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Iran-Israel-US Conflict and CBN’s FX Gains: A Stress Test for Nigeria’s Monetary Stability

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Nigeria’s Monetary Stability

By Blaise Udunze

At the 304th policy meeting held on Wednesday, the 25th February, the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) Monetary Policy Committee cut the rate by 50 basis points to 26.5 per cent from 27 per cent, which has been widely described as a cautious transition from prolonged tightening to calibrated easing. The CBN stated that the decision followed 11 consecutive months of disinflation. The economy witnessed headline inflation easing to 15.10 per cent in January 2026, and food inflation falling sharply to 8.89 per cent. Foreign reserves are climbing to $50.45 billion, their highest level in 13 years. The Purchasing Managers’ Index is holding at an expansionary 55.7 points.

As reported in the paper, no doubt that the macroeconomic narrative appears encouraging. On a closer scrutiny, the sustainability of these gains is now being tested by forces far beyond the apex bank’s policy corridors. This is as a result of the clear, direct ripple effect of the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel, with direct military involvement from the United States, which has triggered one of the most significant geopolitical energy shocks in decades. For Nigeria, the timing is delicate. Just as the CBN signals confidence in disinflation and stability, global volatility threatens to complicate and possibly distort its monetary path.

The rate cut, though welcomed by many analysts, must be understood in context. Nigeria remains in an exceptionally high-rate environment. An MPR of 26.5 per cent is still restrictive by any standard. The Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) remains elevated at 45 per cent for commercial banks, and this effectively sterilises nearly half of deposits, while liquidity ratios are tight, and lending rates to businesses often exceed 30 per cent once risk premiums are included. The adjustment is therefore incremental, not transformational.

The Director/CEO of the Centre for the Promotion of Private Enterprise (CPPE), Dr. Muda Yusuf, has repeatedly noted that Nigeria’s deeper challenge lies in weak monetary transmission. According to him, even when the benchmark rate falls, structural rigidities, high CRR, elevated deposit costs, macroeconomic uncertainty, and crowding-out from government borrowing prevent meaningful relief from reaching manufacturers, SMEs, agriculture, and other productive sectors. Monetary easing, without structural reform, risks becoming cosmetic. The point is that even before structural reforms take effect, the fact is that an external shock will first reshape the landscape.

The Iran-Israel conflict and US involvement have reignited fears in global energy markets. Joint U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets and retaliatory missile exchanges across the Gulf have unsettled oil traders. Brent crude, already rising in anticipation of escalation, surged toward $70-$75 per barrel and could climb higher if shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20 per cent of global oil supplies pass, faces disruption. It is still an irony that a major crude exporter is also an importer of refined petroleum products.

Higher crude prices offer a theoretical windfall. For Nigeria’s economy, it is well known that oil remains its largest source of foreign exchange and accounts for roughly 50 per cent of government revenue. The good thing is that rising prices could boost reserves, improve forex liquidity, strengthen the naira, and ease fiscal pressures. In theory, this external cushion could support macroeconomic stability and reinforce the CBN’s easing posture.

However, the upside is constrained by structural weaknesses. Nigeria’s oil production remains below optimal capacity. A significant portion of crude exports is tied to long-term contracts, limiting immediate gains from spot price surges. As SB Morgen observed in its analysis, Nigeria’s “windfall” is volatile and limited by soft production performance.

More critically, Nigeria’s dependence on imported refined products exposes it to imported inflation. Rising global crude prices increase the cost of petrol, diesel, jet fuel and gas. With fuel subsidies removed, these increases are passed directly to consumers and businesses. Depot pump prices have already adjusted upward amid Middle East tensions.

Energy costs are a primary driver of Nigeria’s inflation, and this has remained sacrosanct. When fuel prices rise, transportation, logistics, food distribution, power generation, and manufacturing costs will definitely skyrocket, as well as the inflationary impulse spreads quickly through the economy. This will push households to face higher food and transportation costs. Businesses see shrinking margins. Real incomes erode.

Thus, the same oil shock that boosts government revenue may simultaneously reignite inflationary pressure, precisely at a moment when the CBN has begun cautiously easing policy.

This dynamic introduces a difficult policy dilemma, even as this could be for the fragile gains of the MPC. This is to say that if energy-driven inflation resurges, the CBN may be forced to pause or reverse its easing cycle. It is clearly spelt that high inflation typically compels tighter monetary conditions. As Yusuf warned, geopolitical headwinds that elevate inflation often push central banks toward higher interest rates. A renewed tightening would strain credit conditions further, undermining growth prospects.

There is also the risk of money supply expansion. Increased oil revenues, once monetised, can expand liquidity in the domestic system. Historically, surges in oil receipts have been associated with monetary growth, inflationary pressure, and exchange rate volatility. Without sterilisation discipline, a revenue boost could ironically destabilise macro fundamentals.

The exchange rate dimension compounds the complexity. Heightened geopolitical risk, just as it is currently playing out with the Iran-Israel conflict, often triggers global flight to safety. This will eventually lure investors to retreat to U.S. Treasuries and gold. Emerging markets face capital outflows. If it happens that foreign portfolio investors withdraw from Nigeria’s fixed-income market in response to global uncertainty, pressure on the naira could intensify.

Already, the CBN has demonstrated sensitivity to exchange rate dynamics by intervening to prevent excessive naira appreciation. A sharp rate cut in the midst of global volatility could destabilise carry trades and spur dollar demand. What should be known is that the 50-bps reduction reflects not just domestic disinflation, but global risk management such as geopolitical tensions, oil prices, and foreign investor sentiment.

Beyond macroeconomics, geopolitical implications carry security concerns. Analysts warn that a widening Middle East conflict could embolden extremist narratives across the Sahel and it directly has security consequences for Nigeria and the broader region. Groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP may exploit anti-Western framing to recruit and mobilise more followers in the Sahel region, thereby giving the extremist groups new propaganda opportunities. The pebble fear is that a diversion of Western security resources away from West Africa could create regional vacuums. What the Nigerian economy will begin to experience is that security instability will disrupt agricultural output, logistics corridors, and investor confidence, feeding back into inflation and slow economic growth, and as ripple effects, the economy becomes weaker.

Nigeria’s diplomatic balancing act adds another layer of fragility because it is walking on a tactful tightrope. The country is trying not to upset anyone, but maintains cautious neutrality, urging restraint while preserving ties with Western allies and Middle Eastern partners. Yet rising tensions globally between major powers, including Russia and China, complicate the geopolitical chessboard. Invariably, this will have a direct impact as trade flows, remittances, and investment patterns may change unexpectedly, affecting Nigeria’s economy.

With the current conflict in the Middle East, the prospects for economic growth also face renewed strain or are under increased pressure. The stock markets in developed countries have been fluctuating a lot because people are worried that there will be problems with the energy supply. If the whole world does not grow fast, then people will use less oil over time. This means that the good things that happen to Nigeria because of oil prices will probably not last, and any extra money Nigeria gets from oil prices now will be lost. Nigeria will not get to keep the money from high oil prices for a long time. The oil prices will affect Nigeria. Then the effect will go away. One clear thing is that since Nigeria relies heavily on oil exports, this commodity dependence exposes the country to significant risk.

Meanwhile, Nigeria’s domestic fundamentals remain structurally challenged. The recapitalisation of banks, with 20 of 33 institutions meeting new capital thresholds, strengthens resilience, but does not guarantee credit expansion into productive sectors. Banks continue to prefer risk-free government securities over private lending in uncertain environments.

Fiscal discipline remains essential. Elevated debt service obligations absorb substantial revenue. Election-related spending poses upside inflation risks. This understanding must be adhered to, that without credible deficit reduction and revenue diversification, monetary easing may be undermined by fiscal expansion.

At the moment, given the current global and domestic uncertainties, the 50 per cent interest cut rate appears less like a pivot toward growth and more like a signal of cautious optimism under conditional stability. The policy decision is based on several key expectations with the assumptions that disinflation will persist, exchange rate stability will hold, and global conditions will not deteriorate dramatically.

But the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict introduces uncertainty into all three assumptions, which is wrongly perceived as behind the rate cut that inflation will keep coming down, that the exchange rate will stay stable, and global conditions won’t worsen, are all undermined by the unfolding conflict.

If the global oil prices rise sharply and fuel becomes more expensive locally, overall prices in the economy could increase again, which means inflation could accelerate.  Another dangerous trend is that if foreign investors pull capital out of Nigeria, exchange rate stability could weaken, seeing the naira coming under pressure. If global growth slows, export earnings could decline. Each of these scenarios would constrain the CBN’s flexibility.

This is not to dismiss potential upsides. Higher oil prices, if production improves, could bolster reserves and moderate fiscal deficits. Forex liquidity could strengthen the naira. Investment in upstream oil and gas could gain momentum. Historically, crude price increases have correlated with improved GDP performance and stock market optimism in Nigeria.

Yet history also warns of volatility. A good example is during the 2022 Ukraine conflict, oil prices spiked above $100 per barrel, which created a potential revenue windfall for oil-exporting countries, but Nigeria struggled to translate that temporary advantage into sustained economic improvement. Inflation persisted. In the case of Nigeria, the deep-rooted systemic or structural weaknesses and inefficiency diluted the benefits that should have been gained.

The lesson is clear because temporary external windfalls or short-term luck cannot substitute for structural and deep internal economic reforms.

The point is that sustainable development demands diversification beyond oil, to strengthening multiple parts of its economy at the same time, such as improved refining capacity, infrastructure investment, agricultural security, logistics efficiency, and fiscal consolidation. Monetary policy, as the action taken by the CBN at the MPC meeting by adjusting interest rates or attempting to control money supply, can anchor expectations and moderate volatility, but it cannot build productive capacity; it will only help to reduce short-term economic swings.

The CBN’s decision to cut the interest rate appears cautious. It is not a bold shift but rather a small adjustment. This shows that the bank is being careful and optimistic about the economy. It also knows that there are still problems. The trouble in the Middle East, like the fighting that affects the oil supply, reminds the people in charge that Nigeria’s economy is closely tied to what happens with energy around the world. This includes things like inflation, the value of money, and how fast the economy grows.

Until structural reforms reduce dependence on volatile oil cycles and imported fuel, Nigeria’s monetary policy will remain reactive to external crises. To really make the economy strong and stable, Nigeria needs to make some changes.  It requires resilience against geopolitical storms.

The MPC has taken a step. Whether it marks a turning point depends less on 50 basis points and more on how Nigeria navigates a world increasingly defined by conflict-driven volatility.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com

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3 Infrastructure Gaps Nigerian Lenders Can’t Afford to Ignore

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Winston Osuchukwu

By Winston Osuchukwu

Digital transformation has modernised the front end of the credit process in Nigeria, streamlining customer journeys and shortening the path from application to disbursement. However, this progress has not reached the core of the credit process. While digital application flows are now standard, the underlying risk infrastructure remains underdeveloped. Following the withdrawal of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s forbearance measures, the sector’s non-performing loan (NPL) ratio climbed to 8.03% – well above the 5% regulatory limit.

The deeper, structural flaw is that banks still run on legacy risk models and backwards-looking data: an approach that leaves existing portfolios exposed while shutting out the vast retail market. To scale retail and SME credit safely, forward-looking institutions must close three critical gaps in their core credit infrastructure.

1. The Bureau and Data Blind Spot

Many institutions rely on a fragmented view of borrower risk. Internal transaction data offers a deep but narrow view of a borrower’s behaviour within one institution, while periodic credit bureau reports provide a broad but shallow, “negative-only” history across other lenders. Because credit bureau coverage in Nigeria remains relatively low and data sharing is often inconsistent, neither source effectively captures how a borrower actually earns, spends, and repays. Resolving this requires unifying the data architecture, integrating internal behavioural signals with diverse external streams such as payroll, utility, and alternative financial data, to build a continuous, real-time picture of cash flow and true repayment capacity.

2. Static Risk Acceptance Criteria

To assess a borrower’s credit eligibility, banks apply internal risk acceptance criteria that are often static. In a volatile macroeconomic environment marked by shifting interest rates and inflation, a borrower’s financial reality changes rapidly, rendering these rigid, point-in-time benchmarks obsolete. Furthermore, out of caution, these inflexible thresholds often default to conservative rejections for unfamiliar applicants, such as new salaried employees or thin-file borrowers – those with little or no formal credit history for a bureau or bank to draw on – leaving profitable loans on the table. Transitioning to a predictive model changes risk management into a continuous, data-driven cycle. By ingesting high-frequency behavioural data, risk systems can dynamically govern their acceptance criteria in real-time, allowing them to adjust parameters, optimise pricing, and deploy interventions well before a default occurs.

3. The Collections Disconnect

In many institutions, collections teams operate in silos downstream of the credit department, meaning critical recovery performance data rarely gets fed back to front-end risk models. Consequently, underwriting systems fail to learn from actual repayment behaviours – repeating the same structural pricing mistakes. Integrating these functions via a direct data pipeline creates a self-learning loop, routing recovery outcomes back into the origination engine. This empowers the risk engine to dynamically update models, continuously refining underwriting criteria based on real-world results to prevent future defaults and capture lost basis points.

The Bottom Line

Closing these gaps requires intentionality: moving away from ‘set-and-forget’ tools to systems that actively manage risk. It means moving beyond fragmented data toward an integrated intelligence layer that learns from borrower behaviour to govern automated decisions with precision. The lenders that lead over the next year will be those that treat credit not as an isolated transaction, but as a continuous, dynamic process. At Mathesis, we have spent years building the engine that makes this possible, powering over eight million loans for two million Nigerians. The future of credit belongs to those who adopt this predictive approach – and we have the proven tools and expertise to help you get there.

Winston Osuchukwu is the Founder and Chief Executive of Mathesis, a Nigerian credit intelligence company

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Nigeria’s Power Reform Faces Delivery Test as Band A Credits, Net Billing Take Effect

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prepaid electricity meter

EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that Nigeria’s electricity reform is entering a phase where higher tariffs, customer credits and new rules on renewable self-generation will be judged by whether businesses actually receive reliable power and can reduce diesel backup costs. Under the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) Service-Based Tariff (SBT) system, a tariff model that links electricity prices to expected supply levels, Band A customers pay premium electricity tariffs in exchange for an expected minimum supply of 20 hours per day. NERC’s latest compensation order sends a clear signal: if customers are paying a premium rate, they should receive the supply level they are paying for, and if they do not, they should be credited.

Why Power Reliability is Now a Business-Cost Story

Nigeria’s power supply gap remains a direct cost for businesses. NERC’s April 2026 Operational Performance Factsheet showed that grid-connected power plants had a Plant Availability Factor (PAF) of 31 per cent, with an average of 4,286 megawatts (MW) available for dispatch out of 13,625MW of installed capacity. When available grid power falls short of business needs, companies often have to keep backup generators running, adding fuel, maintenance and planning costs to production.

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Business Expectations Survey for March 2026 identified insufficient power supply with an index reading of 74.5 as a leading business constraint, ahead of insecurity, high or multiple taxes, high interest rates and financial problems. The index ranks the severity of reported business constraints, with higher readings indicating a more pressing concern for firms.

Band A Compensation Tests Tariff Credibility

NERC’s compensation directive does more than reimburse customers for missed supply hours. It sets a precedent that premium tariff bands carry enforceable service obligations. NERC issued Directive No. NERC/2026/002 on the Special Compensation of Band A Customers Arising from Grid Generation Constraints, covering eligible Band A customers affected by power shortfalls between February and March 2026.

Under the framework, smaller electricity users, classified as Non-Maximum Demand (Non-MD) customers, are to receive a credit equal to 20 per cent of the approved February 2026 energy cap for the affected feeder, meaning the electricity line serving those customers. Larger commercial and industrial users, classified as Maximum Demand (MD) customers, are to receive 20 per cent of the average energy billed per MD customer in February 2026. Prepaid customers are to receive token credits, while postpaid customers are to receive bill adjustments, with February compensation due by 31 May 2026 and March compensation due by 30 June 2026. NERC also directed Distribution Companies (DisCos), the companies that deliver electricity to end-users, not to offset compensation credits against existing customer debts.

The cost of unreliable power does not stay inside the electricity bill. When a factory, supermarket, estate, logistics operator or cold-storage facility pays a premium tariff but still runs diesel backup, those costs move into production, inventory protection, food storage, transport pricing and consumer prices. Customer credits help, but the wider sector still has to manage generation limits, revenue collection and payments across the supply chain.

David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s power reform is moving into an accountability phase. Higher tariffs can only build confidence if customers and businesses receive the level of supply they are paying for. NERC’s Band A compensation order and the rollout of net billing point to the same market test: electricity reform must now be measured by delivery, transparent credit mechanisms and whether businesses can reduce diesel backup costs.”

Net Billing Turns Self-Generation into a Business-Cost Question

Beyond customer credits, NERC’s Net Billing Regulations 2026, published on 3 June 2026, open a separate question for businesses already spending heavily on diesel and backup power: whether renewable self-generation can become a more reliable and cost-effective alternative. The regulation creates a framework for eligible customers to generate renewable electricity, use what they need and export any surplus power to distribution networks.

Many Nigerian businesses already invest in generators, diesel storage, solar systems or hybrid power because grid supply is not reliable enough for production, refrigeration, logistics, retail operations and business continuity. Net billing could make that investment more efficient by allowing eligible users to recover some value from excess renewable power rather than leaving it unused.

The framework is not designed as an instant solution for every household. Qualifying solar or renewable systems must have installed capacity between 50 kilowatt peak (kWp) and 1.5 megawatt peak (MWp), making it more immediately relevant to commercial users, estates, shopping centres, manufacturers, institutions and larger facilities with enough electricity demand and capital to invest. Participants will also need approval from their local distribution company, a technical feasibility review, a Net Billing Agreement and NERC registration. Qualifying systems will require meters that record both electricity consumed and electricity exported.

Whether net billing delivers real savings will come down to implementation. Exported electricity will be credited at an export tariff approved by NERC, which will not necessarily match the price businesses pay for retail electricity purchases. The specific rate and how payments will be settled are still to be confirmed by NERC and DisCos. That export tariff, together with metering, approval timelines and settlement reliability, will determine whether net billing reduces actual costs or remains a regulation that has not yet translated into commercial value.

New Minister Adds an Implementation Test

The appointment of a new Minister of Power adds a wider delivery test to both reforms. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu swore in Joseph Olasunkanmi Tegbe as Minister of Power on 8 June 2026, after the Senate cleared his appointment on 6 May 2026, according to the State House. For businesses and investors, the question is not only whether Nigeria has new rules, but whether the sector can implement them consistently. That means Band A credits must be applied on time, net billing approvals must be workable in practice, export tariffs must be transparent and distribution companies must collect enough revenue to keep paying generators and transmission companies.

What Nigeria’s Electricity Market Will Watch Next

The next phase of Nigeria’s electricity reform may be judged by whether existing rules work in practice, not by new announcements. By 30 June 2026, the March Band A compensation deadline will show whether premium-tariff customers receive visible credits when supply falls short. Net billing faces the same practical test: whether approvals, meters, export tariffs and settlement processes can turn renewable self-generation into a real cost-saving option for eligible businesses. At the same time, both reforms raise the operating bar for DisCos. They must credit customers when service falls short, collect revenue efficiently and keep payments moving to generators and transmission companies. Higher electricity prices may improve sector revenue, but they will not be enough if businesses still have to pay twice: once for premium grid supply and again for diesel backup.

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America Borrows Power, Nigeria Borrows Survival

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America Nigeria borrowing

By Blaise Udunze

Findings show that the United States owes more than $36 trillion while Nigeria owes over N159.28 trillion, with external debt now standing at approximately $51.8 billion. At first glance, when comparing the debt profiles of the world’s largest economy and Africa’s largest economy, it may seem misplaced. America can borrow almost indefinitely because it issues the world’s reserve currency. Nigeria cannot. Yet both countries are confronting a similar worry. This has led to asking, when does debt cease to be a tool for development and become a permanent feature of national survival?

The difference is that while America may be testing the limits of how much debt a superpower can carry, Nigeria is testing how much debt a fragile developing economy can sustain before it begins to mortgage its future.

The latest proposal by the federal government to secure another $1.25 billion World Bank facility under the Nigeria Actions for Investment and Jobs Acceleration Programme has once again reignited a debate that refuses to disappear. What appears to be far from the daily lived experience of Nigerians over the years is having government officials insisting that the loan will support investment, expand access to finance, improve electricity, enhance digital services, and create jobs. According to the claims, these are worthy objectives. But Nigerians have heard similar promises before.

The more important question is no longer whether Nigeria should borrow. Virtually every modern economy borrows. The real question which calls for critical concern is what exactly Nigeria is borrowing for, and why the benefits of decades of borrowing remain largely invisible in the everyday lives of millions of citizens. This is where the national conversation becomes uncomfortable.

Funny enough, over the years, successive governments have justified borrowing as a necessary response to development deficits. Yet despite rising debt levels, many Nigerians struggle to identify corresponding improvements in their lived experiences. This justification has kept many wondering as the roads remain dilapidated, public hospitals are overwhelmed, and the electricity supply also remains unreliable. Talk of the public education system, this has continued to deteriorate badly, and unemployment remains stubbornly high. Inflation has eroded incomes, with the cost of cooking gas hitting N2,400 per kg, while businesses struggle under the weight of high operating costs.

If borrowing is supposed to finance development, where is the development? The concern becomes even more urgent and highly alarming when viewed against the backdrop of Nigeria’s worsening fiscal position. According to the Debt Management Office, public debt has climbed to over N159 trillion. With this outrageous figure, more troubling is the fact that debt servicing now consumes an alarming share of government revenue, which has continued to cripple economic growth and compromise the future. This development caught the attention of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, as it recently noted that Nigeria’s debt-service-to-revenue ratio remains among the highest in the world. In simple and practical terms, this implies that the government is spending an increasingly large portion of what it earns paying creditors rather than investing in infrastructure, healthcare, education, security, or economic expansion.

This is the hallmark of a debt trap. The danger is not necessarily that Nigeria will default tomorrow. The danger is that the nation becomes trapped in a vicious cycle where governments borrow to finance deficits, then borrow again to service existing obligations, and then borrow even more to cover the consequences of previous borrowing. That cycle is already becoming visible.

Come to think of it, President Bola Tinubu’s administration has boldly defended borrowing as necessary to support reforms, cushion economic shocks, and stimulate growth. Yet critics have continued to point to the fact that since May 2023, borrowing has accelerated significantly.

According to economic analyst Dele Oye, the current administration has added approximately N65.9 trillion to Nigeria’s debt stock within just two years, a figure that exceeds several multiples of what Nigeria accumulated during its first five decades after independence.

Whether one agrees with the politics surrounding that claim is secondary. The underlying concern remains valid since debt is growing far faster than the visible capacity of the economy to generate sustainable revenue. This is why comparisons with the United States are useful.

America’s debt is enormous, but debt sustainability is not determined by the size of debt alone. It is determined by economic productivity. The United States supports its debt burden through a diversified economy, deep capital markets, technological innovation, globally competitive corporations, advanced research institutions, and an unmatched ability to attract global investment.

Debt is not what sustains America. Productivity does. Unlike Nigeria, it continues to rely heavily on crude oil revenues, a narrow tax base, volatile foreign exchange earnings, and a fragile manufacturing sector. The critical difference is that every dollar borrowed by Nigeria therefore carries greater risks than every dollar borrowed by the United States.

When America borrows, it borrows largely in its own currency. When Nigeria borrows externally, it exposes itself to exchange-rate risks that can dramatically increase repayment costs whenever the naira weakens, as this calls for utmost caution. Every currency depreciation effectively inflates the burden of external obligations. What appears manageable today can become overwhelming tomorrow. This reality makes Nigeria’s current debt trajectory particularly concerning, which is the truth.

The World Bank itself has raised concerns about governance risks and structural weaknesses within Nigeria’s fiscal architecture. Even more troubling are recent revelations indicating that more than N34.5 trillion was reportedly deducted through pre-distribution mechanisms before revenues reached the Federation Account between 2023 and 2025. According to the findings, approximately 41 per cent of government revenues were removed as first-line charges before distribution.

Whichever way it is viewed, perhaps as fiscal leakages, weak oversight, or institutional inefficiency, the implications are profound and of critical concern. If we must begin to tell ourselves the factual truth, a nation cannot continue borrowing aggressively while simultaneously failing to maximise the value of revenues it already generates.

This brings us to the central question confronting Nigeria today. The point is, are these loans building future productive capacity, or are they merely financing continuity?

Borrowing can be justified when it funds projects that expand economic output. Investments in power generation, transport infrastructure, agriculture, industrialisation, technology, and education can create long-term growth that eventually pays for the debt itself. In such cases, debt becomes a bridge to prosperity.

But it must be known that borrowing to fund recurrent expenditure, sustain bloated government structures, finance consumption, cover inefficiencies, or service previous debts transforms borrowing into a treadmill. The irony here is that the country runs harder every year but remains trapped in the same place. Unfortunately, much of Nigeria’s fiscal reality increasingly resembles the latter.

The tragedy is that this debt burden is not abstract. It is already affecting ordinary Nigerians. The adverse implication and critical point are that every naira directed toward debt servicing is a naira unavailable for schools, hospitals, security, electricity, or social protection. Every external loan increases future repayment obligations. Every missed opportunity to invest borrowed funds productively transfers today’s policy failures to future generations.

The consequences are visible everywhere. Businesses face prohibitively high borrowing costs. Today in Nigeria, it is no longer news that manufacturers struggle with energy expenses, which adversely affect the citizens. The same applies to youth unemployment, which remains widespread. Also, infrastructure deficits persist. Another critical issue is that states remain heavily dependent on monthly allocations from the federal level. With the developments, economic growth remains too weak to significantly improve living standards.

The result is a contradiction in which debt rises while prosperity stagnates. This is perhaps the greatest lesson Nigeria must learn from America’s debt experience.

The debate should not focus exclusively on how much debt a nation carries. The more important progressive question is whether the economy is productive enough to sustain that debt.

What every Nigerian should know is that Nigeria as a country cannot borrow its way to prosperity because it must first strengthen the foundations that generate sustainable growth. With the lingering challenging surrounding the borrowing and the mountain of debts, one key fact is that it cannot rely indefinitely on external creditors while neglecting domestic productivity. Also, it cannot continue to depend on oil revenues while failing to broaden its tax base. Another loose end that has been a critical matter is that it cannot expect debt-financed development without strong institutions, transparency, accountability and effective project execution.

The solutions are neither mysterious nor impossible. This entails that Nigeria must aggressively expand domestic revenue mobilisation without suffocating businesses and ensure it digitises tax administration, eliminates leakages, enforce fiscal responsibility laws. Also, it must reduce the cost of governance, strengthen public procurement systems, while ensuring that every borrowed naira and kobo is linked to measurable economic outcomes.

Equally important, the government must rebuild public trust. The truth is that citizens are more willing to support reforms when they can see tangible results. Some of the developments in the past that have continued to erode public trust are when subsidy savings are announced, people expect better roads, improved healthcare, reliable electricity, and enhanced security. When new loans are obtained, they expect visible projects and measurable returns, but the reverse has been the case. Those at the helm of affairs of this country must understand that transparency is not merely good governance; it is an economic necessity. History offers a warning.

In 2006, under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria celebrated its exit from the Paris Club debt burden after securing one of Africa’s most significant debt relief achievements. Not too long but for a brief period, the country stood relatively free from the crushing obligations that had constrained development for decades. Two decades later, that achievement appears increasingly distant.

The danger is not simply that Nigeria is borrowing. The danger is that borrowing is becoming normalised as a substitute for difficult reforms.

A nation can borrow to build industries or borrow to pay bills. It can borrow to create future wealth or borrow to postpone present challenges. One path expands prosperity; the other compounds dependency.

America’s debt mountain demonstrates that even wealthy nations are not immune to the consequences of structural borrowing. Nigeria’s debt burden demonstrates how much more dangerous that reality becomes when economic productivity fails to keep pace. Borrowing can buy time. It cannot buy prosperity.

Sooner or later, every nation must generate the economic value necessary to justify the debts it accumulates. Nigeria’s future will depend not on how much it can borrow, but on how effectively it can produce, innovate, industrialise, and grow.

That is the lesson hidden underneath America’s debt mountain. It is also the lesson Nigeria ignores at its own peril.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com

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