Feature/OPED
How Secure Is Nigeria…?
Prince Charles Dickson, PhD
A country’s security is not measured by the number of uniforms on the road. It is measured by whether an ordinary mother can sleep without one ear open, whether a trader can return from the market without rehearsing ransom instructions in her head, whether a doctor can drive to an emergency without praying not to meet a checkpoint more dangerous than the patient he is trying to save.
Nigeria today has security everywhere and safety nowhere.
That is the paradox. We have the architecture of force, but not the confidence of protection. We have commands, theatres, operations, task forces, and an alphabet soup of interventions. Yet for many citizens, insecurity still arrives first, and the state arrives later, sometimes not at all. Even the federal government has repeatedly acknowledged that the police ought to be the frontline institution for internal security, and that modern policing requires better training, technology, and professionalism. It has also admitted that police training facilities have fallen into serious dilapidation and need an overhaul.
So, the question is no longer whether Nigeria has security institutions. It does. The more uncomfortable question is whether the current federal policing model, as designed and practised, is still fit for the country we have become.
The Nigeria Police Force remains a centrally commanded institution, with authority cascading from the Inspector-General through Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspectors-General, Commissioners, and downward through the ranks. Administratively, it is split into eight departments. On paper, that looks orderly, neat, even reassuring. But Nigeria is not a paper country. It is a noisy federation of griefs, distances, fractures, ambitions, and emergencies. A chain of command that may satisfy legal elegance can also produce operational remoteness, delayed responsiveness, and a politics of policing in which local pain must wait for federal mood.
This is where the politics begins.
Who does the police truly serve in practice: the republic, the constitution, the citizen, or the powerful? That question hurts because Nigerians already know the answer in their bones. More than 100,000 officers are reportedly assigned to VIP protection out of an estimated 371,800 personnel. That means a startling share of police manpower is concentrated around the elite while ordinary communities make do with thin patrols, slow response, and the old folklore of “call anybody you know.” In effect, the state has built a two-tier policing culture: one for those with sirens, another for those with silence.
And when public policing weakens, Nigeria reaches reflexively for the military.
That too has become normal, and that is precisely the problem. The country now lives under a strange internal-security arrangement in which police are constitutionally primary, but the military increasingly occupies the emotional and operational space of first responder. Analysts have described this as a role lost to the military: a situation in which soldiers are overstretched, police are underpowered, and the public is trapped in a dangerous vacuum between both. New task forces and command theatres may project action, but they can also conceal a deeper institutional confession: that the police have not been built to carry the burden of modern internal security.
This is why I remain cautious when the state celebrates “combined operations,” “joint architecture,” and the multiplication of theatres. Coordination is necessary, yes. But coordination is not the same thing as competence. A nation cannot keep responding to civil insecurity as though every problem is a battlefield problem. Kidnapping, urban crime, community violence, organised extortion, digital fraud, and intelligence-led prevention all require policing that is forensic, local, trusted, and fast. The 21st century does not only ask for men with rifles. It asks for institutions with memory, data, integrity, and legitimacy.
And legitimacy is expensive.
You cannot demand ethical policing from men and women whom the system has abandoned to shabby welfare, poor housing, weak equipment, and thinning morale. Reuters reported in late 2025 that a low-ranking police officer earned about ₦80,000 monthly net pay. Around the same period, former IGP Mike Okiro publicly warned that economic hardship, poor welfare, and years of neglect were crippling police morale. An investigation by The ICIR in February 2026 described dilapidated barracks in Lagos where police families live inside cracked, ageing buildings that are tragedies waiting to happen. This is not merely a welfare issue. It is a security issue. A poorly paid, poorly housed, poorly equipped officer is not just vulnerable. He is recruitable by temptation.
So, is state police the answer?
Maybe. But only maybe.
The argument for state police is no longer fringe. In February 2024, federal and state authorities publicly agreed on the need for state police as insecurity worsened. As of March 1, 2026, the Senate says it intends to complete the constitutional amendment for state police before the end of the year, while also discussing safeguards against abuse by governors. That last phrase matters. Because state police can become either the localisation of safety or the localisation of tyranny. In the hands of disciplined constitutionalism, it may deepen community intelligence, faster response, and contextual policing. In the hands of bad politics, it could become a uniform errand boy for governors, godfathers, and vendetta.
So, let us not romanticise decentralisation. A broken institution does not become healthy merely by being copied 36 times.
State police without safeguards, independent oversight, diversity protections, judicial remedies, professional standards, and funding clarity may only decentralise abuse. Yet federal policing without radical reform has already produced a structure too centralised to feel local, too politicised to feel neutral, and too stretched to feel present. That is the Nigerian trap: the old model is failing, but the new model can also fail if designed as another elite bargain.
The real issue, then, is deeper than federal versus state. It is whether Nigeria truly wants citizen-centred policing or merely a rearrangement of command.
For years, we have treated the police as a ceremonial symbol, a regime accessory, or a checkpoint economy. We post them at politicians’ gates, attach them to convoys, and then act surprised when villages, highways, schools, and neighbourhoods feel abandoned. We invoke reform, but often mean procurement. We invoke modernisation, but often mean new uniforms and fresh rhetoric. Yet even the Presidency has admitted that true reform goes beyond repainting buildings or buying weapons. It requires a fundamental overhaul of institutional mentality and memory. That, perhaps, is the most honest sentence said about the police in recent years.
How secure is Nigeria?
Not secure enough to keep pretending that force projection is the same as public safety.
Until the police are rebuilt as a serious, modern, welfare-backed, intelligence-driven, citizen-facing institution, we will keep living inside a republic where the hierarchy is protected, the theatres are busy, the communiqués are polished, and the people remain one phone call away from abandonment—May Nigeria win!
Feature/OPED
Measures at Ensuring Africa’s Food Sovereignty
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
China’s investments in Africa have primarily been in the agricultural sector, reinforcing its support for the continent to attain food security for the growing population, estimated currently at 1.5 billion people. With a huge expanse of land and untapped resources, China’s investment in agriculture, focused on increasing local production, has been described as highly appreciable.
Brazil has adopted a similar strategy in its policy with African countries; its investments have concentrated in a number of countries, especially those rich in natural resources. It has significantly contributed to Africa’s economic growth by improving access to affordable machinery, industrial inputs, and adding value to consumer goods. Thus, Africa has to reduce product imports which can be produced locally.
The China and Brazil in African Agriculture Project has just published online a series of studies concerning Chinese and Brazilian support for African agriculture. They appeared in an upcoming issue of World Development. The six articles focusing on China are available below:
–A New Politics of Development Cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian Engagements in African Agriculture by Ian Scoones, Kojo Amanor, Arilson Favareto and Qi Gubo.
–South-South Cooperation, Agribusiness and African Agricultural Development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique by Kojo Amanor and Sergio Chichava.
–Chinese State Capitalism? Rethinking the Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa by Jing Gu, Zhang Chuanhong, Alcides Vaz and Langton Mukwereza.
–Chinese Migrants in Africa: Facts and Fictions from the Agri-food Sector in Ethiopia and Ghana by Seth Cook, Jixia Lu, Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.
–Chinese Agricultural Training Courses for African Officials: Between Power and Partnerships by Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu.
–Science, Technology and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres in Africa by Xiuli Xu, Xiaoyun Li, Gubo Qi, Lixia Tang and Langton Mukwereza.
Strategic partnerships and the way forward: African leaders have to adopt import substitution policies, re-allocate financial resources toward attaining domestic production, and sustain self-sufficiency.
Maximising the impact of resource mobilisation requires collaboration among governments, key external partners, investment promotion agencies, financial institutions, and the private sector. Partnerships must be aligned with national development priorities that can promote value addition, support industrialisation, and deepen regional and continental integration.
Feature/OPED
Recapitalisation Without Transformation is a Risk Nigeria Cannot Afford
By Blaise Udunze
In barely two weeks, Nigeria’s banking sector will once again be at a historic turning point. As the deadline for the latest recapitalisation exercise approaches on March 31, 2026, with no fewer than 31 banks having met the new capital rule, leaving out two that are reportedly awaiting verification. As exercise progresses and draws to an end, policymakers are optimistic that stronger banks will anchor financial stability and support the country’s ambition of building a $1 trillion economy.
The reform, driven by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under Governor Olayemi Cardoso, requires banks to significantly raise their capital thresholds, which are set at N500 billion for international banks, N200 billion for national banks, and N50 billion for regional lenders. According to the apex bank, 33 banks have already tapped the capital market through rights issues and public offerings; collectively, the total verified and approved capital raised by the banks amounts to N4.05 trillion.
No doubt, at first glance, the strategy definitely appears straightforward with the idea that bigger capital means stronger banks, and stronger banks should finance economic growth. But history offers a cautionary reminder that capital alone does not guarantee resilience, as it would be recalled that Nigeria has travelled this road before.
During the 2004-2005 consolidation led by former CBN Governor Charles Soludo, the number of banks in the country shrank dramatically from 89 to 25. The reform created larger institutions that were celebrated as national champions. The truth is that Nigeria has been here before because, despite all said and done, barely five years later, the banking system plunged into crisis, forcing regulatory intervention, bailouts, and the creation of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to absorb toxic assets.
The lesson from that experience is simple in the sense that recapitalisation without structural reform only postpones deeper problems.
Today, as banks race to meet the new capital thresholds, the real question is not how much capital has been raised but whether the reform will transform the fundamentals of Nigerian banking. The underlying fact is that if the exercise merely inflates balance sheets without addressing deeper vulnerabilities, Nigeria risks repeating a familiar cycle of apparent stability followed by systemic stress, as the resultant effect will be distressed banks less capable of bringing the economy out of the woods.
The real measure of success is far simpler. That is to say, stronger banks must stimulate economic productivity, stabilise the financial system, and expand access to credit for businesses and households. Anything less will amount to a missed opportunity.
One of the most critical issues surrounding the recapitalisation drive is the quality of the capital being raised.
Nigeria’s banking sector has reportedly secured more than N4.5 trillion in new capital commitments across different categories of banks. No doubt, on paper, these numbers may appear impressive. Going by the trends of events in Nigeria’s economy, numbers alone can be deceptive.
Past recapitalisation cycles revealed troubling practices, whereby funds raised through related-party transactions, borrowed money disguised as equity, or complex financial arrangements that recycled risks back into the banking system. If such practices resurface, recapitalisation becomes little more than an accounting exercise.
To avert a repeat of failure, the CBN must therefore ensure that every naira raised represents genuine, loss-absorbing capital. Transparency around capital sources, ownership structures, and funding arrangements must be non-negotiable. Without credible capital, balance sheet strength becomes an illusion that will make every recapitalisation exercise futile.
In financial systems, credibility is itself a form of capital. If there is one recurring factor behind banking crises in Nigeria, it is corporate governance failure.
Many past collapses were not triggered by global shocks but by insider lending, weak board oversight, excessive executive power, and poor risk culture. Recapitalisation provides regulators with a rare opportunity to reset governance standards across the industry.
Boards must be independent not only in structure but also in substance. Risk committees must be empowered to challenge executive decisions. Insider lending rules must be enforced without compromise because, over the years, they have proven to be an anathema against the stability of the financial sector. The stakes are high.
When governance fails, fresh capital can quickly become fresh fuel for old excesses. Without governance reform, recapitalisation risks reinforcing the very weaknesses it seeks to eliminate.
Another structural vulnerability lies in Nigeria’s increasing amount of non-performing loans (NPLs), which recently caused the CBN to raise concerns, as Nigeria experiences a rise in bad loans threatening banking stability.
Industry data suggests that the banking sector’s NPL ratio has climbed above the prudential benchmark of 5 per cent, reaching roughly 7 per cent in recent assessments. Many of these troubled loans are concentrated in sectors such as oil and gas, power, and government-linked infrastructure projects, alongside other factors such as FX instability, high interest rates, and the withdrawal of Covid-era forbearance, which threaten bank stability.
While regulatory forbearance has helped maintain short-term stability, it has also obscured deeper asset-quality concerns. A credible recapitalisation process must confront this reality directly.
Loan classification standards must reflect economic truth rather than regulatory convenience. Banks should not carry impaired assets indefinitely while presenting healthy balance sheets to investors and depositors.
Transparency about asset quality strengthens trust. Concealment destroys it. Few forces have disrupted Nigerian bank balance sheets in recent years as severely as exchange-rate volatility.
Many banks still operate with significant foreign exchange mismatches, borrowing short-term in foreign currencies while lending long-term to clients earning revenues in naira. When the naira depreciates sharply, these mismatches can erode capital faster than any credit loss.
Recapitalisation must therefore be accompanied by stricter supervision of foreign exchange exposure, as this part calls for the regulator to heighten its supervision. Banks should be required to disclose currency risks more transparently and undergo rigorous stress testing at intervals that assume adverse currency scenarios rather than best-case outcomes. In a structurally import-dependent economy, ignoring FX risk is no longer an option.
Nigeria’s banking system has long been characterised by excessive concentration in a few sectors and corporate clients, which calls for adequate monitoring and the need to be addressed quickly for the recapitalisation drive to yield maximum results.
Growth in most advanced economies comes from the small and medium-sized enterprises that are well-funded. Anything short of this undermines it, since the concentration of huge loans to large oil and gas companies, government-related entities, and major conglomerates absorbs a disproportionate share of bank lending. This has continued to pose a major threat to the system, as the case is with small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of job creation, which remain chronically underfinanced. This imbalance weakens the economy.
Recapitalisation should therefore be tied to policies that encourage credit diversification and risk-sharing mechanisms that allow banks to lend more confidently to productive sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and technology rather than investing their funds into the government’s securities. Bigger banks that remain narrowly exposed do not strengthen the economy. They amplify its fragilities.
Nigeria’s macroeconomic conditions, which are its broad economic settings, are defined by frequent and sometimes sharp changes or instability rather than stability.
Inflation shocks, interest-rate swings, fiscal pressures, and currency adjustments are not rare disruptions; but they have now become a normal part of the economic environment. Despite all these adverse factors, many banks still operate risk models that assume relative stability. Perhaps unbeknownst to the stakeholders, this disconnect is dangerous.
Owing to possible shocks, and when banks increase their capital (recapitalisation), it is required that banks adopt more sophisticated risk-management frameworks capable of withstanding severe economic scenarios, with the expectation that stronger banks should also have stronger systems to manage risks and survive economic crises. In Nigeria today, every financial institution’s stress testing must be performed in the face of the economy facing severe shocks like currency depreciation, sovereign debt pressures, and sudden interest-rate spikes.
Risk management should evolve from a compliance obligation into a strategic discipline embedded in every lending decision.
Public confidence in the banking system depends heavily on credible financial reporting.
Investors, analysts, and depositors need to be able to understand banks’ true financial positions without navigating non-transparent disclosures or creative accounting practices, which means the industry must be liberated to an extent that gives room for access to information.
Recapitalisation provides an opportunity to strengthen the enforcement of international financial reporting standards, enhance audit quality, and require clearer disclosure of capital adequacy, asset quality, and related-party transactions. Transparency should not be feared. It is the foundation of trust.
One thing that must be corrected is that while recapitalisation often focuses on financial metrics, the banking sector ultimately runs on human capital.
Another fearful aspect of this exercise for the economy is that consolidation and mergers triggered by the reform could lead to workforce disruptions if not carefully managed. Job losses, casualisation, and declining staff morale can weaken institutional culture and productivity. Strong banks are built by strong people.
If recapitalisation strengthens balance sheets while destabilising the workforce that powers the system, the reform risks undermining its own economic objectives. Human capital stability must therefore form part of the broader reform strategy.
Doubtless, another emerging shift in Nigeria’s financial landscape is the rise of digital financial platforms that are increasingly changing how people access and use money in Nigeria.
Millions of Nigerians are increasingly relying on fintech platforms for payments, microloans, and everyday financial transactions. One of the advantages it offers is that these services often deliver faster and more user-friendly experiences than traditional banks. While innovation is welcome, it raises important questions about the future structure of financial intermediation.
The point here is that the moment traditional banks retreat from retail banking while fintech platforms dominate customer interactions, systemic liquidity and regulatory oversight could become fragmented.
The CBN must see to it that the recapitalised banks must therefore invest aggressively in digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and customer experience, while cutting down costs on all less critical areas in the industry.
Nigerians should feel the benefits of recapitalisation not only in stronger balance sheets but also in faster apps, reliable payment systems, and responsive customer service.
As banks grow larger through recapitalisation and consolidation, a new challenge emerges via systemic concentration.
Nigeria’s largest banks already control a significant share of industry assets. Further consolidation could deepen the divide between dominant institutions and smaller players. This creates the risk of “too-big-to-fail” banks whose collapse could threaten the entire financial system.
To address this risk, regulators must strengthen resolution frameworks that allow distressed banks to fail without triggering systemic panic, their collapse does not damage the whole financial system, and do not require taxpayer-funded bailouts to forestall similar mistakes that occurred with the liquidation of Heritage Bank. Market discipline depends on credible failure mechanisms.
It must be understood that Nigeria’s banking recapitalisation is not merely a financial exercise or, better still, increasing banks’ capital. It is a rare opportunity to rebuild trust, strengthen governance, and reposition the financial system as a true engine of economic development.
One fact is that if the reform focuses only on capital numbers, the country risks repeating a familiar pattern of churning out impressive balance sheets followed by another cycle of crisis.
But the actors in this exercise must ensure that the recapitalisation addresses governance failures, asset quality concerns, risk management weaknesses, and transparency gaps; and the moment this is done, the banking sector could emerge stronger and more resilient.
Nigeria does not simply need bigger banks. It needs better banks, institutions capable of financing innovation, supporting entrepreneurs, and building economic opportunity for millions of citizens.
The true capital of any banking system is not just money. It is trust. And whether this recapitalisation ultimately succeeds will depend on whether Nigerians see that trust reflected not only in financial statements but in the everyday experience of saving, borrowing, and investing in the economy. Only then will bigger banks translate into a stronger nation.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
When Expertise Meets Politics: The Rejection of Professor Datonye Dennis by Lawmakers
By Meinyie Okpukpo
In a development that has generated debate within both political and medical circles in Rivers State, the Rivers State House of Assembly recently declined to confirm Professor Datonye Dennis Alasia as a commissioner-nominee submitted by the state governor, Siminalayi Fubara.
The decision followed a tense screening session in Port Harcourt and has raised broader questions about the intersection of politics, governance, and the role of technocrats in public administration.
For many in Nigeria’s medical community, Professor Alasia is not simply a nominee rejected by lawmakers. He is a respected physician, academic, and nephrology specialist whose decades-long career has contributed significantly to medical practice and training in the Niger Delta and across Nigeria.
The Political Drama Behind the Rejection
Professor Alasia was among nine commissioner nominees submitted by Governor Fubara to the Rivers Assembly as part of efforts to reconstitute the State Executive Council following the dissolution of the cabinet earlier in 2026. After deliberations, the Assembly confirmed five nominees but rejected four, including Professor Alasia.
During the screening exercise, lawmakers raised concerns about discrepancies in Alasia’s birth certificate as well as the absence of a tax clearance certificate among the documents he submitted to the Assembly. Although the professor offered explanations and apologised for the missing tax document, a motion was moved on the floor of the House recommending that he should not be confirmed. The Assembly subsequently voted against his nomination. Some lawmakers also cited what they described as “poor performance” during the screening exercise as part of the reasons for their decision. The outcome has since become one of the most talked-about developments from the commissioner screening exercise, largely because of Alasia’s distinguished professional background.
Who Is Professor Datonye Dennis Alasia?
Professor Alasia is widely known in Nigeria’s healthcare sector as a consultant nephrologist and Professor of Medicine with long-standing service at the University of Port Harcourt Teaching Hospital (UPTH). At UPTH, he served as Chairman of the Medical Advisory Committee (CMAC), a key leadership position responsible for overseeing clinical governance, medical standards, and patient-care policies in one of Nigeria’s foremost teaching hospitals.
He also previously held the role of Deputy Chief Medical Director, contributing significantly to hospital administration and the implementation of medical policies within the institution.
In addition to his clinical responsibilities, Professor Alasia has been deeply involved in academic medicine, combining medical practice with teaching and research in the university system.
Advancing Nephrology Care in Nigeria
Professor Alasia specialises in nephrology, the branch of medicine that deals with kidney diseases. This area of medicine is particularly important in Nigeria, where hypertension and diabetes have contributed to a growing number of kidney failure cases.
Through his work as a consultant nephrologist, he has been involved in:
Diagnosis and treatment of kidney diseases
Management of chronic kidney failure
Development of nephrology services in tertiary hospitals
Training doctors in renal medicine
His contributions have helped expand specialised kidney care within the Niger Delta region.
Training the Next Generation of Doctors
Beyond clinical practice, Professor Alasia has also played an important role in medical education.
Teaching hospitals like UPTH serve as the backbone of Nigeria’s medical training system. Within this system, professors supervise:
Residency training programmes
Specialist physician development
Medical student education
Clinical research mentorship
Through these responsibilities, Professor Alasia has helped mentor and train numerous doctors who now practice across Nigeria and beyond.
Leadership in Hospital Administration
Professor Alasia’s role as Chairman of the Medical Advisory Committee at UPTH placed him at the centre of hospital governance.
The position involves responsibilities such as:
Oversight of clinical governance
Enforcement of patient-care standards
Coordination of medical departments
Implementation of healthcare policies
The CMAC position is widely regarded as one of the most influential clinical leadership roles in Nigerian teaching hospitals.
Politics Versus Professional Expertise
The rejection of Professor Alasia highlights a broader issue often seen in Nigerian governance—the tension between professional expertise and political scrutiny. On one hand, the Assembly maintains that its decision reflects its constitutional duty to thoroughly vet nominees and ensure that those appointed to public office meet all necessary requirements. On the other hand, some observers argue that professionals with long careers outside politics may sometimes struggle to navigate political screening processes that are often designed with career politicians in mind.
What Happens Next?
With four nominees rejected during the screening exercise, Governor Fubara may be required to submit new names to the Assembly in order to complete the composition of the State Executive Council.
For Professor Alasia, however, the Assembly’s decision does not diminish a career built over decades in medicine, medical education, and hospital administration.
Conclusion
Professor Datonye Dennis Alasia represents a class of Nigerian professionals whose influence lies primarily outside the political arena. As a professor of medicine, consultant nephrologist, and hospital administrator, his contributions to medical training and kidney disease management remain significant.
Yet his experience before the Rivers State Assembly reflects a recurring reality in Nigerian public life: even the most accomplished technocrats must still navigate the complex and often unforgiving terrain of politics.
Meinyie Okpukpo, a socio-political commentator and analyst, writes from Port Harcourt, Rivers State
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