Feature/OPED
2019 Presidential Election: Assessing Possibility of Electoral Fraud
By Omoshola Deji
After about thirty years of stern military rule, Nigeria re-embraced democracy in 1999 and five elections have produced Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo (two terms), Umaru Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan and the incumbent Muhammadu Buhari.
The year 2019 ushers in an opportunity for Nigerians to elect another president or return Buhari. Buhari has promised a free and fair election, but the opposition parties and some observers cast doubts on his commitment to ensuring transparency in an election he is contesting.
This piece examines the allegations and influence of nepotism on the credibility of the electoral process, as well as the effects of underage voting and vote-buying on election results.
Nigerians are criticizing President Buhari’s appointments as nepotistic, especially his choice of the heads of security agencies and the electoral commission. The prevailing argument that this is a clever style of managing the electoral process in his favour steers us into an appraisal of such appointments by the previous governments. Ensuring the successful conduct of elections in Nigeria involves the collaborative effort of several agencies – including the Civil Defense, Army and State Security Service – but Police and INEC are the most crucial. INEC conduct elections and police leads the provision of security. The appraisal thus focuses on these two outfits.
Individuals referenced are classified based on their states of origin and geopolitical zones as currently defined in Nigeria. The zones are abbreviated thus: South-West (SW), South-East (SE), South-South (SS) North-West (NW), North-Central (NC), and the North-East (NE).
Is President Buhari’s appointment of the 2019 election handlers nepotistic? In the first republic (1963-1966), President Nnamdi Azikwe, a native of Anambra State (SE), appointed Louis Edet from Cross River State (SS) as the Inspector General of Police (IGP). Eyo Ita Esua from Cross River State (SS) was appointed the head of the Federal Electoral Commission. You would note that the president and the heads of FEC and police were not from the same geopolitical zone. The military seized power in 1966.
To conduct the election that’ll usher in the second republic in 1979, then General Olusegun Obasanjo from Ogun State (SW) appointed Chief Michael Ani from Cross River State (SS) as Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission. Muhammadu Dikko Yusufu from Katsina State (NW) was appointed the IGP. The head-of-state and the heads of FEC and police were not from the same geopolitical zone. Obasanjo transferred power to Shehu Shagari, but (Nigeria’s incumbent president) then General Muhammadu Buhari seized power via a military coup in 1983. General Ibrahim Babangida later ousted him in 1985.
After being pressurized by a national campaign for democratic rule, Babangida promised to conduct elections and hand over power in 1993 – the third republic. Babangida, a native of Niger State (NC) appointed Professor Humprey Nwosu, an indigene of Anambra State (SE), as the Chairman of the National Electoral Commission. Aliyu Atta from Adamawa State (NE) was appointed the IGP. Please note that the military-president and the heads of NEC and police were not from the same geopolitical zone.
To conduct the election that brought on the (Obasanjo led 1999-2003) fourth republic, General Abdusalami Abubakar from Niger State (NC) appointed Justice Ephraim Akpata from Edo State (SS) as the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Ibrahim Commassie, an indigene of Katsina State (NW), was appointed the IGP. Again, General Abubakar and the heads of INEC and police were not from the same geopolitical zone.
Ex-President Obasanjo’s second term was the fifth republic (2003-2007). The election that earned him the term was handled by then INEC Chairman Abel Guobadia (Edo, SS) and IGP Mustafa Balogun (Osun, SW). Appointments of the two crucial election handlers were not only allotted to the South, the police IG was from Obansanjo’s geopolitical zone, the SW.
This is not the case now in Buhari’s government. Buhari, a native of Katsina State (NW) appointed Mamood Yakubu (Bauchi, NE) and Idris Kpotun (Niger, NC) as INEC and police heads.
Although Buhari dispensed the appointments to northerners, he and the two appointees are from separate northern geopolitical zones. In essence, Obasanjo’s appointment of INEC and police heads when he was seeking re-election in 2003 is even more sectional than what we have now.
It is appalling that facts about an issue that could diminish Buhari’s votes, especially in the South, stay unutilized. Why is the work of presidential aides being left for independent analysts in an election season? Buhari’s aides are either unmindful of the harm negative public perceptions could do to their principal or they are simply overconfident he would win. But on a second look, why was Obasanjo’s appointment not criticized? Why are people afraid that Buhari’s appointments could breed electoral fraud, but weren’t troubled during Obasanjo’s rule?
The issue is best explained empirically. When Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan increased petrol price from 67 to 87 Naira, people protested because his government was widely rated as corrupt. They didn’t trust him. But when President Buhari increased petrol price from 87 to 145 Naira, the protest was very minimal because Nigerians see him as a non-corrupt person. Trust is the keyword here.
People never protested against Obasanjo’s more sectional appointment of INEC and police heads because they didn’t see him as nepotistic and chauvinistic. His other key appointments (of national security adviser and heads of civil defense, army, the state security service etc.) reflected Nigeria’s ethnic pluralism. That cannot be said of Buhari. He is more sectional than national.
The heads of all the above mentioned agencies are from the North. SSS is currently being led by Mathew Seiyefa (Bayelsa, SS) due to dismissal of Lawal Daura (Katsina, NW) and there are reports of ongoing moves to replace him with a northerner. Nigerians are pessimistic about getting a credible election in 2019 as the influence of these outfits’ activities on election results cannot be undermined. Does nepotism breed electoral fraud? We must resist the appetite to digress. I’ll dissect the issue after concluding the ethnic and geopolitical appraisal of individuals appointed to handle the conduct of past national elections.
The election that ushered in the (late Umaru Yar’Adua led) sixth republic was conducted by the Obasanjo administration. The poll was handled by then INEC Chairman, Professor Maurice Iwu (Imo, SE) and IGP Sunday Ehindero (Ondo, SW). In this case, Obasanjo’s appointment of non-northerners can be argued as ensuring fairness and transparency since the election was mainly a contest between northern candidates – late Umaru Yar’Adua for the PDP, M. Buhari for the defunct ANPP, and Atiku Abubakar for the defunct AC.
Yar’Adua’s death left a vacuum in government. His vice, Goodluck Jonathan (Bayelsa, SS), was sworn in on May 5, 2010 to complete the four-year tenure of the sixth republic (2007-2011). As the term ends, Jonathan turned down the northern oligarchy’s request to takeover. He contested, won and governed Nigeria in the seventh republic (2011-2015). The election that returned him elected was handled by the northerners he appointed. Prof. Attahiru Jega (Kebbi, NW) was the INEC Chairman and Hafiz Ringim (Jigawa, NE) was the IGP. Unlike the Buhari administration, Jonathan was mindful of Nigeria’s ethnic sensitivity and majority of his appointment favoured other ethnic groups, especially the northern lived Hausa-Fulani. He retained Jega as INEC Chairman and appointed Suleiman Abba (Jigawa, NE) as IGP for the 2015 elections.
Jonathan lost the race to rule Nigeria in the eighth republic (2015-2019) to incumbent President Buhari. He conceded defeat. Oppositely, when Jonathan floored Buhari in the 2011 presidential election, the latter’s supporters violently protested, killed and destroyed properties in the north. Would the 2011 post-election violence not have been more devastating if the election handlers and service chiefs were Southerners from Jonathan’s ethnic extraction? Ensuring appointments into sensitive positions are fairly distributed remains one of the most effective means of maintaining public trust, dousing inter-ethnic bigotry and erasing agitation for succession in a plural state like Nigeria. Does nepotism breed electoral fraud? How will nepotism, vote-buying and underage voting affect the outcome of the 2019 presidential election?
In the history of Nigeria, Buhari is the first ruler to appoint an INEC Chairman from his region, the NW. He appointed his supposed relation, Mrs Amina Zakari, as the acting INEC Chairman in June 2015. After several criticisms, Prof Mahmood Yakubu was appointed to replace her as the substantive chairman in October 2015. The relationship between Zakari and Yakubu is so strong that it has the tendency to influence the outcome of the elections in favour of Buhari. The nepotism and sectionalism in Buhari’s government is also present in INEC’s leadership.
Vote buying and underage voting are electoral crimes, but INEC and police have been unable to stem the tide. The two agencies only condemn. They are unwilling to prosecute electoral offenders. The northern region has the highest case of underage voting, while vote-buying has recently gained prominence across the country.
In all fairness, affection for Buhari can’t be argued as the sole reason for underage registration and voting in the north. The north has always had a substantial registration of underage voters before Buhari became president. Nonetheless, his re-election bid has led to an increase in such for political gain. In 2019, (regular and) underage voting would be a huge gain for Buhari in his northern stronghold.
In other regions, Buhari currently have an above-average support in the SW, fast-rising support in the SE, and a below-average support in the SS. Vote buying could easily cover up for his shortfalls in these southern areas. Electoral fraud is bound to occur on a massive scale in the 2019 elections. APC and Buhari would profit more from it than the opposition because they are in control of the nation’s finance and force. With the nepotistic arrangement in place and the forces’ top-down chain of command, all it takes the force heads is to post their loyalists to key states in order to allow the Buharists operate unchecked.
Politics is the switch that controls police operations under IGP Idris Kpotum. Sadly, elections in Nigeria are often marred by so much irregularity that it is quite easy for the umpire and security agencies to manipulate the results. Then again, the force heads have been so political that they have a reason to compromise in order to avoid their imminent sack, if the opposition wins. Buhari is no doubt a strong candidate, but the election is being technically managed in such a way that it would be impossible for him to lose.
INEC and the security agencies operations largely determine the outcome of elections in Nigeria. The heads periodically issue obnoxious orders to their subordinates and questioning or disobeying such orders is treated as an affront, insubordination and disloyalty. The punishment for such is non-promotion, unfavourable transfers, and sometimes death. The boss’ mood dictates the actions of the subordinates, and his wish, whether legal or not, becomes the institution’s mission, especially during elections. Making chauvinistic appointments into agencies operating such a closed system – in a nation where people are more committed to their ethnic groups than to the Nigerian state – is unfortunate for Nigeria’s democracy and a recipe for electoral fraud.
All that concern a presidential election in a plural nation should not be regional. In a polity where the instruments of the state are often used for political gains, a presidential election handled by heads of INEC and security agencies who are northerners, with an incumbent northern candidate running, is beyond doubts programmed not be free, fair, credible or transparent. Such election grievously puts the non-northern candidates in an extremely disadvantaged position. Ethnic affiliation controls emotions in Nigerian elections. Ethnic affection inspired the annulment of the 1993 presidential election won by Moshood Abiola. Babangida wouldn’t have annulled the election if Bashir Tofa (his fellow northerner) won.
Political interests dictate government policies in Nigeria. The Supreme Court ruled that using electronic card readers for voter accreditation is not permissible under the Nigerian electoral laws. The national assembly passed a bill that’ll permit the use of electronic card readers for the 2019 elections, but Buhari declined assent twice. The implication of this is that INEC would have to use the manual means of voter accreditation in 2019 and this would lead to massive electoral fraud.
Buhari must live up to the responsibility of ensuring Nigerians get a free, fair and credible election, and accepting the outcome in good faith if defeated. No matter how hard he tries to be transparent, his nepotistic and chauvinistic conducts, the inability to manage personal interest, autocracy, and hounding the opposition could drive Nigeria’s democracy rearward.
Omoshola Deji is a political and public affairs analyst. He wrote in via [email protected]
Feature/OPED
CBN’s New Cash Policy: A Welcome Liberalisation or a Risky Retreat?
By Blaise Udunze
On December 2, 2025, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced a policy that significantly departs from the cash-restriction measures Nigerians have faced lately. The apex bank abolished restrictions on cash deposits. Increased the weekly cash withdrawal limits to N500,000 for individuals and N5 million for corporates while substituting the earlier monthly limits of N5 million and N10 million respectively. These modifications, which will be effective from January 1, 2026, represent what the CBN describes as the necessity to “streamline provisions to reflect present-day realities.”
Authorized by the Director of Financial Policy & Regulation, Dr. Rita I. Sike, the policy overhaul aims to lower cash-management expenses, improve security, and lessen money-laundering threats related to Nigeria’s significant dependence on physical cash. Daily ATM withdrawal limits stay fixed at N100,000 and count toward the total cap. Withdrawals exceeding the limits incur charges of three percent for individuals and five percent for companies, with the revenues divided: 40 percent to the CBN and 60 percent to the banks.
This update comes three years following the disputed 2022-2023 cash redesign crisis at a time characterized by extreme cash deficits, extended lines at banks, and devastating impacts on the informal economy. Consequently, the newest order generates responses: praise from individuals who consider it delayed aid, disapproval from those perceiving it as a bewildering backtrack, and concern from those apprehensive about potential enduring hazards.
Experts Applaud a More Realistic Modification
For economists, in a publication by Nairametrics showed that the action taken by the CBN signifies much-needed practicality. Dr. Salisu Ahmed, an economist based in Abuja, refers to the updated limits as “a step,” praising the CBN for gaining a clearer insight into “cash management practices in a predominantly informal economy.”
He stated that the changes will alleviate the difficulties faced by families and small enterprises due to restrictions. Rigid withdrawal caps had limited transactions, made small-scale commerce more difficult, and caused numerous businesses to experience cash-flow problems. “This adjustment signifies a response from the CBN recognizing the challenges Nigerians face daily and easing rules that previously hindered commerce and individual management,” he clarified.
Banking analyst, David Omale, echoes this view, seeing the CBN’s action as a sign of responsiveness. He points out that higher limits could “enhance liquidity for firms facing challenges from inflation, supply-chain issues and unpredictable cash flows.”
In an economy in which over 60 percent of trade is informal and where the adoption of digital payments varies across different socio-economic groups, experts suggest the updated limits correspond more accurately to real-world conditions. These limits offer businesses flexibility to reinstate transactional liberty and may help recover public confidence diminished by previous cash shortages.
Critics Caution About Continuing Disparities and New Threats
However, the praise is not universally shared. Numerous specialists and industry participants contend that the modifications, although appreciated, are inadequate or might even be detrimental.
Financial strategist Nnenna Okafor contends that the updated limits are insufficient for traders and micro-businesses that depend largely on cash to sustain their operations amid challenges. Due to increasing product prices, logistical difficulties, and unreliable digital banking services in regions, she asserts that numerous Nigerians will still need more liquidity than the new thresholds to stay viable.
Within PoS operators’ players, in Nigeria’s payment system, the response is notably divided.
PoS Operators Split
Certain PoS agents appreciate the modifications, anticipating that they will:
– Reduce friction with banks over “flagged” transactions
– Facilitate processes for clients requiring withdrawals
– Rebuild trust after months of cash shortages
Others convey concern. A PoS operator in Lagos cautions that greater cash availability could hinder the adoption of payments. “While easier access to cash can address problems, it may also decrease dependence on PoS terminals and other digital payment solutions that provide long-term security and efficiency,” she remarked.
She argues that if the CBN does not combine the policy with targeted incentives to encourage payment uptake, Nigeria runs the risk of regressing into deep-rooted reliance on cash.
Another operator in Abuja points out a different issue that has to do with unstable cash supply at numerous commercial banks. He insists that simply boosting withdrawal limits does not automatically fix supply shortages. “If banks cannot consistently provide cash, raising limits fails to solve the issue,” he stated.
Other operators also caution that the new setting might push fintech firms out of the market, which possibly allows monopolies to form since only big payment firms can endure the transition back to increased cash usage.
Experts in Security Alert to Increasing Threats, from Crime
Apart from operational issues, security experts have expressed concerns about the dangers linked to greater cash flow.
Abas Ogendengbe, a security expert at Anold Consulting Ltd., warns that increased access to amounts without strict controls “opens up risks for theft, fraud and money laundering.” He contends that without improvements in surveillance transaction tracking and reporting frameworks by banks, criminal groups might take advantage of the restrictions.
Nigeria continues to confront:
– High rates of petty theft
– Organised criminal cash-for-goods networks
– Ransom-based criminality
– Fraudulent cash-flow manipulation
He contends that a policy boosting the amount of currency in circulation should consequently be accompanied by enhanced institutional protections, rather than diminished ones.
Advantages of the New Policy: Relief, Liquidity, and Business Freedom
Although it has faced criticism, the CBN’s decision carries benefits:
- Increased Liquidity for the Informal Sector
Small-scale merchants, farm producers, haulers, craftsmen, and market participants relying significantly on cash will experience ease in transferring money, purchasing stock, and expanding their businesses.
- Reduced Transaction Friction
Companies that once faced limiting restrictions now recover agility, enhancing business continuity and lowering administrative challenges.
- Restoration of Public Trust
After the trauma of the cash scarcity era, easing restrictions may slowly rebuild confidence in the banking system and encourage more people to save and transact through formal channels.
- Policy Simplicity
The updated limits, while still restricted, are more straightforward and less administrative compared to the special-authorization system.
The Disadvantages: Policy Volatility, Inflationary Risks, and Stunted Digitalisation
Nonetheless, the policy change is also accompanied by drawbacks:
- Weakening of Monetary Policy Credibility
Regular significant reversals indicate instability and undermine confidence. A central bank needs to be consistent and foreseeable; Nigeria’s policy environment has shifted in the contrary.
- Potential for More Money Laundering
Unlimited cash deposits and increased withdrawal limits are inconsistent with standards for preventing illegal financial transactions.
- Undermining Digital Payment Growth
The increase in fintech was expedited amidst cash availability. A return to reliance on cash might hinder innovation. Dampen the use of safer trackable digital methods.
- Increased Risk of Robbery and Cash-Based Crime
An increased amount of cash in use results in tangible currency to be stolen additional opportunities for criminals and amplified operational difficulties for the police.
- Higher Costs of Cash Management
The processes of currency production, circulation, and safeguarding place financial strains on the banking sector and the CBN.
Policy Details and Operational Complexities
The CBN’s circular offers instructions for operations:
– Excess withdrawal charges:
3 percent for individuals
5 percent for corporates
– Revenue sharing:
40 percent to CBN, 60 percent to banks
– Withdrawals from ATMs and PoS terminals contribute to the limit, highlighting the importance for customers to monitor where their withdrawals originate.
– ATMs can now be loaded with all denominations, although third-party cheque cashing is still limited to N100,000.
– Exemptions are maintained for government revenue accounts, microfinance banks, and primary mortgage banks.
– The removal of exemptions for embassies and donor agencies is a move that some parties consider diplomatically risky.
The CBN frames this policy change as a balance, boosting liquidity while still maintaining the nation’s goal of a cashless economy. Nevertheless, its effectiveness depends on the ability of the government and financial institutions to encourage payments while addressing the security challenges posed by greater cash circulation.
A Relief Today, a Question Mark Tomorrow
The CBN’s updated cash-policy structure provides support for families, small enterprises, and the informal sector. It addresses some of the severe effects of previous policies and shows a readiness, though delayed, to adjust to practical realities.
However, the enduring consequences are complex. The policy creates openings, as money laundering hampers progress in payments, increases security threats, and shows a regulatory environment grappling with achieving stability and trustworthiness.
Nigeria is at an intersection. While cash can relieve hardships, it cannot shape the future economic landscape. The current task is to apply this policy without hindering progress, undermining financial integrity, or jeopardizing monetary stability.
The question of whether this constitutes a liberalisation or an expensive withdrawal will in the end hinge on a single element, the CBN’s ability to pair increased liquidity with stronger oversight, steadfast policy direction, and sustained digital-payment incentives.
Only then can Nigeria avoid sliding backward and instead build a financial system that truly reflects the realities of its people, its economy, and its future.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]
Feature/OPED
When Stability Matters: Gauging Gusau’s Quiet Wins for Nigerian Football
By Barr. Adefila Kamal
Football in Nigeria has never been just a sport. It is emotion, argument, nationalism, and sometimes heartbreak wrapped into ninety minutes. That passion is a gift, but it often comes with a tendency to shout down progress before it has the chance to grow. In the middle of this noise sits the Nigeria Football Federation under the leadership of Ibrahim Musa Gusau, a man who has chosen steady hands over loud speeches, structure over drama, and long-term rebuilding over chasing instant applause.
When Gusau took office in 2022, he understood one thing clearly: the only way to fix Nigerian football is to repair its foundations. He said it openly during the 2025 NNL monthly awards ceremony — you cannot build an edifice from the rooftop. And true to that conviction, his tenure has taken shape quietly through structural investments that don’t trend on social media but matter where the future of the game is built. The construction of a players’ hostel and modern training pitches at the Moshood Abiola Stadium is one of the clearest signs of this shift. Nigeria has gone decades without basic infrastructure for its national teams, especially youth and age-grade squads. Gusau’s administration broke that pattern by delivering the first dedicated national-team hostel in our history, a project that signals an understanding that success is not luck — it is preparation.
The same thread runs through grassroots football. The maiden edition of the FCT FA Women’s Inter-Area Councils Football Tournament emerged under this administration, giving young female players a structured platform instead of the token attention they usually receive. These initiatives are not flashy. They do not dominate headlines. But they form the bedrock of any footballing nation that wants to be taken seriously.
Gusau’s leadership has also focused on lifting the domestic leagues out of years of decline. The NFF has revamped professional and semi-professional competitions, working to create consistent scheduling, fair officiating, and marketable competition structures. The growing number of global broadcasting partnerships — something unheard of in the old NPFL era — has brought more eyes, more credibility and more opportunities for clubs and players. Monthly awards for players, coaches and referees have introduced a culture of performance and merit, something our domestic game has needed for years. These are reforms that reshape the culture of football far beyond one season.
Internationally, Nigeria regained a powerful seat at the table when Gusau was elected President of the West African Football Union (WAFU B). This is not a ceremonial achievement. In football politics, influence determines opportunities, hosting rights, development grants, international appointments and the respect with which nations are treated. For too long, Nigeria’s voice in the region was inconsistent. Gusau’s emergence changes that, and it places Nigeria in a position where its administrative competence cannot be dismissed.
His administration has also made it clear that women’s football, youth development and academy systems are no longer side projects. There is a renewed intention to repair the broken pathways that once produced global stars with almost predictable frequency. If Nigeria is going to remain a powerhouse, development must become a machine, not an afterthought.
Still, for many observers, none of this seems to matter because the yardstick is always a single match, a single tournament or a single disappointing moment. Public criticism often grows louder than the facts. Fans want instant results, and when they don’t come, the instinct is to blame whoever is in office at the moment. But this approach has repeatedly sabotaged Nigerian football. Constant leadership changes wipe out institutional memory and scatter reform efforts before they mature. No nation becomes great by resetting its football house every time tempers flare.
Gusau’s leadership is unfolding at a time when FIFA and CAF are tightening their expectations for professionalism, financial transparency and infrastructure. Nigeria cannot afford scandals, disarray or combative politics. We need the kind of administrative consistency that global football bodies can trust — and this is exactly the lane Gusau has chosen. He has not been perfect; no administrator is. But he has been consistent, measured and focused. In an ecosystem that often rewards noise, this is rare.
For progress to hold, Nigeria must shift from the culture of outrage to a culture of constructive contribution. The media, civil society, ex-players, club owners, fan groups — everyone has a role. The truth is that Nigerian football’s biggest enemy has never been the NFF president, whoever he might be at the time. The real enemies are impatience, instability and emotional decision-making. They derail strategy. They kill reforms. They weaken institutions. And they turn football — our greatest cultural asset — into a battlefield of blame.
Gusau’s effort to reposition the NFF is a reminder that real development is rarely glamorous. It is slow, disciplined and often misunderstood. But it is the only route that leads to the future we claim to want: a football system built on structure, modern governance, infrastructure, youth development and global influence. Nigeria will flourish when we start protecting our institutions instead of tearing them down after every misstep.
If we truly want Nigerian football to rise, we must recognise genuine work when we see it. We must support continuity when it is clearly producing a roadmap. And we must resist the temptation to substitute outrage for analysis. Ibrahim Musa Gusau’s tenure is not defined by noise. It is defined by groundwork — the kind that elevates nations long after the shouting stops.
Barr. Adefila Kamal is a legal practitioner and development specialist. He serves as the National President of the Civil Society Network for Good Governance (CSNGG), with a long-standing commitment to transparency, institutional reform and sports governance in Nigeria
Feature/OPED
Unlocking Capital for Infrastructure: The Case for Project Bonds in Nigeria
By Taiwo Olatunji, CFA
Nigeria’s infrastructure ambition is not constrained by vision, but by the financing architecture. The public sector balance sheet, which has been the primary source of financing, has become very tight, while financing from the private sector is available and increasing, with a focus on long-term, naira-denominated assets. Hence, the challenge lies in effectively connecting this capital to bankable projects at scale and with discipline. Project bonds, created, structured and distributed by investment banks, are the instruments required to bridge the country’s infrastructure needs.
The scale of the need is clear. Nigeria’s Revised NIIMP (2020–2043) estimates ~US$2.3 trillion, about US$100bn, a year is required annually for the next 30 years to lift infrastructure to 70% of GDP. Africa’s pensions, insurers and sovereign funds already hold over US$1.1 trillion that can be mobilised for this purpose, but they require new and innovative approaches to enhance their participation in addressing this challenge.
What is broken with the status quo?
Nigeria continues to finance inherently long-dated assets through the issuance of local currency public bonds, Sukuk and Eurobonds. This approach creates a heavy burden on the government’s balance sheet while sometimes causing refinancing risk and FX exposures, where naira cash flows service dollar liabilities. It has also led to the slow conversion of the pipeline of identified projects because many infrastructure projects have not been prepared, appraised and structured to attract the private sector.
Why project bonds and where they sit in the stack
Project bonds are debt securities issued by project SPVs and serviced from project cash flows, typically secured by concessions, offtake agreements, or availability payments. Unlike typical bonds (corporate or government), which are backed by the sponsor’s balance sheets, project bonds are backed by the cash flow generated by the financed project. They often have longer duration, are tradeable, aligned with the long operating life of infrastructure projects and best suited for pension and insurance investors.
Globally, this type of instrument has been used to finance major projects such as toll roads, power plants, and social infrastructure. For example, in Latin America, transportation and energy projects have been financed through project bonds from local and international investors, through the 144A market, a U.S. framework that allows companies to access large institutional investors without going through a full public offering. Similarly, in India, rupee-denominated project bonds have benefited from partial credit guarantees provided by institutions like Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, which help lower investment risk and attract more investors.
In practice, project bonds can be structured in two ways: (i) as a take-out instrument, refinancing bank or DFI construction loans once an asset has reached operational stability; or (ii) as a bond issued from day one for brownfield or late-stage greenfield projects where revenue visibility is high, often supported by credit enhancements such as guarantees.
In both cases, the instrument achieves the same outcome: aligning long-term, project cash flows with the long-term liabilities of domestic institutional investors.
The enabling ecosystem is already emerging
1. Nigeria is not starting from zero. Regulatory infrastructure is already in place. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued detailed rules governing Project Bonds and Infrastructure Funds, creating standardized issuance structures aligned with global best practice and familiar to institutional investors. The SEC is also mulling the inclusion of the proposed rules on Credit Enhancement Service Providers in the existing rules of the Commission.
2. Market benchmarks are already available. The sovereign yield curve, published by the Debt Management Office (DMO) through its regular monthly auctions, provides a transparent reference point for pricing. This curve serves as the base risk-free rate, against which project bond spreads can be calibrated to reflect construction, operating, and sector-specific risks.
3. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) has revised its Regulation on the investment of Pension Fund Assets, increasing the amount of the country’s N25.9 trillion pension assets to be allocated to infrastructure.
4. InfraCredit has established a robust local-currency guarantee framework, supporting an aggregate guaranteed portfolio of approximately ₦270 billion. The portfolio carries a weighted average tenor of ~8 years, with demonstrated capacity to extend maturities up to 20 years. (InfraCredit 2025)
Why merchant banks should lead
Merchant banks sit at the nexus of origination, structuring, underwriting, and distribution, and they need to work with projects sponsors, financiers and government to develop a pipeline of bankable infrastructure projects. A pipeline of bankable infrastructure projects is important to attract investors as they prefer to invest in an economy with a recognizable pipeline. A pipeline also suggests that a structured and well-thought-out approach was adopted, and the projects would have identified all the major risks and the proposed mitigants to address the identified risks.
This “banks-as-catalysts” model, an economic framework that states banks can play an active and creative role in promoting industrialization and economic development, particularly in emerging markets, can be adopted to structure and mobilise domestic private finance into Infrastructure projects.
Coronation Merchant Bank’s role and vision
At Coronation, we believe the identification, structuring and testing of bankable infrastructure projects are the constraints to mobilization of private capital into the infrastructure space. We bring an integrated platform across Financial Advisory, Capital Mobilization, Commercial Debt, Private Debt and Alternative Financing to identify, structure, underwrite and distribute infrastructure debt into domestic institutions. The Bank works with DFIs, guarantee providers and other banks to scale issuance. Our franchise has supported infrastructure debt issuances via the capital markets, likewise Nigerian corporates and the Government.
From Insight to Execution
If you are considering the issuance of a project bond or you want to discuss pipeline readiness, kindly contact [email protected] or call 020-01279760.
Taiwo Olatunji, CFA is the Group Head of Investment Banking at Coronation Merchant Bank
-
Feature/OPED6 years agoDavos was Different this year
-
Travel/Tourism9 years ago
Lagos Seals Western Lodge Hotel In Ikorodu
-
Showbiz3 years agoEstranged Lover Releases Videos of Empress Njamah Bathing
-
Banking7 years agoSort Codes of GTBank Branches in Nigeria
-
Economy3 years agoSubsidy Removal: CNG at N130 Per Litre Cheaper Than Petrol—IPMAN
-
Banking3 years agoFirst Bank Announces Planned Downtime
-
Banking3 years agoSort Codes of UBA Branches in Nigeria
-
Sports3 years agoHighest Paid Nigerian Footballer – How Much Do Nigerian Footballers Earn










