World
Russia and Nigeria: Turning A New Page In Their Relationship?
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
On March 6, Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Sergey Lavrov, held talks with Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, who was in Moscow on an official two-day working visit.
The visit, at the invitation of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which has a lot of distinctive implications and strategic interpretations, was a conscious follow-up to review and discuss Russian-Nigerian partnership issues that were raised long ago and during the second Russia-Africa summit held last July 2023.
Vice President Kashim Shettima headed the Nigerian delegation to attend that second Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg, and Mr Tuggar was among the group.
He often reiterated that Nigeria is one of Africa’s biggest countries and Russia’s priority partner in the West African region.
In the opening remarks and with historical precision, Lavrov mentioned the frequency of Nigeria delegations visiting Moscow, saying “This meeting reflects the long-term friendship between our nations and good prospects for the development of our relations at this stage. We consider Nigeria a priority partner on the African continent.”
In practical terms, Russia has maintained a ‘cordial relationship’ with Nigeria these several years after the collapse of the Soviet era. The greatest achievement, of course, is sustaining the political consultations and frequent dialoguing on several economic issues which have not been effectively implemented in the country.
At the media conference after their ‘behind-the-scene’ discussions on March 6, Lavrov and Tuggar reaffirmed their commitment to the Russian-Nigerian cooperation in political, trade, economic, humanitarian and other areas. It also included the prospects for expanding business contacts and implementing joint projects in energy, mining and mineral processing, construction and modernising infrastructure and agriculture.
“With this aim in view, we have agreed to stimulate the activities of the Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation and to make use of the capabilities of the Russia-Nigeria Business Council. We need to improve our legal framework for implementing projects of mutual interest. We have an interest in implementing the agreement on military-technical cooperation, which has recently been extended. Our Nigerian friends are interested in this too,” Lavrov emphasized.
The two Ministers, during the joint media conference, inevitably never pointed to a single project implemented, undertaken and completed during these several years. The ministry’s website says Lavrov has held his position as foreign minister for two decades, since 2004, and has been dealing with Nigeria and African countries.
More than 15 years ago, Lavrov held a review meeting with his former Nigerian counterpart, Mr Ojo Mbila Maduekwe, who paid a three-day working visit to Moscow. After the closed-door bilateral talks held in March 2009, both Ministers, as always, held a brief media conference and emphatically noted that Moscow was prepared to offer trade preferences to Nigeria.
They also agreed on a broad range of bilateral economic issues, many of which have still not been implemented. Until today, Russia has never honoured its promise of extending trade preferences, in practical terms, to Nigeria. Extending trade preferences was interpreted as an integral part of strengthening bilateral economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.
For trade relations between Russia and Nigeria and other African states to improve appreciably, Professor Dmitri Bondarenko, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for African Studies, suggested “Russia gives some trade preferences to African countries – for example, tax exceptions or reduction among other measures. This can become an effective political step to strengthen economic cooperation with African countries.”
Today, Nigeria is Russia’s second-largest trade partner, only in theory, among sub-Saharan African countries. Russian business circles show an ever greater interest, with sweet rhetoric, in entering the promising market of that large country.
The volume of trade should be in the billions of dollars, even without military hardware. One of the major hindrances to free trade and a significant increase in trade transactions between Nigeria and Russia is the lack of direct air flights. This makes it more inconvenient and expensive for potential investors to travel easily to both countries. Besides, there is no adequate economic and social information available to potential Russian and Nigerian investors.
Russian and Nigerian ambassadors have come forth and back over the years. In May 2022, the Nigerian Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Professor Abdullahi Shehu, gave an inspiring lecture at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Most of the points he raised in that lecture included decades of Moscow’s economic failures in Nigeria and many African countries despite the boast of several years of cordial relationship with Africa.
Professor Shehu’s lecture script points to the fact that President Vladimir Putin considers Africa a so-called second frontier, after Eastern Europe for encircling Western Europe…these reasons may sound strategic yet they remain largely speculative and conjectural.
Understandably, the perceived geopolitical irrelevance of Africa by Russia has changed only a little and new dynamics have beckoned on both sides of subsisting opportunities for increased collaboration between Africa and Russia.
Despite the tidal surge in the new Africa-Russia relations and given the strategic role played by the defunct Soviet Union, now succeeded by Russia, in the attainment of the independence of many African countries, both parties must accept the constraints posed on the former [Russia] by the new economic cum geopolitical realities. The acceptance of these new realities is important to properly assist in the management of Africa’s expectations from Russia particularly in the short term.
Today, for instance, Nigeria offers Russia the advantage of cheap and robust labour. Given Russia’s recent experience of sanctions by America and its Western allies, a new model of doing business with Africa through investment has become, not only sustainable but also imperative. Perhaps, one of the sectors where this model of doing business can be symbiotically harnessed is the field of agriculture and its value chain as a result of the steep rise in the large African market and the projected certainty of huge returns on investment in this sector, according to Ambassador Shehu.
Part of the major essence of this lecture was to look at the past to chart a course for the future, inhaling the fresh aroma of the beauty of the ‘rose’ in the Africa-Russia relationship, weeding out the thorns of inconvenience on which Africa and Russia have marched and straighten any crooked path along which both have passed to arrive faster to the desired destination. While Africa cherishes the important MOUs and agreements Russia has with Africa, there is a need to translate such agreements and MOUs into concrete realities. Additionally, balancing Russia’s commercial interests of arms sales to Africa will ensure that the latter enjoys relative stability and peace so vital for its development.
Without a doubt, Russia has had a long chequered history of post-Soviet diplomacy. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo visited Russia in 2001. That year, Russia and Nigeria signed the fundamental document for interstate cooperation, the Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations and Partnership. According to President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation, like the former Soviet Union, has always attached great significance to promoting its relations with the African continent. Nigeria occupies a special place among African countries. It is one of the largest and most powerful countries in Africa. Its head of state is a recognised leader not only on the continent but in the whole world.
Discussions ended with the administrative long list of projects, and on top were joint activities in the sphere of high technology and the launching of several satellites to be used by Nigeria for environmental monitoring and remote sensing of the Earth are being contemplated. That was on March 6, 2001.
Since then, there have been some deals and business proposals that have never seen the bright sunlight. As far back in June 2009, Dmitry Medvedev as president visited Nigeria for the first time, and held topmost state-level talks on possible nuclear energy, oil exploration and military cooperation. There were talks also focusing on the establishment of a petrochemical plant in Nigeria. Alongside there was also a declaration on principles of friendly relations and partnership between Nigeria and the Russian Federation.
Russian investors had wanted to revamp the Ajaokuta Iron and Steel Complex which was abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago, and further take up energy, oil and gas projects in Nigeria, as well as facilitate trade between Nigeria and Russia. In addition, Russia has been prospecting for its nuclear power ambitions over the years. The promise was to build two nuclear plants estimated cost of $20 billion – the bulk of it by Russia is to boost Nigeria’s electricity supply.
Russia’s second-largest oil company, and privately controlled Lukoil, has gone back and forth these several years with plans to expand its operations in Nigeria, and in many West African countries. There has been a long-dead silence after Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, signed an agreement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [NNPC] on the exploration and exploitation of gas reserves with a new joint venture company known as NiGaz Energy Company.
Some experts argue that there are many other aspects of the bilateral relations. With high interest, Russian officials are pushing for military-technical cooperation. The supply of Russian military equipment could play a high-value addition to the fight against notorious Boko Haram. In most of the economic deals, the Nigerian political elites are under the strong influence of Paris, London and Washington.
South African Institute of International Affairs [SAIIA], a Johannesburg-based foreign policy think tank, put out a report titled “Russia’s Military Diplomacy in Africa: High Risk, Low Reward and Limited Impact” in part says that “Russia’s growing assertiveness in Africa is a driver of instability, its approach to governance encourages pernicious practices, such as kleptocracy and autocracy in Africa.” Worse is that Russia’s strengths expressed through military partnerships fall short of what is needed to address the complexities and scale of the problems facing those African countries. Russia encourages the military regimes [Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger] to hold onto political power, instead of constitutional democracy.
Nigeria is an economic powerhouse in the West African region. As well known, Nigeria is one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies and it has the largest population. Russia and Nigeria have some sort of economic relations, but these are not consistent with the long-standing cordial relations between both countries.
In addition, Nigeria is a vast market with huge potential for prospective foreign investors and so is Russia. Regrettably, investors from both sides appear to know little about these opportunities. This is, usually attributed to the apparent inadequate knowledge of the many investment opportunities in both countries. Despite criticisms, reports show that the majority prefer traditional markets – the United States and Europe, and now the Asian region. The African political elite and business people choose the United States and Europe for their holidays and as tourism destinations.
Lest we forget that Vladimir Putin held discussions with the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari, who went to Sochi to take part in the first Russia-Africa summit in October 2019. Putin reminded during talks that priority to joint search for opportunities to broaden trade, economic and investment cooperation were assigned to the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation and the Russia – Nigeria and Nigeria – Russia Business councils set up in 2006–2007.
In response, Muhammadu Buhari said in part: “Mr President, there are many similarities between Russia under your leadership and Nigeria’s aspirations for the future. We can learn a lot from the experience of Russia’s ongoing reforms, of transitioning from an oil-dependent economy to a modern, diversified and inclusive economy. Russia has through these reforms successfully privatised several state-owned entities, which have now become global household names. This is especially so in the energy, manufacturing, defence and the metallurgical sectors.”
So, it continues, without the least interruption, that Russia and Nigeria share experiences, exchange views on national and international platforms, maintain political dialogues, and discuss economic cooperation and humanitarian issues. Russia and Nigeria share similar positions at the United Nations. Russia and Nigeria have continued to keep a cordial and mutually beneficial relationship in the past years since 1991 after Soviet’s collapse.
The term – bilateral relations – is seen as a two-way street, Nigeria’s presence in the Russian Federation is only the diplomatic representative office. Public outreach diplomacy is generally ineffective, both ways between Russia and Africa. Compared, for example, to the American Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and some trade preferences granted by Europe, Russians hardly encourage African presence in the Russian Federation. On the other hand, Russia hardly in speeches refers to the African Continental Single Market (AfCFTA). With an estimated 1.4 billion people, the market is potentially the largest, Africa – is the continent of the future.
As a matter of fact, to be part of this geopolitical arena, Russia has to take practical steps to move beyond AK-47 in raising its economic influence in Africa. It has to crack the local socio-cultural barriers and, in particular, the deep-seated bureaucracy too. In a continent beleaguered by the ravages of ethnic and political conflicts, Russian officials have to thoroughly study the local conditions before imposing strategic economic initiatives and engaging local African partners and stakeholders.
In summary, the Russian strategic policy interest generally in Africa and specifically in Nigeria, given the strong limitation of its current capability and its re-emergence in Africa, is an earnest attempt to regain part of Soviet-era influence. But these current relations, within the context of geopolitical changes, must necessarily be conducted with consistency and in a concrete manner, but not with mere rhetorics. It is about time to act and most importantly, aim at noticeable results. According to various narratives inside the continent, Russia appears only as an advocate of the emerging multipolar order and as a reliable virtual investor in Africa.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
The Executive President of the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), Sammy Manoj Kotwani, discusses the landmark moment in deepening Russian-Indian collaboration. Kotwani explains the groundbreaking insights into President Vladimir Putin’s working visit to India, the emerging opportunities and pathways for future cooperation, especially for the two-sided economic collaboration. Follow Sammy Manoj Kotwani’s discussions here:
Interpretation of the latest development in Russian-Indian relations
From my viewpoint in Moscow, this visit has effectively opened a new operational chapter in what has always been described as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” It did not just reaffirm political goodwill; it translated that goodwill into a structured economic roadmap through Programme 2030, a clear target to take bilateral trade to around USD 100 billion by 2030, and concrete sectoral priorities: energy, nuclear cooperation, critical minerals, manufacturing, connectivity, fertilizers, and labour mobility.
On the ground, the business community reads this summit as a strong signal that India and Russia are doubling down on strategic autonomy in a multipolar world order. Both sides are trying to de-risk their supply chains and payment systems from over-dependence on any single centre of power. This is visible in the focus on national currencies, alternative payment mechanisms, and efforts to stabilise Rupee–Ruble trade, alongside discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the reinforcement of corridors like the INSTC and the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
In short, my interpretation is that this summit has moved the relationship from “politically excellent but structurally imbalanced” towards a more diversified, long-term economic framework in which companies are expected to co-produce, co-innovate, and invest, not just trade opportunistically.
Significance of the visit for Indian business in Russia and for the Indian Business Alliance (IBA)
For Indian business operating in the Russian Federation, the visit has three immediate effects: confidence, clarity, and continuity. Confidence, because Indian entrepreneurs now see that despite external pressure, New Delhi and Moscow have explicitly committed to deepening economic engagement—especially in energy, fertilizers, defence co-production, nuclear, and critical minerals—rather than quietly scaling it back.
Clarity, because the summit outcomes spell out where the real opportunities lie:
Energy & Petrochemicals: Long-term crude and LNG supply, but also downstream opportunities in refining, petrochemicals, and logistics, where Indian EPC and service companies can participate.
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Devices: Russia’s import substitution drive makes high-quality Indian generics, formulations, and even localized manufacturing extremely relevant.
IT, Digital & AI: There is growing appetite in Russia for Indian IT services, cybersecurity, and digital solutions that are not dependent on Western tech stacks.
Fertilizers, Agro & Food Processing: New joint ventures in fertilizers and agriculture supply chains were explicitly flagged during and around the summit, which is important for both food security and farm incomes.
Continuity, because the Programme 2030 framework and the expected EAEU FTA give businesses a medium-term policy horizon. Tariff reductions, improved market access and predictable regulation are precisely what Indian SMEs and mid-sized companies need to justify long-term investments in Russia.
For the Indian Business Alliance (IBA), this inevitably means more work and more responsibility. We already see increased incoming requests from Indian firms—from large listed companies to first-time exporters—asking very practical questions: Which Russian region should we enter? How do we navigate compliance under the sanctions environment? Which banks are still handling Rupee–Ruble or third-currency settlements? How can we structure joint ventures to align with Russia’s import substitution goals while protecting IP and governance standards?
IBA’s role, therefore, becomes that of economic diplomacy in action: translating high-level summit language into actual B2B meetings, sectoral delegations, regional partnerships, and deal-making platforms such as the India–Russia Business Dialogue in Moscow. This visit will undoubtedly stimulate and intensify IBA’s work as a bridge between the two ecosystems.
India’s current economic presence in the Russian Federation
If we look beyond the headline trade figures, India’s economic presence in Russia today is significant, but not yet commensurate with its potential. Bilateral trade has grown sharply since 2022, largely on the back of discounted Russian oil and coal, making India one of Russia’s top energy customers. However, the structure is still heavily skewed: Russian exports to India dominate, while Indian exports and investments in Russia remain relatively modest and under-diversified.
On the ground in Moscow and across the regions, we see several strong Indian footholds:
Pharmaceuticals: Indian pharma is well-established, respected for its affordability and quality, and poised to deepen localization in line with Russian import substitution policy.
Tea, Coffee, Spices & Food: Traditional segments with deep historical roots, now expanding into ready-to-eat, wellness, and ethnic food categories.
IT & Services: Still under-represented, but with growing interest as Russian entities look for non-Western software, integration, and outsourcing partners.
Diamonds, Textiles, Apparel, and Light Engineering: Present but fragmented, with enormous room to scale, especially if logistics and payment challenges are addressed.
Where India is still behind is on-the-ground investment and manufacturing presence compared to countries like China. Russian policymakers today are clearly favouring investors who help them achieve technological sovereignty and local value addition. For serious Indian companies willing to commit capital, adapt to Russian standards, and accept the complexities of the current environment, this is a period of unusual opportunity. For purely transactional players looking for quick arbitrage, it is becoming progressively harder.
So, I would characterise India’s economic presence as: strategically important, quickly growing in value, but still under-leveraged in terms of depth, diversification, and localization.
Geopolitical pressure from Washington and future predictions
Pressure from Washington—through sanctions, secondary sanctions risk, financial restrictions, and now even tariff measures linked to India’s energy purchases from Russia—is undoubtedly a real and continuing challenge. It affects everything from shipping insurance and dollar transactions to technology transfers and the risk appetite of global banks. In practical terms, it can complicate even a simple India–Russia trade deal if it touches a sanctioned bank, vessel, or technology.
However, my own assessment, based on 35 years of living and working in Russia, is that this pressure will not fundamentally derail India–Russia friendship, but it will reshape how the relationship functions. India’s foreign policy is anchored in strategic autonomy; it seeks strong ties with the United States and Europe, but not at the cost of abandoning a time-tested partner like Russia. Russia, for its part, sees India as a crucial Asian pole in an emerging multipolar world order and as a long-term market, technology partner, and political counterpart in forums like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Looking ahead, I see a few clear trends:
Normalization of alternative payment and logistics systems
We will see more institutionalised use of national currencies, alternative messaging systems, regional banks outside the direct sanctions line, and maybe even digital currencies for specific corridors. Rupee–Ruble trade mechanisms that are today seen as “workarounds” will gradually become part of the normal infrastructure of bilateral commerce.
Shift from pure trade to co-production and joint innovation
To reduce vulnerability to sanctions, both sides will push for manufacturing in India and Russia rather than simple exports: defence co-development, localized pharma and medical devices, high-tech and AI collaborations, and joint ventures in critical minerals and clean energy.
Greater role for regions and business associations
Regional governments in Russia (Far East, Arctic regions, industrial hubs) and Indian states will increasingly drive project-level cooperation, supported by platforms like IBA. This “bottom-up” economic diplomacy will make the relationship more resilient than if it relied only on central governments.
Managed balancing by India
India will continue to deepen technology and investment ties with the West while maintaining energy, defence and strategic cooperation with Russia. The challenge will be to manage U.S. and EU expectations without compromising its core national interests. My prediction is that India will stay firm on this course of balanced engagement, even if it means occasional friction with Washington.
In essence, external pressure may complicate the methods of Indo-Russian cooperation, but it is unlikely to overturn the foundations of trust, mutual interest, and long-term complementarity that have been built over decades.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
After the expiration of bilateral agreement on trade, the US Congress as well as African leaders, highly recognizing its significance, has been pursuing the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The agreement, which allows duty-free access to American markets for African exporters, expired on September 30, 2025.
The US Congress is advancing a bill to revive and extend AGOA, but South Africa’s continued inclusion remains uncertain. The trade pact still has strong bipartisan support, with the House Ways and Means Committee approving it 37-3. However, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, raised concerns about South Africa, citing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and said the administration could consider excluding the country.
This threat puts at risk the duty-free access that has significantly benefited South African automotive, agricultural, and wine exports. The debate highlights how trade policy is becoming entangled with broader diplomatic tensions, casting uncertainty over a key pillar of US-Africa economic relations.
Nevertheless, South Africa continues to lobby for inclusion. South Africa trade summary records show that the US goods and services trade with South Africa estimated at $26.2 billion in 2024. The US and South Africa signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) as far back as in 2012.
The duty-free access for nearly 40 African countries has boosted development and fostered more equitable and sustainable growth in Africa. By design AGOA is a useful mechanism for improving accessibility to trade competitiveness, connectivity, and productivity. During these past 25 years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Key features and benefits of AGOA:
It’s worth reiterating here that during these past several years, AGOA has been the cornerstone of US economic engagement with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, as AGOA is closely working with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat and with the African Union (AU), trade professionals could primarily leverage various economic sectors and unwaveringly act as bridges between the United States and Africa.
* Duty-free Access: AGOA allows eligible products from sub-Saharan African countries to enter the US market without paying tariffs.
* Promotion of Economic Growth: The program encourages economic growth by providing incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets.
* Encouraging Economic Reforms: AGOA encourages economic and political reforms in eligible countries, including the rule of law and market-oriented policies.
* Increased Trade and Investment: The program aims to strengthen trade and investment ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa.
With the changing times, Africa is also building its muscles towards a new direction since the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was officially launched in July 2019.
In practical terms, trading under the AfCFTA commenced in January 2021. And the United States has prioritized the AfCFTA as one mechanism through which to strengthen its long-term relations with the continent. In the context of the crucial geopolitical changes, African leaders, corporate executives, and the entire business community are optimistic over the extension of AGOA, for mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the United States.
Worthy to say that AGOA, to a considerable degree, as a significant trade policy has played a crucial role in promoting economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
Africa stands at the cusp of a transformative digital revolution. With the expansion of mobile connectivity, internet penetration, digital platforms, and financial technology, the continent’s digital economy is poised to become a significant driver of sustainable development, intra-Africa trade, job creation, and economic inclusion.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly Aspiration 1 (a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development), highlights the importance of leveraging technology and innovation. The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has opened a new chapter in market integration, creating opportunities to unlock the full potential of the digital economy across all sectors.
Despite remarkable progress, challenges persist. These include limited digital infrastructure, disparities in digital literacy, fragmented regulatory frameworks, inadequate access to financing for tech-based enterprises, and gender gaps in digital participation. Moreover, Africa must assert its digital sovereignty, build local data ecosystems, and secure cyber-infrastructure to thrive in a rapidly changing global digital landscape.
Against this backdrop, the 16th African Union Private Sector Forum provides a timely platform to explore and shape actionable strategies for harnessing Africa’s digital economy to accelerate intra-Africa trade and sustainable development.
The 16th High-Level AU Private Sector forum is set to take place in Djibouti, from the 14 to 16 December 2025, under the theme “Harnessing Africa’s Digital Economy and Innovation for Accelerating Intra-Africa Trade and Sustainable Development”
The three-day Forum will feature high-level plenaries, expert panels, breakout sessions, and networking opportunities. Each day will spotlight a core pillar of Africa’s digital transformation journey.
Day 1: Digital Economy and Trade Integration in Africa
Focus: Leveraging digital platforms and technologies to enhance trade integration and competitiveness under AfCFTA.
Day 2: Innovation, Fintech, and the Future of African Economies
Focus: Driving economic inclusion through fintech, innovation ecosystems, and youth entrepreneurship.
Day 3: Building Policy, Regulatory Frameworks, and Partnerships for Digital Growth
Focus: Creating an enabling environment for digital innovation and infrastructure through effective policy, governance, and partnerships.
To foster strategic dialogue and action-oriented collaboration among key stakeholders in Africa’s digital ecosystem, with the goal of leveraging digital economy and innovation to boost intra-Africa trade, accelerate economic transformation, and support inclusive, sustainable development.
* Promote Digital Trade: Identify mechanisms and policy actions to enable seamless cross-border digital commerce and integration under AfCFTA.
* Foster Innovation and Fintech: Advance inclusive fintech ecosystems and support innovation-driven entrepreneurship, especially among youth and women.
* Policy and Regulatory Harmonization: Build consensus on regional and continental digital regulatory frameworks to foster trust, security, and interoperability.
* Encourage Investment and Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthen collaboration between governments, private sector, and development partners to invest in digital infrastructure, R&D, and skills development.
* Advance Digital Inclusion and Sustainability: Ensure that digital transformation contributes to environmental sustainability and the empowerment of marginalized communities.
The AU Private Sector Forum has held several forums, with key recommendations. These recommendations provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities facing the African private sector and offer guidance for policymakers on how to support its growth and development.
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