World
Russia’s Economic Influence Lags Behind its Geopolitical Rhetorics and Propaganda in Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
With its Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan (2023-2026), approved finally as a working document by the Kremlin, Russia faces long meandering road, especially in implementing several bilateral agreements signed with African countries. While maneuvering around challenges and obstacles inside Africa, Russia has still not fixed concretely financial budget for development projects, and worse Russia’s financial institutions are unprepared to invest capital in Africa, reflecting comparative low dynamics in resetting its economic influence in Africa. Russia has, therefore, lags far behind its geopolitical rhetorics and propaganda.
On June 4, under the chairmanship of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, a meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation was held on the topic “Furthering Russia’s cooperation with Africa.” While the meeting underscoring the priority status of comprehensive relations with the African continent in line with the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation approved by the President in 2023, it also reminded preparations for the second ministerial conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, scheduled to take place this year in an African state, which will serve as a key milestone ahead of the third Russia-Africa Summit in 2026.
After two historic Russia-Africa summits, several conferences and bilateral meetings intended to move Russia’s relations from stagnation to growth, from low-level to a higher stage within the context of geopolitical competition and rivalry, has hit institutional obstacles including political bureaucracy and lack of prioritizing the implementation of official policies. Russia’s decision to quit the investment landscape could largely be attributed African leaders inability to create favourable climate, un-preparedness to change rules and regulations for foreign corporate businesses to operate in Africa.
Despite its tectonic desire to raise investment in energy and food security, infrastructure and industrial projects, Russia has still lagged behind in implementing its Action Plan Agenda 2023-26 approved during St. Petersburg summit. Policy researchers and experts have also underlined the empirical fact that African leaders have to be blamed for Russian businesses quitting Africa. During these previous years of exploring the question of Russia’s economic presence and the long-term implications, the discovery has been fantastic and mixed, while at times presented some interesting complications and contradictions.
At least, since the first Russia-Africa summit held in 2019, Russia has significantly reset its focus on investing in Africa’s economy, engaged in appreciably resonating public relations. The loudest was the planned construction of nuclear energy plants in Burkina Faso located in West Africa, and in South Africa. Now African leaders, policymakers, business leaders and investors have started rethinking alternative dynamic development models within the context of changing situation in the global economy.
There are many contributing factors to the policy mindset. And moreover African leaders are establishing hidden leverages and adopting a new psychology towards success that are connected to economic development in the continent. A few studies have shown that African business directors entrepreneurial attitudes have changed these decades, in spite of the geopolitical challenges by moving away from reactive to proactive positions in order to improve bilateral situation with Europe and the United States.
The leaders are more concern over growing demographics, rising youth unemployment and social standing of the population. Across Africa, 50-60% of the population is below the age of 25, according to United Nations reports. Leaders are also worried over their political campaign promises and their economic manifestos delivered to the respective electorates, and consequently rhetoric and popular slogans usch as ‘international solidarity and friendship’ are now geopolitical tools of the past. Understandably, these are the stark realities of the present times.
Such emerging trends, as mentioned above, have far-reaching implications particularly for Russia. Under this circumstances, it could still develop an integrated strategies for re-asserting visible economic influence in Africa, but a few reports below equally have some negative connotations. In late May 2025, the Russian media Interfax reported, quoting the press service of Russian state bank VTB, that the shareholders of Banco VTB Africa voted at a general meeting to approve a decision to liquidate the bank. “Work is now being done with the regulator (the National Bank of Angola) to make the relevant decisions on the arrangements for working on the liquidation in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Angola,” VTB said.
It was really anticipated as VTB first deputy CEO Dmitry Pyanov said, initially, in February that the Angolan subsidiary’s license was to be terminated finally in this summer. Report explicitly shows that VTB previously owned 50.1% of Banco VTB Africa and the president of Angolan state company Endiama, Antonio Carlos Sumbula owned the other 49.9%.
Worth noting here that VTB focuses on work in Russia and in countries with which there has a large volume of foreign trade, above all China, trade with which reached US$290 billion in 2022. In early March, Russia’s VTB head Andrei Kostin, also said in an interview with the French newspaper Les Echos, that the VTB would sell its subsidiary bank in Angola due to sanctions. VTB was one of the first to be added to the United States and European Union (EU) sanctions lists, which hit the bank’s international business hard, following the launch of the military operation in Ukraine in February 2022.
Similarly there is also the historical fact that Russia contributed tremendously during South Africa’s political struggle until it attained independence. The outlook of bilateral relations is excellent, both staunch members of BRICS association (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), but Russia’s low level of economic investment is noticeable. By comparison, Russia accounts for a paltry 2% of South Africa’s trade, while the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union account for a combined 35% – with China around 9%. Energy deficit has crippled industrial operations, often described as unjustifiable and unacceptable as South Africa waves its baton, signaling power, on international stage but currently experiencing the worst economic crisis of its history. South Africa and Russia have lately drawn criticisms, while the basic question focused on the reasons why Russia has terribly failed with the planned construction of nuclear power plants under former President Jacob Zuma.
Mark-Anthony Johnson noted in his opinion article of early August 2023, published in Business and Financial Times, that “South Africa risks becoming bankrupt for its relationship with Russia, which adds virtually nothing to the economy, state revenues, economic growth, job creation, socioeconomic stability and investor sentiment.” South Africa has been hit with problems ranging from energy deficits, collapsing industrial production and rising tensions among the large labour force.
Despite consistent assurances made by high-ranking Russian officials that Africa is “in the mainstream of Russia’s foreign policy” have not been substantiated by systematic practical activities, and worse serious lack of state support for sustaining effective Russia-African economic ties have necessitated the pulling out of a number of Russian companies from Africa.
Undoubtedly, a number of Russian companies have largely under-performed in Africa, which experts attributed due to multiple reasons. Most often, Russian investors strike important investment niches that still require long-term strategies and adequate country study. Grappling with reality, there are many investment challenges including official bureaucracy in Africa.
In order to ensure business safety and consequently realize the target goals, it is necessary to attain some level of understanding the priorities of the country, investment legislations, comply with terms of agreement and a careful study of policy changes, particularly when there are sudden changes in government. It is important to study the African market structure, the investment climate, the capabilities of potential business partners and the characteristics of African customers.
In an analytical study, it is clear that Asian states, Europe and the United States often refer to Africa as the continent of the 21st century. Then a further general analysis shows that corporate Russian companies have shown interests in investing in the region. In practical terms, those corporate companies that managed, at least, to make inroads there, a few have already exited citing “technical and operational” reasons. At the same time, the business leaders demonstrated negative attitude towards Africa.
Several reports further confirmed that Russia has abandoned its lucrative platinum project contract that was signed for US$3 billion in September 2014, the platinum mine in the sun-scorched location about 50 km northwest of Harare, the Zimbabwean capital. Reasons for the abrupt termination of the bilateral contract have still not been made public, but Zimbabwe’s Centre for Natural Resource Governance pointed to lack of capital (source of finance)for the project.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov launched the US$3 billion Russian project back in 2014, after years of negotiations, with the hope of raising its economic profile in Zimbabwe. The development of the platinum deposit in Darwendale involves a consortium consisting of the Rostekhnologii State Corporation, Vneshekonombank and Vi Holding in a joint venture with some private Zimbabwe investors as well as the Zimbabwean government.
According to Bloomberg, the Darwendale has been tied to Russia since 2006, when former Zimbabwe president, Robert Mugabe, took the concession from a local unit of South Africa’s Impala Platinum Holdings and handed it over to Russian investors. The first venture to try and tap the deposit was named Ruschrome Mining – it included a state-owned mining company, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp., Russian defence conglomerate Rostec, Vnesheconombank and Vi Holding.
The Darwendale project was not tendered, according to available information from official government website sources monitored both in Russia and Zimbabwe. With its cordial relations, Russia was simply offered the lucrative mining concession without participating in any tender. After the project launch, Brigadier General Mike Nicholas Sango, Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation, told me in an email that “Russia’s biggest economic commitment to Zimbabwe to date was its agreement in September 2014 to invest US$3 billion in what is Zimbabwe’s largest platinum mine”.
“What will set this investment apart from those that have been in Zimbabwe for decades is that the project will see the installation of a refinery to add value, thereby creating more employment and secondary industries. We are confident that this is just the start of a renewed Russian-Zimbabwean economic partnership that will blossom in coming years. The two countries are discussing other mining deals in addition to energy, agriculture, manufacturing and industrial projects,” Ambassador Sango added.
President Emmerson Mnangagwa said his government would soon open up the platinum sector to all interested foreign investors. Zimbabwe has the world’s second-largest platinum reserves after South Africa. With the rapidly geopolitical changes, Mnangagwa has been committed to opening up Zimbabwe’s economy to the rest of the world in order to attract the much-needed foreign direct investment to revive the ailing economy and make maximum use of the opportunities for bolstering and implementing a number of large projects in the country. That Zimbabwe would undergo a “painful” reform process to achieve transformation and modernisation of the economy.
Zimbabwe has various sectors besides mining. There is a possibility of greater participation of Russian economic actors in the development processes in Zimbabwe, and wider in southern Africa. Most often officials speak about Russia, claiming that Zimbabwe has had good and time-tested relations from Soviet days. Diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and Russia already marked the 40th year and yet not a single industrial facility to boast of in that country. Zimbabwe is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Prior to holding the first Russia-Africa summit, Norilsk Nickel terminated its deal with Botswana’s BCL Group. According to TASS News Agency, quoting the company’s media release in December 2018, Norilsk Nickel terminated its agreement to sell African assets to Botswana’s BCL Group, including a 50% stake in the Nkomati joint venture.
It said that the Russian company would seek damages from the BCL Group for the losses it suffered due to BCL’s failure to meet the terms of the agreement. The termination of the agreement would also enable Norilsk Nickel to pursue its own strategy for the African assets, Michael Marriott, Norilsk Nickel Africa’s Chief Executive, said as quoted by the press service.
In East African region, Russia’s RT-Global Resources and Rosneft quitted Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s oil refinery project and many major infrastructure deals. Russia had pledged US$4 billion but later disagreements over terms and frustration over in-fighting, intrigue and lobbying forced them to pull out of the country. The Ugandan government team noted that the Russian consortium exhibited inadequate assurance and availability of preferred alternative foreign contractors with comparatively high bidding terms.
Museveni, at first, favored the Russians because, apart from considering access to weapons, the Ugandan leadership was also counting on Russia’s world superiority as a counterweight to both western powers; mainly America and China. With Russians and the South Koreans out of the negotiations, Uganda appeared somewhat desperate, that was back in 2014.
Similarly to remind that Rosneft also abandoned its interest in the southern Africa oil pipeline construction, soon after its delegation in Angola had discussed the possible participation of the Kremlin-controlled company in exploration and development projects there. That project never appeared despite Russia has excellent relations with Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. From business and political perspectives, the region is considered as a unique regional power put together with South Africa.
In addition, Lukoil, one of the Russia’s biggest oil companies, like many Russian companies, has had a long history of shuttling, forward and backward, with declaration of business intentions in tapping into oil and gas resources in Africa. Besides technical and geographical hitches, Lukoil noted explicitly in an official report on its website that “the African leadership and government policies always pose serious problems to operations in the region.” It said that the company has been ready to observe strictly its obligations as a foreign investor in Africa.
Lukoil pulled out of the oil and gas exploration and drilling project that it began in Sierra Leone. According to Interfax, the local Russian news agency, the company did not currently have any projects and has backed away due to poor exploration results in Sierra Leone. It was reported that drilling in West Africa, including in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, did not bring Lukoil the expected results, as preliminary technical results did not demonstrated commercial hydrocarbon reserves. Vice-President Leonid Fedun ruled Lukoil’s complete withdrawal from almost all projects in West Africa.
In the context of geopolitical changes, Russia’s corporate interest in exploring Africa’s oil and gas has consistently risen beyond its practical action. Understandably while Russia claims the world’s leading position as exporter of oil resources, it has, at the same time, expressing the desire to cooperate with potential African producers. Energy experts and energy analysts have explained Russia would only ‘gatekeep’ African producers from entry into the oil market. Russia exports crude oil and other oil-related products to a number of African countries, earned revenue to its state budget.
Under the aegis of resetting its bilateral economic relations with Nigeria, Russians along the line declared to revamp the Ajaokuta Iron and Steel Complex that was abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and further wanted to take up energy, oil and gas projects, as well as facilitate bilateral trade.
Nigeria is one of the Africa’s fastest growing economies and it boosts the largest population. It is currently estimated at 220 million people, and this is more or less a huge market potential for prospective foreign investors, further presents many investment opportunities.
Foreign Minister Lavrov held a review meeting with his Nigerian counterpart Minister Chief Ojo Mbila Maduekwe and emphatically noted that Moscow was prepared to offer trade preferences to Nigeria. Then, Vice President Kashim Shettima headed the Nigerian delegation to attend that second Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg.
Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar was among the group. Following that, Maitama Tuggar again held talks in March 2024 at the Foreign Ministry. But it conclusively showed, Russia terribly failed to grant ‘trade preference’ it had promised during several Russian-Nigerian bilateral meetings on Smolenskiy Plochad.
Until today, Russia, as a reliable partner, has never honoured its promise of extending trade preferences, in practical terms, to Nigeria. Extending trade preferences was interpreted as an integral part of strengthening bilateral economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.
As well known, Russia has been prospecting for its nuclear-power ambitions down the years. According to Russia’s Rosatom, signed a protocol on nuclear that offered the possibility of bilateral cooperation for the development of nuclear infrastructure and the joint exploration and exploitation of uranium deposits. It was not considered as charity. Nigeria is also an economic powerhouse in West African region. The primary aim, two nuclear plants estimated cost at US$20 billion – the bulk of it by Russia, is to boost Nigeria’s electricity supply.
In addition, Russia’s second-largest oil company, and privately controlled Lukoil, as always, planned to expand its operations in Nigeria, and in a number of West African countries. Until writing this article, there has been a dead silence after Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, signed an agreement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) on the exploration and exploitation of gas reserves with a new joint venture company known as NiGaz Energy Company. Nigeria needs Russian technology to boost industrialization just as Russia needs Nigeria as a market for its industrial products and all kins of military equipment and weaponry. There is an explicit indication the two countries have sufficient and adequate perception of each other, but both grossly lack the required political will to implement existing bilateral agreements.
Over the years, Russian trade experts and business consultants have been discussing ways to improve economic cooperation with Africa. One analytical report indicated that a number of large Russian companies operating in Africa managed to establish themselves negatively in African countries. This is primarily due to ignorance of cultural peculiarities of the region, lack of social responsibility, failure to completely fulfill contractual obligations. These cases damage the image of Russia and Russian companies with entering the African market.
All these developments, more or less, have degraded Russia’s image of Doing Business in Africa. In December 2018, a year prior to the first African leaders gathering in Sochi, the Valdai Discussion Club hosted an expert discussion on Africa. Oleg Barabanov, Program Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, highlighted the investment prospects and their influence by foreign players, and further analyzed perspectives and challenges for potential Russian investors.
In her contribution, Nataliya Zaiser, Chairperson of the Board of the African Business Initiative (ABI) – a Moscow based business NGO, stressed that economic cooperation with African countries is not only an initiative, but also a response to request from African partners. Despite this mutual bilateral interest and potentially fruitful projects, Nataliya Zaiser said that there were still only few really successful Russian business cases on the continent.
Andrei Maslov, Coordinator of the work/project on the Russia Africa Shared Vision 2030 report, Integration Expertise Analytical Centre, explained in comparison with the situation a decade ago, that Africa is not only the main initiator of dialogue with Russia, but it is much more ready for it. If earlier the economic landscape of the continent was determined by Western companies with their colonial approaches, now Africa is ready to become an equal partner, according to the Valdai report.
However, there are problems: Maslov echoed Nataliya Zaiser by saying that about 90% of the projects end in failure. In order to overcome this discord, the coordinating role of the state is needed, which, together with the private business, should prepare a clear-cut roadmap and set targets for the development of various industries. The driver of economic cooperation, according to Maslov, can be private rather than top-down state initiatives.
“For us, Africa is not a terra incognita: the USSR actively worked there, having diplomatic relations with 35 countries. In general, there are no turns, reversals or zigzags in our policy. There is a consistent development of relations with African countries,” according to Oleg Ozerov from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
Signing bilateral agreements is not absolutely the best ultimate guarantee to the success of investment, however it provides legal basis. As the situation develops and interest continues to rise, Russian investors have to make part of the financial budget for private consultancy services, as many foreign players do, and be prepared to learn more about the culture of investing in Africa.
According to expert policy narratives, Russian-African economic cooperation and partnerships continue to face challenges and obstacles, including inadequate knowledge of the Africa’s investment landscape and lack of appreciable state support, while Moscow seems to increasingly prioritize anti-Western rhetoric and political confrontation in the context of the great power competition in Africa. African leaders largely prefers to play neutral positions and act in strategic balancing ways.
In this final summary, a thorough research shows Russian companies have been exiting Africa primarily due to geopolitical shifts, economic challenges, and changing investment climate. This trend has to be drastically reversed, and rather invigorate multifaceted relations. As practical matter of facts, Russia’s decision would be in the right direction in connection with allocating financial resources for specific projects by setting up a Development Fund under the African Partnership Department at Russia’s Foreign Ministry. This ultimate step offers possibility to gain the status as a recognizable key player in the continent. And in this case, Russia’s investment partnerships and its dominating economic collaborations would become more visible in future across Africa. Russia has, therefore, lagged far behind its geopolitical rhetorics and propaganda
Kestér Kenn Klomegâh has a diverse work experience in the field of policy research and business consultancy. His focused interest includes geopolitical changes, foreign relations and economic development related questions in Africa with key global powers.
World
African Graduates Association Promoting Multifaceted Initiatives With Russian Educational Institutions
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In preparations for the third Russia-Africa Summit, scheduled for late October 2026, Dr Francois Ngan, deputy chairman of the Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities, during an official working visit, has held a consultative meeting with Professor Vladimir Filippov, the President of the Russian University of Peoples’ Friendship (RUDN), and former Minister of Higher Education of Russia, Chairman of the National Commission for Accreditation of Higher Education.
RUDN is an educational institution established in 1960, primarily to provide higher education to Third World students. It has now become a popular multidisciplinary spot for many students, especially from developing countries. The university offers various academic programmes and has research infrastructure that comprises laboratories and interdisciplinary centres. The university is named after the former Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba.
Dr Francois Ngan and Professor Filippov discussed the importance of the Graduates Association as a continental platform dedicated to strengthening unity, cooperation, and promoting shared progress among African graduates who studied in the former Soviet Union and in the Russian Federation. They also reviewed multifaceted initiatives that could bring together alumni associations from across Africa, whose members obtained education and professional training, and cultural experiences in Soviet and Russian institutions of higher learning.
Professor Filippov expressed optimism in addressing emerging challenges as a result of shifting geopolitical changes, emphasised strategic cooperation in the educational sphere with Africa, in general, and with the Republic of Cameroon, in particular, and further about the integration of African students during their studies in the Russian Federation.
The meeting also touched on academic and scientific work, the possibility of rewriting a scientific thesis, and the official organisation of transferring versions translated into six languages for the library of RUDN. Significant questions relating to Russia’s educational opportunities, collaborations and partnerships involving African countries were thoroughly discussed.
The Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities was created under one continental umbrella to promote friendship, for professional networking, to engage in cultural exchange, and with particular emphasis on forging strategic cooperation between Africa and Russia.
World
Russia to Support Industrial Growth, Technological Advancement and Supply Chain Resilience across Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
With the heightening of geopolitical rivalry and competition, a new Russia-Africa working group has emerged as a significant institutional mechanism and plans to focus on facilitating and monitoring strategic investments, industrialisation, and infrastructural development—the Strategic Action Plan 2023-2026—that was outlined during the second Russia-Africa summit, in St.Petersburg, the second largest city in the Russian Federation.
While substantial progress has, largely, lagged on the multidimensional economic front with Africa primarily due to its internal difficulties and the complexity of relations with its former Soviet neighbours, Russian officials believe there still remains huge untapped potential in strengthening bilateral cooperation. As planned, President Vladimir Putin has already signed an executive order that directs Moscow to host the forthcoming third Russia-Africa summit in October 2026.
On June 30, a regular meeting of the Business Council on Africa was held under the chairmanship of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. It was dedicated to issues of trade, economic and investment cooperation with Africa. The group discussed the current state and prospects for the implementation of policy initiatives with an emphasis on assisting the countries of the continent, strengthening their economic, energy, technological and food sovereignty, as well as training specialists for Africa.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has reiterated that Russia-Africa relations primarily depend on an understanding of the importance of collective action based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and resolving common tasks. In the past few years, Russia-Africa cooperation has been noticeably strengthening. “We are deepening political dialogues, developing bilateral contacts with African countries, promoting cordial cooperation between ministries and departments, and expanding humanitarian exchanges. We are also continuing the structural diversification of trade partnerships and economic dimensions.”
“Next on the agenda is the launch of diplomatic missions in The Gambia, Liberia, Togo, and the Union of the Comoros,” Lavrov said at a meeting of the Business Council under the Russian foreign minister. Lavrov noted that Russian embassies began operating in three other African countries in 2025: Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. A new Department for Partnership with Africa was also established. According to the top diplomat, “expanding Russia’s diplomatic presence on the continent contributes to developing relations.”
There are already 45 Russian embassies operating in Africa. The Russian foreign minister noted that Moscow is quickly rebuilding its presence in African countries, which sharply declined during the collapse of the Soviet Union. “There will be literally four or five countries left where we still need to establish full-fledged embassies, and then, we will have 100 per cent coverage of the entire African continent with our diplomatic presence,” Lavrov emphasised.
After the first summit in October 2019, the Foreign Ministry also created the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. Its main tasks include controlling the roadmap to Africa’s multidimensional cooperation and guiding potential Russian investors to the continent. This also underscored the priority and post-Soviet solidarity Russia currently attaches to its policy towards Africa, within the growing framework of the emerging new architecture of multipolarity in the Global South.
In an interview in June 2026, the director of the Department of Partnership with Africa at the Foreign Ministry, Tatyana Dovgalenko, shared a few insights in the lead-up to the third summit. Furthermore, Dovgalenko explained that Russia would move away from security to concentrate more on economic issues, especially to team up with African colleagues to streamline mechanisms for implementing projects that will ensure food security and agriculture, and help Africa in installing processing facilities to support its self-sufficiency. She also emphasised energy and vital infrastructures, and the third direction was to simultaneously work more coherently with sub-regional organisations.
Over the past few years, bilateral relations have been increasing. There are positive dynamics in trade turnover, estimated at $30 billion. Steps are being taken to build payment systems, preferably in national currencies, while Russia looks to open four more diplomatic offices, bringing the total to 48 across Africa. Russia is currently training 37,000 African students, but only approximately 1/3 on state scholarships in Russia’s educational institutions. “We are ready to share valuable experiences of building a sovereign development model with African partners to achieve self-reliant economic growth based on their own resources and capabilities. Russia aims at creating processing capabilities and localising production, and provides access to advanced technological solutions,” underlined Dovgalenko in her interview with New Eastern Outlook.
For African countries that have endured difficult decades on the path to political independence, it is now important to take full control over the untapped resources, direct income and revenue toward stimulating the national economic sector, rather than paying for the well-being of the Western “golden billion” during this changing geopolitical era, according to Dovgalenko.
According to reports, the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit will have an economic agenda, including the digital economy, technology, artificial intelligence, healthcare, investment, and settlements in global trade. Of course, the agenda will also cover Africa’s political aspects. But if African friends bring along any specific ideas, Russia will give them serious attention. In addition, with continuity and consistency, pay increased attention to expanding ties with Africa’s regional integration associations.
Going forward, the focus will be on translating strong trade relations into deeper investment partnerships, fostering technology collaboration, strengthening industrial linkages and contributing towards the shared objectives set by the leadership of both African countries and Russia. At the third summit, the above-mentioned specific initiatives will be further designed. In this regard, the key document, the new action plan for the next three-year period (2027-2029), is intended to reflect dynamic realities in the future relations of Russia and Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
At the 12th Primakov Readings conference held in Moscow on June 24, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, categorically emphasised that BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has suspended its future ambitions of expansion, citing divergences and rising perceptions over emerging geopolitical changes between members of the BRICS association. BRICS has experienced tectonic appreciation for its latest expansion from five to ten members, and for creating ‘partner membership’ status for 13 countries. While this was considered a significant achievement under Russia’s chairmanship in 2024, it has now turned into an obstacle confronting BRICS.
Lavrov acknowledged this key obstacle, sharp differences and disputes, as tarnishing the image and hindering, to some degree, the progress of the BRICS association. Primakov Readings was held to underline one of its aspirations, that is, to advance the growing question of multipolarity. In order to make a noticeable headway in establishing a new world order, it is necessary to rope in the East and the Global South to denounce the “rules-based order” and hegemony of the United States and Europe. BRICS, thus, conveniently, provides a platform for these countries to raise their voice and interaction in multilateral institutions and organisations. Acting collectively, they could considerably participate and expectedly rise to the global stage.
In his speech, Lavrov reiterated that the United States and the West in general have not accepted the objective reality of an emerging multipolar world order. They prefer propping up their weakening positions by forcing others to side with them, imposing sanctions, enacting bans, issuing threats and taking other illegitimate measures to force the Global Majority to play their game.
Lavrov, however, raised his genuine criticism: The West persists in its refusal to abide by the universally recognised international norms as outlined in the UN Charter, and has never fully respected them, in fact, even if everyone signing and ratifying the Charter undertakes to fully comply with its norms in their entirety and interconnection. This includes the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs, as well as respecting and guaranteeing human rights regardless of race, sex, language, or religion, to quote the UN Charter.
To unlock the potential of new powerhouses in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a comprehensive agreement was initiated between China and Russia, as staunch driving forces behind BRICS, to increase its numerical strength by proposing new membership for BRICS. It all started with a pretext by inviting South Africa to join BRICS in 2010, then, under Russia’s presidency in 2024, the association moved from five to ten, by total membership.
Nevertheless, after only a couple of years, the planned ‘membership drive’ ultimately proved to be an obstacle to be managed within the current framework of BRICS. For China and Russia, this is a matter of regulatory principle – apparently, it will certainly not produce any positive results. In the end, to logically suspend BRICS’ future expansion. Without mincing words, Lavrov noted this point clearly: “We continue to comprehensively develop them while trying to stimulate the trilateral RIC – Russia-India-China – group. That format was shaped about 30 years ago at the initiative of Yevgeny Primakov and formed the core of BRICS. In our associations, cooperation is based on mutual respect and readiness to search for consensus solutions even when this is a challenging task. These things happen, and quite often. But the solutions we eventually find are guaranteed to serve common interests. That is why the number of countries willing to join the operations of BRICS and the SCO keeps growing, namely, in Central and Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America,” Lavrov said.
Mentioning BRICS during the Primakov Readings forum in late June 2026 was quite important, as Yevgeny Primakov anticipated the evolutionary social development trends during his time. After the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991, we can see that the number of BRICS member states has almost doubled. While explaining these latest developments, that the number of full members has increased from five to ten, Lavrov further pointed out that “this is not how it happened when BRIC accepted South Africa, and the addition of one country posed questions that needed to be clarified to ensure forward movement. When BRICS turned into a group of ten, it was decided to give the new members time to adjust to each other. I believe that it is a correct decision.”
During the meeting of the BRICS Council of Foreign Ministers in India, discussions were held, in practical terms, a difficult conversation between Iranian and Emirati members. This happened in the hottest period of the Gulf confrontation, but eventually, it was managed to coordinate a joint document, despite the highly emotional opinions expressed by both sides. This was one case in point.
But, according to Lavrov’s explanation, other examples go deeper, to clashing economic interests. That is why it has been decided against pushing for further expansion for a few years. But the partner countries attend these events, which is creating grounds for giving BRICS a more universal dimension.
As for the agenda, BRICS is not an organisation, but rather an informal association. This is its strong side, because it would be wrong to create a rigid structure, at least at the current stage, especially a global structure rather than a continental or regional one. Many find this confusing. At least Russia won’t propose formalising BRICS, with the same structural status as the United Nations (UN).
Interesting to note and remind here, in an interview with Sky News Arabia on September 20, 2024, Lavrov expressed scepticism but was straight to the point about the strategic expansion of BRICS. Under Russia’s BRICS presidency, five countries – Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates became the second wave of the newest members to join BRICS.
Tracking down the history, operations and achievements, Lavrov acknowledged, in his interview, that BRICS is consolidating its positions and cooperating with some countries. At the same time, this association is facing serious challenges. It is necessary to promote collaboration based on a balance of interests, and most importantly, BRICS functions based on consensus. The consensus principle primarily aims at finding agreements that reflect the mutual accord of all participants. In practical terms, the more partners, the harder it is to search for accord. It takes more time to finalise any consensus-based agreement than a vote-based solution.
According to Lavrov, BRICS expansion has sparked debates and discussions over the past several years. The foreign minister indicated, and repeatedly explained, the “suspension” of membership in BRICS was primarily due to internal differences, perceptions and approach to geopolitical changes. As stipulated by the guidelines, there are no concrete criteria or rules for admission except using the flexible term “consensus” – a general agreement at summits, which was utilised in the selection process.
At the Primakov Readings, previously held in June 2024, the key point was an announcement by Sergey Lavrov over the ‘suspension’ of new membership. Then, in mid-June 2024, Lavrov hosted the BRICS Foreign Ministers Council in Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod. The BRICS Foreign Ministers decided to suspend admission of new members, and this step was reflected in the final documents.
At present, the annual agenda is determined by the rotating presidency of BRICS. However, practice shows that every successive presiding country strives to ensure continuity. For example, during India’s presidency, BRICS members have been actively working to implement the initiatives which Russia presented during the Kazan summit in autumn 2024. Therefore, it is true that many countries are willing to join the group, which is an inspiring fact. However, BRICS looks for new forms of partner engagement and will, most probably, expand the informal association again.
As a show of indivisible and close-partnered bilateral relationship, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, without the least hesitancy, underlined this final decision to postpone BRICS expansion, at the summit in Kazan, capital of the autonomous Tatarstan Republic of the Russian Federation.
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