Feature/OPED
PIA: Pollution and Host Communities
By Jerome-Maeario Utomi
Like every new invention which comes with opportunities and challenges, the passage by the National Assembly and signing into law of the Petroleum Industry Bill about two years ago by the President Muhammadu Buhari-led federal government, after about 17 years of protracted back-and-forth debates, was greeted with mixed feelings. While some hailed the development, others welcomed it with scepticism.
Aside from the belief that the coming of PIA will make innovation possible within the petroleum sector, those who expressed happiness about the coming of the Act predicated their joys on the fact that the provisions, as sighted in PIA, will assist straddle the middle ground in the nation’s petroleum sector which has for a very long time manifested, proved to be a sector with neither primed nor positioned potentials.
Supporting this assertion is the graphic description by PIA advocates of how the new Act will locate, harmonize and strategically engineer prosperity among the operators of the up, mid and downstream sectors of the oil industry while turning the host communities into a zone of peace and democratized development via the 3% allocation to the host communities as captured in Chapter 3 of the Act.
In the opinion of this piece, this joy expressed by stakeholders for reasons qualifies as apposite, especially when one commits to mind the fact that for decades, the operational templates of the players within the industry, particularly the International Oil Companies (IOCs), have for decades been reputed for non-compliance to set rules and devoid of international best practices.
In fact, industry watchers have, at different times, and places argued that before the advent of PIA, the sector was confronted by the following weaknesses; the existence of multiple but obsolete regulatory frameworks which characterize the oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria.
Secondly, the federal government failed to get the nations’ refineries back to full refining capacity. Thirdly, the Petroleum Ministry’s inability to get committed to making IOCs adhere strictly to the international best practices as it relates to their operational environment.
Fourth and final is the non-existence of clear responsibility/work details and action plans for government agencies and parastatals functioning, monitoring/regulating the sector.
The above failures have, as a direct consequence; cast a long dark shadow on both the ministry and the sector.
To further explain these points beginning with the first challenge, it is worth noting that the business of crude oil exploration and issues of oil production in the country is regulated by multiple but very weak laws and Acts- of which most of these laws are not only complicate enforcement but curiously too old-fashioned for the changing demands of time. Thereby, creating loopholes for operators, especially the IOCs, to exploit both the government and host communities.
Some of these laws/Acts in question operated for over five decades without achieving purposes, and they include but are not limited to; the Petroleum Act of 1969, The Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Positions etc), Act 1988, Mineral Oil Safety Regulation 1963, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 (Subsidiary Legislation to The Petroleum Act), The off-shore Oil Revenue (Registration of Grants)Act 1971, Oil in Navigable Act 1968, Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act 1975, Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979, Associated Gas Re-injection (continued Flaring of Gas) Regulation, Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Decree 1985, Oil Pipeline Act Chapter (CAP) 338, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (L.F.N.) 1990, and Gas Flare prohibition and punishment) Act 2016 among others.
Even as the above remains lamentable, facts have since emerged that instead of providing the anticipated legal, governance, regulatory and fiscal framework for the Nigerian petroleum industry and the host communities, the Petroleum Industry Act (Act), like the other failed laws that it came to replace, has contrary to expectation become different things to different peoples.
To many, PIA is not only an evil wind that blows nobody any good but a toothless bulldog that neither bites nor barks. To others, it is but is a palliative that cures the effect of sickness while leaving the root cause to thrive.
To the host and impacted communities, the Act has become a first line of conflict between crude oil prospecting, exploration companies and their host communities. It is a law that has come to steal, kill and destroy. Members of this group have come to a sudden realization that nothing has changed.
Without going into specifics, concepts, provisions and definitions, there is also greater evidence that points to the fact that the underlying premise behind PIA enactment has been defeated, the eliciting reason for concern that what is currently happening between oil companies and their host communities may no longer be the first half of a reoccurring circle, but, rather the beginning of something negatively new and different.
Take, as an illustration, if PIA is fundamentally effective and efficient, why is it not providing a strong source of remedy for individuals and communities negatively affected by oil exploration and production in the coastal communities? If these frameworks exist and have been comprehensive as a legal solution to the issues of oil-related violations, why are the IOCs operating in the country indulging in selective implementation of the Act?
Why is the Act not enforced by the federal government and other relevant agencies? Why are these hosts and impacted communities still suffering at the hands of the crude oil exploration and production companies operating in the Niger Delta region?
While answers to the above questions are expected, this piece, however, believes that there are reasons why these issues raised about PIA failures and failings cannot be described as unfounded.
The facts are there and speak for it.
On 28th of March 2023, the people of Kantu/Odidi, host communities to Odidi Flow station, OML 42 in Gbaramatu kingdom, Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta State, staged a peaceful protest against the non-implementation of PIA.
While calling for holistic repair works on the Trans Forcados Pipeline (TFP), which runs through OML 42 in Warri South West LGA to Forcados Terminal in Burutu LGA of Delta State, the protesting communities gave the operators a 7-day ultimatum to commence genuine implementation of the PIA process and payment of the 3% of 2022 operating expenses as stipulated by the PIA with immediate effect to enable the communities to resume implementation of developmental projects in the communities, warning that failure to do so may lead to the shutdown of operational activities in the OML 42 Asset.
Lamenting that the TFP pipeline was constructed in the early 1960s and has outlived its lifespan long ago, leading to continuous pollution of the environment and destruction of the ecosystem, creating hardship for the locals, the communities stressed that TFP is one of the major pipelines destroying the environment because it has expired and cannot withstand the pressure of crude oil transported through it.
They, therefore, demanded full replacement of the said pipeline instead of the sectional repair works being planned by NEPL/NECONDE without recourse to its negative implications on communities and the environment, particularly since sectional repair works will not stop further leakages.
Kantu/Odidi protest occurred at a time when the dust raised by the 14 days ultimatum/threat issued to another oil company by the oil-rich community of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) in Warri North Local Government Area of Delta State was yet to settle.
In that particular ‘event’, the people of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) also threatened to shut down ongoing exploration activities of Conoil Producing Limited if the company failed to reach a definite agreement with the community on the implementation of Chapter 3 of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) for the Tsekelewu bloc of communities, supports this assertion.
The Host Community lamented that they adopted the option due to the seemingly snobbish attitude of the management of Conoil Producing, as the company’s management had refused to honour letters asking for a meeting with the TCDA on the issue of the PIA implementation.
Away from the persistent highhandedness of the IOCs, this piece is also of the position that PIA is as weak, defective and insufficient as the laws/Acts it was enacted to replace when it comes to pollution prevention, monitoring and control within the sector.
In fact, it will not be characterized as an overstatement to say that it shares the same body and spirit with the now rested Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Positions etc), Act 1988. The major defect with the referenced Act was signposted in its definition of harmful substance based solely on its impact on human beings and does not include its impacts on the environment and animals.
It focused only on the commission of any action or omission by persons without lawful authority. Thus, where an organization has a license to store waste resulting from production, they are seemingly omitted from the ambit of the Act, but the law failed to take into consideration the inadequate storage or inadequate waste management system by licensed firms or groups. Such failure or oversight is glaring and inherent in PIA.
Adding context to the colossal damage harmful substances arising from crude oil production have caused the nation, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency NOSDRA reports show that oil spill incidents occurred 921 times in 2015, resulting in a loss of 47,714 barrels of oil, the highest within the period under review. In 2016, 688 cases of oil spills occurred, culminating in a volume of 42,744 barrels of oil. In 2017 and 2018, 596 and 706 cases of oil spills occurred and resulted in the spillage of 34,887 and 27,985 barrels of oil, respectively. Oil spills occurred on 732 occasions, spewing 41,381 barrels of oil in 2019, and 455 cases were recorded in 2020 with 23,526 barrels of oil. In 2021, companies reported 388 incidents, resulting in 23,956 barrels of oil.
The report also observed that oil spills should be closed off within 24 hours. And oil companies are required to fund the clean-up of each spill and pay compensation to local communities affected if the incident was the company’s fault.
Despite these beautiful provisions, there exists no appreciable instance within the period under review where such obligations to host communities have been obeyed. This piece also holds the opinion that under the PIA regime, no operator can claim a clean hand when it comes to obeying such laws in Nigeria, and the regulatory agencies have never bothered to hold them accountable for such failures.
Still on inefficiency and insufficiency of PIA provisions to effectively control pollution arising from crude oil exploration and production, this author, in a similar intervention, after a visit to the Niger Delta region, stated that a tour by boat of creeks and coastal communities of Warri South West and Warri North Local Government Areas of Delta state would amply reveal that the much-anticipated end in sight of gas flaring is actually not in sight. In the same manner, a journey by road from Warri via Eku-Abraka to Agbor, and another road trip from Warri through Ughelli down to Ogwuashi Ukwu in Aniocha Local Government of the state, shows an environment where people cannot properly breathe as it is littered by gas flaring points.
To a large extent, the above confirms as true the recently published report, which among other concerns, noted that Nigeria has about 139 gas flare locations spread across the Niger Delta both in onshore and offshore oil fields where gas which constitutes about 11 per cent of the total gas produced are flared.
Apart from the health implication of flared gases on humanity, their adverse impact on the nation’s economy is equally weighty. For instance, a parallel report published a while ago underlined that about 888 million standard cubic feet of gas were flared daily in 2017. The flared gas, it added, was sufficient to light up Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa, generate 2.5 gigawatts (Gw) of power or produce 50 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) or produce 600,000 metric tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) per year, produce 22 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2), feed two-three liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains, generate 300,000 jobs, able to attract $3.5 billion investment into Nigeria and has $350 million carbon credit value’. This is an illustrative pointer as to why the nation economically gropes and stumbles.
Banking on what experts are saying, the major reason for the flaring of gases is that when crude oil is extracted from onshore and offshore oil wells, it brings with it raw natural gas to the surface and where natural gas transportation, pipelines, and infrastructure are lacking, like in the case of Nigeria, this gas is instead burned off or flared as a waste product as this is the cheapest option.
It, therefore, remains an ugly narrative that the choice to flare gas in the country is largely predicated on economies. This has been going on since the 1950s when crude oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria.
While Nigeria and Nigerians persist in encountering gas flaring in the country, even so, has, successive administrations in the country made both feeble and deformed attempts to get it arrested.
In 2016, before the advent of PIA, President Muhammadu Buhari led administration enacted Gas Flare Prohibition and Punishment), an act that, among other things, made provisions to prohibit gas flaring in any oil and gas production operation, blocks, fields, onshore or offshore, and gas facility treatment plants in Nigeria.
On Monday, September 2, 2018, Dr Ibe Kachikwu, Minister of State for Petroleum (as he then was), while speaking at the Buyers’ Forum/stakeholders’ Engagement organized by the Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria in Abuja, among other things, remarked thus; ‘I have said to the Department of Petroleum Resources, beginning from next year (2019 emphasis added), we are going to get quite frantic about this (ending gas flaring in Nigeria) and companies that cannot meet with extended periods –the issue is not how much you can pay in terms of fines for gas flaring, the issue is that you would not produce. We need to begin to look at the foreclosing of licenses’. That threat has since ended in the frames, as there has been little or nothing to get the threat actualized.
The administration also launched the now abandoned National Gas Flare Commercialization Programme (NGFCP), a programme, according to the federal government, aimed at achieving the flares-out agenda/zero routine gas flaring in Nigeria by 2020. Again, like a regular trademark, it failed.
Away from Buhari’s administration, in 1979, the then federal government, in a similar style, came up with the Associated Gas Re-injection Act, which summarily prohibited gas flaring and also fixed the flare-out deadline for January 1, 1984. It failed in line with the leadership philosophy in the country.
Similar feeble and deformed attempts were made in 2003, 2006, and 2008. In the same style and span, precisely on July 2, 2009, the Nigerian Senate passed a Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2009 (SB 126) into law, fixing the flare-out deadline for December 31, 2010- a date that slowly but inevitably failed.
Not stopping at this point, the FG made another attempt in this direction by coming up with the Petroleum Industry Bill, which fixed the flare-out deadline for 2012. The same Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) got protracted till 2021 when it completed its gestation and was subsequently signed into law by President Buhari as Petroleum Industry Act (PIA).
To win, the nation must borrow a ‘soul in order to raise a body’. They must seek solutions from the countries that are presently doing well in these areas where we are facing challenges. Part of that effort will require going beyond PIA to recognise the region as a special area for purposes of development. This demand cannot be described as unfounded as it is historically based, logical and factually supported.
Recall that the colonial government, long before independence turned down the demand for a Calabar/Ogoja/Rivers (COR) region/state. But identified the Niger Delta as a troubled spot and recommended to the then Federal Government that the region be regarded as a special area for purposes of development.
Without any shadow of a doubt, I hold an opinion that the federal government’s inability to treat the region as such set the stage for and nourished the restiveness in both the region and the sector.
Most importantly, the people of the region must be directly involved in the management of their resources.
Jerome-Mario is the programme coordinator (Media and Public Policy) at the Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA). He can be reached via [email protected]/08032725374.
Feature/OPED
What Tech Leaders Should Know About IP Contract Strength
Technology leaders operate at the intersection of innovation, risk, and long-term strategy. As organisations rely more heavily on proprietary platforms, custom software, and licensed technologies, intellectual property contracts become critical business instruments rather than routine legal documents. The strength of these contracts often determines how well a company can protect its innovations, maintain leverage in vendor relationships, and respond to unexpected disruptions.
Strong IP contracts do more than define ownership. They shape accountability, continuity, and trust between parties. For executives and decision makers, understanding what makes an IP agreement resilient is essential to safeguarding both current operations and future growth. Without careful attention, even advanced technology investments can become sources of vulnerability rather than competitive advantage.
Understanding the Role of Intellectual Property in Technology Strategy
Intellectual property sits at the core of most modern technology initiatives. Whether software is developed in-house, licensed from a third party, or built collaboratively, the associated IP defines who controls usage, modification, and distribution. Contracts must clearly reflect how this property aligns with broader business objectives rather than treating IP as a secondary concern.
Tech leaders should evaluate how critical a given technology is to daily operations and customer delivery. The more central the system, the stronger and more precise the IP protections must be. Ambiguous ownership language or overly restrictive licensing terms can limit scalability and innovation. When contracts mirror strategic priorities, they support flexibility rather than constrain it.
Clarity in Ownership and Licensing Provisions
One of the most common weaknesses in IP contracts is unclear ownership language. Agreements should explicitly define which party owns the underlying code, derivative works, and future enhancements. This clarity becomes especially important in custom development arrangements where responsibilities and contributions may overlap.
Licensing provisions must also specify scope, duration, and permitted use. Vague language around usage rights can lead to disputes or unexpected limitations as a business grows or enters new markets. Strong contracts anticipate change and outline how rights evolve alongside business expansion. This level of detail helps prevent costly renegotiations later.
Protecting Access and Continuity Rights
Beyond ownership, access to technology assets is a major concern for leadership teams. If a vendor relationship ends abruptly or a provider becomes unable to perform, access restrictions can disrupt operations. IP contracts should address these risks through well-defined continuity provisions.
In some cases, software escrow services are incorporated to support access to essential materials under specific conditions. While not required in every agreement, mechanisms like this reflect a broader principle of resilience. Tech leaders should ensure that contracts account for worst-case scenarios without undermining productive partnerships. Protection and collaboration are not mutually exclusive when agreements are thoughtfully structured.
Aligning IP Protections with Compliance and Governance
Regulatory compliance and internal governance standards increasingly influence how IP contracts are drafted and enforced. Industries subject to strict data, security, or operational requirements cannot rely on generic contract templates. IP provisions must align with regulatory obligations and internal risk management frameworks.
Leadership teams should collaborate with legal, compliance, and security stakeholders to ensure contracts reflect current standards. This includes addressing data handling, audit rights, and reporting obligations tied to intellectual property usage. When IP contracts support governance objectives, they reduce exposure and demonstrate due diligence to regulators and investors alike.
Managing Disputes and Enforcement Effectively
Even the strongest contracts cannot eliminate the possibility of disagreement. What distinguishes effective IP agreements is how disputes are managed when they arise. Clear dispute resolution clauses provide predictable processes that minimise disruption and preserve working relationships when possible.
Contracts should outline jurisdiction, governing law, and escalation procedures in plain language. Overly complex enforcement mechanisms can delay resolution and increase costs. For tech leaders, the goal is not to prepare for conflict but to ensure that disagreements do not derail core business functions. Well-designed enforcement terms contribute to operational stability.
Planning for Evolution and Innovation
Technology rarely remains static, and IP contracts must evolve accordingly. Agreements should address how updates, integrations, and new use cases are handled over time. Without these provisions, innovation may be slowed by uncertainty or restrictive terms.
Forward-looking contracts recognise that today’s solution may serve tomorrow’s expanded role. By defining how enhancements are owned, licensed, and shared, organisations encourage innovation while preserving control. Tech leaders who prioritise adaptability in IP agreements position their companies to respond confidently to change.
Conclusion
IP contract strength is a strategic concern that extends far beyond legal formalities. For technology leaders, these agreements influence resilience, innovation, and long-term value creation. By focusing on clarity, continuity, compliance, and adaptability, organisations can transform IP contracts into tools that support growth rather than obstacles that limit it. Strong agreements reflect thoughtful leadership and a clear vision for how technology powers the business forward.
Feature/OPED
REVEALED: How Nigeria’s Energy Crisis is Driven by Debt and Global Forces
By Blaise Udunze
For months, Nigerians have argued in circles. Aliko Dangote has been blamed by default. They have accused his refinery of monopoly power, of greed, of manipulation. They have pointed out the rising price of petrol and demanded a villain.
When examined closely, the truth is uncomfortable, layered, and deeply geopolitical because the real story is not at the fuel pump, and this is what Nigerians have been missing unknowingly. The truth is that the real story is happening behind closed doors, across continents, inside financial systems most citizens never see, and the actors will prefer that the people are kept in the dark. And once you see it, the outrage shifts. The questions deepen. The implications expand far beyond Nigeria.
In October 2024, it was obvious that the world would have noticed that Nigeria made a move that should have dominated global headlines, but didn’t. Clearly, this was when the government of President Bola Tinubu introduced a quiet but radical policy, which is the Naira-for-Crude. The idea was simple and revolutionary. Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer, would allow domestic refineries to purchase crude oil in naira instead of U.S. dollars. On the surface, it looked like economic reform. In reality, it was something far more consequential. It was a challenge to the global financial order.
For decades, oil has been traded almost exclusively in dollars, reinforcing the dominance of the United States in global finance. By attempting to refine its own oil using its own currency, Nigeria was not just making a policy adjustment. It was testing the boundaries of economic sovereignty. And in today’s world, sovereignty, especially when it touches money, debt, and energy, comes with consequences.
What followed was not loud. There were no emergency broadcasts or dramatic policy reversals. Instead, the response was quiet, bureaucratic, and devastatingly effective just to undermine the processes. Nigeria produces over 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day, though pushing for 3 million by 20230, yet when the Dangote Refinery requested 15 cargoes of crude for September 2024, what it received was only six from the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Ltd (NNPC), which means its yield for a refinery with such capacity will be low if nothing is done. Come to think of it, between January and August 2025, Nigerian refineries collectively requested 123 million barrels of domestic crude but received just 67 million, which by all indications showed a huge gap. It is a contradiction and at the same time, laughable that an oil-producing nation could not supply its own refinery with its own oil.
So, where was the crude going? The answer exposes a deeper, more uncomfortable truth about Nigeria’s economic reality. The crude was being sold on the international market for dollars. Those dollars were then used, almost immediately, to service Nigeria’s growing mountain of external debt. Loans owed to the same institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, had to be paid, which are the same institutions applauding this government. Nigeria was not prioritising domestic industrialisation; it was prioritising debt repayment.
And the scale of that debt is no longer abstract. Nigeria’s total debt stock is now projected to rise from N155.1 trillion to N200 trillion, following an additional $6 billion loan request by President Tinubu, hurriedly approved by the Senate. At an exchange rate of N1,400 to the dollar, that single loan adds N8.4 trillion to a debt stock that already stood at N146.69 trillion at the end of 2025. This is not just a fiscal statistic. It is the central pressure shaping every major economic decision in the country.
On paper, the government can point to rising revenue, improving foreign exchange inflows, and stronger fiscal discipline as witnessed when the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Olayemi Cardoso, always touted the foreign reserves growth. But a closer review of those numbers reveals a harsher reality. Nigeria is exporting its most valuable resource, converting it into dollars, and sending those dollars straight back out to creditors. The crude leaves. The dollars come in. The dollars leave again. And the cycle repeats.
This is not growth. This is a treadmill powered by debt. Let us not forget that in the middle of that treadmill sits a $20 billion refinery, built to solve Nigeria’s energy dependence, now trapped within the very system it was meant to escape.
By 2025, the contradiction had become impossible to ignore, which is a fact. This is because how can this be explained that the Dangote Refinery, designed to reduce reliance on imports, was increasingly dependent on them. The narrative is that in 2024, Nigeria imported 15 million barrels of crude from America, which is disheartening to mention the least. More troubling is that by 2025, that number surged to 41 million barrels, a 161 per cent increase. By mid-2025, approximately 60 per cent of the refinery’s feedstock was coming from American crude. As of early 2026, Nigerian crude accounted for only about 30 to 35 per cent, which was actually confirmed by Aliko Dangote.
The visible contradiction in this situation is that the refinery built to free Nigeria from dollar dependence was running largely on dollar-denominated imports. Not because the oil did not exist locally, but because the system, shaped by debt obligations and global financial structures, made it more practical to export crude for dollars than to refine it domestically, which leads us to several other covert concerns.
Faced with this troubling reality, there is one major issue that still needs to be answered. This is why Dangote pushed back by filing a N100 billion lawsuit against the NNPC and major oil marketers. He further accused the parties involved of failing to prioritise domestic refining. For a brief moment, one will think that the confrontation, as it appeared, was underway is one that could redefine the balance between state control and private industrial ambition, but these expectations never saw the light of day.
Yes, it never saw the light of day because on July 28, 2025, the lawsuit was quietly withdrawn. No press conferences. No public explanation. No confirmed settlement. Just silence.
There are only a few plausible or credible explanations. As a practice and well-known in the country, institutional pressure may have made continued confrontation untenable. A strategic compromise may have been reached behind closed doors. Or the realities of the system itself may have made victory impossible, regardless of the merits of the case. None of these scenarios suggests a system operating with full autonomy or aligned national interest. All of them point to constraints, political, economic, or structural, that extend far beyond a single company.
Then came the shock that changed everything.
On February 28, 2026, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting a channel through which roughly 20 per cent of the world’s oil supply flows. Prices surged past $100 per barrel. Global markets entered crisis mode. Supply chains are fractured. Countries dependent on Middle Eastern fuel suddenly had nowhere to turn.
And they turned to Nigeria. Nations like South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya began seeking fuel supplies from the Dangote Refinery. The same refinery that had been starved of crude, forced into dollar-denominated imports, and entangled in domestic disputes suddenly became the most strategically important energy asset on the African continent.
Nigeria did not plan for this. It did not negotiate for this. With this development, the world had no choice but to simply run out of options, and Lagos became the fallback.
And then, almost immediately, attention shifted. This swiftly prompted, in early 2026, a United States congressional report to recommend applying pressure on Nigeria’s trade relationships within Africa. Shortly after, on March 16, 2026, the United States launched a Section 301 trade investigation into multiple economies, including Nigeria. This is not a sanction, but it is the legal foundation for one. At the same time, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which had provided duty-free access to U.S. markets for decades, was allowed to expire in 2025 without renewal.
The sequence is difficult to ignore. As Nigeria’s strategic importance rose, so did external scrutiny. As its potential for regional energy leadership increased, so did the instruments of economic pressure.
To understand why, you must look at the system itself. The global economy runs on the U.S. dollar, which the Iranian government tried to scuttle by implementing a policy that requires oil cargo tankers being transported via the Strait of Hormuz to be paid in Yuan. Most countries need dollars to trade, to import essential goods, and to access global markets. The infrastructure that enforces this is the SWIFT financial network, which connects banks across the world. Control over this system confers enormous power. Countries that step too far outside it risk exclusion, and exclusion, in modern terms, means economic paralysis.
Nigeria’s attempt to trade crude in naira was not just a policy experiment. It was a subtle deviation from a system that rewards compliance and punishes independence. The response was not military. It did not need to be. It was structural. Limit domestic supply. Reinforce dollar dependence. Ensure that even attempts at independence remain tethered to the existing order.
And all the while, the debt clock continues to tick. N155.1 trillion.
That number is not just a fiscal burden. It is leverage. It shapes policy. It influences decisions, and it also determines priorities, which tells you that when a nation is deeply indebted, its room to manoeuvre shrinks. In all of this, one thing that must be understood is that choices that might favour long-term sovereignty are often sacrificed for short-term stability. Debt does not just demand repayment. It demands alignment.
Back home, Nigerians remain focused on the most visible symptom, which is fuel prices. Unbeknownst to most Nigerians, they argue, protest, and assign blame while the forces shaping those prices include global currency systems, sovereign debt obligations, trade pressures, and geopolitical realignments. The price at the pump is not the cause. It is the consequence.
Nigeria now stands at an intersection defined not by scarcity, but by contradiction. What is more alarming is that it produces vast amounts of crude oil, yet struggles to supply its own refinery. It earns more in dollar terms, yet its citizens feel poorer. It builds infrastructure meant to ensure independence, yet operates within constraints that reinforce dependence. This is not a failure of resources, and this is because there is a conflict or tension between what Nigeria wants, which reflects its ambition and structure, and between sovereignty and obligation.
And so the questions remain, growing louder with each passing month and might force Nigerians, when pushed to the wall, to begin demanding answers. If Nigeria has the oil, why is it importing crude? Further to this dismay, more questions arise, such as, why is the refinery paying in dollars if Naira-for-crude exists? One will also be forced to ask if the lawsuit had merit, why was it withdrawn without explanation? If revenues are rising, why is hardship deepening? And if Nigeria is merely a developing economy with limited influence, why is it attracting this level of global attention?
These are not abstract questions. They are the pressure points of a system that extends far beyond Nigeria’s borders.
Because this story is no longer just about one country. The reality is that, perhaps unbeknownst to many, it is about the future of African economic independence. It is about the structure of global energy markets, the dominance of the dollar and the role of debt in shaping national destiny. Honestly, the question that comes to bear is that if Nigeria, with all its resources and scale, cannot fully align its production with its domestic needs, what does that imply for the rest of the continent?
The next time the conversation turns to petrol prices, something must shift. Because the number on the pump is not where this battle is being fought. It is being fought in allocation decisions, in debt negotiations, in regulatory frameworks, in international financial systems, and in quiet policy moves that rarely make headlines.
The Dangote Refinery is not just an industrial project. It is a test case. A test of whether a nation can truly control its own resources in a world where power is rarely exercised loudly, but always effectively. And right now, that test is still unfolding.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
Feature/OPED
2027: The Unabating Insecurity and the US Directive to Embassy, is History About to Repeat Itself?
By Obiaruko Christie Ndukwe
We can’t be acting like nothing is happening. The US orders its Embassy Staff and family in the US to leave Nigeria immediately based on security concerns.
Same yesterday, President Donald J. Trump posted on his Truth Social that Nigeria was behind the fake news on his comments on Iran.
Some people believe it was the same way the Obama Government came against President Goodluck Jonathan before he lost out in the election that removed him from Aso Rock. They say it’s about the same thing for President Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu.
But I wonder if the real voting is done by external forces or the Nigerian electorate. Or could it be that the external influence swings the voting pattern?
In the middle of escalating security issues, the opposition is gaining more prominence in the media, occasioned by the ‘controversial’ action of the INEC Chairman in delisting the names of the leaders of ADC, the new ‘organised’ opposition party.
But the Federal Government seems undeterred by the flurry of crises, viewing it as an era that will soon fizzle out. Those on the side of the Tinubu Government believe that the President is smarter than Jonathan and would navigate the crisis as well as Trump’s perceived opposition.
Recall that in the heat of the CPC designation and the allegations of a Christian Genocide by the POTUS, the FG was able to send a delegation led by the NSA, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, to interface with the US Government and some level of calm was restored.
With the renewed call by the US Government for its people to leave Nigeria, with 23 states classified as “dangerous”, where does this place the government?
Can Tinubu manoeuvre what many say is history about to repeat itself, especially with the renewed call for Jonathan to throw his hat into the ring?
Let’s wait and see how it goes.
Chief Christie Obiaruko Ndukwe is a Public Affairs Analyst, Investigative Journalist and the National President of Citizens Quest for Truth Initiative
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