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PIA: Pollution and Host Communities

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By Jerome-Maeario Utomi

Like every new invention which comes with opportunities and challenges, the passage by the National Assembly and signing into law of the Petroleum Industry Bill about two years ago by the President Muhammadu Buhari-led federal government, after about 17 years of protracted back-and-forth debates, was greeted with mixed feelings. While some hailed the development, others welcomed it with scepticism.

Aside from the belief that the coming of PIA will make innovation possible within the petroleum sector, those who expressed happiness about the coming of the Act predicated their joys on the fact that the provisions, as sighted in PIA, will assist straddle the middle ground in the nation’s petroleum sector which has for a very long time manifested, proved to be a sector with neither primed nor positioned potentials.

Supporting this assertion is the graphic description by PIA advocates of how the new Act will locate, harmonize and strategically engineer prosperity among the operators of the up, mid and downstream sectors of the oil industry while turning the host communities into a zone of peace and democratized development via the 3% allocation to the host communities as captured in Chapter 3 of the Act.

In the opinion of this piece, this joy expressed by stakeholders for reasons qualifies as apposite, especially when one commits to mind the fact that for decades, the operational templates of the players within the industry, particularly the International Oil Companies (IOCs), have for decades been reputed for non-compliance to set rules and devoid of international best practices.

In fact, industry watchers have, at different times, and places argued that before the advent of PIA, the sector was confronted by the following weaknesses; the existence of multiple but obsolete regulatory frameworks which characterize the oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria.

Secondly, the federal government failed to get the nations’ refineries back to full refining capacity. Thirdly, the Petroleum Ministry’s inability to get committed to making IOCs adhere strictly to the international best practices as it relates to their operational environment.

Fourth and final is the non-existence of clear responsibility/work details and action plans for government agencies and parastatals functioning, monitoring/regulating the sector.

The above failures have, as a direct consequence; cast a long dark shadow on both the ministry and the sector.

To further explain these points beginning with the first challenge, it is worth noting that the business of crude oil exploration and issues of oil production in the country is regulated by multiple but very weak laws and Acts- of which most of these laws are not only complicate enforcement but curiously too old-fashioned for the changing demands of time. Thereby, creating loopholes for operators, especially the IOCs, to exploit both the government and host communities.

Some of these laws/Acts in question operated for over five decades without achieving purposes, and they include but are not limited to; the Petroleum Act of 1969, The Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Positions etc), Act 1988, Mineral Oil Safety Regulation 1963, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 (Subsidiary Legislation to The Petroleum Act), The off-shore Oil Revenue (Registration of Grants)Act 1971, Oil in Navigable Act 1968, Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act 1975, Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979, Associated Gas Re-injection (continued Flaring of Gas) Regulation, Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Decree 1985, Oil Pipeline Act Chapter (CAP) 338, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (L.F.N.) 1990, and Gas Flare prohibition and punishment) Act 2016 among others.

Even as the above remains lamentable, facts have since emerged that instead of providing the anticipated legal, governance, regulatory and fiscal framework for the Nigerian petroleum industry and the host communities, the Petroleum Industry Act (Act), like the other failed laws that it came to replace, has contrary to expectation become different things to different peoples.

To many, PIA is not only an evil wind that blows nobody any good but a toothless bulldog that neither bites nor barks. To others, it is but is a palliative that cures the effect of sickness while leaving the root cause to thrive.

To the host and impacted communities, the Act has become a first line of conflict between crude oil prospecting, exploration companies and their host communities. It is a law that has come to steal, kill and destroy. Members of this group have come to a sudden realization that nothing has changed.

Without going into specifics, concepts, provisions and definitions, there is also greater evidence that points to the fact that the underlying premise behind PIA enactment has been defeated, the eliciting reason for concern that what is currently happening between oil companies and their host communities may no longer be the first half of a reoccurring circle, but, rather the beginning of something negatively new and different.

Take, as an illustration, if PIA is fundamentally effective and efficient, why is it not providing a strong source of remedy for individuals and communities negatively affected by oil exploration and production in the coastal communities? If these frameworks exist and have been comprehensive as a legal solution to the issues of oil-related violations, why are the IOCs operating in the country indulging in selective implementation of the Act?

Why is the Act not enforced by the federal government and other relevant agencies? Why are these hosts and impacted communities still suffering at the hands of the crude oil exploration and production companies operating in the Niger Delta region?

While answers to the above questions are expected, this piece, however, believes that there are reasons why these issues raised about PIA failures and failings cannot be described as unfounded.

The facts are there and speak for it.

On 28th of March 2023, the people of Kantu/Odidi, host communities to Odidi Flow station, OML 42 in Gbaramatu kingdom, Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta State, staged a peaceful protest against the non-implementation of PIA.

While calling for holistic repair works on the Trans Forcados Pipeline (TFP), which runs through OML 42 in Warri South West LGA to Forcados Terminal in Burutu LGA of Delta State, the protesting communities gave the operators a 7-day ultimatum to commence genuine implementation of the PIA process and payment of the 3% of 2022 operating expenses as stipulated by the PIA with immediate effect to enable the communities to resume implementation of developmental projects in the communities,  warning that failure to do so may lead to the shutdown of operational activities in the OML 42 Asset.

Lamenting that the TFP pipeline was constructed in the early 1960s and has outlived its lifespan long ago, leading to continuous pollution of the environment and destruction of the ecosystem, creating hardship for the locals, the communities stressed that TFP is one of the major pipelines destroying the environment because it has expired and cannot withstand the pressure of crude oil transported through it.

They, therefore, demanded full replacement of the said pipeline instead of the sectional repair works being planned by NEPL/NECONDE without recourse to its negative implications on communities and the environment, particularly since sectional repair works will not stop further leakages.

Kantu/Odidi protest occurred at a time when the dust raised by the 14 days ultimatum/threat issued to another oil company by the oil-rich community of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) in Warri North Local Government Area of Delta State was yet to settle.

In that particular ‘event’, the people of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) also threatened to shut down ongoing exploration activities of Conoil Producing Limited if the company failed to reach a definite agreement with the community on the implementation of Chapter 3 of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) for the Tsekelewu bloc of communities, supports this assertion.

The Host Community lamented that they adopted the option due to the seemingly snobbish attitude of the management of Conoil Producing, as the company’s management had refused to honour letters asking for a meeting with the TCDA on the issue of the PIA implementation.

Away from the persistent highhandedness of the IOCs, this piece is also of the position that PIA is as weak, defective and insufficient as the laws/Acts it was enacted to replace when it comes to pollution prevention, monitoring and control within the sector.

In fact, it will not be characterized as an overstatement to say that it shares the same body and spirit with the now rested Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Positions etc), Act 1988. The major defect with the referenced Act was signposted in its definition of harmful substance based solely on its impact on human beings and does not include its impacts on the environment and animals.

It focused only on the commission of any action or omission by persons without lawful authority. Thus, where an organization has a license to store waste resulting from production, they are seemingly omitted from the ambit of the Act, but the law failed to take into consideration the inadequate storage or inadequate waste management system by licensed firms or groups. Such failure or oversight is glaring and inherent in PIA.

Adding context to the colossal damage harmful substances arising from crude oil production have caused the nation, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency  NOSDRA reports show that oil spill incidents occurred 921 times in 2015, resulting in a loss of 47,714 barrels of oil, the highest within the period under review. In 2016, 688 cases of oil spills occurred, culminating in a volume of 42,744 barrels of oil. In 2017 and 2018, 596 and 706 cases of oil spills occurred and resulted in the spillage of 34,887 and 27,985 barrels of oil, respectively. Oil spills occurred on 732 occasions, spewing 41,381 barrels of oil in 2019, and 455 cases were recorded in 2020 with 23,526 barrels of oil. In 2021, companies reported 388 incidents, resulting in 23,956 barrels of oil.

The report also observed that oil spills should be closed off within 24 hours. And oil companies are required to fund the clean-up of each spill and pay compensation to local communities affected if the incident was the company’s fault.

Despite these beautiful provisions, there exists no appreciable instance within the period under review where such obligations to host communities have been obeyed. This piece also holds the opinion that under the PIA regime, no operator can claim a clean hand when it comes to obeying such laws in Nigeria, and the regulatory agencies have never bothered to hold them accountable for such failures.

Still on inefficiency and insufficiency of PIA provisions to effectively control pollution arising from crude oil exploration and production, this author, in a similar intervention, after a visit to the Niger Delta region, stated that a tour by boat of creeks and coastal communities of Warri South West and Warri North Local Government Areas of Delta state would amply reveal that the much-anticipated end in sight of gas flaring is actually not in sight. In the same manner, a journey by road from Warri via Eku-Abraka to Agbor, and another road trip from Warri through Ughelli down to Ogwuashi Ukwu in Aniocha Local Government of the state, shows an environment where people cannot properly breathe as it is littered by gas flaring points.

To a large extent, the above confirms as true the recently published report, which among other concerns, noted that Nigeria has about 139 gas flare locations spread across the Niger Delta both in onshore and offshore oil fields where gas which constitutes about 11 per cent of the total gas produced are flared.

Apart from the health implication of flared gases on humanity, their adverse impact on the nation’s economy is equally weighty. For instance, a parallel report published a while ago underlined that about 888 million standard cubic feet of gas were flared daily in 2017. The flared gas, it added, was sufficient to light up Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa, generate 2.5 gigawatts (Gw) of power or produce 50 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) or produce 600,000 metric tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) per year, produce 22 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2), feed two-three liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains, generate 300,000 jobs, able to attract $3.5 billion investment into Nigeria and has $350 million carbon credit value’. This is an illustrative pointer as to why the nation economically gropes and stumbles.

Banking on what experts are saying, the major reason for the flaring of gases is that when crude oil is extracted from onshore and offshore oil wells, it brings with it raw natural gas to the surface and where natural gas transportation, pipelines, and infrastructure are lacking, like in the case of Nigeria, this gas is instead burned off or flared as a waste product as this is the cheapest option.

It, therefore, remains an ugly narrative that the choice to flare gas in the country is largely predicated on economies. This has been going on since the 1950s when crude oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria.

While Nigeria and Nigerians persist in encountering gas flaring in the country, even so, has, successive administrations in the country made both feeble and deformed attempts to get it arrested.

In 2016, before the advent of PIA, President Muhammadu Buhari led administration enacted Gas Flare Prohibition and Punishment), an act that, among other things, made provisions to prohibit gas flaring in any oil and gas production operation, blocks, fields, onshore or offshore, and gas facility treatment plants in Nigeria.

On Monday, September 2, 2018, Dr Ibe Kachikwu, Minister of State for Petroleum (as he then was), while speaking at the Buyers’ Forum/stakeholders’ Engagement organized by the Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria in Abuja, among other things, remarked thus; ‘I have said to the Department of Petroleum Resources, beginning from next year (2019 emphasis added), we are going to get quite frantic about this (ending gas flaring in Nigeria) and companies that cannot meet with extended periods –the issue is not how much you can pay in terms of fines for gas flaring, the issue is that you would not produce. We need to begin to look at the foreclosing of licenses’. That threat has since ended in the frames, as there has been little or nothing to get the threat actualized.

The administration also launched the now abandoned National Gas Flare Commercialization Programme (NGFCP), a programme, according to the federal government, aimed at achieving the flares-out agenda/zero routine gas flaring in Nigeria by 2020. Again, like a regular trademark, it failed.

Away from Buhari’s administration, in 1979, the then federal government, in a similar style, came up with the Associated Gas Re-injection Act, which summarily prohibited gas flaring and also fixed the flare-out deadline for January 1, 1984. It failed in line with the leadership philosophy in the country.

Similar feeble and deformed attempts were made in 2003, 2006, and 2008. In the same style and span, precisely on July 2, 2009, the Nigerian Senate passed a Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2009 (SB 126) into law, fixing the flare-out deadline for December 31, 2010- a date that slowly but inevitably failed.

Not stopping at this point, the FG made another attempt in this direction by coming up with the Petroleum Industry Bill, which fixed the flare-out deadline for 2012. The same Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) got protracted till 2021 when it completed its gestation and was subsequently signed into law by President Buhari as Petroleum Industry Act (PIA).

To win, the nation must borrow a ‘soul in order to raise a body’. They must seek solutions from the countries that are presently doing well in these areas where we are facing challenges.  Part of that effort will require going beyond PIA to recognise the region as a special area for purposes of development. This demand cannot be described as unfounded as it is historically based, logical and factually supported.

Recall that the colonial government, long before independence turned down the demand for a Calabar/Ogoja/Rivers (COR) region/state.  But identified the Niger Delta as a troubled spot and recommended to the then Federal Government that the region be regarded as a special area for purposes of development.

Without any shadow of a doubt, I hold an opinion that the federal government’s inability to treat the region as such set the stage for and nourished the restiveness in both the region and the sector.

Most importantly, the people of the region must be directly involved in the management of their resources.

Jerome-Mario is the programme coordinator (Media and Public Policy) at the Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA). He can be reached via [email protected]/08032725374.

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Navigating Nigeria’s $1 Trillion Roadmap: Growth Indexes and PR Intelligence That Define Success in 2026

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Nosa Iyamu IVI PR

By Nosa Iyamu

As we navigate the threshold of 2026, the Nigerian economic landscape is finally shedding the “survivalist” skin that defined the previous two years. The data from 2025 paints a compelling picture of a nation pivoting toward stability. Headline inflation, which sat at a staggering 34.8% in December 2024, underwent a significant decline through 2025, cooling to 14.45% by November. This disinflationary trend, paired with economic reforms such as the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission’s (NERC) aggressive reforms and strategic shifts in the Oil and Gas sector, has effectively reopened the floodgates for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The narrative has shifted from a desperate scramble for survival to a strategic quest for sustainability. Investors who were once hesitant are now looking at Nigeria not as a volatility risk, but as a market undergoing profound structural re-engineering. This transition is marked by a renewed focus on transparency and a commitment to market-driven policies that reward institutional resilience and long-term planning.

Building on the stability achieved last year, 2026 is projected to be a period of “Growth Consolidation.” With GDP expansion forecasted between 4.1% and 4.2% and headline inflation expected to settle into a manageable range of 12.5% to 20%, the mandate for brands should shift. It is no longer about merely surviving the storm of volatility; it is about scaling within high-impact corridors that have been cleared by these macroeconomic reforms. Strategic opportunities are ripening in four key sectors: Energy, driven by the Electricity Act 2023 and NERC’s cost-reflective market reforms; Healthcare, anchored by the landmark $5.1B Bilateral MOU between the U.S. and Nigeria; Financial Services, fueled by post-recapitalization lending power; and the Digital Economy, accelerated by the 5G rollout and the maturity of social commerce. Brands playing in these spaces and other industries must recognize that the consumer of 2026 is more discerning, having been refined by the economic hardships of the past, and will only reward businesses that offer clear value and authentic connection.

Perhaps the most pivotal anchor for 2026 is that $2 billion bilateral health Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the U.S. and Nigeria. This five-year agreement, which began its full implementation cycle in early 2026, is far more than a healthcare play; it is a massive economic stimulus and a resounding vote of global confidence in Nigeria’s institutional reforms. It signals that Nigeria is ready for high-level international cooperation and that the groundwork for a stable, productive economy is being laid. As we march toward the ambitious goal of a $1 trillion economy by 2030, visibility is no longer the endgame for any serious brand. To survive and thrive during this transition from subsistence to high productivity, brands must be deeply understood. It is about moving from the “top of mind” awareness to “top of heart” resonance, where the brand’s purpose aligns with the aspirations of a nation on the move.

In the fast-evolving communications landscape of 2026, visibility has become a cheap commodity, but clarity is a premium asset. The Public Relations industry has officially entered the era of Narrative Intelligence. Traditional Search Engine Optimization (SEO) is being rapidly superseded by Generative Engine Optimization (GEO). As consumers increasingly rely on AI agents and large language models (LLMs) rather than scrolling through pages of search results, brands must ensure they aren’t just “present” on the web—they must be cited as authoritative, credible voices by AI models. This requires a shift from keyword stuffing to high-context storytelling and data-backed authority. If an AI agent cannot summarize your brand’s value proposition accurately in two sentences, you are effectively invisible to the next generation of digital consumers. Narrative Intelligence is about ensuring your brand’s story is coherent, consistent, and machine-readable across all digital touchpoints.

However, this AI-driven world brings a darker side – the proliferation of Deepfakes and hyper-realistic misinformation. As the 2027 political cycle begins to warm up in late 2026, the Nigerian digital space could become a minefield of synthetic media designed to manipulate public opinion. For brands, this represents a significant reputational risk. PR professionals must now act as “Narrative Bodyguards,” deploying advanced AI detection tools to monitor, detect, and neutralize synthetic media before it erodes brand equity. Authenticity is no longer a buzzword or a marketing slogan; it is a defensive necessity. Brands must lean into “Responsible Communication,” ensuring that every piece of content is verifiable and that their response mechanisms for crisis management are faster than the speed of a viral deepfake. Trust, once lost in this high-speed environment, is nearly impossible to regain.

The era of the “Press Release for the sake of it” is officially dead. In 2026, Nigerian boardrooms are demanding a direct, quantifiable line between PR activity and business impact. This marks the definitive death of vanity metrics. Success is no longer measured by the thickness of a press clipping file or the number of generic “likes” on a social media post. Instead, we are seeing a shift from volume to impact, where the primary KPIs are how a campaign drives customer acquisition, increases investor interest, or improves employee retention. Measurement has shifted focus to quality over quantity; it is about the sentiment of the conversation and the conversion rate of the audience. If your PR strategy does not move the needle on the set measurable objectives, it is considered mere noise. PR is now a performance-driven discipline, integrated deeply into the sales and growth funnels of the modern Nigerian enterprise.

The age of the N100 million celebrity brand ambassador is also rapidly fading. Battle-hardened by years of economic shifts and broken promises, Nigerian consumers are increasingly skeptical of high-gloss, low-substance celebrity endorsements. In 2025, the Creator Economy has professionalized and matured. We will see the ascendancy of Niche Creators—the personal finance expert on TikTok, the sustainable farmer on YouTube, or the tech-policy analyst on Instagram. These voices offer what traditional celebrities cannot: community, deep credibility, and a mastery of their craft. Brands in 2026 will pivot toward long-term “Responsible Communication” partnerships with these creators who speak the hyper-local language of their audience. The “next big creator” is no longer a movie star; they are a subject matter expert with a loyal, high-intent community that values authentic insight over superficial fame.

While we must continue to support and prioritize independent media platforms to maintain democratic health, the reality is that traditional newsrooms continue to shrink under the weight of digital disruption. In response, savvy brands are increasingly becoming their own media houses. “Owned Media”—newsletters, podcasts, proprietary research reports, and custom-built community platforms—is the new frontier for brand storytelling. By owning the platform, brands can ensure their story is not diluted or lost in the noise of a fragmented media landscape. This allows for Direct Empathy, speaking to the consumer’s daily reality without a third-party filter. It provides Narrative Control, which is essential in an era of deepfakes, and grants Data Ownership, allowing brands to deeply understand who is engaging with their story and why. Owned media is the bridge that moves a brand from being seen to being truly understood and must be a strategy for 2026.

The 2026 landscape is a high-stakes arena of immense complexity and opportunity. With the active involvement of global powers like China, Russia, and the USA in trade and commerce, and a renewed national commitment to fighting insecurity to protect the $1 trillion goal, Nigeria is a land of profound transformation. But for a brand to capture this opportunity, it must move beyond the surface-level metrics of the past. Brands must empathize through genuine partnerships, drive cross-sector collaboration, and tell stories that resonate with the Nigerian spirit of resilience. The verdict for the year is clear: Trust is the new currency. In a world of AI-generated noise and economic restructuring, the brands that win will be those that have spent the time to build a foundation of understanding. The mandate for 2026 is simple: Don’t just show up. Ensure your audience knows exactly who you are, what you stand for, and why you are essential to their future.

Nosa Iyamu is the CEO of IVI PR

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On the Gazetted Tax Laws: What if Dasuki Was Indifferent?

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Abdussamad Dasuki

By Isah Kamisu Madachi

For over a week now, flipping through the pages of Nigerian newspapers, social media, and other media platforms, the dominant issue trending nationwide has been the discovery of significant discrepancies between the gazetted version of the tax laws made available to the public and what was actually passed by the Nigerian legislature.

Since this shocking discovery by a member of the House of Representatives, opinions from tax experts, public affairs analysts, activists, civil society organisations, opposition politicians, and professional bodies have been pouring in.

Many interesting events capable of burying the tempo of the debate have recently surfaced in the media, yet the tax law discussion persists due to how deeply entrenched public interest is in the contested laws.

However, while many view the issue from angles such as a breach of public trust, a violation of legislative privilege by the executive council, the passage of an ill-prepared law and so on, I see it from a different, narrower, and governance-centred perspective.

What brought this issue to public attention was an alarm raised by Abdulsammad Dasuki, a member of the House of Representatives from Sokoto State, during a plenary on December 17, 2025. He called the attention of the House to what he identified as discrepancies between the gazetted version of the tax laws he obtained from the Federal Ministry of Information and what was actually debated, agreed upon, and passed on the floors of both the House and the Senate.

He requested that the Speaker ensure all relevant documents, including the harmonised versions, the votes and proceedings of both chambers, and the gazetted copies, are brought before the Committee of the Whole for careful scrutiny. The lawmaker expressed concern over what he described as a serious breach of his legislative privilege.

Beyond that, however, my concern is about how safe and protected Nigerians’ interests are in the hands of our lawmakers at the National Assembly. This ongoing discussion raises a critical question about representation in Nigeria. Does this mean that if Dasuki had also been indifferent and had not bothered to utilise the Freedom of Information Act 2011 to obtain the gazetted version of the laws from the Federal Ministry of Information, take time to study it, and make comparisons, there would have been no cause for alarm from any of Nigeria’s 360 House of Representatives members and 109 senators? Do lawmakers discard the confidence we reposed in them immediately after election results are declared?

This debate should indeed serve a latent function of waking us up to the reality of the glaring disconnect between public interest and the interests of our representatives. The legislature in a democratic setting is a critical institution that goes beyond routine plenaries that are often uninteresting and sparsely attended by the lawmakers. It is meant to be a space for scrutiny, deliberation, and the protection of public interest, especially when complex laws with wide social consequences are involved.

We saw Ali Ndume in a short video clip that recently swept the media, furiously saying during a verbal altercation with Adams Oshiomhole over ambassadorial screening that “the Senate is not a joke.” The Senate is, of course, not a joke, and either should the entire National Assembly be.

Ideally, it should not be a joke to us or to the legislators themselves. Therefore, we should not shy away from discussing how disinterested those entrusted with the task of representing us, and primarily protecting our interests, appear to be in our collective affairs.

It is not a coincidence that even before the current debate around the tax reform law, it had continued to generate controversy since its inception. It also does not take quantum mechanics to understand that something is fundamentally wrong when almost nobody truly understands the law. Thanks to social media, I have come across numerous skits, write-ups, and commentaries attempting to explain it, but often followed by opposing responses saying that the authors either did not understand the law themselves or did not take sufficient time to study it.

The controversy around the gazetted Tax Reform Laws should not end with public outrage or media debates alone. It should force a deeper reflection on how laws are made, checked, and defended in Nigeria’s democracy. A system that relies on the alertness of one lawmaker to prevent serious legislative discrepancies is not a resilient or reliable system. Representation cannot be occasional and vigilance cannot be optional.

Nigerians deserve a legislature that safeguards their interests, not one that notices breaches only when a few individuals choose to be different and look closely. If this ongoing debate does not lead to formidable internal checks and a renewed sense of responsibility among lawmakers, then the problem is far bigger than a flawed gazette. When legislative processes fail, it is ordinary Nigerians who bear the cost through policies they did not scrutinize and consequences they did not consent to.

Isah Kamisu Madachi is a public policy enthusiast and development practitioner. He writes from Abuja and can be reached via: [email protected]

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After the Capital Rush: Who Really Wins Nigeria’s Bank Recapitalisation?

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CBN Building Governor Yemi Cardoso

By Blaise Udunze

By any standard, Nigeria’s ongoing bank recapitalisation exercise is one of the most consequential financial sector reforms since the 2004-2005 consolidation that shrank the number of banks from 89 to 25. Then, as now, the stated objective was stability to have stronger balance sheets, better shock absorption, and banks capable of financing long-term economic growth.

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), in 2024, mandated a sweeping recapitalisation exercise compelling banks to raise substantially higher capital bases depending on their license categories. The categorisation mandated that every Tier-1 deposit money bank with international authorization is to warehouse N500 billion minimum capital base, and a national bank must have N200 billion, while a regional bank must have N50 billion by the deadline of 31st March 2026. According to the apex bank, the objectives were to strengthen resilience, create a more robust buffer against shocks, and position Nigerian banks as global competitors capable of funding a $1 trillion economy.

But in the thick of the race to comply and as the dust gradually settles, a far bigger conversation has emerged, one that cuts to the heart of how our banking system works. What will the aftermath of recapitalisation mean for Nigeria’s banking landscape, financial inclusion agenda, and real-sector development?

Beyond the headlines of rights issues, private placements, and billionaire founders boosting stakes, every Nigerians deserve a sober assessment of what has changed, and what still must change, if recapitalisation is to translate into a genuinely improved banking system.

The points are who benefits most from its evolution, and whether ordinary Nigerians will feel the promised transformation in their everyday financial lives, because history has taught us that recapitalisation is never a neutral policy. The fact remains that recapitalization creates winners and losers, restructures incentives, and often leads to unintended outcomes that outlive the reform itself.

Concentration Risk: When the Big Get Bigger

Recapitalisation is meant to make banks stronger, and at the same time, it risks making them fewer and bigger, concentrating power and risks in an ever-narrowing circle. Nigeria’s Tier-1 banks, those already controlling roughly 70 percent of banking assets, are poised to expand further in both balance sheet size and market influence. This deepens the divide between the “haves” and “have-nots” within the sector.

A critical fallout of this exercise has been the acceleration of consolidation. Stronger banks with ready access to capital markets, like Access Holdings and Zenith Bank, have managed to meet or exceed the new thresholds early by raising funds through rights issues and public offerings. Access Bank boosted its capital to nearly N595 billion, and Zenith Bank to about N615 billion.

In contrast, banks that lack deep pockets or the ability to quickly mobilise investors are lagging. The results always show that the biggest banks raise capital faster and cheaper, while smaller banks struggle to keep pace.

As of mid-2025, fewer than 14 of Nigeria’s 24 commercial banks met the required capital base, meaning a significant number were still scrambling, turning to rights issues, private placements, mergers, and even licensing downgrades to survive.

The danger here is not merely numerical. It is systemic: as capital becomes more concentrated, the banking system could inadvertently mimic oligopolistic tendencies, reducing competition, narrowing choices for customers, and potentially heightening systemic risk should one of these “too-big-to-fail” institutions falter.

Capital Flight or Strategic Expansion? The Foreign Subsidiary Question

One of the most contentious aspects of the recapitalisation aftermath has been the deployment of newly raised capital, especially its use outside Nigeria. Several banks, flush with liquidity from rights issues and injections, have signalled or executed investments in foreign subsidiaries and expansions abroad, like what we are experiencing with Nigerian banks spreading their tentacles to the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, and beyond. Zenith Bank’s planned expansion into the Ivory Coast exemplifies this outward push.

While international diversification can be a sound strategic move for multinational banks, there is an uncomfortable optics and developmental question here: why is Nigerian money being deployed abroad when millions of Nigerians remain unbanked or underbanked at home?

According to the World Bank, a large number of Nigeria’s adult population still lack access to formal financial services, while millions of SMEs, micro-entrepreneurs, and rural households remain on the edge, underserved by traditional banks that now chase profitability and scale.

Of a truth, redirecting Nigerian capital to foreign markets may deliver shareholder returns, but it does little in the short term to advance domestic financial inclusion, poverty reduction, or grassroots economic participation. The optics of capital flight, even when legal and strategic, demand scrutiny, especially in a nation still struggling with deep regional and demographic disparities.

Impact on Credit and the Real Economy

For the ordinary Nigerian, the most important question is simple: will recapitalisation make credit cheaper and more accessible?

History suggests the answer is not automatic. The tradition in Nigeria’s bank system is mainly to protect returns, and for this reason, many banks respond to higher capital requirements by tightening lending standards, raising interest rates, or focusing on low-risk government securities rather than private-sector loans, because raising capital is expensive, and banks are profit-driven institutions.  Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), often described as the engine of growth, are usually the first casualties of such risk aversion.

If recapitalisation results in stronger balance sheets but weaker lending to the real economy, then its benefits remain largely cosmetic. The economy does not grow on capital adequacy ratios alone; it grows when banks take measured risks to finance production, innovation, and consumption.

Retail Banking Retreat: Handing the Mass Market to Fintechs?

In recent years, we have witnessed one of the most striking shifts, or a gradual retreat of traditional banks from mass retail banking, particularly low-income and informal customers.

The question running through the hearts of many is whether Nigerian banks are retreating from retail banking, leaving space for fintech disruptors to fill the void.

In recent years, players like OPAY, Moniepoint, Palmpay, and a host of digital financial services arms have become de facto retail banking platforms for millions of Nigerians. They provide everyday payment services, wallet functionalities, micro-loans, and QR-enabled commerce, areas traditional banks once dominated. This trend has accelerated as banks chase corporate clients where margins are higher and risk profiles perceived as more manageable. The true picture of the financial landscape today is that the fintechs own the retail space, and banks dominate corporate and institutional finance. But it is unclear or uncertain if this model can continue to work effectively in the long term.

Despite the areas in which the Fintechs excel, whether in agility, product innovation, and customer experience, they still rely heavily on underlying banking infrastructure for liquidity, settlement, and regulatory compliance. Should the retail banking ecosystem become split between digital wallets and corporate corridors, rather than being vertically integrated within banks, systemic liquidity dynamics and financial stability could be affected.

Nigerians deserve a banking system where the comforts and conveniences of digital finance are backed by the stability, regulatory oversight, and capital strength of licensed banks, not a system where traditional banks withdraw from retail, leaving unregulated or lightly regulated players to carry that mantle.

Corporate Governance: When Founders Tighten Their Grip

The recapitalisation exercise has not been merely a technical capital-raising exercise; it has become a theatre of power plays at the top. In several banks, founders and major investors have used the exercise to increase their stakes, concentrating ownership even as they extol the virtues of financial resilience.

Prominent founders, from Tony Elumelu at UBA to Femi Otedola at First Holdco and Jim Ovia at Zenith Bank, have all been actively increasing their shareholdings. These moves raise legitimate questions about corporate governance when founders increase control during a regulatory exercise. Are they driven by confidence in their institutions, or are they fortifying personal and strategic influence amid industry restructuring?

Though there might be nothing inherently wrong with founders or shareholders demonstrating faith in their institutions, one fact remains that the governance challenge lies not simply in who holds the shares, but how decisions are made and whose interests are prioritised. Will banks maintain robust internal checks and balances, ensuring that capital deployment aligns with national development goals? The question is whether the CBN is equipped with adequate supervisory bandwidth and tools to check potential excesses if emerging shareholder concentrations translate into undue influence or risks to financial stability. These are questions that transcend annual reports; they strike at the heart of trust in the system.

Regional Disparity in Lending: Lagos Is Not Nigeria

One of the persistent criticisms of Nigerian banking is regional lending inequality. It has been said that most bank loans are still overwhelmingly concentrated in Lagos and the Southwest, despite decades of financial deepening in this region; large swathes of the North, Southeast, and other underserved regions receive disproportionately smaller shares of credit. This imbalance not only undermines inclusive growth but also fuels perceptions of economic exclusion.

Recapitalisation, in theory, should have enhanced banks’ capacity to support broader economic activity. Yet, the reality remains that loans and advances are overwhelmingly concentrated in economic hubs like Lagos.

The CBN must deploy clear incentives and penalties to encourage geographic diversification of lending. This could include differentiated capital requirements, credit guarantees, or tax incentives tied to regional loan portfolios. A recapitalised banking system that does not finance national development is a missed opportunity.

Cybersecurity, Staff Welfare, and the Technology Deficit

Beyond balance sheets and brand expansion, there is a human and technological dimension to the banking sector’s challenge. Fraud remains rampant, and one of the leading frustrations voiced by Nigerians involves failed transactions, delayed reversals, and poor digital experience. Banks can raise capital, but if they fail to invest heavily in cybersecurity, fraud detection, staff training, and welfare, the everyday customer will continue to view the banking system as unreliable.

Nigeria’s fintech revolution has thrived precisely because it has pushed incumbents to become more customer-centric, agile, and tech-savvy. If banks now flush with capital don’t channel a portion of those funds into robust IT systems, workforce development, fraud mitigation, and seamless customer service, then the recapitalisation will have achieved little beyond stronger balance sheets. In short, Nigerians should feel the difference, not merely in stock prices and market capitalisation, but in smooth banking apps, instant reversals, responsive customer care, and secure platforms.

The Banks Left Behind: Mergers, Failures, or Forced Restructuring?

With fewer than half the banks having fully complied with the recapitalisation requirements deep into 2025, a pressing question is: what awaits those that lag? Many banks are still closing capital gaps that run into hundreds of billions of naira. According to industry estimates, the total recapitalisation gap across the sector could reach as much as N4.7 trillion if all requirements are strictly enforced.

Banks that fail to meet the March 2026 deadline face a few options:

–       Forced M&A. Regulators could effectively compel weaker banks to merge with stronger ones, echoing the consolidation wave of 2005 that reduced the sector from 89 to 25 banks.

–       License downgrades or conversions. Some banks may choose to operate at a lower license category that demands a smaller capital base.

–       Exits or closures. In extreme cases, banks that can neither raise capital nor find a merger partner might be forced out of the market.

This regulatory pressure should not be construed merely as punitive. It is part of the CBN’s broader architecture of ensuring that only solvent, well-capitalised, and risk-prepared institutions operate. However, the transition must be managed carefully to prevent contagion, protect depositors, and preserve confidence.

Why Are Tier-1 Banks Still Chasing Capital?

Perhaps the most intriguing puzzle is why some Tier-1 banks, long regarded as strong and profitable, are aggressively raising capital. Even banks thought to be among the strongest, such as UBA, First Holdco, Fidelity, GTCO, and FCMB, have struggled to close their capital gaps. UBA, for instance, succeeded in raising around N355 billion toward its N500 billion target at one point and planned additional rights issues to bridge the remainder.

This reveals another reality that capital is not just numbers on paper; it is investor confidence, market appetite, and macroeconomic stability.

One can also say that the answer lies partly in ambition to expand into new markets, infrastructure financing, and compliance with stricter global standards.

However, it also reflects deeper structural pressures, including currency depreciation eroding capital, rising non-performing loans, and the substantial funding required to support Nigeria’s development needs. Even giants are discovering that yesterday’s capital is no longer sufficient for tomorrow’s challenges.

Reform Without Deception

As the Nigerian banking sector recapitalization exercise comes to a close by March 31, 2026, the ultimate test will be whether the reforms deliver on their transformational promise.

Some of the concerns in the minds of Nigerians today will be to see a system that supports inclusive growth, equitable credit distribution, world-class customer service, and resilient financial intermediation. Or will we see a sector that, despite larger capital bases, still reflects old hierarchies, geographic biases, and operational friction? The cynic might say that recapitalisation simply made big banks bigger and empowered dominant shareholders.

But a more hopeful perspective invites stakeholders, including regulators, customers, civil society, and bankers themselves, to co-design the next chapter of Nigerian banking; one that balances scale with inclusion, profitability with impact, and stability with innovation. The difference will be made not by press releases or shareholder announcements, but by deliberate regulatory action and measurable improvements in how banks serve the economy.

For now, the capital has been raised, but the true capital that counts is the confidence Nigerians place in their banks every time they log into an app, make a transfer, or deposit their life’s savings. Only when that trust is visible in everyday experience can we say that recapitalisation has truly succeeded.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]

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