World
Russia’s Real Motives in Africa Causing Some to Worry—Gruzd
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
As preparations are underway for the second Russia-Africa summit planned for 2022, African leaders, politicians, academic researchers and experts have been discussing several aspects of the current state of Russia-Africa relations.
They, most often, compare it with a number of foreign countries notably China, the United States, the European Union, India, France, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea that have held such gatherings in that format with Africa.
Some have convincingly argued that Russia has moved away from its low-key strategy to vigorous relations, as shown by the first symbolic Russia-Africa summit in the Black Sea city of Sochi in October 2019.
Russia and Africa adopted a joint declaration, a comprehensive document that outlines the key objectives and necessary tasks that seek to raise assertively the entirety of relations to a new level.
Long before the summit, at least, during the past decade, several bilateral agreements between Russia and individual African countries were signed. Besides, memoranda of understanding, declaration of interests, pledges and promises dominated official speeches.
On the other side, Russia is simply invisible in economic sectors in Africa, despite boasting of decades-old solid relations with the continent.
Undoubtedly, Africa is opening up new fields of opportunity. The creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides a unique and valuable opportunity for businesses to access an integrated African market of over 1.3 billion people with a GDP of over $2.5 trillion. It aspires to connect all the regions of Africa, deepen economic integration and boost intra-African trade and investment.
Despite existing risks, challenges and threats, a number of external countries continue strengthening their economic footholds in Africa and contribute enormously towards the continent’s efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Russia has to upgrade or scale up its collaborative engagement with Africa. It has to consider seriously launching more public outreach programmes, especially working with civil society to change public perceptions and the private sector to strengthen its partnership with Africa. In order to achieve this, it has to surmount the challenges, take up the courage and work consistently with both private and public sectors and with an effective Action Plan.
In this exclusive interview, Steven Gruzd, Head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses a few questions, highlights existing challenges and passionately offers some progressive suggestions regarding Russia-African relations and the fears over Russia’s real motives in Africa.
Steven Gruzd also heads the Russia-Africa Research Programme initiated this year at SAIIA, South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent, non-government think tank, with a long and proud history of providing thought leadership in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
What are your appreciations and fears for Russia returning to Africa?
Africa is becoming crowded, with many old and new actors actively involved on the continent. Apart from EU countries, China and the US, we have players such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, the UAE, Japan and others.
So, Russia’s renewed interest in Africa does not happen in isolation. It, of course, seeks to build on Soviet-era ties, and several African leaders today studied in the USSR or the Soviet sphere of influence. Russia has tended to focus on niche areas such as weapons sales, nuclear energy and resource extraction, at a much smaller scale than China.
Many leaders are welcoming the attention of Russia, but some remain wary of Russia’s hidden motives and intentions. Russia’s dealings are not transparent and open compared to China. The shadowy world of private military companies such as Russia’s Wagner Group is causing concern in unstable countries like the CAR, Libya and Mali. So, in fact, there is a kind of mixed picture, sentiments and interpretations are also varied here.
How would you argue that Russia engages fairly in “competition for cooperation” in Africa?
Africa is a busy geopolitical arena, with many players operating. Russia has to compete against them, and distinctively remain focused its efforts. Russia welcomes diplomatic support from African countries, and unlike the West, it does not demand good governance or advocate for human rights reforms.
Russia likes to portray itself as not interfering in local politics or judging African countries, even though there is mounting evidence that it has been involved in meddling in elections in Africa through disinformation, fake news and attempting to exploit fault lines in societies through social media.
Do you think, to some extent, Russia is fighting neo-colonial tendencies, as shown in Guinea, Mali, CAR and Sudan? Does it imply that Russia supports military leaders in Africa?
Russia uses the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in its engagement with Africa, and that it is fighting neo-colonialism from the West, especially in relations with their former colonies. It sees France as a threat to its interests especially in Francophone West Africa, the Maghreb and the Sahel.
Russia has invested resources in developing French-language news media, and engages in anti-French media activity, including through social media. I think Russia has its own economic and political interests in countries like Guinea, Mali, CAR and Sudan, even if it uses the language of fighting neo-colonialism. It explicitly appears that Russia supports several undemocratic African leaders and their regimes.
Some experts have argued that Russia’s diplomacy is full of bilateral agreements, largely not implemented, and gamut of pledges and promises. What are your views about these?
I would largely agree that there is a divide between what has been pledged and promised at high-level meetings and summits, compared to what has actually materialised on the ground. There is more talk than action, and in most cases down the years mere intentions and ideas have been officially presented as initiatives already in progress. It will be interesting to see what has been concretely achieved in reports at the second Russia-Africa summit scheduled for late 2022.
From the above discussions so far, what do you think are Russia’s challenges and setbacks in Africa?
Africa is a crowded playing field. Russia does not have the same resources and approaches as China, France, UK or US, so it has limited impact. The language barrier could be used as an excuse, but Russia has the great possibility to leverage into the Soviet- and Russian-trained diaspora. On the other hand, Russia feels it is unfairly portrayed in Western media, so that is another perception it seeks to change. It can change the perception by supporting public outreach programmes.
Working closely with the academic community, such as the South African Institute of International Affairs and similar ones throughout Africa, is one potential instrument to raise its public image. In places like Mozambique and the CAR, the Wagner Group left after incurring human losses – does Russia have staying power?
As it prepares to hold the second Russia-Africa summit in 2022, what could be the expectations for Africa? What to do ultimately with the first Joint Declaration from Sochi?
As already mentioned, there needs to be a lot of tangible progress on the ground for the second summit to show impact. It is worth reiterating here that African countries will expect more debt relief and solid investment from Russian businesses.
In terms of political support at places like the UN Security Council, there is close interaction between Russia and the African States, but as recent research by SAIIA shows, not as much as assumed. (https://saiia.org.za/research/walking-with-the-bear-russia-and-the-a3-in-the-un-security-council/). The relationship has to however deliver and move from words to deeds.
In conclusion, I would suggest that Russia has to take up both the challenges and unique opportunities and attempt to scale up its influence by working consistently on practical multifaceted sustainable development issues and by maintaining appreciable relations with Africa.
On the other side, African countries likewise have to devise viable strategies for engaging with Russia.
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
For three working days, 9th –11th January 2025, in the Speke Resort Conference Centre in Uganda’s capital, Kampala, the African Union Commission (AUC) will host the Extraordinary Summit on the Post-Malabo Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). This Summit is supported by the Government of Uganda.
The event is organized jointly by the African Union Commission, Department of Agriculture Rural Development Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (DARBE) and African Union Development Agency- New Partnership African Development (AUDA-NEPAD).
Dignitaries will deliver statements on the consideration of the Kampala Declaration, the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Ten-Year Strategy and Action Plan (2026-2035); the draft Statute of Africa Food Safety Agency; and the report on selection of African Union Centres of Excellence for Research and Training in Fisheries, Aquaculture, Aquatic Biodiversity Conservation and Ecosystems Management.
The Objectives of the Summit:
The convening of the extraordinary session of the Assembly is specifically to:
Endorse the draft Kampala CAADP Declaration. The draft declaration provides a vision for transforming Africa’s Agrifood Systems for the period: 2026-2035.
Endorse Ten-Year CAADP Strategy and Action Plan: 2026-2035. This plan provides details on how to achieve the goals and targets in the draft Kampala CAADP Declaration.
Risk Management and Mitigation
The post-Malabo CAADP strategy will span ten years, from 2626 to 2035. Given the longtime horizon, many risks and uncertainties could affect the strategic positioning of the agri-food systems transformation agenda to deliver on its goals. There are external socioeconomic, environmental, and other shocks that might come up, which will demand that the strategy be agile enough to respond to such unforeseen developments. The strategy will therefore call for institutional adaptation to changes in a complex and rapidly changing context. Major risks and uncertainties will need to be identified and outlined together with their respective mitigation actions.
Key interventions to ensure better risk management include:
- Identify potential risks (e.g., political instability, climate change) and put in place mechanisms for dealing with or mitigating such risks
- Identify health crises, including pandemics or epidemics, early and develop mechanisms for minimizing negative impacts
- Identify and address gender inequalities or biases and restrictive social norms that may limit the access of women and youth to education, resources, and decision making processes thereby preventing them from fully participating in and benefiting from agricultural activities or initiatives
- Invest in durable peace because it is essential for building resilient agri-food systems (from the local to global levels) and affects agricultural production, food security, market access, investment, resilience, and social cohesion. Establishing and maintaining peace is critical for enabling long-lasting investment to unlock the full potential of Africa’s agri-food systems. The Kampala CAADP Declaration will need to emphasize establishing conflict-resolution mechanisms at the community level while strengthening local markets and value chains.
- Promote household insurance and other coping mechanisms that can help mitigate the impact of health shocks on livelihoods. These mechanisms will be key to enhancing the resilience of communities.
- Enhance public health surveillance systems to detect and respond to health threats, including of zoonotic origin. It will also be important to strengthen food safety measures to prevent health shocks related to foodborne diseases.
- Financial resources will be required to achieve the Kampala CAADP declaration’s resilience objectives. Specifically, households need access to credit, savings, and other financial instruments that help them weather economic shocks.
- Food price monitoring: It will be necessary to implement policies that stabilize food markets and prevent price volatility to ensure a steady supply of food and agricultural inputs.
- Capacities development of African governments to formulate resilience-focused policy measures is a critical step and a priority for the CAADP Strategy and Action Plan. Mainstreaming resilience-focused policies will trickle down to operational actions led by various stakeholders towards sustainable agri-food systems.
Background: The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) has been crucial in driving agricultural transformation across Africa since its inception in 2003. The program is aimed at increasing food security and nutrition, reducing rural poverty, creating employment, and contributing to economic development while safeguarding the environment. CAADP aims for a 6% annual growth rate in the agricultural sector, with African Union member states allocating at least 10% of their budgets to agriculture.
Building on the Maputo Declaration (2003-2013), the 2014 Malabo CAADP Declaration renewed commitment to CAADP and established ambitious goals for 2025, including eradicating hunger, reducing malnutrition, tripling intra-African trade, and building resilience of livelihoods and production systems. The Malabo Declaration underscored the importance of mutual accountability through agricultural biennial reviews and recognized the essential role of related sectors like infrastructure and rural development. During the Thirty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly in February 2024, the Heads of State and Government expressed concern that the continent is not on track to meet the Malabo CAADP goals and targets by 2025. This has spurred a call for the development of a post-Malabo CAADP agenda to build resilient agri-food systems.
It is in this context that the An Extraordinary Summit of The African Union Assembly of Heads of States and Governments is scheduled for January 9th to 11th 2025 in Kampala, Uganda, to deliberate on the post-Malabo CAADP agenda to consider the draft Ten-Year CAADP Strategy and Action Plan with its associated draft Kampala Declaration on Advancing Africa’s Inclusive Agrifood Systems Transformation for Sustainable Economic Growth and Shared Prosperity.
Format and Structure of the Summit: The Extraordinary Summit will start with a one-day meeting of the Ministers responsible for Agriculture, Rural Development Water and Environment on the 9th of January 2025, to be followed by Joint Session of the Ministers of Agriculture, Rural Development, Water and Environment together with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the 10th of January 2025.
The sessions will feature two presentations the: i) draft CAADP Ten-Year Strategy and Action Plan (2026-2035); ii) draft Kampala CAADP Declaration and both will be done in closed sessions. The Ministerial sessions will be structured to encourage inclusive and interactive conversations and dialogue among the Ministers, as well as between the Ministers and key strategic stakeholders. At the same time, it will enable the Ministers to review the strategic documents presented to them for their consideration and recommendations to the Assembly.
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government will convene on the 11th of January 2025 to endorse the: i) draft Ten-Year CAADP Strategy and Action Plan (2026-2035); ii) draft Kampala CAADP Declaration.
Participants: The Extraordinary Summit on the CAADP Agenda will be attended by Heads of States and Government of the African Union Member State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, PRCs, Ministers and Experts in-Charge of Agriculture (forestry, fisheries, crops and livestock), Rural Development, Water and Environment, RECs, Youth, Women, Non-State Actors, Media, Academia and Development Partners
African Union: The AU is guided by its vision of “An Integrated, Prosperous and Peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.” The African Union (AU) is a continental body consisting of the 55 member states that make up the countries of the African Continent. To ensure the realisation of its objectives and the attainment of the Pan African Vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, Agenda 2063 was developed as a strategic framework for Africa’s long term socio-economic and integrative transformation. Agenda 2063 calls for greater collaboration and support for African led initiatives to ensure the achievement of the aspirations of African people.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Global food commodity prices declined by 2.1 per cent in 2024 compared to the previous year, 2023, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) said on Friday.
However, it warned they remain considerably higher than before the COVID-19 pandemic.
The UN FAO overall Food Price Index averaged 122.0 points — 2.6 points or 2.1 per cent lower than the average value in 2023Food prices increased over the course of the year, with the index climbing from 117.6 points in January to 127.0 in December.
The index rose 6.7 per cent from December 2023 to 2024, with meat, dairy and food oils accounting for the increase.
The UN’s food agency tracks monthly and global changes in the international prices of a set of globally traded commodities.
The disruption to global trade during the COVID-19 pandemic initially saw food prices dip but they later climbed higher amid the surge in inflation as the global economy rebounded.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent them spiking to records since both nations are major wheat exporters, but efforts to ensure shipments were not blocked led to prices easing lower until the beginning of 2024.
The dip in the average value for the index between 2023 and 2024 was mainly due to falls in cereals and sugar prices.
Cereals dropped 13.3 points compared to 2023 underpinned by lower wheat and coarse grain prices, marking a second annual decline from the 2022 record level.
The Sugar Price Index averaged 125.8 points, down 19.2 points (13.2 per cent) from 2023 mainly reflecting record-high exports from Brazil during the year and a positive global supply outlook for the 2024/25 season
The decreases were offset in part by a 9.4-per cent rise in the vegetable oil price index.
In 2024 as a whole, the FAO Dairy Price Index averaged 129.6 points, up 5.8 points (4.7 per cent) from 2023. This increase was mainly attributed to a sharp surge in butter prices, on the back of a high global demand and constrained exportable supplies, resulting from erratic weather patterns that negatively impacted production.
For meat prices, they averaged 117.2 points, up 3.1 points (2.7 per cent) from 2023. This was driven by robust import demand from key meat-importing countries, amid slower global production growth.
This sustained higher average prices for bovine (cattle), ovine (sheep), and poultry meats, while average pig meat prices declined, prompted by subdued import demand, particularly from China.
By Adedapo Adesanya
Nigeria has won a prolonged legal battle to recover over $6 million in arms funds that had been seized by the United States government since 2014.
The funds were seized about a decade ago from an arms broker, who was trying to supply military equipment from the US to Nigeria without having the necessary licence.
The US government said the arms broker’s active involvement in the sale, export, and supply of military products to Nigeria without authorisation was a violation of the Arms Export Control Act, leading to the seizure of the funds.
However, in a ruling on December 23, the US District Court for Eastern California ordered the release of the funds totalling about $6.02 million after confirming Nigeria’s interest in it.
Judge Jenniffer Thurston issued a permanent order of forfeiture of the money in favour of Nigeria, modifying the earlier January 2020 preliminary order forfeiting the assets to the US government.
The judge ordered the US government to release the money with the accrued interests to the Nigerian government within 60 days.
“Within sixty (60) days from entry of this Stipulation for Final Order of Forfeiture and Order Thereon, the US Customs and Border Protection shall return the above-listed assets to Petitioner, along with any interest earned by the United States while on deposit in an interest-bearing account,” a copy of the court order said.
For context, Nigeria had paid agents for the purchase of military equipment during the peak of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2014, but received neither the funds nor the equipment it intended to purchase.
The deal ran into a roadblock in August 2014 when the US government denied approval to purchase and export the arms to Nigeria because the agents were not approved to carry out the deal.
The US government seized the money, describing it as the proceeds of a violation of its Arms Export Control Act, on the grounds that the agency did not have the licence to engage in the sale, export, import and brokering of military products at the time.
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