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NEM Insurance Plc’s 48th AGM and Associated Governance Issues

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By Nonso Okpala

An integral component of the long-term strategy of any company is corporate governance, epitomized by transparency and accountability.

By extension, it is also the single most important means of sustaining the vibrancy and relevance of any capital market in the world.

Furthermore, it has been observed that regulated markets with that adhere to best corporate governance practices have attracted and retained the confidence of investors, local and foreign alike.

As the CEO of VFD Group Limited, a company implementing a long-term investment strategy in the financial services industry, I basically assess companies on three cardinal points.

First, the presence of a visionary and selfless leader as espoused by Jim Collins in his book, “Good to Great”.

I also look for companies that have strategically positioned themselves within the context of their operating economy. These are companies that have developed a niche, either by way of technology, regulations, efficiency, etc., and established a moat around their business, as a barrier against competitors.

The last cardinal point I consider is the company’s adherence to best practice in corporate governance, regardless of the local governance standards or regulatory requirements.

In the course of our operations, we have invested in a few listed companies — despite being mainly focused on private investment — and we intend to increase our capital allocation to this class of investment. One of our early investment picks was NEM Insurance Plc. The company had been a diamond in the rough for years with its market price then below N1.

However, our valuation of the company, on a futuristic earning basis, was conservatively about N4 per share. This valuation has subsequently been validated by market trends; as at 21st June 2018, the market price of the stock was N3.04.

We invested in the company based on our confidence in the long-term prospects of the company and its high score on our three-assessment parameters (i.e. strong leadership, strategic positioning and best practice in corporate governance) particularly the first two parameters.

NEM Insurance has a visionary leader, Tope Smart. He stands out as an extraordinary leader and is remarkably humble at it. He took on a struggling company in 2007 and bootstrapped it into one of the top five insurance companies in the industry. The company has doubled shareholders’ funds in the last five years and consistently paid dividends over the stated period. He has also built a team of remarkable lieutenants who rank as the best in the industry on a cost basis consideration.

As a result of their strategic positioning within their operating economy, the company not only enjoys the insurance regulatory environment, but has further enhanced its economic moat via efficient performance in a sector that is spectacularly known for inefficiency and poor regulatory compliance.

Unfortunately, it appears that the company is not nearly as strong on governance practices, relative to its stellar performance on the other two counts as stated above. I will elucidate with the organization of the company’s purported 2018 Annual General Meeting (AGM).

As a background, the Directors of the company collectively own less than 23.73% of the company’s issued shares. 22.98% of the 23.73% of the shares attributed to all Directors are held by four Directors (the “ruling 4”) out of ten Directors (source: NEM 2017 Annual Report & Accounts). On closer examination, the situation gets even more interesting. The same audited financial statements reveal that only 16 shareholders, inclusive of the “ruling 4” Directors, have up to 50m shares each and this group of 16 shareholders collectively controls 52.11% of the company’s issued shares. The implication is that there are 12 shareholders who collectively control 29.13% of the company’s issued shares that are not included in the management of the company. VFD Group is one of the 12 shareholders, with a 2.11% stake. In recent times, we have made efforts to identify the other 11 shareholders and observed a trend of exclusion of these shareholders from the activities of the company.

For instance, as a run up to the 2018 AGM of the company, most of these shareholders did not receive notice of the meeting, the proposed special resolutions, proxy forms and audited financial statements as required by CAMA. This is extremely suspicious, particularly if one considers the special resolutions proposed for consideration and approval at the purported AGM.

First, special resolutions are usually passed by 75% of the votes of shareholders present and voting in an AGM. In the case of NEM, none of these resolutions can be passed if the 12 excluded shareholders were present and voted against the resolutions. It will be mathematically impossible because if all shareholders are in attendance, the 12 shareholders would represent 29.13% of the possible votes. This will preclude the possibility of achieving the 75% approval that is required for the resolution. This is further compounded by the fact that 100% attendance of its shareholders in NEM’s AGM is impossible. Thus, the only way to assure the passing of such resolutions (if management is not sure of the position of the 12 shareholders) is to tactically exclude them so as to ensure victory if a poll is conducted.

I am certain the question running through your head is, why go through all of these, at the risk of regulatory sanctions? Why risk the company’s reputation and particularly jeopardize the otherwise stellar achievements and track record of the Group Managing Director? The answer is simple: the company is run by a minority group of shareholders, “the ruling 4” Directors, who want to secure their hold on the company, at all costs.

The Directors, at the purported AGM, sought a resolution to issue 1.056bn shares of the company by way of private placement, at a price of N2.50. Looking closely at the proposal reveals why, in the words of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, “it is a do or die” affair for this ruling group of Directors. By maintaining the status quo and buying up shares on the floor of the stock exchange, it is currently impossible for anyone with minority holding to gain majority shareholding, and neither is it possible through fair and equitable rights’ offers. Nevertheless, the proposed special/private placement makes it possible for “the ruling 4” Directors plus the “special interest” beneficiary of the special/private placement to achieve a super majority.

Putting this in clearer context, post the proposed private placement, the collective stake of the “ruling 4” Directors plus the special interest to whom the placement shares are issued will increase to 35.82% from 22.98%.

Kindly note that the provisions of the special placement gives “the ruling 4” Directors the right to pick who these shares can be allotted to. They can even allot the said shares to themselves or any one of them in the absence of any sensible checks and balances.

In truth, if the intention of the “ruling 4” Directors is to increase their interest or influence in the company, I have no fundamental objection to this goal. After all, we believe that the interest of shareholders is best served when management is significantly invested in the subject company. But the offer should nevertheless be appropriately priced.

If I were to negotiate on behalf of fellow shareholders, I would place a price tag of N4 per share as I initially stated in this article and every kobo of that valuation can be justified. However, do not take my valuation as it is, let’s look to the market for the appropriate valuation of the company’s shares. The special placement is priced at N2.50 while the market price is currently N3.34 as at 27/06/18, representing a discount of 33.59%. This is clearly unusual and indicative of management’s destruction of other shareholders’ value and is designed to grant inordinate gain to an unidentified “special interest”. The question is: who will these shares be allotted to?

As an investor and specifically a shareholder of this company, VFD Group will like to participate in this offer. In fact, we will like to take up the entire offer. Why is such a compelling offer restricted to the exclusion of other shareholders who are willing and able to participate? How do you offer a significant stake of a company via a special/private placement priced at a significant discount to market?

My basic understanding of special/private placement posits the following considerations:

1. That the public company cannot raise capital via rights offer.

2. That the public company cannot raise capital via a public offer.

3. That the company is not doing well and as such, investors are reluctant to be exposed to such company and therefore placing the company under immense capitalisation pressure.

4. That the company is subject to all three above considerations and it is in dire need of funds.

If any of the above stated is the situation with NEM Insurance Plc, then the offer as proposed will be in the best interest of the company and shareholders alike. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Shareholders are willing to participate in a public or rights offer because the company is doing very well.

As mentioned earlier, the Management of the company have done remarkably well based on the operations of the company and this is indicative in the current market price, profitability and industry ranking of the company.

The company is also not cash-strapped; in fact, the Board proposed and obtained approval for the payment of 10k/share dividend at the purported AGM and has consistently paid dividend in the prior years. It is also not under pressure by regulators to recapitalise, as it is one of the few insurance companies that has maintained a clean bill of health.

By the way, to date, no one has explained to shareholders what the funds to be raised will be utilised for.

So, what is the justification for the proposed special/private placement? What are the proceeds of the proposed offer for? If we must raise funds, why not do it via rights issue or public offer? A private placement appropriates the value in the company for the benefit of a few and savvy shareholders will have none of this.

On a general note, I will like to address the role of institutions in the pursuance of best practices in corporate governance. Their roles are integral to its attainment or otherwise.

I have reviewed the activities of our corporate regulators e.g. SEC, NSE, CAC, NAICOM and others and I am extremely confident in their capacity and moral commitment to upholding global best practice standards in governance in our market. They have demonstrated this time and time again and we have no doubt that it will sustain through the foreseeable future.

It is important to ensure that this governance standards are not only upheld but are seen to be upheld by all relevant parties, including NEM Insurance Plc and all auxiliary and related parties or officers of the company, such as the directors and the company secretary, as well as the Company’s Registrar, APEL Capital & Trust Limited. These parties all owe a fiduciary responsibility to all shareholders and are expected to always act in the best interests of the shareholders.

Before I conclude this piece, I will like to state a few things about VFD Group as a background to this matter, and with specific reference to our investment in NEM Insurance Plc.

1. We are a Group of companies with interest/aspiration in all sectors of the financial services industry e.g. Asset Management, Bureau de Change, Banking, Microfinance, Insurance, International Remittance, Real Estate etc.

2. Our operations are funded by our equity and debt investors as well as retained profit and we have been in existence for nine years. We currently have about 48 shareholders from all works of life, including leaders of public listed companies.

3. We are not particularly interested in running these companies or retaining Board positions, but we are firmly interested in the proper governance of our investee companies, a strong trend of profitability and consistent payment of dividend. Once that is in place, we are delighted to support management of these companies.

4. We also stand against interference with the operations of the company because we do not consider ourselves experts in our investee companies’ area of business. We believe once our set objectives are in place, we have no business interfering in their business operation.

5. This article is not written with malice and as much as possible, I have ensured that it is not personal but focused purely on the facts at hand. I also owe a fiduciary responsibility to our shareholders and it behoves me to speak on their behalf and protect their interest. I also think it is in the interest of the Nigerian investing public to speak out and advocate better corporate governance. Our economy will be better off by this and similar efforts.

6. We think that our interests are aligned with those of NEM Insurance Plc and that there is absolutely no need for protective schemes with the negative implication on the company.

In conclusion, I call on the Board and Management of NEM Insurance Plc to set aside the purported 48th AGM of the Company and the resolutions passed thereat. This should not be done with the mind-set of a victor or vanquished but should be done in the interest of all shareholders, majority or minority alike.

I am certain that if we do the right thing by the company, all shareholders will be better for it in the long run instead of a slow and deliberate process of destruction of value that is inevitable, if we continue down this path. In the meantime, VFD Group will take all necessary lawful steps to protect its investments in NEM while supporting the company to continue its growth trajectory.

Nonso Okpala is a visionary and serial investor. He is also the Managing Director/CEO of VFD Group Ltd and Father-In-Chief. You can mail him at [email protected] or follow him on Twitter and Instagram for further discussions.

Dipo Olowookere is a journalist based in Nigeria that has passion for reporting business news stories. At his leisure time, he watches football and supports 3SC of Ibadan. Mr Olowookere can be reached via [email protected]

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Why President Tinubu Must End Retirement Age Disparity Between Medical and Veterinary Doctors Now

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Tinubu Türkiye

By James Ezema

To argue that Nigeria cannot afford policy inconsistencies that weaken its already fragile public health architecture is not an exaggeration. The current disparity in retirement age between medical doctors and veterinary professionals is one such inconsistency—one that demands urgent correction, not bureaucratic delay.

The Federal Government’s decision to approve a 65-year retirement age for selected health professionals was, in principle, commendable. It acknowledged the need to retain scarce expertise within a critical sector. However, by excluding veterinary doctors and veterinary para-professionals—whether explicitly or by omission—the policy has created a dangerous gap that undermines both equity and national health security.

This is not merely a professional grievance; it is a structural flaw with far-reaching consequences.

At the heart of the issue lies a contradiction the government cannot ignore. For decades, Nigeria has maintained a parity framework that places medical and veterinary doctors on equivalent footing in terms of salary structures and conditions of service. The Consolidated Medical Salary Structure (CONMESS) framework recognizes both professions as integral components of the broader health ecosystem. Yet, when it comes to retirement policy, that parity has been abruptly set aside.

This inconsistency is indefensible.

Veterinary professionals are not peripheral actors in the health sector—they are central to it. In an era defined by zoonotic threats, where the majority of emerging infectious diseases originate from animals, excluding veterinarians from extended service retention is not only unfair but strategically reckless.

Nigeria has formally embraced the One Health approach, which integrates human, animal, and environmental health systems. But policy must align with principle. It is contradictory to adopt One Health in theory while sidelining a core component of that framework in practice.

Veterinarians are at the frontline of disease surveillance, outbreak prevention, and biosecurity. They play critical roles in managing threats such as anthrax, rabies, avian influenza, Lassa fever, and other zoonotic diseases that pose direct risks to human populations. Their contribution to safeguarding the nation’s livestock—estimated in the hundreds of millions—is equally vital to food security and economic stability.

Yet, at a time when their relevance has never been greater, policy is forcing them out prematurely.

The workforce realities make this situation even more alarming. Nigeria is already grappling with a severe shortage of veterinary professionals. In some states, only a handful of veterinarians are available, while several local government areas have no veterinary presence at all. Compelling experienced professionals to retire at 60, while their medical counterparts remain in service until 65, will only deepen this crisis.

This is not a theoretical concern—it is an imminent risk.

The case for inclusion has already been made, clearly and responsibly, by the Nigerian Veterinary Medical Association and the Federal Ministry of Livestock Development. Their position is grounded in logic, policy precedent, and national interest. They are not seeking special treatment; they are demanding consistency.

The current circular, which limits the 65-year retirement age to clinical professionals in Federal Tertiary Hospitals and excludes those in mainstream civil service structures, is both administratively narrow and strategically flawed. It fails to account for the unique institutional placement of veterinary professionals, who operate largely outside hospital settings but are no less critical to national health outcomes.

Policy must reflect function, not merely location.

This is where decisive leadership becomes imperative. The responsibility now rests squarely with Bola Ahmed Tinubu to address this imbalance and restore coherence to Nigeria’s health and civil service policies.

A clear directive from the President to the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation can correct this anomaly. Such a directive should ensure that veterinary doctors and veterinary para-professionals are fully integrated into the 65-year retirement framework, in line with existing parity policies and the realities of modern public health.

Anything less would signal a troubling disregard for a sector that plays a quiet but indispensable role in national stability.

This is not just about fairness—it is about foresight. Public health security is interconnected, and weakening one component inevitably weakens the entire system.

Nigeria stands at a critical juncture, confronted by complex health, food security, and economic challenges. Retaining experienced veterinary professionals is not optional; it is essential.

The disparity must end—and it must end now.

Comrade James Ezema is a journalist, political strategist, and public affairs analyst. He is the National President of the Association of Bloggers and Journalists Against Fake News (ABJFN), National Vice-President (Investigation) of the Nigerian Guild of Investigative Journalists (NGIJ), and President/National Coordinator of the Not Too Young To Perform (NTYTP), a national leadership development advocacy group. He can be reached via email: [email protected] or WhatsApp: +234 8035823617.

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N4.65 trillion in the Vault, but is the Real Economy Locked Out?

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By Blaise Udunze

Following the successful conclusion of the banking sector recapitalisation programme initiated in March 2024 by the Central Bank of Nigeria, the industry has raised N4.65 trillion. No doubt, this marks a significant milestone for the nation’s financial system as the exercise attracted both domestic and foreign investors, strengthened capital buffers, and reinforced regulatory confidence in the banking sector. By all prudential measures, once again, it will be said without doubt that it is a success story.

Looking at this feat closely and when weighed more critically, a more consequential question emerges, one that will ultimately determine whether this achievement becomes a genuine turning point or merely another financial milestone. Will a stronger banking sector finally translate into a more productive Nigerian economy, or will it be locked out?

This question sits at the heart of Nigeria’s long-standing economic contradiction, seeing a relatively sophisticated financial system coexisting with weak industrial output, low productivity, and persistent dependence on imports truly reflects an ironic situation. The fact remains that recapitalisation, by design, is meant to strengthen banks, enhancing their ability to absorb shocks, manage risks and support economic growth. According to the apex bank, the programme has improved capital adequacy ratios, enhanced asset quality, and reinforced financial stability. Under the leadership of Olayemi Cardoso, there has also been a shift toward stricter risk-based supervision and a phased exit from regulatory forbearance.

These are necessary reforms. A stable banking system is a prerequisite for economic development. However, the truth be told, stability alone is not sufficient because the real test of recapitalisation lies not in stronger balance sheets, but in how effectively banks channel capital into productive economic activity, sectors that create jobs, expand output and drive exports. Without this transition, recapitalisation risks becoming an exercise in financial strengthening without economic transformation.

Encouragingly, early signals from industry experts suggest that the next phase of banking reform may begin to address this long-standing gap. Analysts and practitioners are increasingly pointing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as a key destination for recapitalisation inflows, which is a fact beyond doubt. Given that SMEs account for over 70 per cent of registered businesses in Nigeria, the logic is compelling. With great expectation, as has been practicalised and established in other economies, a shift in credit allocation toward this segment could unlock job creation, stimulate domestic production, and deepen economic resilience. Yet, this expectation must be balanced with reality. Historically, and of huge concern, SMEs have received only a marginal share of total bank credit, often due to perceived risk, lack of collateral, and weak credit infrastructure.

Indeed, Nigeria’s broader financial intermediation challenge remains stark. Even as the giant of Africa, private sector credit stands at roughly 17 per cent of GDP, and this is far below the sub-Saharan African average, while SMEs receive barely 1 per cent of total bank lending despite contributing about half of GDP and the vast majority of employment. These figures underscore the structural disconnect between the banking system and the real economy. Recapitalisation, therefore, must be judged not only by the strength of banks but by whether it meaningfully improves this imbalance.

Nigeria’s economic challenge is not merely one of capital scarcity; it is fundamentally a problem of low productivity. Manufacturing continues to operate far below capacity, agriculture remains largely subsistence-driven, and industrial output contributes only modestly to GDP. Despite decades of banking sector expansion, credit to the real sector has remained limited relative to the size of the economy. Instead, banks have often gravitated toward safer and more profitable avenues such as government securities, treasury instruments, and short-term trading opportunities.

This is not irrational. It reflects a rational response to risk, policy signals, and market realities. However, it has created a structural imbalance in which capital circulates within the financial system without sufficiently reaching the productive economy. The result is a pattern where financial sector growth outpaces real sector development, a phenomenon widely described as financialisation without productivity gains.

At the centre of this challenge is the issue of credit allocation. A recapitalised banking sector, strengthened by new capital and improved buffers, should theoretically expand lending. But this is, contrarily, because the more important question is where that lending will go. Will Nigerian banks extend long-term credit to manufacturers, finance agro-processing and value chains, and support scalable SMEs, or will they continue to concentrate on low-risk government debt, prioritise foreign exchange-related gains, and maintain conservative lending practices in the face of macroeconomic uncertainty? Some of these structural questions call for immediate answers from policymakers.

Some industry voices are optimistic that the expanded capital base will translate into a broader loan book, increased investment in higher-risk sectors, and improved product offerings for depositors; this is not in doubt. There are also expectations that banks will scale operations across the continent, leveraging stronger balance sheets to expand their regional footprint. Yes, they are expected, but one thing that must be made known is that optimism alone does not guarantee transformation. The fact is that without deliberate incentives and structural reforms, capital may continue to flow toward low-risk assets rather than high-impact sectors.

Beyond lending, experts are also calling for a shift in how banking success is measured. The next phase of reform, according to the experts in their arguments, must move from capital thresholds to customer outcomes. This includes stronger consumer protection frameworks, real-time complaint management systems and more transparent regulatory oversight. A more technologically driven supervisory model, one that allows regulators to monitor customer experiences and detect systemic risks early, could play a critical role in strengthening trust and accountability within the system.

This dimension is often overlooked but deeply significant. A banking system that is well-capitalised but unresponsive to customer needs risks undermining public confidence. True financial development is not only about capital strength but also about accessibility, fairness, and service quality. Nigerians must feel the impact of recapitalisation not just in improved financial ratios, but in better banking experiences, more inclusive services, and greater economic opportunity.

The recapitalisation exercise has also attracted notable foreign participation, signalling confidence in Nigeria’s banking sector. However, confidence in banks does not necessarily translate into confidence in the broader economy. The truth is that foreign investors are typically drawn to strong regulatory frameworks, attractive returns, and market liquidity, though the facts are that these factors make Nigerian banks appealing financial assets; it must be made explicitly clear that they do not automatically reflect confidence in the country’s industrial base or productivity potential.

This distinction is critical. An economy can attract capital into its financial sector while still struggling to attract investment into productive sectors. When this happens, growth becomes financially driven rather than fundamentally anchored. The risk, therefore, is that recapitalisation could deepen Nigeria’s financial markets, but what benefits or gains when banks become stronger or liquid without addressing the structural weaknesses of the real economy.

It is clear and explicit that the current policy direction of the CBN reflects a strong emphasis on stability, with tightened supervision, improved transparency, and stricter prudential standards. These measures are necessary, particularly in a volatile global environment. However, there is an emerging concern that stability may be taking precedence over growth stimulation, which should also be a focal point for every economy, of which Nigeria should not be left out of the equation.  Central banks in emerging markets often face a delicate balancing act, and this is putting too much focus on stability, which can constrain credit expansion, while too much emphasis on growth can undermine financial discipline, as this calls for a balance.

In Nigeria’s case, the question is whether sufficient mechanisms exist to align banking sector incentives with national productivity goals. Are there enough incentives to encourage long-term lending, sector-specific financing, and innovation in credit delivery? Or does the current framework inadvertently reward risk aversion and short-term profitability?

Over the past two decades, it has been a herculean experience as Nigeria’s economic trajectory suggests a growing disconnect between the financial sector and the real economy. Banks have become larger, more sophisticated and more profitable, yet the irony is that the broader economy continues to struggle with high unemployment, low industrial output, and limited export diversification. This divergence reflects the structural risk of financialization, a condition in which financial activities expand without a corresponding increase in real economic productivity.

If not carefully managed, recapitalisation could reinforce this trend. With more capital at their disposal, banks may simply scale existing business models, expanding financial activities that generate returns without contributing meaningfully to production. The point is that this is not solely a failure of the banking sector; it is a systemic issue shaped by policy design, regulatory priorities, and market incentives, which needs the urgent attention of policymakers.

Meanwhile, for recapitalisation to achieve its intended purpose and truly work, it must be accompanied by a deliberate shift or intentional policy change from capital accumulation to productivity enhancement and the economy to produce more goods and services efficiently. This begins with creating stronger incentives for real sector lending with differentiated capital requirements based on sector exposure, credit guarantees for high-impact industries, and interest rate support for priority sectors, which can encourage banks to channel funds into productive areas, and this must be driven and implemented by the apex bank to harness the gains of recapitalisation.

This transformative process is not only saddled with the CBN, but the Development finance institutions also have a critical role to play in de-risking long-term investments, making it easier for commercial banks to participate in financing projects that drive economic growth. At the same time, one of the missing pieces that must be taken into cognisance is that regulatory frameworks should discourage excessive concentration in risk-free assets. No doubt, banks thrive in profitability, as government securities remain important; overreliance on them can crowd out private sector credit and limit economic expansion.

Innovation in financial products is equally essential. Traditional lending models often fail to meet the needs of SMEs and emerging industries, as this has continued to hinder growth. Banks must explore new approaches, including digital lending platforms, supply chain financing, and blended finance solutions that can unlock new growth opportunities, while they extend their tentacles by saturating the retail space just like fintech.

Accountability must also be embedded in the system. One fact is that if recapitalisation is justified as a tool for economic growth, then its outcomes and gains must be measurable and not obscure. Increased credit to productive sectors, higher industrial output and job creation should serve as key indicators of success. Without such metrics, the exercise risks being judged solely by financial indicators rather than its real economic impact.

The completion of the recapitalisation programme represents more than a regulatory achievement; it is a defining moment for Nigeria’s economic future. The country now has a banking sector that is better capitalised, more resilient, and more attractive to investors. These are important gains, but they are not ends in themselves.

The ultimate objective is to build an economy that is productive, diversified, and inclusive. Achieving this requires more than strong banks; it requires banks that actively power economic transformation.

The N4.65 trillion recapitalisation is a significant step forward. It strengthens the foundation of Nigeria’s financial system and enhances its capacity to support growth. However, capacity alone is not enough and truly not enough if the gains of recapitalisation are to be harnessed to the latter. What matters now is how that capacity is deployed.

Some of the critical questions for urgent attention are as follows: Will banks rise to the challenge of financing Nigeria’s productive sectors, particularly SMEs that form the backbone of the economy? Will policymakers create the right incentives to ensure credit flows where it is most needed? Will the financial system evolve from a focus on profitability to a broader commitment to the economic purpose of fostering a more productive Nigerian economy and the $1 trillion target?

The above questions are relevant because they will determine whether recapitalisation becomes a catalyst for change or a missed opportunity if not taken into cognisance. A well-capitalised banking sector is not the destination; it is the starting point. The real journey lies in building an economy where capital works, productivity rises, and growth becomes both sustainable and inclusive.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]

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Akintola vs Awolowo, Opposition, and the One-Party Temptation

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By Prince Charles Dickson, PhD

Every generation of Nigerian politics likes to imagine that its quarrel is unprecedented, that its betrayals are original, that its intrigue is wearing a crown no earlier intrigue ever touched. But Nigerian politics is an old drummer. It changes songs, not rhythm. The names change. The costumes improve. The microphones get better. Yet the same questions keep returning like harmattan dust: What is opposition for? Is it a moral force, a strategic waiting room, or merely a branch office of the ruling instinct?

To ask that question seriously is to walk back into the haunted chamber of Awolowo and Akintola. What began as a struggle inside the Action Group was not just a disagreement between two brilliant men. It was a collision of political temperaments, ideological direction, ambition, and the larger architecture of power in Nigeria. Awolowo, who moved to the federal centre as opposition leader after 1959, was increasingly identified with a broader ideological project. Akintola, by contrast, came to embody a more conservative, region-focused and business-oriented current, and his openness to working with the Northern-dominated federal establishment deepened the rupture. By mid-1962, Awolowo’s camp had repudiated Akintola; the federal government declared a state of emergency in the Western Region and restored him in 1963. The bitterness of that split, and the wreckage that followed, helped poison the First Republic.

That is why the Awolowo-Akintola feud still matters. It was not gossip in an agbada. It was an early Nigerian lesson that opposition can die in two ways. It can be strangled from outside by a hostile ruling order. Or, more dangerously, it can decay from within, when conviction gives way to access, when strategy becomes personal survival, when party machinery becomes a theatre of ego. The Western crisis was, in that sense, not only about who should lead. It was about whether opposition should remain an instrument of principle or become a bargaining chip in the market of power.

Kano and Kaduna then enter the story like twin furnaces of northern political memory. Kano carries the old radical grammar of Aminu Kano, NEPU, Sawaba, talakawa politics, the language of emancipation rather than patronage. Oxford’s entry on Aminu Kano notes his struggle against corruption and oppression in the emirate order and his commitment to democratizing Northern Nigeria. The PRP’s own profile, lodged with INEC, explicitly roots itself in NEPU’s legacy and recalls that the PRP had two state governments in the Second Republic: Kaduna and Kano. In other words, both states are not accidental footnotes in the story of Nigerian opposition. They are ancestral terrain.

Then came 1999 and the Fourth Republic, with the PDP arriving not merely as a party but as a vast political weather system. Founded in 1998 and quickly becoming dominant, winning the presidency and legislative majorities in 1999 and retained national control for years. Opposition existed, yes, but it was fragmented, regional, underpowered, and often more symbolic than threatening. That era did not abolish opposition. It domesticated it.

The great interruption came in 2013, when the APC was formed through the merger of major opposition forces. That merger worked because it answered a Nigerian truth older than any campaign slogan: power rarely yields to scattered complaint. It yields to a disciplined coalition. The APC emerged from the merger of ACN, CPC, ANPP, and part of APGA, and in 2015, Buhari’s victory marked the first time an incumbent was defeated and the first inter-party transfer of power in Nigeria’s post-independence history. Reuters described it plainly as a historic democratic transfer. For a brief moment, opposition in Nigeria looked like more than lamentation. It looked like a ladder.

But even that victory carried a warning label. The problem with Nigerian opposition is that once it wins, it often stops being opposition in spirit and becomes merely the next landlord in the same building. An academic review of Nigeria’s democratic journey notes that the APC and PDP share many structural defects, and even cites the broader judgment that little distinguishes the two main parties because both are fluid elite networks with weak ideology. That diagnosis is painful because it explains so much. In Nigeria, opposition too often opposes only until the gates open. After that, the vocabulary changes, but the appetite stays the same.

This is where Kano and Kaduna become especially revealing from 1999 till now. Kano has repeatedly shown a willingness to defy neat national binaries, and in the 2023 election, it backed Rabiu Kwankwaso of the NNPP in the presidential race while also electing Abba Kabir Yusuf of the NNPP as governor. Kaduna told a different but equally interesting story: it voted Atiku Abubakar of the PDP in the presidential contest, yet elected APC’s Uba Sani as governor. CDD West Africa described the 2023 election as unusually fragmented, noting that all four major presidential contenders won at least one state and that states like Kano, Lagos, and Rivers split among three different parties. So, Kano and Kaduna have not been passive spectators in the Nigerian democratic drama. They have been laboratories of resistance, fragmentation, coalition, and contradiction.

And now we arrive at the present crossroads, where the phrase “one-party state” is no longer a tavern exaggeration but a live political argument. Reuters reported in May 2025 that the APC endorsed President Tinubu for a second term while the opposition was widely seen as too divided and weak to mount a serious challenge, with high-profile defections strengthening the ruling party. AP later reported Tinubu’s denial that Nigeria was being turned into a one-party state, even as several governors and federal lawmakers had left opposition parties for the APC. By February 2026, major opposition leaders, including Atiku, Peter Obi, and Amaechi, were jointly rejecting the new Electoral Act, calling it anti-democratic and warning that it could help install a one-party order. Tinubu, for his part, has continued to insist that democracy requires room for the minority to speak.

So, is Nigeria now a one-party state? Not formally. Not yet. There are still multiple parties, multiple ambitions, multiple resentments, and multiple routes to elite reassembly. But that is not the only question that matters. A country can avoid the legal shell of one-party rule and still drift into the political culture of one-party dominance. That drift happens when the ruling party becomes the default shelter for frightened politicians, when defections replace debate, when opposition parties become war zones of internal ego, and when citizens begin to see parties not as platforms of principle but as bus stops for the next powerful convoy. The danger is less a constitutional decree than a democratic evaporation.

This is why the ghosts of Awolowo and Akintola are still standing by the roadside, watching us. Their quarrel warned that opposition without internal discipline can collapse into treachery, and that power at the centre always knows how to exploit a divided house. Kano reminds us that opposition can spring from social memory, from the stubborn dignity of people who do not always vote as ordered. Kaduna reminds us that politics is rarely simple, that a state can host both establishment power and insurgent sentiment in the same electoral season. And the Fourth Republic reminds us that opposition in Nigeria only works when it is more than noise, more than wounded ambition, more than a coalition of temporarily unemployed strongmen.

The real Nigerian danger, then, is not that one party will conquer the entire country by brilliance alone. It is that the opposition will continue to fail by habit. If opposition is only a queue for access, then the ruling party will keep eating its rivals one defection at a time. If, however, opposition rediscovers ideology, internal democracy, regional credibility, and the courage to look different from what it condemns, then the old republic may still whisper a useful lesson into the new one.

Awolowo and Akintola were not just fighting over a party. They were fighting over the soul of the political alternative in Nigeria. That battle never ended—May Nigeria win!

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