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Russia’s Real Motives in Africa Causing Some to Worry—Gruzd

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Russia's Real Motives Steven Gruzd

By Kester Kenn Klomegah

As preparations are underway for the second Russia-Africa summit planned for 2022, African leaders, politicians, academic researchers and experts have been discussing several aspects of the current state of Russia-Africa relations.

They, most often, compare it with a number of foreign countries notably China, the United States, the European Union, India, France, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea that have held such gatherings in that format with Africa.

Some have convincingly argued that Russia has moved away from its low-key strategy to vigorous relations, as shown by the first symbolic Russia-Africa summit in the Black Sea city of Sochi in October 2019.

Russia and Africa adopted a joint declaration, a comprehensive document that outlines the key objectives and necessary tasks that seek to raise assertively the entirety of relations to a new level.

Long before the summit, at least, during the past decade, several bilateral agreements between Russia and individual African countries were signed. Besides, memoranda of understanding, declaration of interests, pledges and promises dominated official speeches.

On the other side, Russia is simply invisible in economic sectors in Africa, despite boasting of decades-old solid relations with the continent.

Undoubtedly, Africa is opening up new fields of opportunity. The creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides a unique and valuable opportunity for businesses to access an integrated African market of over 1.3 billion people with a GDP of over $2.5 trillion. It aspires to connect all the regions of Africa, deepen economic integration and boost intra-African trade and investment.

Despite existing risks, challenges and threats, a number of external countries continue strengthening their economic footholds in Africa and contribute enormously towards the continent’s efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Russia has to upgrade or scale up its collaborative engagement with Africa. It has to consider seriously launching more public outreach programmes, especially working with civil society to change public perceptions and the private sector to strengthen its partnership with Africa. In order to achieve this, it has to surmount the challenges, take up the courage and work consistently with both private and public sectors and with an effective Action Plan.

In this exclusive interview, Steven Gruzd, Head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses a few questions, highlights existing challenges and passionately offers some progressive suggestions regarding Russia-African relations and the fears over Russia’s real motives in Africa.

Steven Gruzd also heads the Russia-Africa Research Programme initiated this year at SAIIA, South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent, non-government think tank, with a long and proud history of providing thought leadership in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:

What are your appreciations and fears for Russia returning to Africa?

Africa is becoming crowded, with many old and new actors actively involved on the continent. Apart from EU countries, China and the US, we have players such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, the UAE, Japan and others.

So, Russia’s renewed interest in Africa does not happen in isolation. It, of course, seeks to build on Soviet-era ties, and several African leaders today studied in the USSR or the Soviet sphere of influence. Russia has tended to focus on niche areas such as weapons sales, nuclear energy and resource extraction, at a much smaller scale than China.

Many leaders are welcoming the attention of Russia, but some remain wary of Russia’s hidden motives and intentions. Russia’s dealings are not transparent and open compared to China. The shadowy world of private military companies such as Russia’s Wagner Group is causing concern in unstable countries like the CAR, Libya and Mali. So, in fact, there is a kind of mixed picture, sentiments and interpretations are also varied here.

How would you argue that Russia engages fairly in “competition for cooperation” in Africa?

Africa is a busy geopolitical arena, with many players operating. Russia has to compete against them, and distinctively remain focused its efforts. Russia welcomes diplomatic support from African countries, and unlike the West, it does not demand good governance or advocate for human rights reforms.

Russia likes to portray itself as not interfering in local politics or judging African countries, even though there is mounting evidence that it has been involved in meddling in elections in Africa through disinformation, fake news and attempting to exploit fault lines in societies through social media.

Do you think, to some extent, Russia is fighting neo-colonial tendencies, as shown in Guinea, Mali, CAR and Sudan? Does it imply that Russia supports military leaders in Africa?

Russia uses the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in its engagement with Africa, and that it is fighting neo-colonialism from the West, especially in relations with their former colonies. It sees France as a threat to its interests especially in Francophone West Africa, the Maghreb and the Sahel.

Russia has invested resources in developing French-language news media, and engages in anti-French media activity, including through social media. I think Russia has its own economic and political interests in countries like Guinea, Mali, CAR and Sudan, even if it uses the language of fighting neo-colonialism. It explicitly appears that Russia supports several undemocratic African leaders and their regimes.

Some experts have argued that Russia’s diplomacy is full of bilateral agreements, largely not implemented, and gamut of pledges and promises. What are your views about these?

I would largely agree that there is a divide between what has been pledged and promised at high-level meetings and summits, compared to what has actually materialised on the ground. There is more talk than action, and in most cases down the years mere intentions and ideas have been officially presented as initiatives already in progress. It will be interesting to see what has been concretely achieved in reports at the second Russia-Africa summit scheduled for late 2022.

From the above discussions so far, what do you think are Russia’s challenges and setbacks in Africa?

Africa is a crowded playing field. Russia does not have the same resources and approaches as China, France, UK or US, so it has limited impact. The language barrier could be used as an excuse, but Russia has the great possibility to leverage into the Soviet- and Russian-trained diaspora. On the other hand, Russia feels it is unfairly portrayed in Western media, so that is another perception it seeks to change. It can change the perception by supporting public outreach programmes.

Working closely with the academic community, such as the South African Institute of International Affairs and similar ones throughout Africa, is one potential instrument to raise its public image. In places like Mozambique and the CAR, the Wagner Group left after incurring human losses – does Russia have staying power?

As it prepares to hold the second Russia-Africa summit in 2022, what could be the expectations for Africa? What to do ultimately with the first Joint Declaration from Sochi?

As already mentioned, there needs to be a lot of tangible progress on the ground for the second summit to show impact. It is worth reiterating here that African countries will expect more debt relief and solid investment from Russian businesses.

In terms of political support at places like the UN Security Council, there is close interaction between Russia and the African States, but as recent research by SAIIA shows, not as much as assumed. (https://saiia.org.za/research/walking-with-the-bear-russia-and-the-a3-in-the-un-security-council/). The relationship has to however deliver and move from words to deeds.

In conclusion, I would suggest that Russia has to take up both the challenges and unique opportunities and attempt to scale up its influence by working consistently on practical multifaceted sustainable development issues and by maintaining appreciable relations with Africa.

On the other side, African countries likewise have to devise viable strategies for engaging with Russia.

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Trump’s Tariffs, Russia and Africa Trade Cooperation in Emerging Multipolar World

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Trump's Tariffs

By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh

With geopolitical situation heightening, trade wars are also becoming increasingly prominent. The 47th United States President Donald Trump has introduced trade tariffs, splashed it over the world. China, an Asian trade giant and an emerging economic superpower, has its highest shared.

South Africa, struggling with its fragile foreign alliances, is seriously navigating the new United States economic policy and trade measures, at least to maintain its membership in the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) which is going to expire in September 2025.

It is a well-known fact that AGOA waived duties on most commodities from Africa in order to boost trade in American market. The AGOA also offers many African countries trade preferences in the American market, earning huge revenues for their budgets. Financial remittances back to Africa also play mighty roles across the continent from the United States.

That however, the shifting geopolitical situation combined with Trump’s new trade policies and Russia’s rising interest in Africa, the overarching message for African leaders and business corporate executives is to review the level of degree how to appreciably approach and strengthen trade partnership between Africa and Russia.

The notion of a new global order and frequently phrased multipolar world, indicating the construction of a fairer architecture of interaction, in practical terms, has become like a relic and just as a monumental pillar. Even as we watch the full-blown recalibration of power, the geopolitical reshuffling undoubtedly creates the conditions for new forms of cooperation.

In this current era of contradictions and complexities we are witnessing today, we must rather reshape and redefine rules and regulations to facilitate bilateral and multilateral relations between African countries and Russia, if really Russia seeks to forge post-Soviet strategic economic cooperation with Africa.

In fact, post-Soviet in the sense that trade is not concentrate on state-to-state but also private – including, at least, medium scale businesses. The new policy dealing with realities of the geopolitical world, distinctively different from Soviet-era slogans and rhetorics of ‘international friendship and solidarity’ of those days.

Bridging Africa and Russia, at least in the literal sense of the word, necessitates partial departure from theoretical approach to implementing several bilateral and multilateral decisions, better still agreements reached at previous summits and conferences during the past decade.

Understandably Africa has a stage, Russia termed ‘the struggle against neo-colonial tendencies’ and mounting the metal walls against the ‘scrambling of resources’ across Africa. Some experts argued that Africa, at the current stage, has to develop its regions, modernize most the post-independence-era industries to produce exportable goods, not only for domestic consumption. Now the emphasis is on pushing for prospects of a single continental market, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).

This initiative, however, must be strategically and well-coordinated well, and here I suggest integration and cooperation starting at country-wide basis to regional level before it broadly goes to the entire continent, consisting 54 independent states.

These are coordinated together as African Union (AU), which in January 2021 initiated the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). With this trading goals in mind, Africa as a continent has to integrate, promote trade and economic cooperation, engage in investment and development. In that direction, genuine foreign partners are indiscriminately required, foreign investment capital in essential for collaboration as well as their entrepreneurial skills and technical expertise.

For instance, developing relations with Asian giants such China and India, the European Union and the United States. A number of African countries are shifting to the BRICS orbit, in search for feasible alternative opportunities, for the theatrical trade drama. In the Eurasian region and the former Soviet space, Kazakhstan and Russia stand out, as potential partners, for Africa.

Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov has said, at the podium before the staff and students at Moscow State Institute of International Affairs in September, that trade between Russia and Africa would grow further as more and more African partners continued to show interest in having Russians in the economic sectors in Africa. This provides greater competition between the companies from Western countries, China, and Russia. With competition for developing mineral resources in Africa, it is easier and cheaper for African colleagues to choose partners.

As far back in October 2010, Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry posted an official report on its website that traditional products from least developed countries (including Africa) would be exempted from import tariffs. The legislation stipulated that the traditional goods are eligible for preferential customs and tariffs treatment.

Thereafter, Minister Sergey Lavrov has reiterated, in speeches, trade preferences for African exporters, but terribly failed to honour these thunderous promises. Notwithstanding the above granting trade preferences, there prevailing multitude of questions relating to the pathways of improving trade transactions, and removing obstacles including those Soviet-era rules and regulations.

Logistics is another torny hurdle. Further to this, Russian financial institutions can offer credit support that will allow to localize Russian production in Africa’s industrial zones, especially southern and eastern African regions that show some stability and have good investment and business incentives.

In order to operate more effectively, Russians have to risk by investing, recognize the importance of cooperation on key investment issues and to work closely on the challenges and opportunities on the continent. On one hand, analyzing the present landscape of Africa, Russia can export its technology and compete on equal terms with China, India and other prominent players. On the other hand, Russia lacks the competitive advantage in terms of finished industrial (manufactured) products that African consumers obtain from Asian countries such as China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Compared to the United States and Europe, Russia did very little after the Cold War and it is doing little even today in Africa. On 27th–28th July 2023, St Petersburg hosted the second Russia-Africa summit. At the plenary session, President Vladimir Putin underscored the fact that there was, prior to the collapse of the Soviet, there were over 330 large infrastructure and industrial facilities in Africa, but most were lost. Regarding trade, Putin, regrettably, noted Russia’s trade turnover with the African countries increased in 2022 and reached almost US$18 billion, (of course, that was 2022).

Arguably, Russia’s economic presence is invisible across Africa. It currently has insignificant trade statistics. Until the end of the first quarter of 2025, Russia still has a little over $20 billion trade volume with Africa. Statistics on Africa’s trade with foreign countries vary largely.

For example, the total United States two-way trade in Africa has actually fallen off in recent years, to about $60 billion, far eclipsed by the European Union with over $240 billion, and China more than $280 billion, according to a website post by the Brookings Institution.

According to the African Development Bank, Africa’s economy is growing faster than those of any other regions. Nearly half of Africa is now classified as middle income countries, the numbers of Africans living below the poverty line fell to 39 percent as compared to 51 percent in 2023, and around 380 million of Africa’s 1.4 billion people are now earning good incomes – rising consumerism – that makes trade profitable.

Nevertheless, there is great potential, as African leaders and entrepreneurial community are turing to Russia for multifaceted cooperation due to the imperialist approach of the United States and its hegemonic stand triggered over the years, and now with Trump new trade tariffs and Washington’s entire African policy.

China has done its part, Russia has to change and adopt new rules and regulations, pragmatic approach devoid of mere frequent rhetorics. It is important discussing these points, and to shamelessly repeat that both Russia and Africa have to make consistent efforts to look for new ways, practical efforts at removing existing obstacles that have impeded trade over the years.

Sprawling from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean, Russia is a major great power and has the potential to become a superpower. Russia can regain part of its Soviet-era economic power and political influence in present-day Africa.

Certainly, the expected superpower status has to be attained by practical multifaceted sustainable development and by maintaining an appreciably positive relations with Africa. We have come a long way, especially after the resonating first summit (2019 and high-praised second summit (2023), several bilateral agreements are yet to be implemented. The forthcoming Russia – Africa Partnership summit is slated for 2026, inside Africa and preferably in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Kestér Kenn Klomegâh is a frequent and passionate contributor. During his professional career as a researcher specialising in Russia-Africa policy, which spans nearly two decades, he has been detained and questioned several times by Russian federal security services for reporting facts. Most of his well-resourced articles are reprinted in a number of reputable foreign media.

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Tariff War Threatens Global Economy, US-China Goods Trade By 80%—WTO DG

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Okonjo-Iweala

By Adedapo Adesanya

The Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Mrs Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has said the US-China tariff war could reduce trade in goods between the two economic giants by 80 per cent and hurt the rest of the world economy.

President Donald Trump raised tariffs on China to 125 per cent on Wednesday as the world’s two largest economies fought over retaliatory levies.

The American President earlier ramped up duties on Chinese goods to 104 per cent, only to hike them further when China retaliated by raising tariffs on US imports to 84 per cent.

In a social media post announcing the moves, President Trump said China had been singled out for special treatment because of “the lack of respect that China has shown to the world’s markets.”

In her reaction to the development, the WTO DG said in a statement that, “The escalating trade tensions between the United States and China pose a significant risk of a sharp contraction in bilateral trade. Our preliminary projections suggest that merchandise trade between these two economies could decrease by as much as 80 per cent.”

She said the United States and China account for three per cent of world trade and warned that the conflict could “severely damage the global economic outlook”.

Even as he slapped further tariffs on China, Mr Trump paused higher tariffs on the rest of the world for 90 days, claiming that dozens of countries reached out for negotiations.

Mrs Okonjo-Iweala warned that the world economy risked breaking into two blocs, one centred around the United States and the other China.

“Of particular concern is the potential fragmentation of global trade along geopolitical lines. A division of the global economy into two blocs could lead to a long-term reduction in global real GDP by nearly seven percent,” she said.

She urged all WTO members “to address this challenge through cooperation and dialogue.”

“It is critical for the global community to work together to preserve the openness of the international trading system.”

“WTO members have agency to protect the open, rules-based trading system. The WTO serves as a vital platform for dialogue. Resolving these issues within a cooperative framework is essential,” she added.

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AFC Tops $1bn Revenue in 2024 Financial Year

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Africa Finance Corporation

By Adedapo Adesanya

Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), the continent’s top infrastructure solutions provider, has announced its strongest financial performance to date, with total revenue for the year ended December 31, 2024 surpassing $ 1 billion for the first time in its history.

This record performance marks a significant milestone in AFC’s mission to close Africa’s infrastructure gap through scalable, de-risked investments that attract global capital and deliver tangible development outcomes.

The corporation posted a 22.8 per cent increase in total revenue to US$1.1 billion and a 22.3 per cent rise in total comprehensive income to $400 million, up from $327 million in 2023.

AFC’s earnings growth was driven by improved asset yields, prudent cost-of-funds management and sustained traction in advisory mandates.

Further significant financial highlights include net interest income up 42.5 per cent to $ 613.6 million; fee and commission income rose to $109 million, the highest in over five years; operating income climbed 42.7 per cent to $709.7 million; total assets reached a record $14.4 billion, a 16.7 per cent year-on-year increase; liquidity coverage ratio strengthened to 194 per cent, providing over 34 months of cover; and cost-to-income ratio improved to 17.3 per cent from 19.6 per cent in 2023.

According to a statement, AFC said throughout 2024 it continued to scale its impact by mobilising capital for landmark projects across energy, transport, and natural resources.

These included the Lobito Corridor – a cross-border railway development spanning Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Zambia. AFC led the initiative to secure a concession agreement within one year of the initial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), an unprecedented achievement for a project of its scale. In the DRC, AFC also invested $150 million in the Kamoa-Kakula Copper Complex, Africa’s largest copper producer and one of the most sustainable globally, thanks to its high-grade ore and renewable-powered smelter.

Other milestones transactions included financing support for the commissioning of the Dangote Refinery, the largest in Africa, and continued progress on AFC-backed Infinity Power Holding’s 10 GW clean energy ambition, with power purchase agreements secured in Egypt and South Africa.

AFC also invested in the 15GW Xlinks Morocco-UK Power Project, providing $14.1 million to support early-stage development of a transcontinental renewable energy pipeline between North Africa and Europe.

AFC strengthened its capital base and expanded its investor network through several landmark funding initiatives. These included a $ 1.16 billion syndicated loan – the largest in its history, a $500 million perpetual hybrid bond issue, and the successful execution of Nigeria’s first-ever domestic dollar bond, which raised $900 million at 180 per cent oversubscription.

AFC also returned to the Islamic finance market after eight years, closing a $400 million Shariah-compliant facility.

The year also saw strong momentum in equity mobilisation, with $181.8 million in new capital raised from ten institutional investors. These included Turk Eximbank – AFC’s first non-African sovereign shareholder – the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), and several major pension funds spanning Cameroon, Seychelles, Mauritius, and South Africa. Ratings agencies affirmed AFC’s robust credit profile, with AAA ratings from S&P Global (China) and China Chengxin International, and a stable A3 Outlook from Moody’s.

Speaking on the result, Ms Samaila Zubairu, President & CEO of AFC said, “These results send a clear message that strategic investment in African infrastructure creates lasting value for both beneficiaries and investors.”

“In 2024, we exceeded the billion-dollar revenue mark, delivered game-changing projects, and reinforced our financial resilience—demonstrating the scalability of our unique model that blends purpose with performance to accelerate Africa’s economic transformation,” she added.

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