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Nigeria Trading Across the Continent Under NIDO-Africa’s Leadership

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jude osakwe NIDO-Africa's Leadership

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In this insightful interview, Professor Jude Osakwe, Continental Chairman of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) Africa, highlights the rapidly shifting global trade landscape and the renewed focus on intra-African trade. This necessitates convening the Regional Trade Conference — ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ — in Dakar, Senegal, from 24–28 November 2025.

Professor Osakwe underlined a key message: while multilateral trade frameworks are increasingly fragmented, this development presents a strong opportunity to strengthen the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Consequently, Nigeria’s NIDO-Africa “Made-in-Nigeria” initiative aims to advance the country’s trade aspirations within the framework of the African Union’s Agenda 2063.  Below are excerpts from the interview. Here are the interview excerpts:

In the context of geopolitical shift, how would you characterize and argue that the forthcoming event ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ is an integral aspect of Intra-Africa trade policy under the African Union?

The ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ event represents a critical convergence of continental trade ambitions and national industrial capacity at a pivotal moment in global economic realignment. As multilateral trade frameworks face increasing fragmentation and regional blocs strengthen, Africa’s response through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) signals our determination to chart an independent economic trajectory.

Nigeria, as Africa’s largest economy and most populous nation, occupies a unique position in this continental project. The ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ initiative directly advances the AU’s Agenda 2063 objectives by showcasing indigenous manufacturing capacity, promoting value addition within the continent, and demonstrating that intra-African trade can be anchored in substantive productive capabilities rather than merely raw material exchange.

This event specifically addresses a fundamental challenge in African integration: the current reality that intra-African trade represents only approximately 15-18% of the continent’s total trade, significantly lower than other regions. By highlighting Nigerian-manufactured products, from processed foods and pharmaceuticals to technology solutions and creative industries, we are providing tangible evidence that African nations can serve as both producers and consumers within a genuinely integrated market. This isn’t theoretical policy; it’s operational implementation of the AfCFTA’s vision.

Under NIDO-Africa leadership, what are the expectations during this event? Despite the fact that it is focused on intra-Africa, are foreign traders and importers your targets, as a priority of raising the level of economic cooperation with Nigeria?

NIDO-Africa’s leadership brings a distinctive diaspora perspective, we understand both African productive capacity and global market demands, having operated at this intersection throughout our professional lives. Our expectations for this event are strategically layered.

Primarily, we’re facilitating meaningful intra-African commercial connections. This means bringing together procurement officers from African governments, regional distributors, retail chains, and manufacturing firms who can establish long-term supply relationships with Nigerian producers. The goal is to create sustainable trade corridors, not one-off transactions.

However, your question touches on an important strategic dimension: foreign traders and importers are indeed significant targets, though we’d characterize them as complementary rather than competing priorities. Nigeria’s economic growth requires both expanded African market access AND continued global trade partnerships. Foreign importers, particularly from the US, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, serve multiple strategic purposes:

* They bring capital, technology transfer, and global best practices

* They can establish joint ventures that enhance Nigerian productive capacity

* They provide access to markets beyond Africa’s current absorption capacity

* Their participation validates the quality and competitiveness of Nigerian products

The sophistication of our approach is precisely that we’re not presenting this as an either/or proposition. We’re positioning Nigeria as a continental manufacturing hub that serves African markets while maintaining robust global trade relationships. Foreign traders who engage now gain preferred access to Africa’s 1.3 billion-person market through a Nigerian gateway.

Can you give an assessment and significance of the current level of economic cooperation between Nigeria and, for instance with the United States, China, India and Russia?

Nigeria maintains strategically important but differently configured relationships with each of these global powers, and understanding these dynamics is essential to appreciating where opportunities for deeper cooperation exist:

United States: The relationship centers on energy (Nigeria was historically a significant oil supplier), security cooperation, and development assistance. While trade volumes remain substantial, there’s significant unrealized potential in non-oil sectors, technology, pharmaceuticals, agribusiness, and creative industries. The challenge is moving beyond a resource-extraction paradigm toward genuine industrial partnership.

China: China has become Nigeria’s largest trading partner and a major infrastructure financier, particularly in railways, power generation, and telecommunications. However, the relationship faces tensions around trade imbalances, Nigerian imports from China far exceed exports, and concerns about local manufacturing displacement. The opportunity lies in negotiating technology transfer agreements and joint ventures that build Nigerian productive capacity rather than simply facilitating imports.

India: Often underappreciated, India maintains deep pharmaceutical, automotive, and ICT connections with Nigeria. The relationship is characterized by significant Indian investment in Nigerian manufacturing and a substantial expatriate business community. This represents perhaps the most balanced model among Nigeria’s major trading relationships, with genuine two-way flows in goods, services, and human capital.

Russia: Historically limited, this relationship has focused on energy sector cooperation (particularly nuclear power aspirations) and mineral resources. Recent geopolitical shifts have created space for expanded engagement, though infrastructural and financial linkages remain underdeveloped compared to other major powers.

The significance of these relationships is that they collectively demonstrate Nigeria’s multi-alignment strategy in an increasingly multipolar world. However, they also reveal a persistent pattern: Nigeria frequently engages as a commodity supplier and finished goods importer rather than as a manufacturing power. The ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ initiative aims to fundamentally disrupt this pattern.

In your opinion, what are the landmark achievements since the establishment of AGOA and Nigeria?

The African Growth and Opportunity Act, established in 2000, represents America’s most sustained trade initiative toward Sub-Saharan Africa, offering duty-free access to US markets for thousands of product categories. For Nigeria specifically, AGOA’s achievements are mixed—revealing both opportunities captured and potential unrealized.

Landmark achievements include:

*Energy sector exports: AGOA facilitated billions of dollars in petroleum exports to the US, though this sector would likely have developed independently given global oil demand

*Agricultural product access: Nigerian cocoa, cashew nuts, and sesame seeds have gained improved US market access, supporting smallholder farmers

*Textile and apparel potential: Though underutilized compared to East African nations, AGOA’s textile provisions have supported nascent garment manufacturing

However, the more significant story is unrealized potential:

Nigeria has chronically underutilized AGOA compared to countries like Kenya, South Africa, or Lesotho. Our non-oil exports under AGOA remain modest, representing a fraction of what our productive capacity could achieve. This underperformance stems from:

*Inadequate awareness among Nigerian manufacturers

*Compliance and certification challenges

*Infrastructure bottlenecks affecting export logistics

*Limited value-addition in sectors where we have raw material advantages

The landmark lesson from AGOA isn’t just about what’s been achieved—it’s about what becomes possible when market access meets productive capacity. Countries that invested in export-ready manufacturing infrastructure captured transformative benefits. Nigeria’s current focus on industrial policy and manufactured exports, exemplified by initiatives like ‘Made-in-Nigeria,’ positions us to finally realize AGOA’s full potential before its current extension expires in 2025 and as discussions for its successor framework develop.

China is an active player now offering tariffs-free for Africa. Do you think that can play a noticeable role in providing long-term bilateral trade solution and, most probably, support the proposed ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ program being pursued by NIDO-Africa?

China’s announcement of tariff-free access for African least-developed countries, and its broader “Global South” economic engagement, represents both significant opportunity and strategic challenge for Nigeria and the ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ agenda.

The opportunity dimension:

China’s tariff elimination could theoretically provide Nigerian manufacturers with preferential access to the world’s second-largest consumer market, potentially transformative for sectors like processed agricultural goods, light manufacturing, and resource-based products. For manufacturers building capacity under the ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ program, this represents a massive potential market beyond Africa’s current absorption capacity.

Additionally, China’s established infrastructure investments in Nigeria, from railways to manufacturing zones—create potential synergies. If Nigerian producers can leverage these facilities to achieve economies of scale for Chinese market export, we could see genuine industrial deepening.

The challenge dimension requires candor:

Nigeria must be strategic rather than simply enthusiastic. China’s tariff-free offer, while generous in headline terms, operates within a complex reality:

*China’s manufacturing efficiency means the competitive pressure on emerging Nigerian industries could be overwhelming

*Historical trade patterns show massive imbalances, Nigeria imports far more from China than it exports

*Without deliberate industrial policy safeguards, preferential access could accelerate deindustrialization rather than support manufacturing growth

The strategic approach for ‘Made-in-Nigeria’:

Rather than viewing Chinese engagement passively, NIDO-Africa and Nigerian policymakers should pursue aggressive negotiation for:

*Technology transfer requirements linked to market access

*Joint venture mandates ensuring Nigerian ownership stakes and skills development

*Local content requirements that build indigenous supply chains

*Sector-specific protection for infant industries while exporting in areas of established competitiveness

The long-term bilateral solution isn’t simply about accessing Chinese markets—it’s about ensuring Chinese engagement actively builds Nigerian productive capacity. If ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ products achieve quality certification for Chinese markets while we simultaneously protect space for domestic industries to mature, then yes, this could be transformative. Without such strategic conditionality, tariff-free access might simply formalize dependency.

What opportunities and incentives are currently available, especially for potential importers of goods and entrepreneurial services from Nigeria?

This is where the ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ event becomes practically valuable for business decision-makers. Nigeria currently offers a compelling value proposition for importers and trading partners, though these opportunities remain underappreciated in global markets:

Immediate Commercial Opportunities:

*Processed agricultural products: Nigeria is a global leader in cocoa, cassava, sesame, and ginger production. Value-added products (cocoa powder, cassava flour, processed spices) offer quality at competitive prices with growing international certification

*Pharmaceutical and healthcare products: Nigerian pharmaceutical manufacturers increasingly meet international quality standards (WHO-GMP certification) and offer significant cost advantages for both African and global markets

*Creative and digital services: Nollywood productions, music, software development, and creative services represent high-growth export sectors

*Solid minerals: Beyond oil, Nigeria has underexplored reserves of tin, columbite, gold, and lithium, critical for technology and energy transition sectors

*Engineering and construction services: Nigerian firms have growing capacity for infrastructure delivery across Africa

*Incentives and Facilitation Mechanisms:

Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) support: *Export grant facilities, market information, and trade mission sponsorship

*Export Processing Zones: Tax incentives, duty-free importing of inputs, and streamlined customs procedures for export-oriented manufacturers

*AfCFTA rules of origin benefits: Products manufactured in Nigeria qualify for preferential access across African markets

*Diaspora investment facilitation: NIDO networks provide cultural bridge and due diligence support for foreign partners

*Naira depreciation dynamics: Currency adjustments have made Nigerian exports significantly more price-competitive internationally

What makes this moment distinctive:

Nigeria is simultaneously investing in power sector reform, transportation infrastructure, and digital connectivity, addressing historical bottlenecks that previously constrained export reliability. Early entrants who establish supply relationships now will benefit from improving operational environment while competing players face higher entry barriers later.

For entrepreneurial service importers specifically, consultancies, technology firms, financial services, Nigeria’s 200+ million population, growing middle class, and youthful demographic create one of Africa’s most dynamic service markets. Foreign firms entering now via the ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ network gain first-mover advantages and local partnerships that determine long-term market position.

Would you, finally, agree that foreign players are generally competing and rivalry-ing for existing investment opportunities based on the fact that Nigeria maintains a conducive business environment, and has political stability?

This question requires a nuanced, honest response that serves your audience better than diplomatic oversimplification.

The competition for Nigerian opportunities is real and intensifying—but the drivers are complex:

*Foreign players, from American tech firms to Chinese manufacturers to Indian pharmaceutical companies, are indeed actively competing for Nigerian market position. However, this competition is driven less by current “conducive business environment” claims and more by:

*Market size and demographic trajectory: Nigeria will be the world’s third-most populous nation by 2050. No serious global business strategy can ignore this market scale

*Resource endowment: Beyond oil, Nigeria’s agricultural potential, solid minerals, and renewable energy capacity remain substantially underdeveloped

*Regional gateway positioning: Nigeria’s influence across West Africa and its role in AfCFTA make it a continental strategic anchor

*Competitive positioning relative to rivals: Companies enter Nigeria not because conditions are optimal, but because competitors are entering—creating a self-reinforcing dynamic

Now, the necessary candor about “conducive business environment” and “political stability”. Nigeria faces well-documented challenges that honest assessment requires acknowledging:

*Infrastructure deficits (power, transportation, ports) that increase operational costs

*Security concerns in certain regions affecting supply chain reliability

*Regulatory complexity and inconsistency across different government levels

*Foreign exchange management issues that complicate repatriation

*Periodic political transitions that create policy uncertainty

However, and this is strategically crucial, successful businesses understand that emerging markets offer risk-return trade-offs:

The same factors that create operational challenges also create barriers that protect market share once established. Companies that enter Nigeria now, master its complexities, and build local partnerships (precisely what ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ facilitates) gain sustainable competitive advantages that later entrants cannot easily replicate.

The more accurate framing:

*Foreign players compete for Nigerian opportunities not because the business environment is perfect, but because:

*Nigeria’s economic fundamentals (population, resources, market size) are transformational

*The government is actively pursuing reforms (power sector, infrastructure, ease-of-business)

*Current challenges create discounted entry valuations for capable operators

*The alternative, waiting for “perfect conditions”, means ceding market position to competitors

NIDO-Africa’s role in this context:

We help bridge the gap between Nigeria’s potential and its current operational reality. The ‘Made-in-Nigeria’ event specifically reduces information asymmetry, facilitates credible partnerships, and helps foreign players navigate complexity. We’re not claiming Nigeria has achieved ideal conditions, we’re demonstrating that substantial opportunities exist for strategically sophisticated players, and we’re providing the networks and knowledge to capture those opportunities effectively.

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AFC Backs Future Africa, Lightrock in $100m Tech VC Funding Bet

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Lightrock Africa

By Adedapo Adesanya

Infrastructure solutions provider, Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), has committed parts of a $100 million investment to fund managers—Future Africa and Lightrock Africa—to boost African tech venture backing.

The commitment to Lightrock Africa Fund II and Future Africa Fund III is the first tranche of a broader deployment, AFC noted.

The corporation added that it is actively evaluating a pipeline of additional Africa-focused funds spanning a range of strategies and stages, with further commitments expected in the near term.

This is part of its efforts to plug a persistent gap in long-term institutional capital on the continent, which constrains the development and scaling of high-potential technology businesses across the continent, especially with a drop in foreign investments.

“Through this commitment, AFC will deploy catalytic capital in leading Africa-focused technology Funds and, in particular, African-owned fund managers,” it said in a statement on Monday.

AFC aims to address the underrepresentation of local capital in venture funding by catalysing greater participation from African institutional investors and deepening local ownership within the ecosystem.

Despite some success stories on the continent, local institutional capital remains significantly underrepresented across many fund cap tables, with the majority of venture funding continuing to flow from international sources.

AFC’s commitment is designed to shift that dynamic, according to Mr Samaila Zubairu, its chief executive.

“Across the continent, young Africans are not waiting for the digital economy to arrive; they are seizing the moment — adopting technology, creating markets and solving real economic problems faster than infrastructure has kept pace. That is the investment signal.

“AFC’s $100 million Africa-focused Technology Fund will accelerate the convergence of growing demand, rapid technology adoption, youthful demographics and the enabling infrastructure we are building.

“Digital infrastructure is now as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as roads, rail, ports and power — enabling productivity, payments, logistics, services, data and cross-border trade, while creating jobs and industrial scale.”

Mr Pal Erik Sjatil, Managing Partner & CEO, Lightrock, said: “We are delighted to welcome Africa Finance Corporation as an anchor investor in Lightrock Africa II, deepening a strong partnership shaped by our collaboration on high-impact investments across Africa, including Moniepoint, Lula, and M-KOPA.

“With aligned capital, a long-term perspective, and a shared focus on value creation, we are well positioned to support exceptional management teams and scale category-leading businesses that deliver attractive financial returns alongside measurable environmental and social outcomes,” he added.

Adding his input, Mr Iyin Aboyeji, Founding Partner, Future Africa, said: “By investing in AI-native skills, financing productive tools such as phones and laptops, and expanding energy, connectivity and compute infrastructure, we can convert Africa’s greatest asset — its people — into critical participants in the new global economy. AFC’s US$100 million commitment is the anchor this moment demands.

“As our first multilateral development bank partner, AFC is sending a clear signal that digital is as fundamental to Africa’s transformation as agriculture, manufacturing and physical infrastructure. We trust that other development finance institutions, insurers, reinsurers and pension funds will follow AFC’s lead.”

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Africa ‘Reawakening’ In Emerging Multipolar World

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Gustavo de Carvalho

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

In this interview, Gustavo de Carvalho, Programme Head (Acting): African Governance and Diplomacy, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses at length aspects of Africa’s developments in the context of shifting geopolitics, its relationships with external countries, and expected roles in the emerging multipolar world. Gustavo de Carvalho further underscores key issues related to transparency in agreements, financing initiatives, and current development priorities that are shaping Africa’s future. Here are the interview excerpts:

Is Africa undergoing the “second political re-awakening” and how would you explain Africans’ perceptions and attitudes toward the emerging multipolar world?

We should be careful not to overstate novelty. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War, too, from Bandung to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has actually shifted is the structure of the international system around the continent. The unipolar moment has faded, the menu of partners has widened, and a generation of policymakers under fifty operates without the inhibitions of either the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War period. African publics, however, are more pragmatic than multipolar rhetoric assumes. Afrobarometer’s surveys across more than thirty countries consistently show citizens evaluating external partners on tangible outcomes such as infrastructure, jobs and security, rather than on civilisational narratives. China is generally associated with positive economic influence, the United States retains the strongest pull as a development model, and Russia, despite a louder political profile, registers a smaller and more geographically concentrated footprint. Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.

Do you think it is appropriate to use the term “neo-colonialism” referring to activities of foreign players in Africa? By the way, who are the neo-colonisers in your view?

The term has analytical value when used carefully, and loses it when deployed selectively against whichever power one wishes to embarrass. Nkrumah’s 1965 formulation was precise: political independence accompanied by continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, irrespective of the capital from which they originate. The structural picture is well documented. Africa still exports primary commodities and imports manufactured goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen per cent of total trade, well below Asian or European levels. African sovereigns pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what fundamentals alone justify. Applied consistently, the lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid architectures that bypass African institutions. That description fits legacy French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells us more about the speaker’s politics than about the structure.

How would you interpret the current engagement of foreign players in Africa? Do you also think there is geopolitical competition and rivalry among them?

Competition is real and intensifying, and the proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia has held two summits, in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures give a more honest sense of weight than diplomatic theatre. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023, United States-Africa trade sits in the 60 to 70 billion range, and Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard, however, understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that entail longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates the latter starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded their relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data shows civilian fatalities from political violence rising rather than falling across the same period. Substituting providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.

Do you think much depends on African leaders and their people (African solutions to African problems) to work toward long-term, sustainable development?

The principle is correct, and it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failings, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The AU’s operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades on. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.

Often described as a continent with huge, untapped natural resources and large human capital (1.5 billion), what then specifically do African leaders expect from Europe, China, Russia and the United States?

Expectations differ across the three relationships, and that differentiation is itself a marker of agency. From China, leaders expect infrastructure financing, sustained commodity demand, and a partnership that does not condition itself on domestic governance reforms. FOCAC commitments have delivered visible results in ports, railways and power generation, though Beijing itself has shifted toward smaller, more selective lending since around 2018. From Russia, expectations are narrower because the economic footprint is. Moscow’s offer is political backing in multilateral forums, arms transfers, grain and fertiliser supply, civilian nuclear cooperation in a handful of cases, and security partnerships, including those involving private military formations. The record of those security arrangements in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and Mozambique deserves a sober assessment on its own terms, because the human and political costs are documented and uneven. From the United States, leaders look for market access through instruments such as AGOA, whose post-2025 future has generated significant uncertainty, alongside private capital, technology partnerships and a posture that treats the continent as more than a counter-terrorism theatre. The priorities across all three relationships are essentially the same: transparency in the terms of agreements, arrangements that preserve future policy space, and partnerships that build domestic productive capacity rather than substitute for it. The continent’s leverage in this multipolar moment is real, but it is not permanent. It will be squandered if used to rotate among external dependencies rather than reduce them.

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Africa Startup Deals Activity Rebound, Funding Lags at $110m in April 2026

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By Adedapo Adesanya

Africa’s startup ecosystem showed tentative signs of recovery in April 2026, with deal activity picking up after a subdued March, though funding volumes remained weak by recent standards, Business Post gathered from the latest data by Africa: The Big Deal.

In the review month, a total of 32 startups across the continent announced funding rounds of at least $100,000, raising a combined $110 million through a mix of equity, debt and grant deals, excluding exits. The figure represents a notable rebound from the 22 deals recorded in March, suggesting renewed investor engagement after a slow start to the second quarter.

However, the recovery in deal count did not translate into stronger capital inflows. April’s $110 million total marks the lowest monthly funding volume since March 2025, when startups raised $52 million, and falls significantly short of the previous 12-month average of $275 million per month.

The data highlights a growing divergence between investor activity and cheque sizes, with more deals being completed but at smaller ticket values.

The data showed that, despite this, looking at the numbers on a month-to-month basis does not tell the whole story of venture funding cycles as a broader 12-month rolling view presents a more stable picture of Africa’s startup ecosystem.

Based on this, over the 12 months to April 2026 (May 2025–April 2026), startups across the continent raised a total of $3.1 billion, excluding exits – largely in line with the range observed since August 2025. The figure has hovered around $3.1 billion, with only marginal deviations of about $90 million, indicating relative stability despite recent monthly dips.

A closer breakdown shows that equity financing accounted for $1.7 billion of the total, while debt funding contributed $1.4 billion, alongside approximately $30 million in grants. This composition underscores the growing role of debt in sustaining overall funding levels.

The data suggests that while headline monthly figures may point to short-term weakness, the broader funding environment remains resilient, supported in large part by continued activity in debt financing, even as equity investments show signs of moderation.

The report said if April’s total amount was lower than March’s overall, it was higher on equity: $74 million came as equity and $36 million as debt, while March had been overwhelmingly debt-led ($55 million equity, $96 million debt).

In the review month, the deals announced include Egyptian fintech Lucky raising a $23 million Series B, while Gozem ($15.2 million debt) and Victory Farms ($15 milliomn debt) did most of the heavy lifting on the debt side. Ethiopia-based electric mobility start-up Dodai announced $13m ($8m Series A + $5m debt).

April also saw two exits as Nigeria’s Bread Africa was acquired by SMC DAO as consolidation continues in the country’s digital asset sector, and Egypt’s waste recycling start-up Cyclex was acquired by Saudi-Egyptian investment firm Edafa Venture.

Year-to-Date (January to April), startups on the continent have raised a total of $708 million across 124 deals of at least $100,000, excluding exits. The funding mix was almost evenly split, with $364 million in equity (51.4 per cent) and $340 million in debt (48.0 per cent), alongside a small contribution from grants (0.6 per cent). This is an early sign that funding startups is taking a different shape compared to what the ecosystem witnessed in 2025.

For instance, in the first four months of last year, startups raised a higher $813 million across a significantly larger 180 deals. More notably, last year’s funding was heavily skewed toward equity, which accounted for $652 million (80.1 per cent) compared to just $138 million in debt (16.9 per cent).

The year-on-year comparison points to two clear trends: a contraction in deal activity as evidenced by a 31 per cent drop, and a 13 per cent decline in total funding. At the same time, the composition of capital has shifted meaningfully, with debt now playing a much larger role in sustaining funding volumes.

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