World
Russia’s Real Motives in Africa Causing Some to Worry—Gruzd
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
As preparations are underway for the second Russia-Africa summit planned for 2022, African leaders, politicians, academic researchers and experts have been discussing several aspects of the current state of Russia-Africa relations.
They, most often, compare it with a number of foreign countries notably China, the United States, the European Union, India, France, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea that have held such gatherings in that format with Africa.
Some have convincingly argued that Russia has moved away from its low-key strategy to vigorous relations, as shown by the first symbolic Russia-Africa summit in the Black Sea city of Sochi in October 2019.
Russia and Africa adopted a joint declaration, a comprehensive document that outlines the key objectives and necessary tasks that seek to raise assertively the entirety of relations to a new level.
Long before the summit, at least, during the past decade, several bilateral agreements between Russia and individual African countries were signed. Besides, memoranda of understanding, declaration of interests, pledges and promises dominated official speeches.
On the other side, Russia is simply invisible in economic sectors in Africa, despite boasting of decades-old solid relations with the continent.
Undoubtedly, Africa is opening up new fields of opportunity. The creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides a unique and valuable opportunity for businesses to access an integrated African market of over 1.3 billion people with a GDP of over $2.5 trillion. It aspires to connect all the regions of Africa, deepen economic integration and boost intra-African trade and investment.
Despite existing risks, challenges and threats, a number of external countries continue strengthening their economic footholds in Africa and contribute enormously towards the continent’s efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Russia has to upgrade or scale up its collaborative engagement with Africa. It has to consider seriously launching more public outreach programmes, especially working with civil society to change public perceptions and the private sector to strengthen its partnership with Africa. In order to achieve this, it has to surmount the challenges, take up the courage and work consistently with both private and public sectors and with an effective Action Plan.
In this exclusive interview, Steven Gruzd, Head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses a few questions, highlights existing challenges and passionately offers some progressive suggestions regarding Russia-African relations and the fears over Russia’s real motives in Africa.
Steven Gruzd also heads the Russia-Africa Research Programme initiated this year at SAIIA, South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent, non-government think tank, with a long and proud history of providing thought leadership in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
What are your appreciations and fears for Russia returning to Africa?
Africa is becoming crowded, with many old and new actors actively involved on the continent. Apart from EU countries, China and the US, we have players such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, the UAE, Japan and others.
So, Russia’s renewed interest in Africa does not happen in isolation. It, of course, seeks to build on Soviet-era ties, and several African leaders today studied in the USSR or the Soviet sphere of influence. Russia has tended to focus on niche areas such as weapons sales, nuclear energy and resource extraction, at a much smaller scale than China.
Many leaders are welcoming the attention of Russia, but some remain wary of Russia’s hidden motives and intentions. Russia’s dealings are not transparent and open compared to China. The shadowy world of private military companies such as Russia’s Wagner Group is causing concern in unstable countries like the CAR, Libya and Mali. So, in fact, there is a kind of mixed picture, sentiments and interpretations are also varied here.
How would you argue that Russia engages fairly in “competition for cooperation” in Africa?
Africa is a busy geopolitical arena, with many players operating. Russia has to compete against them, and distinctively remain focused its efforts. Russia welcomes diplomatic support from African countries, and unlike the West, it does not demand good governance or advocate for human rights reforms.
Russia likes to portray itself as not interfering in local politics or judging African countries, even though there is mounting evidence that it has been involved in meddling in elections in Africa through disinformation, fake news and attempting to exploit fault lines in societies through social media.
Do you think, to some extent, Russia is fighting neo-colonial tendencies, as shown in Guinea, Mali, CAR and Sudan? Does it imply that Russia supports military leaders in Africa?
Russia uses the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in its engagement with Africa, and that it is fighting neo-colonialism from the West, especially in relations with their former colonies. It sees France as a threat to its interests especially in Francophone West Africa, the Maghreb and the Sahel.
Russia has invested resources in developing French-language news media, and engages in anti-French media activity, including through social media. I think Russia has its own economic and political interests in countries like Guinea, Mali, CAR and Sudan, even if it uses the language of fighting neo-colonialism. It explicitly appears that Russia supports several undemocratic African leaders and their regimes.
Some experts have argued that Russia’s diplomacy is full of bilateral agreements, largely not implemented, and gamut of pledges and promises. What are your views about these?
I would largely agree that there is a divide between what has been pledged and promised at high-level meetings and summits, compared to what has actually materialised on the ground. There is more talk than action, and in most cases down the years mere intentions and ideas have been officially presented as initiatives already in progress. It will be interesting to see what has been concretely achieved in reports at the second Russia-Africa summit scheduled for late 2022.
From the above discussions so far, what do you think are Russia’s challenges and setbacks in Africa?
Africa is a crowded playing field. Russia does not have the same resources and approaches as China, France, UK or US, so it has limited impact. The language barrier could be used as an excuse, but Russia has the great possibility to leverage into the Soviet- and Russian-trained diaspora. On the other hand, Russia feels it is unfairly portrayed in Western media, so that is another perception it seeks to change. It can change the perception by supporting public outreach programmes.
Working closely with the academic community, such as the South African Institute of International Affairs and similar ones throughout Africa, is one potential instrument to raise its public image. In places like Mozambique and the CAR, the Wagner Group left after incurring human losses – does Russia have staying power?
As it prepares to hold the second Russia-Africa summit in 2022, what could be the expectations for Africa? What to do ultimately with the first Joint Declaration from Sochi?
As already mentioned, there needs to be a lot of tangible progress on the ground for the second summit to show impact. It is worth reiterating here that African countries will expect more debt relief and solid investment from Russian businesses.
In terms of political support at places like the UN Security Council, there is close interaction between Russia and the African States, but as recent research by SAIIA shows, not as much as assumed. (https://saiia.org.za/research/walking-with-the-bear-russia-and-the-a3-in-the-un-security-council/). The relationship has to however deliver and move from words to deeds.
In conclusion, I would suggest that Russia has to take up both the challenges and unique opportunities and attempt to scale up its influence by working consistently on practical multifaceted sustainable development issues and by maintaining appreciable relations with Africa.
On the other side, African countries likewise have to devise viable strategies for engaging with Russia.
By Modupe Gbadeyanka
For transforming cross-border payments through its deployment with Global Money Exchange, Comviva has been named Best In-Class Cross Border Payments.
The global leader in digital transformation solutions clinched this latest accolade at the IBS Intelligence Global FinTech Innovation Award 2025.
The recognition highlights how Comviva’s mobiquity Pay is helping shape a modern cross-border payment ecosystem that stretches far beyond conventional remittance services.
Deployed as a white label Wallet Platform and launched as Global Pay Oman App, it fulfils GMEC’s dual vision—positioning itself as an innovative payment service provider while digitally extending its core money transfer business.
The solution allows GMEC to offer international money transfers alongside seamless forex ordering and other services. These capabilities sit alongside a broad suite of everyday financial services, including bill and utility payments, merchant transactions, education-related payments, and other digital conveniences — all delivered through one unified experience.
“This award is a testament to Oman’s accelerating digital transformation and our commitment to reshaping how cross-border payments serve people and businesses across the Sultanate.
“By partnering with Comviva and bringing the Global Pay Oman Super App, we have moved beyond traditional remittance services to create a truly inclusive and future-ready financial ecosystem.
“This innovation is not only enhancing convenience and transparency for our customers but is also supporting Oman’s broader vision of building a digitally empowered economy,” the Managing Director at Global Money Exchange, Subromoniyan K.S, said.
Also commenting, the chief executive of Comviva, Mr Rajesh Chandiramani, said, “Cross-border payments are becoming a daily necessity, not a niche service, particularly for migrant and trade-linked economies.
“This recognition from IBS Intelligence validates our focus on building payment platforms that combine global reach with local relevance, operational resilience and a strong user experience. The deployment with Global Money Exchange Co. demonstrates how mobiquity® Pay enables financial institutions to move beyond remittances and deliver integrated digital services at scale.”
“The deployment of mobiquity Pay for GMEC showcases how scalable, API-driven digital wallet platforms can transform cross-border payments into seamless, value-rich experiences.
“By integrating remittances, bill payments, forex services, and AI-powered engagement into a unified Super App, Comviva has reimagined customer journeys and operational agility.
“This Best-in-Class Cross-border Payments award win stands as a testament to Comviva’s excellence in enabling financial institutions to compete and grow in a digitally convergent world,” the Director for Research and Digital Properties at IBS Intelligence, Nikhil Gokhale, said.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
At the end of an extensive consultation with African foreign ministers, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, has emphasized that Moscow would advance its economic engagement across Africa, admittedly outlining obstacles delaying the prompt implementation of several initiatives set forth in Strategic Action Plan (2023-2026) approved in St. Petersburg during the Russia-Africa Summit.
The second Ministerial Conference, by the Russian Foreign Ministry with support from Roscongress Foundation and the Arab Republic of Egypt, marked an important milestone towards raising bilateral investment and economic cooperation.
In Cairo, the capital city of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Lavrov read out the final resolution script, in a full-packed conference hall, and voiced strong confidence that Moscow would achieve its strategic economic goals with Africa, with support from the African Union (AU) and other Regional Economic blocs in the subsequent years. Despite the complexities posed by the Russia-Ukraine crisis, combined with geopolitical conditions inside the African continent, Moscow however reiterated its position to take serious steps in finding pragmatic prospects for mutual cooperation and improve multifaceted relations with Africa, distinctively in the different sectors: in trade, economic and investment spheres, education and culture, humanitarian and other promising areas.
The main event was the plenary session co-chaired by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emigration, and Egyptians Abroad Bashar Abdelathi. Welcome messages from Russian President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdelhak Sisi were read.
And broadly, the meeting participants compared notes on the most pressing issues on the international and Russian-African agendas, with a focus on the full implementation of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan for 2023-2026, approved at the second Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in 2023.
In addition, on the sidelines of the conference, Lavrov held talks with his African counterparts, and a number of bilateral documents were signed. A thematic event was held with the participation of Russian and African relevant agencies and organizations, aimed at unlocking the potential of trilateral Russia-Egypt-Africa cooperation in trade, economic, and educational spheres.
With changing times, Africa is rapidly becoming one of the key centers of a multipolar world order. It is experiencing a second awakening. Following their long-ago political independence, African countries are increasingly insisting on respect for their sovereignty and their right to independently manage their resources and destiny. Based on these conditions, it was concluded that Moscow begins an effective and comprehensive work on preparing a new three-year Cooperation and Joint Action Plan between Russia and Africa.
Moreover, these important areas of joint practical work are already detailed in the Joint Statement, which was unanimously approved and will serve as an important guideline for future work. According to reports, the Joint Statement reflects the progress of discussions on international and regional issues, as well as matters of global significance.
Following the conference, the Joint Statement adopted reflects shared approaches to addressing challenges and a mutual commitment to strengthening multifaceted cooperation with a view to ensuring high-quality preparation for the third Russia-Africa Summit in 2026.
On December 19-20, the Second Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum was held in Cairo, Egypt. It was held for the first time on the African continent, attended by heads and representatives of the foreign policy ministries of 52 African states and the executive bodies of eight regional integration associations.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Social media platform, TikTok’s Chinese owner ByteDance has signed binding agreements with United States and global investors to operate its business in America.
Half of the joint venture will be owned by a group of investors, including Oracle, Silver Lake and the Emirati investment firm MGX, according to a memo sent by chief executive, Mr Shou Zi Chew.
The deal, which is set to close on January 22, 2026 would end years of efforts by the US government to force ByteDance to sell its US operations over national security concerns.
It is in line with a deal unveiled in September, when US President Donald Trump delayed the enforcement of a law that would ban the app unless it was sold.
In the memo, TikTok said the deal will enable “over 170 million Americans to continue discovering a world of endless possibilities as part of a vital global community”.
Under the agreement, ByteDance will retain 19.9 per cent of the business, while Oracle, Silver Lake and Abu Dhabi-based MGX will hold 15 per cent each.
Another 30.1 per cent will be held by affiliates of existing ByteDance investors, according to the memo.
The White House previously said that Oracle, which was co-founded by President Trump’s supporter Larry Ellison, will license TikTok’s recommendation algorithm as part of the deal.
The deal comes after a series of delays.
Business Post reported in April 2024 that the administration of President Joe Biden passed a law to ban the app over national security concerns, unless it was sold.
The law was set to go into effect on January 20, 2025 but was pushed back multiple times by President Trump, while his administration worked out a deal to transfer ownership.
President Trump said in September that he had spoken on the phone to China’s President Xi Jinping, who he said had given the deal the go ahead.
The platform’s future remained unclear after the leaders met face to face in October.
The app’s fate was clouded by ongoing tensions between the two nations on trade and other matters.
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