Feature/OPED
13% Derivation, DESOPADEC and Oil and Gas Host Communities
By Jerome-Mario Chijioke Utomi
A cursory look at the oil and gas host communities in Delta State reveals an area tensed up with a lot of issues, intrigues and hiccups. Their anger in the present moment, going by media reports, is precipitated by the alleged opaque manner the former governor of the state, Ifeanyi Okowa, managed the 13% oil derivation fund that accrued to the state.
Correspondingly, it will not be characterized as hasty to conclude that there is presently in Delta State no agency or commission that is troubled as the Delta State Oil Producing Area Development Commission (DESOPADEC), an agency created by the enabling Act in Delta State to secure 50% of the 13% oil derivation fund accruing to the Delta State government and the received sum used for rehabilitation and development of oil-producing areas of the state as well as carry out other development projects as may be determined from time to time.
Supporting the above assertions is a recent statement by Edwin Clark, convener of the Pan-Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), where he alleged that Ifeanyi Okowa misappropriated the state’s derivation fund amounting to N1.760 trillion.
Pa Edwin’s bombshell was followed in quick succession by a protest staged in Abuja by representatives of the Delta State oil and gas host communities, calling on the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) to investigate the immediate past Governor for allegedly misappropriating over N1 trillion oil derivation fund belonging to the state during his tenure.
While the coastal dwellers, in their statement, insisted that the former governor unlawfully diverted the aforementioned sum, the former Governor’s men are at work, thwarting every attempt to rubbish the reputation of their former boss.
For instance, the immediate-past Commissioner for Information in Delta State, Ehiedu Charles Aniagwu, recently told the world that all the money Okowa’s administration got from Federation Account Allocation Committee, including derivation for the whole period in office amounted to N2.1 trillion and therefore described as wild goose chase HOSTCOM’s narrative on N1 trillion.
But in all this, what this piece observed could be safely categorized into three parts; first, Senator Okowa’s led government brought to the oil and gas host communities flashes of streets/internal roads.
Beyond this acknowledgement, there also exists in the state a deeply neglected coastal area which doubles as oil and gas host communities where poverty, disease and illiteracy walked their creeks, rivers and estuaries and, as a resultant effect, forced many children out of school, not because of their unwillingness to learn, but occasioned by non-availability/provision of schools in the area by the government. These are verifiable facts!
A movement by boat from Egbema Kingdom in Warri North Local Government Council to Gbaramatu Kingdom in Warri South, from Ogulaha Kingdom in Burutu Local Government to Kabowe in Patani Local Government Area, down to Bomadi Local Government Local Councils, among others, reveals a seemingly similar experience. They are all oil and gas-bearing kingdoms and communities and play host to major crude oil platforms operated by International Oil Companies (IOCs) but they have nothing to show for it.
Secondly, without going into a critical analysis of claims by Okowa that DESOPADEC got what was due to it according to the law establishing it, this piece believes that such declaration on DESOPADEC receiving a total of N208 billion in the eight years of his administration, as its rightful statutory funds appear inaccurate and, therefore, cannot hold water when faced with embarrassing arguments.
DESOPADEC, as noted in the first paragraph, is to secure 50% of the 13% oil derivation fund accruing to the Delta State government. With this in mind, is the former Governor saying that it was only N416 billion that accrued as 13% derivation to the state in the past 8 years, which summed DESOPADEC’s statutory 50% to N208 billion? Again, instead of giving a cumulative amount received from the Federation Account Allocation Committee, what stops the former Governor and his supporters from specifying the exact amount received as a 13% derivation?
While answer(s) to the above questions raised is awaited, the third and most dramatic point is DESOPADEC-specific. The non-satisfactory development of the area within this period under review, in my view, remains an emblematic sign that the affairs of the coastal areas of the state were handed over to a bunch of politicians masquerading as leaders but lacking public leadership acumen and orientation. To use the words of a public affairs commentator, they were people that ‘spend more time with wines than with books’.
Aside from turning the coastal part of the state into an endangered species via human capital neglect and infrastructural abandonment, these ‘leaders’, in turn, neglected community relations and communication. And because of this non-participatory leadership style and engagement, each time communities ask for bread, the agency makes ‘stones’ available and when the communities ask for fish, DESOPADEC provides a ‘snake’.
This piece will highlight two recent separate but related examples to support the above claims.
In October 2022, it was in the news that in the face of grave developmental challenges confronting the coastal dwellers in the state crying for attention, DESOPADEC leadership, against all known logic, opted for the donation of 50 grass-cutting machines to the people of Okerenkoko community in Gbaramatu Kingdom, Warri South-Local Government Area of Delta state. Presenting the machines, the DESOPADEC commissioner noted that the donation of grass-cutting machines to the community was statutorily captured in the commission’s 2021 budget, adding that the project was principally influenced by him”.
Those who are not conversant with the Okerenkoko community and may be tempted to believe that the donation was a right step taken in the right direction may see nothing wrong with the donation. But for someone that is familiar with the aforementioned community, the decision to donate these machines qualifies as a misguided priority.
In fact, there is everything wrong with the development. For instance, there is evidence which points to the fact that the community was neither consulted nor carried along before the decision was made. In the opinion of this piece, the grass-cutting machine donation failed the NEEDS assessment stipulations.
The words of the youth leader from the community support this assertion.
Reacting to the development, the youth leader who spoke on behalf of the community, among other things, said, “We heard about the ongoing skill acquisition. We are appealing to the Commissioner to at least create some avenue for those skill acquisitions for our ladies, for the youth in this community so that they can go out there and learn skills to back themselves, put themselves in order.”
From the above comment, one thing stands out: if given the opportunity, these knowledge-hungry youths in the community, who will provide the future leadership needs of the country, would have opted for skill acquisition. Instead of grass-cutting machines, the youths in the community would have preferred access to good schools where they would learn and compete with their peers across the globe. They were not just asking for more; rather, they asked for something new, different and more beneficial to their future.
Similarly, in November 2022, barely one month after, It was again reported that DESOPADEC leadership invited the Local Government Chairmen of Burutu, Bomadi, Patani and Warri South West Local Government Areas of the state, to a shop in Warri City, Delta State, where it handed over relief materials purchased for the victims of the flood that ravaged almost all the communities/villages in the aforementioned local government councils.
The items distributed to the affected local governments were bags of garri, bags of rice, bags of onions, bags of beans, noodles, vegetable oil, palm oil, toiletries, and foams, among others.
While the donation to flood victims is understandable, commendable and appreciated, some questions immediately come to mind as to why DESOPADEC management decided to be compassionate by proxy. What prevented DESOPADEC management from visiting the real victims of the flood to empathize with them personally? Is DESOPADEC management unaware that, in the applied sense of the word, the real empathy lies more in the visit and emotional consolation of the flood victims than the so-called relief material sent through a proxy? What will it cost DESOPADEC to pay a visit to these villages/communities in creeks?
What is the distance from Warri to Patani, Burutu and Bomadi that DESOPADEC management cannot send a delegation? How will DESPODEC management ensure/ascertain that the relief materials get to the targeted beneficiaries without getting lost in transit or misdirected? If DESOPADEC management cannot visit the creeks in this crisis period, what time will be more/most suitable to visit these people?
Even as this ugly leadership situation ‘blossoms’ in the coastal communities of Delta State, the truth remains that if we look hard enough at the moment, we shall, as a people, discover that the challenge confronting the region is not too difficult to grasp. Rather, the challenge flourishes because agencies such as DESOPADEC and their administrators have routinely become reputed for taking decisions that breed poverty.
For me, While DESOPADEC’s new leadership must commit to mind the above admonition, this piece holds the opinion that to sustainably solve the problem of the coastal dwellers in the state, a compelling point the state government must not fail to remember is the present call by stakeholders on DESOPADEC management to emulate the Chevron Nigeria Limited template in community engagement. A template that deals directly with the host community and an approach the communities claimed has worked perfectly in the area of infrastructural provision.
On his part, Governor Sheriff Oborevwori of Delta State should, within this period, execute the oil and gas host communities’ legacy projects that will stand the test of time. It will not be out of place if a bridge is constructed to link and open these oil-bearing communities.
Utomi Jerome-Mario is the Programme Coordinator (Media and Public Policy) at Social and Economic Justice Advocacy (SEJA), a Lagos-based Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO). He can be reached via *********@***oo.com/08032725374″ target=”_blank” rel=”nofollow noopener noreferrer”>Je*********@***oo.com/
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
