Feature/OPED
PIA: Pollution and Host Communities
By Jerome-Maeario Utomi
Like every new invention which comes with opportunities and challenges, the passage by the National Assembly and signing into law of the Petroleum Industry Bill about two years ago by the President Muhammadu Buhari-led federal government, after about 17 years of protracted back-and-forth debates, was greeted with mixed feelings. While some hailed the development, others welcomed it with scepticism.
Aside from the belief that the coming of PIA will make innovation possible within the petroleum sector, those who expressed happiness about the coming of the Act predicated their joys on the fact that the provisions, as sighted in PIA, will assist straddle the middle ground in the nation’s petroleum sector which has for a very long time manifested, proved to be a sector with neither primed nor positioned potentials.
Supporting this assertion is the graphic description by PIA advocates of how the new Act will locate, harmonize and strategically engineer prosperity among the operators of the up, mid and downstream sectors of the oil industry while turning the host communities into a zone of peace and democratized development via the 3% allocation to the host communities as captured in Chapter 3 of the Act.
In the opinion of this piece, this joy expressed by stakeholders for reasons qualifies as apposite, especially when one commits to mind the fact that for decades, the operational templates of the players within the industry, particularly the International Oil Companies (IOCs), have for decades been reputed for non-compliance to set rules and devoid of international best practices.
In fact, industry watchers have, at different times, and places argued that before the advent of PIA, the sector was confronted by the following weaknesses; the existence of multiple but obsolete regulatory frameworks which characterize the oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria.
Secondly, the federal government failed to get the nations’ refineries back to full refining capacity. Thirdly, the Petroleum Ministry’s inability to get committed to making IOCs adhere strictly to the international best practices as it relates to their operational environment.
Fourth and final is the non-existence of clear responsibility/work details and action plans for government agencies and parastatals functioning, monitoring/regulating the sector.
The above failures have, as a direct consequence; cast a long dark shadow on both the ministry and the sector.
To further explain these points beginning with the first challenge, it is worth noting that the business of crude oil exploration and issues of oil production in the country is regulated by multiple but very weak laws and Acts- of which most of these laws are not only complicate enforcement but curiously too old-fashioned for the changing demands of time. Thereby, creating loopholes for operators, especially the IOCs, to exploit both the government and host communities.
Some of these laws/Acts in question operated for over five decades without achieving purposes, and they include but are not limited to; the Petroleum Act of 1969, The Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Positions etc), Act 1988, Mineral Oil Safety Regulation 1963, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 (Subsidiary Legislation to The Petroleum Act), The off-shore Oil Revenue (Registration of Grants)Act 1971, Oil in Navigable Act 1968, Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act 1975, Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979, Associated Gas Re-injection (continued Flaring of Gas) Regulation, Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Decree 1985, Oil Pipeline Act Chapter (CAP) 338, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (L.F.N.) 1990, and Gas Flare prohibition and punishment) Act 2016 among others.
Even as the above remains lamentable, facts have since emerged that instead of providing the anticipated legal, governance, regulatory and fiscal framework for the Nigerian petroleum industry and the host communities, the Petroleum Industry Act (Act), like the other failed laws that it came to replace, has contrary to expectation become different things to different peoples.
To many, PIA is not only an evil wind that blows nobody any good but a toothless bulldog that neither bites nor barks. To others, it is but is a palliative that cures the effect of sickness while leaving the root cause to thrive.
To the host and impacted communities, the Act has become a first line of conflict between crude oil prospecting, exploration companies and their host communities. It is a law that has come to steal, kill and destroy. Members of this group have come to a sudden realization that nothing has changed.
Without going into specifics, concepts, provisions and definitions, there is also greater evidence that points to the fact that the underlying premise behind PIA enactment has been defeated, the eliciting reason for concern that what is currently happening between oil companies and their host communities may no longer be the first half of a reoccurring circle, but, rather the beginning of something negatively new and different.
Take, as an illustration, if PIA is fundamentally effective and efficient, why is it not providing a strong source of remedy for individuals and communities negatively affected by oil exploration and production in the coastal communities? If these frameworks exist and have been comprehensive as a legal solution to the issues of oil-related violations, why are the IOCs operating in the country indulging in selective implementation of the Act?
Why is the Act not enforced by the federal government and other relevant agencies? Why are these hosts and impacted communities still suffering at the hands of the crude oil exploration and production companies operating in the Niger Delta region?
While answers to the above questions are expected, this piece, however, believes that there are reasons why these issues raised about PIA failures and failings cannot be described as unfounded.
The facts are there and speak for it.
On 28th of March 2023, the people of Kantu/Odidi, host communities to Odidi Flow station, OML 42 in Gbaramatu kingdom, Warri South West Local Government Area of Delta State, staged a peaceful protest against the non-implementation of PIA.
While calling for holistic repair works on the Trans Forcados Pipeline (TFP), which runs through OML 42 in Warri South West LGA to Forcados Terminal in Burutu LGA of Delta State, the protesting communities gave the operators a 7-day ultimatum to commence genuine implementation of the PIA process and payment of the 3% of 2022 operating expenses as stipulated by the PIA with immediate effect to enable the communities to resume implementation of developmental projects in the communities, warning that failure to do so may lead to the shutdown of operational activities in the OML 42 Asset.
Lamenting that the TFP pipeline was constructed in the early 1960s and has outlived its lifespan long ago, leading to continuous pollution of the environment and destruction of the ecosystem, creating hardship for the locals, the communities stressed that TFP is one of the major pipelines destroying the environment because it has expired and cannot withstand the pressure of crude oil transported through it.
They, therefore, demanded full replacement of the said pipeline instead of the sectional repair works being planned by NEPL/NECONDE without recourse to its negative implications on communities and the environment, particularly since sectional repair works will not stop further leakages.
Kantu/Odidi protest occurred at a time when the dust raised by the 14 days ultimatum/threat issued to another oil company by the oil-rich community of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) in Warri North Local Government Area of Delta State was yet to settle.
In that particular ‘event’, the people of Tsekelewu (Polobubo) also threatened to shut down ongoing exploration activities of Conoil Producing Limited if the company failed to reach a definite agreement with the community on the implementation of Chapter 3 of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) for the Tsekelewu bloc of communities, supports this assertion.
The Host Community lamented that they adopted the option due to the seemingly snobbish attitude of the management of Conoil Producing, as the company’s management had refused to honour letters asking for a meeting with the TCDA on the issue of the PIA implementation.
Away from the persistent highhandedness of the IOCs, this piece is also of the position that PIA is as weak, defective and insufficient as the laws/Acts it was enacted to replace when it comes to pollution prevention, monitoring and control within the sector.
In fact, it will not be characterized as an overstatement to say that it shares the same body and spirit with the now rested Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Positions etc), Act 1988. The major defect with the referenced Act was signposted in its definition of harmful substance based solely on its impact on human beings and does not include its impacts on the environment and animals.
It focused only on the commission of any action or omission by persons without lawful authority. Thus, where an organization has a license to store waste resulting from production, they are seemingly omitted from the ambit of the Act, but the law failed to take into consideration the inadequate storage or inadequate waste management system by licensed firms or groups. Such failure or oversight is glaring and inherent in PIA.
Adding context to the colossal damage harmful substances arising from crude oil production have caused the nation, the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency NOSDRA reports show that oil spill incidents occurred 921 times in 2015, resulting in a loss of 47,714 barrels of oil, the highest within the period under review. In 2016, 688 cases of oil spills occurred, culminating in a volume of 42,744 barrels of oil. In 2017 and 2018, 596 and 706 cases of oil spills occurred and resulted in the spillage of 34,887 and 27,985 barrels of oil, respectively. Oil spills occurred on 732 occasions, spewing 41,381 barrels of oil in 2019, and 455 cases were recorded in 2020 with 23,526 barrels of oil. In 2021, companies reported 388 incidents, resulting in 23,956 barrels of oil.
The report also observed that oil spills should be closed off within 24 hours. And oil companies are required to fund the clean-up of each spill and pay compensation to local communities affected if the incident was the company’s fault.
Despite these beautiful provisions, there exists no appreciable instance within the period under review where such obligations to host communities have been obeyed. This piece also holds the opinion that under the PIA regime, no operator can claim a clean hand when it comes to obeying such laws in Nigeria, and the regulatory agencies have never bothered to hold them accountable for such failures.
Still on inefficiency and insufficiency of PIA provisions to effectively control pollution arising from crude oil exploration and production, this author, in a similar intervention, after a visit to the Niger Delta region, stated that a tour by boat of creeks and coastal communities of Warri South West and Warri North Local Government Areas of Delta state would amply reveal that the much-anticipated end in sight of gas flaring is actually not in sight. In the same manner, a journey by road from Warri via Eku-Abraka to Agbor, and another road trip from Warri through Ughelli down to Ogwuashi Ukwu in Aniocha Local Government of the state, shows an environment where people cannot properly breathe as it is littered by gas flaring points.
To a large extent, the above confirms as true the recently published report, which among other concerns, noted that Nigeria has about 139 gas flare locations spread across the Niger Delta both in onshore and offshore oil fields where gas which constitutes about 11 per cent of the total gas produced are flared.
Apart from the health implication of flared gases on humanity, their adverse impact on the nation’s economy is equally weighty. For instance, a parallel report published a while ago underlined that about 888 million standard cubic feet of gas were flared daily in 2017. The flared gas, it added, was sufficient to light up Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa, generate 2.5 gigawatts (Gw) of power or produce 50 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) or produce 600,000 metric tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) per year, produce 22 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2), feed two-three liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains, generate 300,000 jobs, able to attract $3.5 billion investment into Nigeria and has $350 million carbon credit value’. This is an illustrative pointer as to why the nation economically gropes and stumbles.
Banking on what experts are saying, the major reason for the flaring of gases is that when crude oil is extracted from onshore and offshore oil wells, it brings with it raw natural gas to the surface and where natural gas transportation, pipelines, and infrastructure are lacking, like in the case of Nigeria, this gas is instead burned off or flared as a waste product as this is the cheapest option.
It, therefore, remains an ugly narrative that the choice to flare gas in the country is largely predicated on economies. This has been going on since the 1950s when crude oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria.
While Nigeria and Nigerians persist in encountering gas flaring in the country, even so, has, successive administrations in the country made both feeble and deformed attempts to get it arrested.
In 2016, before the advent of PIA, President Muhammadu Buhari led administration enacted Gas Flare Prohibition and Punishment), an act that, among other things, made provisions to prohibit gas flaring in any oil and gas production operation, blocks, fields, onshore or offshore, and gas facility treatment plants in Nigeria.
On Monday, September 2, 2018, Dr Ibe Kachikwu, Minister of State for Petroleum (as he then was), while speaking at the Buyers’ Forum/stakeholders’ Engagement organized by the Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria in Abuja, among other things, remarked thus; ‘I have said to the Department of Petroleum Resources, beginning from next year (2019 emphasis added), we are going to get quite frantic about this (ending gas flaring in Nigeria) and companies that cannot meet with extended periods –the issue is not how much you can pay in terms of fines for gas flaring, the issue is that you would not produce. We need to begin to look at the foreclosing of licenses’. That threat has since ended in the frames, as there has been little or nothing to get the threat actualized.
The administration also launched the now abandoned National Gas Flare Commercialization Programme (NGFCP), a programme, according to the federal government, aimed at achieving the flares-out agenda/zero routine gas flaring in Nigeria by 2020. Again, like a regular trademark, it failed.
Away from Buhari’s administration, in 1979, the then federal government, in a similar style, came up with the Associated Gas Re-injection Act, which summarily prohibited gas flaring and also fixed the flare-out deadline for January 1, 1984. It failed in line with the leadership philosophy in the country.
Similar feeble and deformed attempts were made in 2003, 2006, and 2008. In the same style and span, precisely on July 2, 2009, the Nigerian Senate passed a Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2009 (SB 126) into law, fixing the flare-out deadline for December 31, 2010- a date that slowly but inevitably failed.
Not stopping at this point, the FG made another attempt in this direction by coming up with the Petroleum Industry Bill, which fixed the flare-out deadline for 2012. The same Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) got protracted till 2021 when it completed its gestation and was subsequently signed into law by President Buhari as Petroleum Industry Act (PIA).
To win, the nation must borrow a ‘soul in order to raise a body’. They must seek solutions from the countries that are presently doing well in these areas where we are facing challenges. Part of that effort will require going beyond PIA to recognise the region as a special area for purposes of development. This demand cannot be described as unfounded as it is historically based, logical and factually supported.
Recall that the colonial government, long before independence turned down the demand for a Calabar/Ogoja/Rivers (COR) region/state. But identified the Niger Delta as a troubled spot and recommended to the then Federal Government that the region be regarded as a special area for purposes of development.
Without any shadow of a doubt, I hold an opinion that the federal government’s inability to treat the region as such set the stage for and nourished the restiveness in both the region and the sector.
Most importantly, the people of the region must be directly involved in the management of their resources.
Jerome-Mario is the programme coordinator (Media and Public Policy) at the Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA). He can be reached via [email protected]/08032725374.
Feature/OPED
When Stability Matters: Gauging Gusau’s Quiet Wins for Nigerian Football
By Barr. Adefila Kamal
Football in Nigeria has never been just a sport. It is emotion, argument, nationalism, and sometimes heartbreak wrapped into ninety minutes. That passion is a gift, but it often comes with a tendency to shout down progress before it has the chance to grow. In the middle of this noise sits the Nigeria Football Federation under the leadership of Ibrahim Musa Gusau, a man who has chosen steady hands over loud speeches, structure over drama, and long-term rebuilding over chasing instant applause.
When Gusau took office in 2022, he understood one thing clearly: the only way to fix Nigerian football is to repair its foundations. He said it openly during the 2025 NNL monthly awards ceremony — you cannot build an edifice from the rooftop. And true to that conviction, his tenure has taken shape quietly through structural investments that don’t trend on social media but matter where the future of the game is built. The construction of a players’ hostel and modern training pitches at the Moshood Abiola Stadium is one of the clearest signs of this shift. Nigeria has gone decades without basic infrastructure for its national teams, especially youth and age-grade squads. Gusau’s administration broke that pattern by delivering the first dedicated national-team hostel in our history, a project that signals an understanding that success is not luck — it is preparation.
The same thread runs through grassroots football. The maiden edition of the FCT FA Women’s Inter-Area Councils Football Tournament emerged under this administration, giving young female players a structured platform instead of the token attention they usually receive. These initiatives are not flashy. They do not dominate headlines. But they form the bedrock of any footballing nation that wants to be taken seriously.
Gusau’s leadership has also focused on lifting the domestic leagues out of years of decline. The NFF has revamped professional and semi-professional competitions, working to create consistent scheduling, fair officiating, and marketable competition structures. The growing number of global broadcasting partnerships — something unheard of in the old NPFL era — has brought more eyes, more credibility and more opportunities for clubs and players. Monthly awards for players, coaches and referees have introduced a culture of performance and merit, something our domestic game has needed for years. These are reforms that reshape the culture of football far beyond one season.
Internationally, Nigeria regained a powerful seat at the table when Gusau was elected President of the West African Football Union (WAFU B). This is not a ceremonial achievement. In football politics, influence determines opportunities, hosting rights, development grants, international appointments and the respect with which nations are treated. For too long, Nigeria’s voice in the region was inconsistent. Gusau’s emergence changes that, and it places Nigeria in a position where its administrative competence cannot be dismissed.
His administration has also made it clear that women’s football, youth development and academy systems are no longer side projects. There is a renewed intention to repair the broken pathways that once produced global stars with almost predictable frequency. If Nigeria is going to remain a powerhouse, development must become a machine, not an afterthought.
Still, for many observers, none of this seems to matter because the yardstick is always a single match, a single tournament or a single disappointing moment. Public criticism often grows louder than the facts. Fans want instant results, and when they don’t come, the instinct is to blame whoever is in office at the moment. But this approach has repeatedly sabotaged Nigerian football. Constant leadership changes wipe out institutional memory and scatter reform efforts before they mature. No nation becomes great by resetting its football house every time tempers flare.
Gusau’s leadership is unfolding at a time when FIFA and CAF are tightening their expectations for professionalism, financial transparency and infrastructure. Nigeria cannot afford scandals, disarray or combative politics. We need the kind of administrative consistency that global football bodies can trust — and this is exactly the lane Gusau has chosen. He has not been perfect; no administrator is. But he has been consistent, measured and focused. In an ecosystem that often rewards noise, this is rare.
For progress to hold, Nigeria must shift from the culture of outrage to a culture of constructive contribution. The media, civil society, ex-players, club owners, fan groups — everyone has a role. The truth is that Nigerian football’s biggest enemy has never been the NFF president, whoever he might be at the time. The real enemies are impatience, instability and emotional decision-making. They derail strategy. They kill reforms. They weaken institutions. And they turn football — our greatest cultural asset — into a battlefield of blame.
Gusau’s effort to reposition the NFF is a reminder that real development is rarely glamorous. It is slow, disciplined and often misunderstood. But it is the only route that leads to the future we claim to want: a football system built on structure, modern governance, infrastructure, youth development and global influence. Nigeria will flourish when we start protecting our institutions instead of tearing them down after every misstep.
If we truly want Nigerian football to rise, we must recognise genuine work when we see it. We must support continuity when it is clearly producing a roadmap. And we must resist the temptation to substitute outrage for analysis. Ibrahim Musa Gusau’s tenure is not defined by noise. It is defined by groundwork — the kind that elevates nations long after the shouting stops.
Barr. Adefila Kamal is a legal practitioner and development specialist. He serves as the National President of the Civil Society Network for Good Governance (CSNGG), with a long-standing commitment to transparency, institutional reform and sports governance in Nigeria
Feature/OPED
Unlocking Capital for Infrastructure: The Case for Project Bonds in Nigeria
By Taiwo Olatunji, CFA
Nigeria’s infrastructure ambition is not constrained by vision, but by the financing architecture. The public sector balance sheet, which has been the primary source of financing, has become very tight, while financing from the private sector is available and increasing, with a focus on long-term, naira-denominated assets. Hence, the challenge lies in effectively connecting this capital to bankable projects at scale and with discipline. Project bonds, created, structured and distributed by investment banks, are the instruments required to bridge the country’s infrastructure needs.
The scale of the need is clear. Nigeria’s Revised NIIMP (2020–2043) estimates ~US$2.3 trillion, about US$100bn, a year is required annually for the next 30 years to lift infrastructure to 70% of GDP. Africa’s pensions, insurers and sovereign funds already hold over US$1.1 trillion that can be mobilised for this purpose, but they require new and innovative approaches to enhance their participation in addressing this challenge.
What is broken with the status quo?
Nigeria continues to finance inherently long-dated assets through the issuance of local currency public bonds, Sukuk and Eurobonds. This approach creates a heavy burden on the government’s balance sheet while sometimes causing refinancing risk and FX exposures, where naira cash flows service dollar liabilities. It has also led to the slow conversion of the pipeline of identified projects because many infrastructure projects have not been prepared, appraised and structured to attract the private sector.
Why project bonds and where they sit in the stack
Project bonds are debt securities issued by project SPVs and serviced from project cash flows, typically secured by concessions, offtake agreements, or availability payments. Unlike typical bonds (corporate or government), which are backed by the sponsor’s balance sheets, project bonds are backed by the cash flow generated by the financed project. They often have longer duration, are tradeable, aligned with the long operating life of infrastructure projects and best suited for pension and insurance investors.
Globally, this type of instrument has been used to finance major projects such as toll roads, power plants, and social infrastructure. For example, in Latin America, transportation and energy projects have been financed through project bonds from local and international investors, through the 144A market, a U.S. framework that allows companies to access large institutional investors without going through a full public offering. Similarly, in India, rupee-denominated project bonds have benefited from partial credit guarantees provided by institutions like Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, which help lower investment risk and attract more investors.
In practice, project bonds can be structured in two ways: (i) as a take-out instrument, refinancing bank or DFI construction loans once an asset has reached operational stability; or (ii) as a bond issued from day one for brownfield or late-stage greenfield projects where revenue visibility is high, often supported by credit enhancements such as guarantees.
In both cases, the instrument achieves the same outcome: aligning long-term, project cash flows with the long-term liabilities of domestic institutional investors.
The enabling ecosystem is already emerging
1. Nigeria is not starting from zero. Regulatory infrastructure is already in place. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued detailed rules governing Project Bonds and Infrastructure Funds, creating standardized issuance structures aligned with global best practice and familiar to institutional investors. The SEC is also mulling the inclusion of the proposed rules on Credit Enhancement Service Providers in the existing rules of the Commission.
2. Market benchmarks are already available. The sovereign yield curve, published by the Debt Management Office (DMO) through its regular monthly auctions, provides a transparent reference point for pricing. This curve serves as the base risk-free rate, against which project bond spreads can be calibrated to reflect construction, operating, and sector-specific risks.
3. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) has revised its Regulation on the investment of Pension Fund Assets, increasing the amount of the country’s N25.9 trillion pension assets to be allocated to infrastructure.
4. InfraCredit has established a robust local-currency guarantee framework, supporting an aggregate guaranteed portfolio of approximately ₦270 billion. The portfolio carries a weighted average tenor of ~8 years, with demonstrated capacity to extend maturities up to 20 years. (InfraCredit 2025)
Why merchant banks should lead
Merchant banks sit at the nexus of origination, structuring, underwriting, and distribution, and they need to work with projects sponsors, financiers and government to develop a pipeline of bankable infrastructure projects. A pipeline of bankable infrastructure projects is important to attract investors as they prefer to invest in an economy with a recognizable pipeline. A pipeline also suggests that a structured and well-thought-out approach was adopted, and the projects would have identified all the major risks and the proposed mitigants to address the identified risks.
This “banks-as-catalysts” model, an economic framework that states banks can play an active and creative role in promoting industrialization and economic development, particularly in emerging markets, can be adopted to structure and mobilise domestic private finance into Infrastructure projects.
Coronation Merchant Bank’s role and vision
At Coronation, we believe the identification, structuring and testing of bankable infrastructure projects are the constraints to mobilization of private capital into the infrastructure space. We bring an integrated platform across Financial Advisory, Capital Mobilization, Commercial Debt, Private Debt and Alternative Financing to identify, structure, underwrite and distribute infrastructure debt into domestic institutions. The Bank works with DFIs, guarantee providers and other banks to scale issuance. Our franchise has supported infrastructure debt issuances via the capital markets, likewise Nigerian corporates and the Government.
From Insight to Execution
If you are considering the issuance of a project bond or you want to discuss pipeline readiness, kindly contact [email protected] or call 020-01279760.
Taiwo Olatunji, CFA is the Group Head of Investment Banking at Coronation Merchant Bank
Feature/OPED
Nigeria’s “Era of Renewed Stability” and the Truths the CBN Chooses to Overlook
By Blaise Udunze
At the Annual Bankers’ Dinner, when the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Yemi Cardoso, recently stated that Nigeria had “turned a decisive corner,” his remark aimed to convey assurance that inflation was decelerating with headline inflation eased to 16.05percent and food inflation retreating to 13.12 percent, the exchange rate was stabilizing, and foreign reserves ($46.7 billion) had climbed to a seven-year peak. However, beneath this announcement, a grimmer and conflicting economic situation challenges households, businesses, and investors daily.
Stability is not announced; it is felt. For millions of Nigerians, however, what they are facing instead are increasing difficulties, declining abilities, diminished buying power, and susceptibilities that dispute any assertion of a steady macroeconomic path.
The 303rd MPC gathering was the most significant in recent times, revealing policies and statements that prompt more questions than clarifications. It highlighted an economy striving to appear stable, in theory, while the actual sector struggles to breathe.
This narrative explores why Cardoso’s assertion of “restored stability” is based on a delicate and partial foundation, and why Nigeria continues to be distant from attaining economic robustness.
Manufacturing: The Core of Genuine Stability Remains Struggling to Survive
A strong economy is characterized by growth in production, increased investment, and competitive industries. Nigeria lacks all of these elements.
The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) expressed this clearly in its response to the MPC’s choice to keep the Monetary Policy Rate at 27 percent. MAN stated that elevated interest rates are now” hindering production, deterring investment, and weakening competitiveness.
Producers are presently taking loans at rates between 30-37 percent, an environment that renders growth unfeasible and survival challenging. MAN’s Director-General, Segun Ajayi-Kadir, emphasized that although stable exchange rates matter, no genuine industry can endure borrowing expenses to those charged by loan sharks.
The CBN’s choice to maintain elevated interest rates is based on drawing foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) to support the naira’s stability. However, FPIs are well-known for being short-term, speculative, and reactive to disturbances. They do not signify long-term stability. Do they represent genuine economic development?
Genuine stability demands assurance, in manufacturing beyond financial tightening. Manufacturers are expressing, clearly and persistently, that no progress has been made.
Oil Output and Revenue: The Engine Behind Nigeria’s Stability Is Misfiring
Nigeria’s oil sector, which is the backbone of its fiscal stability, is underperforming. The 2025 budget presumed:
- $75 per barrel oil price
- 2.06 million barrels per day production
Both objectives have fallen apart. Brent crude lingers near $62.56 under the benchmark. Contrary to the usual explanations, experts attribute the decline not mainly to external shocks but to poor reservoir management, outdated models, weak oversight, and delayed technical decisions.
Engineer Charles Deigh, a regarded expert in reservoir engineering, clearly expressed that Nigeria is experiencing production losses due to inadequate well monitoring, obsolete reservoir models, and technical choices lacking fundamental engineering precision. These shortcomings result directly in decreased revenue. By September 2025:
– Nigeria had accumulated N62.15 trillion from oil revenue
– instead of the N84.67 trillion budgeted.
– In September, the Federal Inland Revenue Service reported a startling 49.60 percent deficit in revenue from oil taxes.
A nation falling short of its main revenue goals by 50 percent cannot assert stability. Instead, it will take loans. Nigeria has taken loans.
A Stability Built on Debt, Not Productivity
Nigeria is now Africa’s largest borrower, and the world’s third-biggest borrower from the World Bank’s IDA, with $18.5 billion in commitments. By mid-2025, the total public debt amounts to N152.4 trillion, marking a 348.6 percent rise since 2023.
From July to October 2025, the government secured contracts for: $24.79 billion, €4 billion, ¥15 billion, N757 billion, and $500 million Sukuk loans. Nevertheless, in spite of these acquisitions, infrastructure continues to be manufacturing remains limited, and social welfare is still insufficient.
Uche Uwaleke, a finance and capital markets professor, cautions that Nigeria’s debt service ratio is “detrimental to growth.” Currently, the government spends one out of every four naira it earns on servicing debts. Taking on debt is not harmful in itself, provided it finances projects that pay for themselves. In Nigeria, it supports subsistence. A country funding today, through the labour of the future, cannot assert restored stability.
The Naira: A Currency Supported by Fragile Pillars
The CBN contends that elevated interest rates and enhanced market confidence have contributed to the naira’s stabilisation. However, this steadiness is based on grounds that cannot endure even the slightest global disturbance. The pillars of a stable currency are:
– Rising domestic production
– Expanding exports
– Reliable energy supply
– Strong security
– A thriving manufacturing base
None of these is Nigeria’s current reality. What Nigeria actually receives is capital from portfolio investors, and past events (2014, 2018, 2020, 2022) have demonstrated how rapidly these funds disappear.
Unemployment: “Stable” Figures Mask a Rising Youth Crisis
The CBN touts a reported unemployment rate of 4.3 percent. However, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), along with economists, cautions that the approach conceals more serious issues in the labour market.
Youth joblessness has increased to 6.5 percent, and the Nigerian Economic Summit Group cautions that Nigeria needs to generate 27 million formal employment opportunities by 2030 or else confront a disastrous labour crisis. The employment crisis is a ticking time bomb. A country cannot maintain stability when its youth are inactive, disheartened, and financially marginalized.
FDI Continues to Lag Despite CBN’s Positive Outlook
During the 2025 Nigerian Economic Summit, NESG Chairman, Niyi Yusuf stated that Nigeria’s efforts to attract direct investment (FDI) continue to be sluggish despite the implementation of reforms. FDI genuinely reflects investor trust, not portfolio inflows. FDI signifies enduring dedication, manufacturing plants, employment, and generating value. Nigeria does not have any of this as of now. An economy unable to draw long-term investments lacks stability.
139 Million Nigerians in Poverty: What Stability?
The recent development report from the World Bank estimates that 139 million Nigerians are living in poverty, and more than half of the population faces daily struggles. This is not stability. It is a humanitarian and economic crisis.
Food inflation continues to stay structurally high. The cost of a food basket has risen five times since 2019. Low-income families currently allocate much, as 70 percent of their earnings to food. A government cannot claim stability when its citizens go hungry.
A Fragile, Failing Power Sector
The power sector, another cornerstone of economic stability, is failing. Over 90 million Nigerians are without access to electricity, which is one of the highest figures globally. Even homes linked to the grid get 6.6 hours of electricity daily. Companies allocate funds to generators rather than to technology, innovation, or growth. Nigeria has now emerged as the biggest importer of solar panels in Africa, not due to environmental goals but because the national power grid is unreliable.
A country cannot achieve stability if it is unable to supply electricity to its residences, industrial plants, or medical centers.
Insecurity: The Silent Pillar Undermining All Economic Policy
Banditry, terrorism, abduction, and militant attacks persist in agriculture, manufacturing, logistics, and investment. Nigeria forfeits $15 billion each year due to insecurity and resources that might have fueled industrial development.
Food price increases are mainly caused by instability, and farmers are unable to cultivate, gather, or deliver their products. Nevertheless, the MPC approaches inflation predominantly as an issue of policy. In a country where insecurity fundamentally hinders the economy tightening policy cannot ensure stability.
Inflation Figures Under Suspicion
Questions have also emerged regarding the reliability of inflation data. Dr. Tilewa Adebajo, an economist, affirmed that the CBN might not entirely rely on the NBS inflation figures, highlighting increasing apprehension. A sharp decrease to 16 percent inflation clashes with market conditions.
Families are facing the food costs in two decades. Costs, for transport, housing rent, education fees, and necessary items keep increasing. Food prices cannot decline when farmers are abandoning their farmlands and fleeing for safety. If inflation figures are manipulated or partial, the stability story based on them becomes deceptive. There is, quite frankly, a significant disconnect between governance and the lived experience of ordinary Nigerians.
Foreign Reserves: A Story of Headlines vs Reality
Even Nigeria’s celebrated foreign reserves require scrutiny. The CBN reported $46.7 billion in reserves. However, a closer examination shows:
– Net usable reserves are only $23.11 billion
– The remainder is connected to commitments, swaps, and debts
Gross reserves make the news. Net reserves protect the currency. The difference is too large to assert that the naira is stable.
Nigeria’s Economic Contradiction: Stability at the Top, Volatility at the Bottom
In reality, Nigeria is caught between official proclamations of stability and lived experiences of volatility. The disparity between the CBN’s account and the actual experiences of Nigerians highlights a reality:
– Macroeconomic changes have failed to convert into improvements in human well-being.
– Nigeria might appear stable officially. Its citizens are experiencing instability in truth.
– Taking on debt is increasing
– Poverty is worsening
– Manufacturing is contracting
– Jobs are scarce
– Authority is breaking down
– Feelings of insecurity are growing stronger
– Inflation is undermining dignity
– Companies are struggling to breathe
– Capital is escaping
– Misery, among humans, is expanding
A strong economy is one where advancement is experienced, not announced.
What Genuine Stability Demands
To move from paper stability to real stability, Nigeria must:
- Support domestic production. Cut interest rates for manufacturers, reduce borrowing costs, and provide targeted credit.
- Fix oil production technically. Revamp reservoir engineering, implement surveillance. Allocate resources to adequate technical oversight.
- Prioritize security. Secure farmlands, highways, and industrial corridors.
- Reform the power sector. Invest in grid reliability, renewable integration, and private-sector-led transmission.
- Attract real FDI. Streamline rules, enhance the framework, and maintain consistent policy guidance.
- Anchor debt on productive projects. Take loans exclusively for infrastructure projects that produce income.
- Prioritize reforms in welfare. Adopt crisis-responsive, domestically funded safety nets.
- Improve transparency. Ensure inflation, employment, and reserve data reflect reality.
Stability Is Not Given; It Has to Be Achieved
The CBN Governor’s statement of “renewed stability” is hopeful. It remains unproven. The inconsistencies are glaring, the statistics too. The real-world experiences are too harsh. Nigerians require outcomes, not slogans. Stability is gauged not through statements on policy but by whether:
– Manufacturing plants are creating (factories operate at full capacity),
– Food is affordable,
– Young people have jobs
– The naira is strong without artificial props,
– Electricity is reliable,
– Security is assured,
– Poverty rates are decreasing.
Unless these conditions are met, Nigeria is not experiencing a period of restored stability. Instead, it is going through a phase of recovery, one that will collapse if the actual economy keeps worsening while decision-makers prematurely applaud their successes. The CBN must rethink its approach. Nigeria needs productive stability, not statistical stability.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]
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