopia has 14 major rivers flowing from its highlands, including the Nile. It has the largest water reserves in Africa. As of 2012, hydroelectric plants represented around 88.2% of the total installed electricity generating capacity. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project, when finally completed, will provide surplus energy in Ethiopia which will be available for export to neighbouring countries.
Ethiopia is often considered the birthplace of coffee which it produces more than any other nation on the continent. Coffee provides a livelihood for close to 15 million Ethiopians, 16% of the population, and it generates $1.4 billion in revenues annually.
Ethiopian Airlines, wholly owned by the government, is the flagship of Ethiopia. It serves a network of 125 passenger destinations. It is Africa’s largest airline in terms of passengers carried, destinations served, fleet size and annual total revenue.
Addis Ababa, the prestigious capital city of Ethiopia, hosts the African Union headquarters and all foreign governments and international organizations are represented here. In contrast, Moscow, the capital of Russia, has a modern infrastructure but lacks foreign representative organizations. Moscow is not New York or Washington, and with the Russia-Ukraine crisis, most foreign organizations have exited the city.
China is the largest developing country in the world, and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. However, China is visible with its investment and financing infrastructure in Africa. In January 2012, the African Union inaugurated its new headquarters in the prestigious city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The $200 million building was funded and largely built by China, even using building materials imported from China. In addition, the construction of the headquarters of the Africa Center for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) is a project undertaken and financed with $48 million by China.
In addition to the above significant points, there is currently a large Ethiopian Diaspora in the United States. There are roughly 251,000 Ethiopian immigrants and their children living in the United States. But the unofficial estimates fixed the number range upwards at 460,000, and Ethiopian bank reports indicate that close to $2.4 billion is remitted yearly from the United States to Ethiopia.
“Remittance from the Ethiopian Diaspora is critically important to the country’s foreign exchange growth,” the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) said in its official annual report. Ethiopians residing in North America, Europe, and the Middle East are among the major remitters of foreign currency to Ethiopia. It further said that a total of US$4 billion was remitted during the entire 2020/21 fiscal year.
Ethiopia – the Poorest Nation?
The Ethiopian leadership, the government and Ethiopians wholeheartedly accept the diminutive description of their nation as the poorest in order to get regular humanitarian assistance from external donors. By classification and from Russia’s perspective, for instance, Ethiopia is one of the poorest in need of food security and urgent humanitarian assistance. President Vladimir Putin reiterated the free delivery of food to Africa’s poorest, referring to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan.
Russian Security Council deputy chairman Dmitry Medvedev and South Africa’s Deputy President David Mabuza discussed in early November, within the strict adherence to the Istanbul package agreements, to export Ukrainian grain and advance Russian foodstuffs and fertilizers to world markets, including Africa. Medvedev confirmed Russia’s readiness to provide its stock of agricultural products to African partners free of charge.
According to Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, an agreement was reached with Russia on the supply of grain to poor countries in Africa. “First of all, the corridor will function for deliveries to the poor countries of Africa, in particular to Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan,” he said.
Putin consistently makes passionate arguments for a shift from western hegemony, while Russia is an alternative that could support sustainable development, especially in Africa. On the other hand, African leaders have to think seriously about how to use their huge untapped resources to improve the agricultural sector and raise agricultural production for impoverished millions.
Andrew Korybko, an American Moscow-based political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, wrote in an October article to One World: “As Ethiopia attempts to reduce its dependence on foreign food aid, it must first seriously consider switching suppliers in order to not remain as vulnerable to the West’s possible weaponization of this aid during the interim. Russia has become an agricultural superpower in recent years, ironically enough, largely due to its response to Western sanctions, according to President Putin during his remarks at the latest Valdai Club plenary session. It should therefore have more than enough supply to meet Ethiopia’s needs.”
According to Korybko’s analysis, the Eurasian Great Power is incomparably more politically reliable than the West, as evidenced by its support of Ethiopia during its ongoing anti-terrorist campaign in Tigray. The two countries even signed a military agreement over the summer to revive their Soviet-era strategic partnership. From the Ethiopian perspective, it would be wise to rely more on Russian wheat imports – including through possible food aid – than on Western ones while it transitions towards sustainably ensuring its food security, which will take time.
But in sharp contrast to the above, why should Africa and its leaders brace for grain imports and be struggling with rising food prices as a direct result of the Russia-Ukraine crisis? Do Africa boast of vast uncultivated land? Why could Africa not prioritize mechanized agriculture? In the national development context, and to a large extent, are not questions of neo-colonialism, imperialism or the Joe Biden administration. Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan, and many others have to get back to learn the advantages of pragmatic import substitution policies in basic Economics.
The Way Forward
Beyond food assistance that is commendable, but if it is interested in sustainable food security, then Russia has to facilitate agricultural development in Africa. That compared, China has always been sharing its agricultural development experience and technology with Africa to support African countries in improving agricultural production and processing and to help them in building their agricultural value chains and trade.
Reports show that since 2012, 7,456 African trainees have received agricultural training in China. Through projects such as sending Chinese agricultural experts to Africa, more than 50,000 Africans have been trained, and 23 agricultural demonstration centres have been built. To date, China has established agricultural cooperation mechanisms with 23 African countries and regional organizations and signed 72 bilateral and multilateral agricultural cooperation agreements.
Since 2012, China has signed 31 agricultural cooperation agreements with 20 African countries and regional organizations. In 2019, the First China-Africa Agriculture Cooperation Forum was held, which announced the establishment of the China-AU Agriculture Cooperation Commission and the formulation of a program of action to promote China-Africa cooperation in agricultural modernization.
By the end of 2020, more than 200 Chinese companies had an investment stock of $1.11 billion in the agricultural sector in 35 African countries. Their investments cover areas such as planting, breeding and processing. More than 350 types of African agricultural products can be traded with China. All this ensures steady growth in China-Africa agricultural trade.
Significant to note that during a business conference held at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on April 22, African Development Bank Group President Dr Akinwumi Adesina, speaking as a guest of the Washington, DC, US-based think tank, called for an increased sense of urgency amid what he described as a once-in-a-century convergence of global challenges for Africa, including a looming food crisis. The continent’s most vulnerable countries have been hit hardest by conflict, climate change and the pandemic, which upended economic and development progress in Africa.
Adesina suggested that Africa must rapidly expand its production to meet food security challenges. “My basic principle is that Africa should not be begging. Some of our leaders negotiate for grains, foodstuffs and agricultural products that they can produce. We must solve our own challenges ourselves without depending on others,” he said.
In a similar argument and direction, the World Bank has also expressed worry over sub-Saharan African countries’ high expenditure on food imports that could be produced locally using their vast uncultivated lands and the devastating impact on budgets due to rising external borrowing. According to the bank, it is crucial to increase the effectiveness of current resources to expand and support local production, especially in the sectors of agriculture and industry, during this crucial period of the Russia-Ukraine crisis.
With the above facts, African leaders have to demonstrate a higher level of commitment to tackling post-pandemic challenges and the Russia-Ukraine crisis that has created global economic instability and other related severe consequences. And this requires collaborative action and a much stronger pace of transformation to cater for the needs of the over 1.3 billion population in Africa.
Conclusion
In a wider context, as I have written multiple times about food security, especially in Africa, while a few outspoken African leaders shifted blame to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, others focused on spending the state budget to import food to calm rising discontent among the population, it is necessary to redirect focus on improving local agricultural production. Some experts and international organizations have also expressed the fact that African leaders have to adopt import substitution mechanisms and use their financial resources to strengthen agricultural production systems.
Providing food assistance is commendable but will definitely not offer the needed long-term food security. External investment in Africa’s agriculture is the best way to support Africa. China is doing its best, as also some European Union members. African leaders have to continue building production capacity and look for more resilient agriculture and food systems as answers to national food requirements and needs. Some external states are readily assisting with long-term solutions.
Reports show that U.S. Congress allocated $336.5 million to bilateral programs for Sub-Saharan Africa, including Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and regional programs in southern Africa, west Africa, and the Sahel.
Also, of this $2.76 billion, USAID is programming $2 billion in emergency food security assistance over the next three months. Last August, the United States provided nearly $1 billion specifically for countries in Africa and a further $2 billion commitment to the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda.
That compared, Russia’s Agro-Export Federal Center for Development of Agribusiness Exports, in close partnership collaboration with Trust Technologies and the business expert community, plans to earn (revenue) $33 billion through massive export of grains, meat, poultry and other agricultural products to Africa.
According to Interfax News Agency and TASS reports, the plan remotely aims at marginalizing local production, cutting out foreign contributions to support livelihoods through local production and making African leaders spend their hard-earned revenue on food imports instead of supporting agricultural production. The business concept report says eight African countries have already been identified and chosen as target markets for the delivery of agricultural products. These are Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tunisia and South Africa.
In sharp contrast to food-importing African countries, Zimbabwe has increased wheat production, especially during this crucial time of the current Russia-Ukraine crisis. This achievement was attributed to efforts in mobilizing local scientists to improve the crop’s production. Zimbabwe is an African country that has been under Western sanctions for 25 years, hindering imports of much-needed machinery and other inputs from driving agriculture, but now working towards food sufficiency in southern Africa.
Addressing food security in these changing geopolitical times should be the key in the 21st century for Africa. From the discussions above and various perspectives, African leaders have to focus, mobilize and redirect both human and financial resources toward increasing local production, the surest approach to attain sustainable food security for over 1.3 billion population in Africa, and this falls directly within the Agenda 2063 of the African Union.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:
Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?
We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.
Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?
The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.
How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?
Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.
Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?
The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.
Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?
Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Africa’s startup ecosystem showed tentative signs of recovery in April 2026, with deal activity picking up after a subdued March, though funding volumes remained weak by recent standards, Business Post gathered from the latest data by Africa: The Big Deal.
In the review month, a total of 32 startups across the continent announced funding rounds of at least $100,000, raising a combined $110 million through a mix of equity, debt and grant deals, excluding exits. The figure represents a notable rebound from the 22 deals recorded in March, suggesting renewed investor engagement after a slow start to the second quarter.
However, the recovery in deal count did not translate into stronger capital inflows. April’s $110 million total marks the lowest monthly funding volume since March 2025, when startups raised $52 million, and falls significantly short of the previous 12-month average of $275 million per month.
The data highlights a growing divergence between investor activity and cheque sizes, with more deals being completed but at smaller ticket values.
The data showed that, despite this, looking at the numbers on a month-to-month basis does not tell the whole story of venture funding cycles as a broader 12-month rolling view presents a more stable picture of Africa’s startup ecosystem.
Based on this, over the 12 months to April 2026 (May 2025–April 2026), startups across the continent raised a total of $3.1 billion, excluding exits – largely in line with the range observed since August 2025. The figure has hovered around $3.1 billion, with only marginal deviations of about $90 million, indicating relative stability despite recent monthly dips.
A closer breakdown shows that equity financing accounted for $1.7 billion of the total, while debt funding contributed $1.4 billion, alongside approximately $30 million in grants. This composition underscores the growing role of debt in sustaining overall funding levels.
The data suggests that while headline monthly figures may point to short-term weakness, the broader funding environment remains resilient, supported in large part by continued activity in debt financing, even as equity investments show signs of moderation.
The report said if April’s total amount was lower than March’s overall, it was higher on equity: $74 million came as equity and $36 million as debt, while March had been overwhelmingly debt-led ($55 million equity, $96 million debt).
In the review month, the deals announced include Egyptian fintech Lucky raising a $23 million Series B, while Gozem ($15.2 million debt) and Victory Farms ($15 milliomn debt) did most of the heavy lifting on the debt side. Ethiopia-based electric mobility start-up Dodai announced $13m ($8m Series A + $5m debt).
April also saw two exits as Nigeria’s Bread Africa was acquired by SMC DAO as consolidation continues in the country’s digital asset sector, and Egypt’s waste recycling start-up Cyclex was acquired by Saudi-Egyptian investment firm Edafa Venture.
Year-to-Date (January to April), startups on the continent have raised a total of $708 million across 124 deals of at least $100,000, excluding exits. The funding mix was almost evenly split, with $364 million in equity (51.4 per cent) and $340 million in debt (48.0 per cent), alongside a small contribution from grants (0.6 per cent). This is an early sign that funding startups is taking a different shape compared to what the ecosystem witnessed in 2025.
For instance, in the first four months of last year, startups raised a higher $813 million across a significantly larger 180 deals. More notably, last year’s funding was heavily skewed toward equity, which accounted for $652 million (80.1 per cent) compared to just $138 million in debt (16.9 per cent).
The year-on-year comparison points to two clear trends: a contraction in deal activity as evidenced by a 31 per cent drop, and a 13 per cent decline in total funding. At the same time, the composition of capital has shifted meaningfully, with debt now playing a much larger role in sustaining funding volumes.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has summoned South Africa’s Acting High Commissioner to complain about xenophobic attacks against its citizens, weeks after a similar complaint was lodged by Ghana.
The ministry called the meeting to convey “profound concern regarding recent events that have the potential to impact the established cordial relations between Nigeria and South Africa,” it said in a statement posted on X on Monday.
It noted that the country is aware of the growing discontent among Nigerians concerning the treatment of their nationals in South Africa, but implored calm while it plans to repatriate those willing to return home voluntarily, amid growing fears that recent attacks on foreigners there could escalate.
Foreign Minister, Mrs Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, said 130 applicants had already registered for the exercise, adding that the number was expected to rise.
She expressed President Bola Tinubu’s concern about the attacks in the southern African nation, and condemned the violence against foreign nationals and demonstrations characterised by “xenophobic rhetoric, hate speeches and incendiary anti-migrant statements”.
“Nigerian lives and businesses in South Africa must not continue to be put at risk, and we remain committed to working to explore with South Africa ways to put an end to this,” she said.
She cited the killing of two Nigerians in separate incidents involving local security personnel, insisting that her government was demanding justice.
She said the Nigerian president’s priority was for the safety of citizens and “consequently, arrangements are currently underway to collate details of Nigerians in South Africa for voluntary repatriation flights for those seeking assistance to return home”.
According to reports, four Ethiopian nationals have also been killed in recent weeks, while there have been attacks on citizens of other African countries.
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has condemned the attacks but also cautioned foreigners to respect local laws.
He used his Freedom Day address last week – marking the country’s first democratic elections in 1994 – to remind South Africans of the support other African nations had given in the struggle against the racist system of apartheid.
However, anti-immigrant groups in South Africa have accused foreigners of being in the country illegally, taking jobs from locals and having links to crime, especially drug trafficking.
They have also reportedly been stopping people outside hospitals and schools, demanding to see their identity papers.
Last month, Ghana summoned South Africa’s top envoy after a video was widely shared showing a Ghanaian man being challenged to prove he had the correct immigration papers.
Anti-immigrant sentiment rose earlier this year after reports that the head of the Nigerian community in the port city of KuGompo (formerly East London) had been installed in a traditional role often translated as “king”. Some South Africans in the local area saw this as an attempt to grab political power and kicked against it.
South Africa is home to about 2.4 million migrants, just less than 4 per cent of the population, according to official figures. However, many more are thought to be in the country without official authorisation. Most come from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, which have a history of providing migrant labour to their wealthy neighbour.
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