Feature/OPED
NEM Insurance Plc’s 48th AGM and Associated Governance Issues
By Nonso Okpala
An integral component of the long-term strategy of any company is corporate governance, epitomized by transparency and accountability.
By extension, it is also the single most important means of sustaining the vibrancy and relevance of any capital market in the world.
Furthermore, it has been observed that regulated markets with that adhere to best corporate governance practices have attracted and retained the confidence of investors, local and foreign alike.
As the CEO of VFD Group Limited, a company implementing a long-term investment strategy in the financial services industry, I basically assess companies on three cardinal points.
First, the presence of a visionary and selfless leader as espoused by Jim Collins in his book, “Good to Great”.
I also look for companies that have strategically positioned themselves within the context of their operating economy. These are companies that have developed a niche, either by way of technology, regulations, efficiency, etc., and established a moat around their business, as a barrier against competitors.
The last cardinal point I consider is the company’s adherence to best practice in corporate governance, regardless of the local governance standards or regulatory requirements.
In the course of our operations, we have invested in a few listed companies — despite being mainly focused on private investment — and we intend to increase our capital allocation to this class of investment. One of our early investment picks was NEM Insurance Plc. The company had been a diamond in the rough for years with its market price then below N1.
However, our valuation of the company, on a futuristic earning basis, was conservatively about N4 per share. This valuation has subsequently been validated by market trends; as at 21st June 2018, the market price of the stock was N3.04.
We invested in the company based on our confidence in the long-term prospects of the company and its high score on our three-assessment parameters (i.e. strong leadership, strategic positioning and best practice in corporate governance) particularly the first two parameters.
NEM Insurance has a visionary leader, Tope Smart. He stands out as an extraordinary leader and is remarkably humble at it. He took on a struggling company in 2007 and bootstrapped it into one of the top five insurance companies in the industry. The company has doubled shareholders’ funds in the last five years and consistently paid dividends over the stated period. He has also built a team of remarkable lieutenants who rank as the best in the industry on a cost basis consideration.
As a result of their strategic positioning within their operating economy, the company not only enjoys the insurance regulatory environment, but has further enhanced its economic moat via efficient performance in a sector that is spectacularly known for inefficiency and poor regulatory compliance.
Unfortunately, it appears that the company is not nearly as strong on governance practices, relative to its stellar performance on the other two counts as stated above. I will elucidate with the organization of the company’s purported 2018 Annual General Meeting (AGM).
As a background, the Directors of the company collectively own less than 23.73% of the company’s issued shares. 22.98% of the 23.73% of the shares attributed to all Directors are held by four Directors (the “ruling 4”) out of ten Directors (source: NEM 2017 Annual Report & Accounts). On closer examination, the situation gets even more interesting. The same audited financial statements reveal that only 16 shareholders, inclusive of the “ruling 4” Directors, have up to 50m shares each and this group of 16 shareholders collectively controls 52.11% of the company’s issued shares. The implication is that there are 12 shareholders who collectively control 29.13% of the company’s issued shares that are not included in the management of the company. VFD Group is one of the 12 shareholders, with a 2.11% stake. In recent times, we have made efforts to identify the other 11 shareholders and observed a trend of exclusion of these shareholders from the activities of the company.
For instance, as a run up to the 2018 AGM of the company, most of these shareholders did not receive notice of the meeting, the proposed special resolutions, proxy forms and audited financial statements as required by CAMA. This is extremely suspicious, particularly if one considers the special resolutions proposed for consideration and approval at the purported AGM.
First, special resolutions are usually passed by 75% of the votes of shareholders present and voting in an AGM. In the case of NEM, none of these resolutions can be passed if the 12 excluded shareholders were present and voted against the resolutions. It will be mathematically impossible because if all shareholders are in attendance, the 12 shareholders would represent 29.13% of the possible votes. This will preclude the possibility of achieving the 75% approval that is required for the resolution. This is further compounded by the fact that 100% attendance of its shareholders in NEM’s AGM is impossible. Thus, the only way to assure the passing of such resolutions (if management is not sure of the position of the 12 shareholders) is to tactically exclude them so as to ensure victory if a poll is conducted.
I am certain the question running through your head is, why go through all of these, at the risk of regulatory sanctions? Why risk the company’s reputation and particularly jeopardize the otherwise stellar achievements and track record of the Group Managing Director? The answer is simple: the company is run by a minority group of shareholders, “the ruling 4” Directors, who want to secure their hold on the company, at all costs.
The Directors, at the purported AGM, sought a resolution to issue 1.056bn shares of the company by way of private placement, at a price of N2.50. Looking closely at the proposal reveals why, in the words of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, “it is a do or die” affair for this ruling group of Directors. By maintaining the status quo and buying up shares on the floor of the stock exchange, it is currently impossible for anyone with minority holding to gain majority shareholding, and neither is it possible through fair and equitable rights’ offers. Nevertheless, the proposed special/private placement makes it possible for “the ruling 4” Directors plus the “special interest” beneficiary of the special/private placement to achieve a super majority.
Putting this in clearer context, post the proposed private placement, the collective stake of the “ruling 4” Directors plus the special interest to whom the placement shares are issued will increase to 35.82% from 22.98%.
Kindly note that the provisions of the special placement gives “the ruling 4” Directors the right to pick who these shares can be allotted to. They can even allot the said shares to themselves or any one of them in the absence of any sensible checks and balances.
In truth, if the intention of the “ruling 4” Directors is to increase their interest or influence in the company, I have no fundamental objection to this goal. After all, we believe that the interest of shareholders is best served when management is significantly invested in the subject company. But the offer should nevertheless be appropriately priced.
If I were to negotiate on behalf of fellow shareholders, I would place a price tag of N4 per share as I initially stated in this article and every kobo of that valuation can be justified. However, do not take my valuation as it is, let’s look to the market for the appropriate valuation of the company’s shares. The special placement is priced at N2.50 while the market price is currently N3.34 as at 27/06/18, representing a discount of 33.59%. This is clearly unusual and indicative of management’s destruction of other shareholders’ value and is designed to grant inordinate gain to an unidentified “special interest”. The question is: who will these shares be allotted to?
As an investor and specifically a shareholder of this company, VFD Group will like to participate in this offer. In fact, we will like to take up the entire offer. Why is such a compelling offer restricted to the exclusion of other shareholders who are willing and able to participate? How do you offer a significant stake of a company via a special/private placement priced at a significant discount to market?
My basic understanding of special/private placement posits the following considerations:
1. That the public company cannot raise capital via rights offer.
2. That the public company cannot raise capital via a public offer.
3. That the company is not doing well and as such, investors are reluctant to be exposed to such company and therefore placing the company under immense capitalisation pressure.
4. That the company is subject to all three above considerations and it is in dire need of funds.
If any of the above stated is the situation with NEM Insurance Plc, then the offer as proposed will be in the best interest of the company and shareholders alike. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Shareholders are willing to participate in a public or rights offer because the company is doing very well.
As mentioned earlier, the Management of the company have done remarkably well based on the operations of the company and this is indicative in the current market price, profitability and industry ranking of the company.
The company is also not cash-strapped; in fact, the Board proposed and obtained approval for the payment of 10k/share dividend at the purported AGM and has consistently paid dividend in the prior years. It is also not under pressure by regulators to recapitalise, as it is one of the few insurance companies that has maintained a clean bill of health.
By the way, to date, no one has explained to shareholders what the funds to be raised will be utilised for.
So, what is the justification for the proposed special/private placement? What are the proceeds of the proposed offer for? If we must raise funds, why not do it via rights issue or public offer? A private placement appropriates the value in the company for the benefit of a few and savvy shareholders will have none of this.
On a general note, I will like to address the role of institutions in the pursuance of best practices in corporate governance. Their roles are integral to its attainment or otherwise.
I have reviewed the activities of our corporate regulators e.g. SEC, NSE, CAC, NAICOM and others and I am extremely confident in their capacity and moral commitment to upholding global best practice standards in governance in our market. They have demonstrated this time and time again and we have no doubt that it will sustain through the foreseeable future.
It is important to ensure that this governance standards are not only upheld but are seen to be upheld by all relevant parties, including NEM Insurance Plc and all auxiliary and related parties or officers of the company, such as the directors and the company secretary, as well as the Company’s Registrar, APEL Capital & Trust Limited. These parties all owe a fiduciary responsibility to all shareholders and are expected to always act in the best interests of the shareholders.
Before I conclude this piece, I will like to state a few things about VFD Group as a background to this matter, and with specific reference to our investment in NEM Insurance Plc.
1. We are a Group of companies with interest/aspiration in all sectors of the financial services industry e.g. Asset Management, Bureau de Change, Banking, Microfinance, Insurance, International Remittance, Real Estate etc.
2. Our operations are funded by our equity and debt investors as well as retained profit and we have been in existence for nine years. We currently have about 48 shareholders from all works of life, including leaders of public listed companies.
3. We are not particularly interested in running these companies or retaining Board positions, but we are firmly interested in the proper governance of our investee companies, a strong trend of profitability and consistent payment of dividend. Once that is in place, we are delighted to support management of these companies.
4. We also stand against interference with the operations of the company because we do not consider ourselves experts in our investee companies’ area of business. We believe once our set objectives are in place, we have no business interfering in their business operation.
5. This article is not written with malice and as much as possible, I have ensured that it is not personal but focused purely on the facts at hand. I also owe a fiduciary responsibility to our shareholders and it behoves me to speak on their behalf and protect their interest. I also think it is in the interest of the Nigerian investing public to speak out and advocate better corporate governance. Our economy will be better off by this and similar efforts.
6. We think that our interests are aligned with those of NEM Insurance Plc and that there is absolutely no need for protective schemes with the negative implication on the company.
In conclusion, I call on the Board and Management of NEM Insurance Plc to set aside the purported 48th AGM of the Company and the resolutions passed thereat. This should not be done with the mind-set of a victor or vanquished but should be done in the interest of all shareholders, majority or minority alike.
I am certain that if we do the right thing by the company, all shareholders will be better for it in the long run instead of a slow and deliberate process of destruction of value that is inevitable, if we continue down this path. In the meantime, VFD Group will take all necessary lawful steps to protect its investments in NEM while supporting the company to continue its growth trajectory.
Nonso Okpala is a visionary and serial investor. He is also the Managing Director/CEO of VFD Group Ltd and Father-In-Chief. You can mail him at no**********@******up.com or follow him on Twitter and Instagram for further discussions.
Feature/OPED
The Risk of Calling Alex Otti ‘Another Sam Mbakwe’
By Blaise Udunze
Do you know that history rarely produces leaders whose names become synonymous with development? In Nigeria’s post-independence political history, only a few governors have achieved that distinction. And, among them stands Dee Sam Mbakwe, whose tenure as Governor of the old Imo State between 1979 and 1983 permanently and to date altered public expectations of what purposeful leadership could accomplish.
One outstanding fact that can’t be erased is that even more than four decades after leaving office, Mbakwe’s name remains shorthand for visionary governance. It has been on record that across today’s Imo, Abia, Ebonyi and parts of Rivers State, the territories carved out of the old Imo State, roads, educational institutions, hospitals and industrial estates associated with his administration still shape public memory to date. His lasting and enduring legacy demonstrates an important principle that visibly shows that governments are remembered less for political speeches or white elephant projects in print than for institutions and infrastructure that survive them.
Today, a similar conversation is unfolding in Abia State. Governor Alex Otti, now in the middle of his first term, is increasingly being compared with the legendary Mbakwe. While noting that it is not a risk, such comparisons should neither be dismissed as political enthusiasm nor accepted as settled history. They deserve careful examination through the lens of governance, economics and institutional transformation. History ultimately rewards evidence, not sentiment.
The more important and inevitable question, therefore, is whether Abia is merely experiencing another burst of public infrastructure or whether it is witnessing the emergence of a developmental state that is strongly built and anchored on long-term economic transformation because the distinction truly matters.
Apt attention is drawn to the view that development economists have long argued that sustained economic growth depends not on isolated projects but on complementary investments in infrastructure, energy, institutions, human capital and productive enterprise. Roads without electricity rarely attract industries. Schools without jobs encourage migration. Fiscal discipline without investment suppresses growth. Successful governments integrate these sectors into a coherent development strategy.
Measured against this framework, Otti’s administration appears to be pursuing something more ambitious than conventional public works.
For decades, the majority of those in the know and who have visited could attest that Abia’s deteriorating road network represented the visible face of state failure. Aba, once known as the commercial heartbeat of the South-East and also one of Africa’s largest clusters of small and medium-scale manufacturers, gradually lost competitiveness as logistics costs rose and businesses struggled with decaying infrastructure.
Economic theory is unequivocal in that infrastructure reduces transaction costs, improves productivity and attracts private investment.
Recognising this reality, the Otti administration has made infrastructure renewal its most visible priority. By its third anniversary, the government reported completing more than 414 road projects covering over 860 kilometres, including strategic economic corridors such as Port Harcourt Road, Ohanku Road, Aguiyi Ironsi Boulevard, Omenuko Bridge and numerous urban and rural link roads.
The significance extends beyond asphalt. This is to say that every rehabilitated road lowers transport costs, improves market access, reduces vehicle operating expenses and enhances the competitiveness of manufacturers, traders and farmers. There must be an understanding that infrastructure, in this context, becomes an economic policy rather than merely a construction programme.
The symbolism of these projects recalls Sam Mbakwe’s philosophy that public works should stimulate production rather than merely create political visibility. Like Mbakwe, Otti appears to recognise that infrastructure is not an end in itself but the foundation upon which economic prosperity is built.
If roads defined Mbakwe’s administration, reliable electricity may ultimately define Otti’s.
Few constraints have damaged Nigeria’s industrial competitiveness more than unreliable power supply. Recognising this, the administration has leveraged the Aba Integrated Power Project developed by Professor Barth Nnaji’s Geometric Power as a catalyst for wider economic transformation.
It is worth noting that Governor Otti has openly acknowledged that more reliable electricity provided the confidence to introduce electric buses into Abia’s transportation system, describing Geometric Power as “a landmark investment” that lays the foundation for industrial growth, energy security, and cleaner transportation. Hence, it has become the goose that lays the golden eggs, as his admission is significant because it demonstrates an understanding that electricity is not merely a utility but an engine of economic growth.
Development is rarely driven by isolated projects. It occurs when infrastructure complements infrastructure. Electricity powers factories. Roads move goods. Efficient transportation expands labour mobility. Water improves public health. Digital infrastructure attracts investment. Together, they create an ecosystem capable of sustaining economic growth.
Professor Barth Nnaji’s disclosure adds another historical dimension to this story. Long before entering politics, Alex Otti played a critical role in securing financing for the Geometric Power Project during his banking career at First Bank and later Diamond Bank. He also helped facilitate the restructuring of the project’s foreign currency obligations from dollars to naira. This continuity suggests that Otti’s commitment to industrial infrastructure predates his governorship. Unlike politicians who discover development after assuming office, his engagement with productive investments appears rooted in decades of experience within Nigeria’s financial system.
One of the enduring criticisms of many Nigerian states is their dependence on monthly allocations from the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC), with limited attention paid to expanding internally generated economic activity. Sam Mbakwe challenged that model through industrial estates and productive public investments.
Otti appears to be pursuing a twenty-first-century version of the same philosophy.
The proposed $145 million solar manufacturing plant in Isiala Ngwa South, government support for Ultimum Limited’s multimillion-dollar beverage manufacturing facility, efforts to operationalise the long-delayed Isiala Ngwa Inland Dry Port and continued urban renewal in Aba all point towards an economy increasingly oriented towards production rather than consumption.
These initiatives matter because investment decisions respond to confidence. Capital flows where infrastructure is reliable, institutions are predictable, and governments demonstrate policy consistency. Every new factory expands employment. Every logistics hub reduces business costs. Every industrial investment broadens the state’s future tax base. This is how economies become less dependent on federal allocations and more reliant on productive enterprise.
Modern development extends beyond physical infrastructure. Recognising this reality, the administration has invested in healthcare, expanded educational reforms, upgraded public hospitals, recruited teachers and healthcare personnel and partnered with the Federal Government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and TETFund to establish Nigeria’s first Manufacturing Technology University Innovation Pod at Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, Umudike.
The symbolism is significant. While Mbakwe built institutions for an industrial economy, Otti appears to be preparing Abia for an innovation-driven economy where manufacturing increasingly depends on technology, research and advanced skills. Development today requires not only roads and bridges but also intellectual infrastructure.
Beyond healthcare and education, the rehabilitation of the Ubakala and Ariaria Water Schemes underscores the administration’s recognition that access to potable water remains a critical driver of public health and productivity. Likewise, it would be said that the rollout of electric buses, commissioned by the Director-General of the World Trade Organisation, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, represents an early attempt to align Abia’s transportation system with global trends in sustainable urban mobility. The basic fact is that these initiatives reinforce the idea that development is most effective when sectors are integrated rather than treated as isolated government programmes, which has been a norm with many states.
Perhaps the least visible but most consequential reform lies in governance itself.
Markets respond not merely to infrastructure but to credibility. Businesses invest where contracts are respected. Banks lend where institutions function. Citizens willingly pay taxes where governments deliver services.
Against this backdrop, efforts to improve fiscal discipline, reduce inherited liabilities, clear more than N40 billion in salary and pension arrears, strengthen transparency and restore confidence in public administration become economic reforms in their own right.
Governance is itself infrastructure. It lowers uncertainty, attracts investment, encourages entrepreneurship and expands opportunity.
One cannot overlook the growing external validation of Abia’s transformation. Members of the Presidency’s Renewed Hope Media Team, after touring projects across the state, publicly acknowledged the scale of infrastructural renewal taking place. The willingness of investors to commit $145 million to a solar manufacturing facility, the collaboration between the Abia State Government, the Federal Government, UNDP and TETFund on innovation projects, and ongoing discussions around the Abia International Airport all point to increasing confidence in the state’s development trajectory.
This matters because no state government possesses sufficient resources to finance development alone; as such, partnerships also come to the rescue. Sustainable economic transformation depends on attracting private investment, fostering productive partnerships and creating an enabling environment where businesses can flourish and remain sustainable.
Notwithstanding, understand that comparisons with Sam Mbakwe should be aptly approached with caution. History has already delivered its verdict on Mbakwe, and there must be this understanding that his reputation has endured because successive generations continued to experience the value of the infrastructure and institutions he built.
Alex Otti’s story is still being written. Many flagship projects remain under construction. The proposed Abia International Airport, the planned FIFA-standard stadium in Aba, the expansion of industrial clusters, the operationalisation of the Isiala Ngwa Inland Dry Port and other strategic initiatives must ultimately translate into measurable improvements in economic performance.
The true indicators of success will not simply be kilometres of roads completed or projects commissioned. They will include higher internally generated revenue, increased private investment, expanded manufacturing output, lower unemployment, stronger small and medium-sized enterprises, improved educational outcomes, wider healthcare access, increased exports and rising household incomes.
These are the metrics that distinguish transformational governance from routine administration.
Nigeria has never lacked development plans. What it has often lacked is disciplined execution.
Sam Mbakwe demonstrated that purposeful leadership could transform public expectations even within a single tenure. Alex Otti appears to be pursuing a similar path under far more difficult macroeconomic conditions characterised by high inflation, fiscal constraints, exchange-rate volatility, elevated public debt and heightened public scrutiny.
Whether he ultimately joins the ranks of Nigeria’s truly transformational governors will depend less on today’s commendations than on tomorrow’s outcomes.
If the institutions being built endure, if industries expand, if investors continue to choose Abia, if innovation flourishes and if ordinary citizens experience sustained improvements in their quality of life, history may indeed place Alex Otti alongside Sam Mbakwe.
For history has always reserved its highest honours not for politicians who merely won elections, but for leaders who fundamentally changed the economic destiny of their people.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
The Kaduna Peace Model, HURIWA and Northern Governors: Promise, Proof or Anagnorisis?
By Sani Abdulrazak, PhD
The fundamentality of securing our lives and property, especially in Northern Nigeria, cannot be overemphasised. Any other responsibility comes after this for a responsible government. Sadly, for close to two decades, Northern Nigeria has been a gallows of despair, rape, and death. From banditry and freelance killings that scratch, pierce, and are ruining the North West, to the bloody insurgency that barks and bites in the North East, to farmers-herder conflicts in the North Central, leaving behind a scorching trail of rancour and sorrow of unimaginable proportion for millions, Kaduna State was one of the worst-hit states in terms of banditry and kidnappings, ethno-religious conflicts, and freelance killings.
But in the last three years, the state has metamorphosed into one of the most peaceful in the region via the Kaduna Peace Model. More so, the recent endorsement of the Kaduna Peace Model by the Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA) deserves thoughtful examination rather than unquestioning acceptance. HURIWA’s position has brought renewed attention to Kaduna State’s approach to conflict management and peacebuilding. The endorsement raises an important policy question: Has Kaduna developed a governance model capable of reducing conflict in a sustainable manner, and if so, why have other northern states not moved to adapt it? These questions deserve answers rooted in facts rather than political loyalties.
The phrase “Kaduna Peace Model” does not point to or refer to a single law, policy document, or institutional framework. Rather, it describes an evolving approach that combines conventional security operations with community engagement, dialogue among stakeholders, collaboration with traditional and religious institutions, support for security agencies, conflict mediation, and development interventions in communities affected by violence. Instead of relying exclusively on military responses, the approach seeks to address some of the social and political conditions that often sustain insecurity. Whether this amounts to a distinct governance model remains open to debate. Nevertheless, it reflects a broader understanding that lasting peace requires more than the deployment of armed personnel. Security may suppress violence temporarily, but durable peace depends equally on trust, inclusion, justice, and economic opportunity.
The next question is unavoidable: Has the approach worked?
The evidence suggests that Kaduna today presents a different security picture from that of three years ago, although not an entirely peaceful one. Around 2023, the state remained one of Nigeria’s most violence-affected regions. Conflict trackers documented frequent attacks, kidnappings, and communal violence, with 85 recorded conflict incidents resulting in 261 fatalities in the final quarter of 2023 alone. Entire communities lived under constant fear, farming activities were disrupted in several local government areas, and many roads within the state became synonymous with insecurity.
Recent years, however, indicate a significant degree of improvement in almost all parts of the state. Some communities have resumed agricultural activities, commercial movement has improved along previously troubled corridors, and government engagement with local communities has become more visible. These developments suggest that violence has, in almost all areas of the state, reduced in intensity. Yet such observations should not be mistaken for a declaration of victory.
A meaningful assessment, however, goes beyond casualty figures alone. It must also consider whether displaced persons have returned home, whether schools operate without interruption, whether farmers cultivate their lands without fear, whether markets function normally, and whether citizens genuinely perceive improvements in their daily security. Peace, as we know it, is not merely the absence of gunfire; it is the restoration of ordinary life.
It is within this context that HURIWA’s endorsement should be understood.
Civil society organisations play an important role in recognising promising governance practices, encouraging innovation, and stimulating public debate. Their endorsements can influence policy conversations and encourage governments to learn from one another. However, endorsements are neither official certifications nor substitutes for independent evaluation. Every governance model, regardless of who praises it, must remain open to scrutiny, evidence, and continuous improvement.
The larger question, therefore, is whether the Kaduna experience can be replicated elsewhere across Northern Nigeria.
It is a fact that certain principles underlying the Kaduna approach are broadly applicable. Community dialogue, cooperation between government and traditional institutions, investment in local peacebuilding, and stronger collaboration with security agencies are strategies that have relevance beyond Kaduna’s borders. But due to the non-uniformity and complexity of the hydra-headed nature of insecurity across Northern Nigeria, it becomes almost impossible for the model to work across the whole of Northern Nigeria. The security dynamics of Kaduna differ from those of Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Niger, Benue, Plateau, or Borno. Banditry, communal conflicts, terrorism, farmer-herder disputes, and transnational criminal networks vary significantly in their causes and manifestations. A strategy that succeeds in one environment cannot simply be copied into another without adjustment.
This probably explains why other northern governors have not simply adopted what is popularly described as the Kaduna Peace Model. Effective governance is context-specific. Every state possesses different demographic realities, institutional capacities, historical grievances, and security challenges. Replication without adaptation risks producing disappointing outcomes. If northern states are to draw lessons from Kaduna’s experience, several adjustments are necessary. Independent conflict assessments should precede policy adoption. Local governments must become stronger partners in peacebuilding. Traditional and religious leaders should be integrated into structured dialogue mechanisms rather than informal consultations alone. Reliable security data should guide decision-making, while transparent monitoring systems should measure outcomes beyond political narratives. Economic recovery, youth employment, and access to justice must complement security interventions if peace is to endure.
Despite its widely acknowledged contributions to reducing insecurity and fostering dialogue over the past three years, the Kaduna Peace Model is not without significant shortcomings. One of its most notable weaknesses is the absence of a clearly documented framework that defines its philosophy, guiding principles, operational structure, implementation strategy, monitoring indicators, and evaluation mechanisms. Consequently, much of what is described as the “Kaduna Peace Model” exists in practice rather than in a codified, replicable document, making independent assessment, institutional continuity, and adaptation by other jurisdictions difficult. Furthermore, the model remains heavily dependent on the commitment of the incumbent political leadership, raising concerns about its sustainability beyond the current administration. While it has contributed to stabilising many communities, it has yet to comprehensively address the underlying structural drivers of conflict, including competition over natural resources and historical grievances, and questions persist regarding transparency, measurable performance indicators, accountability, and the extent of participation by women, youth, victims, and other marginalised groups. These limitations suggest that although the model has demonstrated practical value, its long-term effectiveness would be strengthened through formal documentation, institutionalisation, a robust implementation framework, and regular independent evaluation.
Possibly the greatest lesson from Kaduna is not that it has discovered a perfect formula for peace. No society has. Rather, it demonstrates that conflict management increasingly demands governance approaches that extend beyond military deployments alone. Therefore, HURIWA’s endorsement should not be viewed as the conclusion of the conversation but as its beginning. Whether the Kaduna Peace Model becomes a genuine reference point for other states will depend less on public commendation than on rigorous evidence, independent evaluation, and its ability to produce durable improvements in the lives of ordinary citizens.
In governance, therefore, the true measure of peace is not the number of endorsements the Kaduna Peace Model receives. It is the number of lives it has protected, the communities restored, and the confidence with which citizens wake each morning believing that tomorrow will be safer than yesterday.
Sani Abdulrazak, PhD, is a writer, researcher and public affairs analyst based in Zaria, Kaduna State
Feature/OPED
$40bn Net Reserves, Record Wealth, Relentless Poverty: Who Is Nigeria’s Economy Serving Today?
By Blaise Udunze
No doubt, it was a welcome announcement that Nigeria’s net foreign exchange (FX) reserves have surged by an astonishing 1,233 per cent from about $3 billion to over $40 billion. This would ordinarily be the kind of economic milestone that inspires optimism, coupled with gross external reserves of about $52.52 billion, which are sufficient to finance roughly 11 months of imports of goods and services. Penultimate week, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Olayemi Cardoso, presented the development at the end of the 306th meeting of the apex bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) as evidence that its reforms are working.
It is no surprise that around the same period, one would say that another important economic event occurred with the government sharing more money than ever before with the federal, state, and local governments, as the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) distributed a record N2.55 trillion, representing an increase of N250 billion over the N2.3 trillion shared in the preceding month.
Of course, the official figures are impressive numbers. Yes, anyone would conclude that the economy is becoming stronger, more stable and better positioned for growth. While this suggests stronger public finances, it also raises the question of whether these larger allocations are producing tangible improvements in the lives of ordinary Nigerians. More interesting is that another set of figures tells a completely different story.
According to the World Bank’s newly approved Country Partnership Framework for Nigeria, 61 per cent of Nigerians now live below the poverty line, while about 79 per cent are either poor or vulnerable to falling into poverty. More than 139 million Nigerians live below the poverty line. Over 86 million people lack access to electricity, while millions of young Nigerians enter the labour market every year with little prospect of decent employment.
The contradiction could not be starker. If reserves are rising, government revenues are increasing, and governments at all levels are receiving record allocations, why are the lives of ordinary Nigerians becoming more difficult?
This is the question policymakers must answer not with statistics, but with tangible improvements in the lives of citizens. If government agencies engineering these figures must know, these are not merely economic statistics; they are the lived realities by which citizens judge any government.
Foreign exchange reserves are not an economic trophy. They are a means to an end. Strong reserves are expected to stabilise the currency, reassure investors, strengthen the country’s ability to withstand external shocks and create an enabling environment for investment, production and employment.
But reserves alone do not feed families nor would they reduce their housing rents. They do not lower transport fares. They do not reduce school fees. They do not make healthcare affordable. Nor do they automatically create jobs.
Ultimately, this is to say that the success of macroeconomic reforms must be measured not by the strength of the CBN’s balance sheet but by the wellbeing of the Nigerian people.
Historically, unlike our dear country, countries that consistently build substantial foreign exchange reserves do so on the back of strong economic fundamentals. The fact is that they maintain sustained trade surpluses, export diversified products, attract large volumes of long-term foreign direct investment (FDI), develop globally competitive manufacturing industries and continuously improve productivity.
Nigeria, unfortunately, still struggles on nearly all these fronts. The country’s export earnings remain overwhelmingly dependent on crude oil. Non-oil exports remain relatively insignificant. Value-added manufacturing exports are weak. Another area that raises concern is agriculture, which continues to export mostly raw commodities rather than higher-value processed products despite being known previously as the country’s mainstay. With all these so-called developments, Nigeria still imports refined petroleum products, machinery, pharmaceuticals, industrial inputs and even food that could be produced locally.
This naturally raises an uncomfortable but legitimate question that requires an answer. Yes, it would be necessary to ask: How exactly has Nigeria grown and accumulated over $40 billion in net foreign exchange reserves without the structural fundamentals that typically support such reserve growth?
The apex bank has continued to credit exchange-rate reforms, improved transparency, stronger investor confidence and increased diaspora remittances. Well, it would be said that these achievements deserve recognition.
However, they do not completely explain the scale or, more importantly, the sustainability of the reserve accumulation.
Nigeria has not consistently recorded the large trade surpluses associated with countries that rapidly accumulate reserves. Oil production remains below historical capacity. Export diversification remains limited. Ease of doing business continues to be constrained by multiple taxation, infrastructure deficits, insecurity, policy uncertainty, logistics bottlenecks and unreliable electricity.
Without addressing these structural deficiencies, reserve accumulation risks becoming more financial than productive.
Equally important is the question of foreign direct investment. Governor Cardoso has argued that improved macroeconomic stability is attracting foreign investors. That may well be true. But confidence alone does not build factories.
The real question is how much fresh FDI has actually entered Nigeria’s productive sectors? How much has gone into manufacturing? How much into agro-processing? How much into export-oriented industries capable of generating sustainable foreign exchange earnings and creating jobs?
If reserve growth is being driven largely by short-term portfolio investments attracted by high interest rates rather than long-term productive investment, then Nigeria remains vulnerable. Portfolio investors can exit as quickly as they entered whenever global financial conditions change.
The unarguable fact is that foreign direct investment, by contrast, creates factories, expands production, develops supply chains and creates lasting employment. Nigeria desperately needs more of the latter.
The CBN also points to diaspora remittances as a growing source of reserve accumulation, projecting inflows of approximately $1 billion every month before the end of the year. Again, this is encouraging.
Again, the country will not be tired of asking questions because several of these questions deserve closer examination. How much of these remittances represent genuinely new inflows rather than funds previously routed through informal channels? Come to think of it, how much of these remittances finance productive investments instead of household consumption? Can diaspora remittances realistically become a permanent substitute for export competitiveness?
No economy has ever industrialised on remittances alone. A nation cannot sustainably depend on the sacrifices of its citizens abroad while failing to create opportunities for them at home.
Beyond the reserve figures lies another troubling contradiction. This is more disturbing because every month, FAAC distributes unprecedented sums to governments across Nigeria. Yet again, with daily regret, the average Nigerian struggles with deteriorating public services.
Honestly speaking, it has become so frustrating that the majority of the people who yearn for pleasant or attractive experiences are struggling as roads remain poor, public hospitals remain overstretched, schools continue to decline, electricity remains unreliable, water infrastructure remains inadequate, and youth unemployment remains widespread. Worst still, think of the cases as the nation continues to grapple with rising inflation, worsening poverty, declining purchasing power, struggling businesses and persistent insecurity.
One major contradiction is that if revenues continue rising while poverty deepens, then one unavoidable question must be asked: Where is the money going? Another pertinent question: How can the citizens be surrounded by water and still suffer from thirst or soap lather in their eyes?
This has been the predominant worry in the minds of many even as the World Bank itself acknowledges this disconnect. While praising recent macroeconomic reforms for improving fiscal stability, strengthening foreign reserves and restoring investor confidence, it concludes emphatically that the gains have not translated into meaningful improvements in living standards.
Ironically, despite the claims of declining inflation, it continues to erode purchasing power. Social protection remains weak. Most Nigerians remain trapped in low-productivity informal employment.
One contradicting and astonishing step taken recently is nowhere more evident than in the Central Bank’s monetary policy. Consider this: despite a marginal decline in headline inflation to 15.91 per cent in June 2026, the Monetary Policy Committee retained the benchmark Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 26.5 per cent, alongside a 45 per cent Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) for commercial banks.
The decision reflects understandable caution. The CBN remains concerned that escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle East could increase global energy prices, worsen imported inflation and reverse recent gains in price stability.
From a monetary policy perspective, this caution is defensible. But from the standpoint of businesses and households, the consequences are profound. An interest rate of 26.5 per cent inevitably translates into prohibitively expensive bank lending.
The ripple and adverse effects have led to manufacturers struggling to finance expansion. Another tough aspect is seeing the small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of employment generation, find access to affordable credit increasingly difficult. Entrepreneurs postpone investments. Factories delay expansion. Potential employers reduce hiring. Economic growth slows.
Ironically, while it is understandable that high interest rates may help stabilise inflation and attract foreign portfolio inflows that support reserves, it should be made known that they simultaneously suppress domestic investment, production and job creation.
In other words, the same policies helping strengthen the country’s macroeconomic indicators may also be constraining the real economy. Even the celebrated decline in inflation deserves closer scrutiny.
The national inflation rate may have eased marginally to 15.91 per cent, but this national average masks severe hardship across much of the country, which continues to create perpetual pain.
How best can this be figured out if data from the National Bureau of Statistics show that 19 states and the Federal Capital Territory recorded inflation rates exceeding 30 per cent, with Niger State above 42 percent and Kogi State exceeding 41 per cent?
Food inflation continues to rise, driven by increases in the prices of tomatoes, pepper, beef, yams, garri and other staple foods.
Businesses themselves remain unconvinced. The Organised Private Sector has welcomed the marginal moderation in inflation but insists that prices remain painfully high for both consumers and businesses.
Leaders of small business associations argue that market realities tell a different story from headline statistics. For millions of Nigerians, inflation is not measured by percentages. It is measured by empty shopping baskets. By reduced meal portions. By businesses shutting their doors. By families withdrawing children from school. By postponed medical treatments.
From a theoretical standpoint, macroeconomic stability is undoubtedly necessary. Without it, sustainable development is impossible. But it would also be agreed that macroeconomic stability alone is not sufficient. It can be argued further that economic reforms must eventually improve household incomes, reduce poverty, expand productive employment and raise living standards.
Otherwise, they risk becoming reforms that look impressive in economic reports but remain invisible in everyday life.
The truth remains that with the current situation, Nigeria therefore stands at a critical pivotal moment and the decisions taken now will determine its future.
The current reserve position should not become a destination for celebration but a foundation for deeper structural transformation. The country must diversify exports beyond crude oil. Strengthen manufacturing. Promote value-added agricultural exports. Improve electricity supply. Reduce the cost of doing business. Expand logistics infrastructure. Attract long-term productive investment.
In addition, support local industries with affordable financing. Strengthen institutions. Improve governance and ensure greater accountability for public spending. Only then will rising reserves translate into rising prosperity. Only then will record FAAC allocations produce visible development. Only then will macroeconomic stability become household stability.
The ultimate measure of economic success is not the number of dollars held in the Central Bank’s vaults. It is whether parents can afford school fees and housing rent. Whether young graduates can find decent jobs. Whether businesses can borrow, produce and expand. Whether families can afford food without sacrificing nutrition. Whether citizens feel that economic growth includes them.
Until those questions receive positive answers, one uncomfortable question will continue to linger. Who Is Nigeria’s Economy Serving Today?
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com



