Feature/OPED
2019 Presidential Election: Assessing Possibility of Electoral Fraud
By Omoshola Deji
After about thirty years of stern military rule, Nigeria re-embraced democracy in 1999 and five elections have produced Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo (two terms), Umaru Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan and the incumbent Muhammadu Buhari.
The year 2019 ushers in an opportunity for Nigerians to elect another president or return Buhari. Buhari has promised a free and fair election, but the opposition parties and some observers cast doubts on his commitment to ensuring transparency in an election he is contesting.
This piece examines the allegations and influence of nepotism on the credibility of the electoral process, as well as the effects of underage voting and vote-buying on election results.
Nigerians are criticizing President Buhari’s appointments as nepotistic, especially his choice of the heads of security agencies and the electoral commission. The prevailing argument that this is a clever style of managing the electoral process in his favour steers us into an appraisal of such appointments by the previous governments. Ensuring the successful conduct of elections in Nigeria involves the collaborative effort of several agencies – including the Civil Defense, Army and State Security Service – but Police and INEC are the most crucial. INEC conduct elections and police leads the provision of security. The appraisal thus focuses on these two outfits.
Individuals referenced are classified based on their states of origin and geopolitical zones as currently defined in Nigeria. The zones are abbreviated thus: South-West (SW), South-East (SE), South-South (SS) North-West (NW), North-Central (NC), and the North-East (NE).
Is President Buhari’s appointment of the 2019 election handlers nepotistic? In the first republic (1963-1966), President Nnamdi Azikwe, a native of Anambra State (SE), appointed Louis Edet from Cross River State (SS) as the Inspector General of Police (IGP). Eyo Ita Esua from Cross River State (SS) was appointed the head of the Federal Electoral Commission. You would note that the president and the heads of FEC and police were not from the same geopolitical zone. The military seized power in 1966.
To conduct the election that’ll usher in the second republic in 1979, then General Olusegun Obasanjo from Ogun State (SW) appointed Chief Michael Ani from Cross River State (SS) as Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission. Muhammadu Dikko Yusufu from Katsina State (NW) was appointed the IGP. The head-of-state and the heads of FEC and police were not from the same geopolitical zone. Obasanjo transferred power to Shehu Shagari, but (Nigeria’s incumbent president) then General Muhammadu Buhari seized power via a military coup in 1983. General Ibrahim Babangida later ousted him in 1985.
After being pressurized by a national campaign for democratic rule, Babangida promised to conduct elections and hand over power in 1993 – the third republic. Babangida, a native of Niger State (NC) appointed Professor Humprey Nwosu, an indigene of Anambra State (SE), as the Chairman of the National Electoral Commission. Aliyu Atta from Adamawa State (NE) was appointed the IGP. Please note that the military-president and the heads of NEC and police were not from the same geopolitical zone.
To conduct the election that brought on the (Obasanjo led 1999-2003) fourth republic, General Abdusalami Abubakar from Niger State (NC) appointed Justice Ephraim Akpata from Edo State (SS) as the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Ibrahim Commassie, an indigene of Katsina State (NW), was appointed the IGP. Again, General Abubakar and the heads of INEC and police were not from the same geopolitical zone.
Ex-President Obasanjo’s second term was the fifth republic (2003-2007). The election that earned him the term was handled by then INEC Chairman Abel Guobadia (Edo, SS) and IGP Mustafa Balogun (Osun, SW). Appointments of the two crucial election handlers were not only allotted to the South, the police IG was from Obansanjo’s geopolitical zone, the SW.
This is not the case now in Buhari’s government. Buhari, a native of Katsina State (NW) appointed Mamood Yakubu (Bauchi, NE) and Idris Kpotun (Niger, NC) as INEC and police heads.
Although Buhari dispensed the appointments to northerners, he and the two appointees are from separate northern geopolitical zones. In essence, Obasanjo’s appointment of INEC and police heads when he was seeking re-election in 2003 is even more sectional than what we have now.
It is appalling that facts about an issue that could diminish Buhari’s votes, especially in the South, stay unutilized. Why is the work of presidential aides being left for independent analysts in an election season? Buhari’s aides are either unmindful of the harm negative public perceptions could do to their principal or they are simply overconfident he would win. But on a second look, why was Obasanjo’s appointment not criticized? Why are people afraid that Buhari’s appointments could breed electoral fraud, but weren’t troubled during Obasanjo’s rule?
The issue is best explained empirically. When Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan increased petrol price from 67 to 87 Naira, people protested because his government was widely rated as corrupt. They didn’t trust him. But when President Buhari increased petrol price from 87 to 145 Naira, the protest was very minimal because Nigerians see him as a non-corrupt person. Trust is the keyword here.
People never protested against Obasanjo’s more sectional appointment of INEC and police heads because they didn’t see him as nepotistic and chauvinistic. His other key appointments (of national security adviser and heads of civil defense, army, the state security service etc.) reflected Nigeria’s ethnic pluralism. That cannot be said of Buhari. He is more sectional than national.
The heads of all the above mentioned agencies are from the North. SSS is currently being led by Mathew Seiyefa (Bayelsa, SS) due to dismissal of Lawal Daura (Katsina, NW) and there are reports of ongoing moves to replace him with a northerner. Nigerians are pessimistic about getting a credible election in 2019 as the influence of these outfits’ activities on election results cannot be undermined. Does nepotism breed electoral fraud? We must resist the appetite to digress. I’ll dissect the issue after concluding the ethnic and geopolitical appraisal of individuals appointed to handle the conduct of past national elections.
The election that ushered in the (late Umaru Yar’Adua led) sixth republic was conducted by the Obasanjo administration. The poll was handled by then INEC Chairman, Professor Maurice Iwu (Imo, SE) and IGP Sunday Ehindero (Ondo, SW). In this case, Obasanjo’s appointment of non-northerners can be argued as ensuring fairness and transparency since the election was mainly a contest between northern candidates – late Umaru Yar’Adua for the PDP, M. Buhari for the defunct ANPP, and Atiku Abubakar for the defunct AC.
Yar’Adua’s death left a vacuum in government. His vice, Goodluck Jonathan (Bayelsa, SS), was sworn in on May 5, 2010 to complete the four-year tenure of the sixth republic (2007-2011). As the term ends, Jonathan turned down the northern oligarchy’s request to takeover. He contested, won and governed Nigeria in the seventh republic (2011-2015). The election that returned him elected was handled by the northerners he appointed. Prof. Attahiru Jega (Kebbi, NW) was the INEC Chairman and Hafiz Ringim (Jigawa, NE) was the IGP. Unlike the Buhari administration, Jonathan was mindful of Nigeria’s ethnic sensitivity and majority of his appointment favoured other ethnic groups, especially the northern lived Hausa-Fulani. He retained Jega as INEC Chairman and appointed Suleiman Abba (Jigawa, NE) as IGP for the 2015 elections.
Jonathan lost the race to rule Nigeria in the eighth republic (2015-2019) to incumbent President Buhari. He conceded defeat. Oppositely, when Jonathan floored Buhari in the 2011 presidential election, the latter’s supporters violently protested, killed and destroyed properties in the north. Would the 2011 post-election violence not have been more devastating if the election handlers and service chiefs were Southerners from Jonathan’s ethnic extraction? Ensuring appointments into sensitive positions are fairly distributed remains one of the most effective means of maintaining public trust, dousing inter-ethnic bigotry and erasing agitation for succession in a plural state like Nigeria. Does nepotism breed electoral fraud? How will nepotism, vote-buying and underage voting affect the outcome of the 2019 presidential election?
In the history of Nigeria, Buhari is the first ruler to appoint an INEC Chairman from his region, the NW. He appointed his supposed relation, Mrs Amina Zakari, as the acting INEC Chairman in June 2015. After several criticisms, Prof Mahmood Yakubu was appointed to replace her as the substantive chairman in October 2015. The relationship between Zakari and Yakubu is so strong that it has the tendency to influence the outcome of the elections in favour of Buhari. The nepotism and sectionalism in Buhari’s government is also present in INEC’s leadership.
Vote buying and underage voting are electoral crimes, but INEC and police have been unable to stem the tide. The two agencies only condemn. They are unwilling to prosecute electoral offenders. The northern region has the highest case of underage voting, while vote-buying has recently gained prominence across the country.
In all fairness, affection for Buhari can’t be argued as the sole reason for underage registration and voting in the north. The north has always had a substantial registration of underage voters before Buhari became president. Nonetheless, his re-election bid has led to an increase in such for political gain. In 2019, (regular and) underage voting would be a huge gain for Buhari in his northern stronghold.
In other regions, Buhari currently have an above-average support in the SW, fast-rising support in the SE, and a below-average support in the SS. Vote buying could easily cover up for his shortfalls in these southern areas. Electoral fraud is bound to occur on a massive scale in the 2019 elections. APC and Buhari would profit more from it than the opposition because they are in control of the nation’s finance and force. With the nepotistic arrangement in place and the forces’ top-down chain of command, all it takes the force heads is to post their loyalists to key states in order to allow the Buharists operate unchecked.
Politics is the switch that controls police operations under IGP Idris Kpotum. Sadly, elections in Nigeria are often marred by so much irregularity that it is quite easy for the umpire and security agencies to manipulate the results. Then again, the force heads have been so political that they have a reason to compromise in order to avoid their imminent sack, if the opposition wins. Buhari is no doubt a strong candidate, but the election is being technically managed in such a way that it would be impossible for him to lose.
INEC and the security agencies operations largely determine the outcome of elections in Nigeria. The heads periodically issue obnoxious orders to their subordinates and questioning or disobeying such orders is treated as an affront, insubordination and disloyalty. The punishment for such is non-promotion, unfavourable transfers, and sometimes death. The boss’ mood dictates the actions of the subordinates, and his wish, whether legal or not, becomes the institution’s mission, especially during elections. Making chauvinistic appointments into agencies operating such a closed system – in a nation where people are more committed to their ethnic groups than to the Nigerian state – is unfortunate for Nigeria’s democracy and a recipe for electoral fraud.
All that concern a presidential election in a plural nation should not be regional. In a polity where the instruments of the state are often used for political gains, a presidential election handled by heads of INEC and security agencies who are northerners, with an incumbent northern candidate running, is beyond doubts programmed not be free, fair, credible or transparent. Such election grievously puts the non-northern candidates in an extremely disadvantaged position. Ethnic affiliation controls emotions in Nigerian elections. Ethnic affection inspired the annulment of the 1993 presidential election won by Moshood Abiola. Babangida wouldn’t have annulled the election if Bashir Tofa (his fellow northerner) won.
Political interests dictate government policies in Nigeria. The Supreme Court ruled that using electronic card readers for voter accreditation is not permissible under the Nigerian electoral laws. The national assembly passed a bill that’ll permit the use of electronic card readers for the 2019 elections, but Buhari declined assent twice. The implication of this is that INEC would have to use the manual means of voter accreditation in 2019 and this would lead to massive electoral fraud.
Buhari must live up to the responsibility of ensuring Nigerians get a free, fair and credible election, and accepting the outcome in good faith if defeated. No matter how hard he tries to be transparent, his nepotistic and chauvinistic conducts, the inability to manage personal interest, autocracy, and hounding the opposition could drive Nigeria’s democracy rearward.
Omoshola Deji is a political and public affairs analyst. He wrote in via [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Debt is Dragging Nigeria’s Future Down
By Abba Dukawa
A quiet fear is spreading across the hearts of Nigerians—one that grows heavier with every new headline about rising debt. It is no longer just numbers on paper; it feels like a shadow stretching over the nation’s future. The reality is stark and unsettling: nearly 50% of Nigeria’s revenue is now used to service debt. That is not just unsustainable—it is suffocating.
Behind these figures lies a deeper tragedy. Millions of Nigerians are trapped in what experts call “Multidimensional Poverty,” struggling daily for dignity and survival, while a privileged few continue to live in comfort, untouched by the hardship tightening around the nation. The contrast is painful, and the silence around it is even louder.
Since assuming office, Bola Ahmed Tinubu has embarked on an aggressive borrowing path, presenting it as a necessary step to revive the economy, rebuild infrastructure, and stabilise key sectors.
Between 2023 and 2026, billions of dollars have been secured or proposed in foreign loans. On paper, it is a strategy of hope. But in the hearts of many Nigerians, it feels like a gamble with consequences yet to unfold.
The numbers are staggering. A borrowing plan exceeding $21 billion, backed by the National Assembly, alongside additional billions in loans and grants, signals a government determined to keep spending and building. Another $6.9 billion facility follows closely behind. These are not just financial decisions; they are commitments that will echo into generations yet unborn.
And so, the questions refuse to go away. Who will bear this burden? Who will repay these debts when the time comes? Will it not fall on ordinary Nigerians already stretched thin to carry the weight of decisions they never made?
There is a growing fear that the nation may be walking into a future where its people become strangers in their own land, bound by obligations to distant creditors.
Even more troubling is the sense that something is not adding up. The removal of fuel subsidy was meant to free up resources, to create breathing room for meaningful development.
But where are the results? Why does it feel like sacrifice has not translated into relief? The silence surrounding these questions breeds suspicion, and suspicion slowly erodes trust. As of December 31, 2025, Nigeria’s public debt has risen to N159.28 trillion, according to the Debt Management Office.
The numbers keep climbing, but for many citizens, life keeps declining. This disconnect is what hurts the most. Borrowing, in itself, is not the enemy. Nations borrow to grow, to build, to invest in their future. But borrowing without visible progress, without accountability, without compassion for the people, it begins to feel less like strategy and more like a slow descent.
If these borrowed funds are truly building roads, schools, hospitals, and opportunities, then Nigerians deserve to see it, to feel it, to live it. But if they are funding excess, waste, or luxury, then this path is not just dangerous—it is devastating.
Nigeria’s growing loan profile is a double-edged sword. It can either accelerate development or deepen economic challenges. The key issue is not just borrowing, but what the country does with the money. Strong governance, transparency, and investment in productive sectors will determine whether these loans become a foundation for growth or a long-term liability. Because in the end, debt is not just an economic issue. It is a moral one. And if care is not taken, the price Nigeria will pay may not just be financial—it may be the future of its people.
Dukawa writes from Kano and can be reached at [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Nigeria’s Power Illusion: Why 6,000MW Is Not An Achievement
By Isah Kamisu Madachi
For decades, Nigeria has been called the Giant of Africa. The question no one in government wants to answer is why a giant cannot keep the lights on.
Nigeria sits on the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, holds the continent’s most populous nation at over 220 million people, and commands the fourth largest GDP on the continent at roughly $252 billion. It possesses vast deposits of solid minerals, a fintech ecosystem that accounts for 28% of all fintech companies on the African continent, and a diaspora that remits billions of dollars annually.
If potential were electricity, Nigeria would have been powering half the world. Instead, an immediate former minister is boasting about 6,000 megawatts.
Adebayo Adelabu resigned as Minister of Power on April 22, 2026, citing his ambition to contest the Oyo State governorship election. In his resignation letter, he listed among his achievements that peak generation had increased to over 6,000 megawatts during his tenure, supported by the integration of the Zungeru Hydropower Plant. It was presented as a great crowning legacy. The claim deserves scrutiny, and the numbers deserve context.
To begin with, the context. Ghana, Nigeria’s neighbour in West Africa, has a national electricity access rate of 85.9%, with 74% access in rural areas and 94% in urban areas. Kenya, with a 71.4% national electricity access rate, including 62.7% in rural areas, leads East Africa. Nigeria, by contrast, recorded an electricity access rate of just 61.2 per cent as of 2023, according to the World Bank. This is not a distant or poorer country outperforming Nigeria. Ghana’s GDP stands at approximately $113 billion, less than half of Nigeria’s. Kenya’s economy is around $141 billion. Ethiopia, which has invested massively in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and is already exporting electricity to neighbouring countries, has a GDP of roughly $126 billion. All three are doing more with far less.
Now to examine the 6,000-megawatt, Daily Trust obtained electricity generation data from the Association of Power Generation Companies and the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, covering quarterly performance from 2023 to 2025 and monthly data from January to March 2026. The data shows that in 2023, peak generation was approximately 5,000 megawatts; in 2024, it reached approximately 5,528 megawatts; in 2025, it ranged between 5,300 and 5,801 megawatts; and by March 2026, available capacity had declined to approximately 4,089 megawatts. The grid never recorded a verified peak of 6,000 megawatts or higher. Adelabu had, in fact, set the 6,000-megawatt target publicly on at least three separate occasions, missing each deadline, and later admitted the target was not achieved, attributing the failure to vandalism of key transmission infrastructure.
In February 2026, Nigeria’s national grid produced an average available capacity of 4,384 megawatts, the lowest monthly average since June 2024. For a country with over 220 million people, this means electricity supply remains far below national demand, with the grid delivering only about 32 per cent of its theoretical installed capacity of approximately 13,000 megawatts. To put that in sharper comparison: in 2018, 48 sub-Saharan African countries, home to nearly one billion people, produced about the same amount of electricity as Spain, a country of 45 million. Nigeria, the continent’s most resource-rich large economy, is a significant part of that embarrassing equation.
The tragedy here is not just technical. It is a governance failure with compounding human costs. An economy that cannot provide reliable electricity cannot competitively manufacture goods, cannot industrialise at scale, cannot attract the volume of foreign direct investment its endowments warrant, and cannot build the digital infrastructure that would allow it to lead on artificial intelligence, data governance, and the emerging critical minerals economy where Africa’s next great opportunity lies. Countries with a fraction of Nigeria’s mineral wealth and human capital are already debating those frontiers. Nigeria is still campaigning on megawatts.
What a departing minister should be able to say, given Nigeria’s endowments, is not that peak generation touched 6,000 megawatts at some unverified moment. He should be saying that Nigeria now generates reliably above 15,000 megawatts, that rural electrification has crossed 70 per cent, and that the country is on a credible trajectory toward the kind of energy sufficiency that unlocks industrial growth. That is the standard Nigeria’s size and resources demand. Anything below it is not an achievement. It is an apology dressed in a press release.
The power sector has received billions of dollars in investment across multiple administrations. The 2013 privatisation exercise, the Presidential Power Initiative, the Electricity Act of 2023, and successive reform promises have produced a sector that still, in 2026, cannot guarantee eight hours of reliable supply to the average Nigerian household. That a minister exits that ministry citing a megawatt figure that fact-checkers have shown was never actually reached, and that even if reached would be unworthy of celebration given Nigeria’s potential, captures the full depth of the problem. The ambition is too small. The accountability is too thin. And the country deserves better from those who are privileged to manage its extraordinary, squandered potential.
Isah Kamisu Madachi is a policy analyst and development practitioner. He writes via [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Systemically Weak Banks Put Nigeria’s $1 trillion Ambition at Risk
By Blaise Udunze
Nigeria’s banking sector has just undergone one of its most ambitious recapitalisation exercises in two decades, all thanks to the Central Bank of Nigeria under the leadership of Olayemi Cardoso. About N4.65 trillion ($3.38) has been raised. Balance sheets have been strengthened, at least the improvement could be said to exist in reports or accounting figures. Regulators have drawn a new line in the sand, proposing N500 billion for international banks, N200 billion for national banks, and N50 billion for regional players. This is a bold reset.
Meanwhile, as the dust settles, an uncomfortable question refuses to go away, which has been in the minds of many asking, “Has Nigeria once again solved yesterday’s problem, while tomorrow’s risks gather quietly ahead?”
At a period when banks globally are being tested against tougher buffers, cross-border shocks, and higher regulatory expectations, Nigeria’s revised benchmarks risk falling short of what the global system demands.
In a world where scale, resilience, and competitiveness define banking credibility, capital is not measured in isolation; it is judged relative to peers, risks, and ambition.
Because when placed side by side with a far more unsettling reality, that a single South African bank, Standard Bank Group, rivals or even exceeds the valuation and asset strength of Nigeria’s entire banking sector, the celebration begins to feel premature.
The recapitalisation may be necessary. But is it sufficient? The numbers are not just striking, they are deeply revealing. Standard Bank Group, with a market valuation hovering around $21-22 billion and assets approaching $190 billion, stands as a continental giant. In contrast, the combined market capitalisation of Nigeria’s listed banks, even after recent capital raises, struggles to match that scale.
The combined value of the 13 listed Nigerian banks reached N16.14 trillion (11.9 billion) using N1.367/$1 in early April 2026, following the recapitalisation momentum.
Even more revealing is the contrast at the top. Zenith Bank is valued at N4.7 trillion ($3.44 billion), Guaranty Trust Holding Company, widely admired for efficiency and profitability, is valued at under N4.6 trillion ($3.37 billion), while Access Holdings, despite managing tens of billions in assets, carries a market value below the upper Tier’s N1.4 trillion ($1.02 billion).
This is not merely a gap. It is a structural disconnect. And it raises a critical point, revealing that recapitalisation is not just about meeting regulatory thresholds; it is about closing credibility gaps.
With accounting figures or reports, Nigeria’s new capital thresholds appear formidable. But paper strength is not the same as real strength.
The naira’s persistent depreciation has quietly undermined the meaning of these figures. What looks like N500 billion in nominal terms translates into a much smaller and shrinking figure in dollar terms.
This is the misapprehension at the heart of Nigeria’s banking reform, as we are measuring financial strength in a currency that has been losing strength.
In real terms, some Nigerian banks today may not be significantly stronger than they were years ago, despite meeting much higher nominal thresholds. So while regulators see progress, global investors see vulnerability. Markets are rarely sentimental. They price risk with ruthless clarity.
The valuation gap between Nigerian banks and their South African counterparts is not an accident; it must be made known that it is strategic intentionality. By this, it truly reflects a deeper judgment about currency stability, regulatory predictability, governance standards, and long-term growth prospects. Investors are not just asking how much capital Nigerian banks have. They are asking how durable that capital is.
Even when Nigerian banks post strong profits, much of it has been driven by foreign exchange revaluation gains rather than core lending or operational efficiency. The CBN’s decision to restrict dividend payments from such gains is telling; it acknowledges that not all profits are created equal. True strength lies not in accounting gains, but in economic impact.
Nigeria has travelled this road before. Under Charles Soludo, the 2004-2006 banking consolidation raised minimum capital from N2 billion to N25 billion, reducing the number of banks dramatically and producing industry champions like Zenith Bank and United Bank for Africa. For a time, Nigerian banks expanded across Africa and became formidable competitors.
But the momentum did not last, emanating with lots of economic headwinds. One amongst all that played out was that the global financial crisis exposed weaknesses in governance and risk management, leading to another wave of reforms under Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. The lesson from that era remains clear, which revealed that capital reforms can stabilise a system, but they do not automatically transform it. Without bigger structural changes, the gains fade.
The real weakness of Nigeria’s current approach is not the size of the thresholds; it is their rigidity. Fixed capital requirements do not adjust for inflation, reflect currency depreciation, scale with systemic risk, or capture the complexity of modern banking.
In contrast, global regulatory frameworks are increasingly dynamic and risk-based. This is where Nigeria risks falling behind again. Because while the numbers have changed, the philosophy has not.
Nigeria’s economic aspirations are bold. The country speaks confidently about building a $1 trillion economy, expanding infrastructure, and driving industrialisation, but in dollar terms, many Nigerian banks remain small, too small for the scale of ambition the country now proclaims. Albeit, it must be understood that ambition alone does not finance growth. Banks do.
And here lies the uncomfortable mismatch, which is contradictory in nature because the economy Nigeria wants to build is significantly larger than the banks it currently has.
In South Africa, what Nigerian stakeholders are yet to understand is that large, well-capitalised banks play a central role in financing infrastructure, corporate expansion, and consumer credit. Their scale allows them to absorb risk and deploy capital at levels Nigerian banks struggle to match. Without comparable financial depth, Nigeria’s development ambitions risk being constrained by its own banking system.
At its core, banking is about channelling capital into productive sectors, as this stands as one of its responsibilities if it truly wants to ever catch up to a $1 trillion economy. Yet Nigerian banks have increasingly, in their usual ways, leaned toward safer, short-term returns, particularly government securities. This is not irrational. It is a response to high credit risk, regulatory uncertainty, and macroeconomic instability.
But it comes at a cost. Yes! The fact is that when banks prioritise safety over lending, the real economy suffers. What this tells us is that manufacturing, agriculture, and small businesses remain underfunded, limiting growth and job creation.
Recapitalisation is meant to change this dynamic. Stronger capital buffers should enable banks to take on more risk and finance larger projects. But capital alone will not solve the problem. Confidence will.
One of the most persistent obstacles facing Nigerian banks is currency volatility. Each major devaluation of the naira erodes investor returns and reduces the dollar value of bank capital. This creates a contradiction whereby banks appear profitable in naira terms, but unattractive in global markets.
In contrast, South Africa benefits from a more stable currency environment and deeper capital markets. Without much ado, it is clear that this stability attracts long-term institutional investors that Nigeria struggles to retain. Until this macroeconomic challenge is addressed, recapitalisation alone cannot close the gap because, without making it a priority, even the strongest banks will remain constrained.
In a global competitive financial market, one would agree that capital is necessary, but not sufficient. Beyond the capital, one crucial lesson stakeholders in Nigeria’s banking space must understand is that investors’ confidence is heavily influenced by governance standards and operational efficiency, which mainly guarantee more success and capability. Also, another relevant trait to sustainable banking is transparency, regulatory consistency, and accountability, which matter as much as balance sheet strength.
While Nigerian banks have made progress, lingering concerns remain around insider lending, regulatory unpredictability, and complex ownership structures. If policymakers revisit and reflect on the episodes involving institutions like First Bank of Nigeria and the liquidation of Heritage Bank, this will reinforce the perceptions of systemic risk.
Recapitalisation offers an opportunity to reset governance standards, but only if it is accompanied by stricter enforcement and greater transparency, with the key stakeholders seeing beyond the capital growth.
As if traditional challenges were not enough, Nigerian banks are also facing increasing competition from fintech companies. Nigeria has emerged as a leading fintech hub in Africa, reshaping payments, lending, and digital banking.
To remain relevant, banks must invest heavily in technology, an area that requires not just capital, but smart capital, ensuring that digital innovation becomes a core strength rather than an external add-on. The recapitalisation exercise provides the financial capacity. Whether banks use it effectively is another matter entirely.
So, are Nigeria’s new capital thresholds already outdated? Not yet. But they are already under pressure, pressure from inflation, currency weakness, global competition, and Nigeria’s own economic ambitions.
The truth is that the reforms are a step in the right direction, but they may already be systemically weak in the face of global realities. Whilst the actors keep focusing heavily on capital thresholds without addressing deeper structural issues, the reforms risk creating a system that is compliant, but not competitive, stable but not strong.
The recapitalisation exercise has bought Nigeria time. That is its greatest achievement. But time is only valuable if it is used wisely.
If policymakers treat this reform as a destination, the thresholds will age faster than expected. If they treat it as a foundation, Nigeria has a chance to build a banking system capable of supporting its ambitions.
It can either strengthen its financial foundations to match its economic ambitions or continue to pursue growth on a fragile base.
The warning signs are already visible. Systemic weaknesses, if left unaddressed, will not remain contained; they will surface at the worst possible moment, undermining confidence and limiting progress.
Otherwise, the uncomfortable truth will persist; one well-capitalised bank elsewhere will continue to stand taller than an entire banking system at home. Whilst a $1 trillion economy cannot be built on a weak banking system. The sooner this reality is acknowledged, the better Nigeria’s chances of turning ambition into achievement.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
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