Feature/OPED
A Dangerous Concentration of Power: Is CBN’s Fixed Income Securities Takeover a Ticking Bomb for Nigeria’s Economy?
By Blaise Udunze
The Central Bank of Nigeria’s decision to take full control of government securities issuance has been described by some as a bold move toward transparency and market efficiency. Yet, beneath the surface of this reform lies a web of structural dangers that could tighten credit even further, push interest rates higher, escalate exchange-rate instability, trigger regulatory turf wars, and strangulate the private sector, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that already struggle to survive in Nigeria’s high-cost economy.
The policy shift became more pronounced with the rollout of a new Treasury Bills (T-Bills) auction regime, mandating that all bids be submitted through the CBN’s S4 digital interface. This transition officially bypasses the longstanding Primary Dealer Market Maker (PDMM) framework and represents the clearest sign yet that the apex bank is asserting complete control over how government securities are issued, priced, and distributed. In fact, the first major test of this system will occur with the federal government’s planned N700 billion T-Bills issuance scheduled for November 20, 2025 which is an unprecedented rollout that effectively transfers auction power from market intermediaries directly to the CBN.
Analysts say this shift is not merely operational; it is structural. The S4 interface, which has existed since 2014 but never fully deployed as the primary submission platform, now becomes the exclusive gateway for government securities issuance. All bids, whether retail or institutional must be lodged through S4 between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., with the CBN maintaining full discretion to adjust the offer amount or reject bids it considers inconsistent with market conditions. Settlement will occur within 24 hours.
According to market expert Tajudeen Olayinka, CEO of Wyoming Capital Partners, the policy “is consistent with the CBN’s signal that it would take charge of the primary segment of the fixed-income market where government securities are issued.” Another veteran dealer put it more bluntly: “With S4, no dealer can see what rate others are quoting. All bids now meet at the same window. This dismantles the old advantage PDMMs enjoyed.”
Although transparency is improved by removing dealers’ visibility over competing bids, concerns have intensified over the broader consequences of the CBN monopolizing the government securities market. The danger is that this reform which is unaccompanied by strong institutional coordination between the CBN, the DMO, and the Ministry of Finance could trigger deeper systemic imbalances.
One of the most pressing fears is the crowding-out effect. If the CBN aggressively issues more government securities as part of its liquidity-management operations, banks, already heavily invested in government debt, will divert even more of their portfolios toward these risk-free instruments rather than lending to the real economy.
Nigeria’s top five banks known as the FUGAZ group (First HoldCo, UBA, GTCO, Access Corp, and Zenith Bank) provide compelling evidence of this shift. Their financial statements show a combined N49.152 trillion investment in securities and Treasury Bills as of September 2025, a sharp rise from N42.204 trillion at the end of 2024. In just nine months, they added nearly N7 trillion to these holdings.
Interest income from these investments surged by 33 percent, hitting N4.8 trillion in the first nine months of 2025 compared to N3.6 trillion in the same period of 2024.
– Access Corporation led the pack with N15.25 trillion in securities holdings,
– followed by UBA with N13.59 trillion,
– Zenith at N9.05 trillion,
– First HoldCo with N6.35 trillion, and
– GTCO at N4.91 trillion.
These investments generated robust returns: Access earned N1.3 trillion; Zenith N1.14 trillion; UBA N1.03 trillion; FBN HoldCo N720 billion; and GTCO N570 billion.
For analysts, these numbers expose a structural vulnerability as Nigerian banks are quickly transforming into large-scale government lenders rather than engines of private-sector credit. As Dr. Muktar Mohammed of Lagos Business School explains, “Banks have found refuge in government instruments because they are safe, liquid, and yield high returns in a volatile economy, but this behaviour constrains credit growth to the real sector.”
Lending data confirms this.
– Zenith Bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio slipped from 43 to 40 percent;
– Access Corporation maintained a flat 41.2 percent despite rising deposits;
– UBA’s ratio dropped to 28.2 percent;
– GTCO’s remained stagnant; and only
– First HoldCo showed notable improvement.
This trend is dangerous. Nigeria’s private sector, especially SMEs is already starved of credit. Lending rates hover between 28 percent and 35 percent, making capital unaffordable for most small businesses.
With the CBN taking full control of securities issuance, the likelihood is high that more liquidity will be absorbed through T-Bills and OMO bills, pushing interest rates further upward. The more attractive government securities become, the less incentive banks will have to lend to SMEs. This is how economies slide into cycles of low productivity, high unemployment, and weak domestic investment.
The implications do not end there. Excessive issuance of government securities could also destabilize the exchange rate. When interest rates remain artificially high to attract foreign portfolio investors into T-Bills, Nigeria becomes dependent on “hot money” which turns out to be short-term foreign inflows that exit the economy at the slightest shock. This pattern has historically triggered sharp naira depreciation, panic in the FX markets, and severe liquidity shortages in the banking sector. If the CBN uses this securities-controlled regime to sustain high yields, Nigeria risks attracting unstable capital inflows that will exit rapidly, putting pressure on the naira.
Beyond monetary and credit risks, there is a troubling regulatory dimension. The CBN’s move to migrate fixed-income trading and settlement from the FMDQ Securities Exchange, which is under SEC oversight to its own Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) and S4 platforms has ignited a full-blown turf war between the CBN and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Under the Investments and Securities Act (ISA) 2025, the SEC holds exclusive authority over trading venues. Critics warn that the CBN’s attempt to operate exchange-like infrastructure violates statutory boundaries and risks destabilizing the market.
Dr. Akin Olaniyan, CEO of Charterhouse Limited, described the move as “a potential recipe for dual regulation and confusion,” arguing that it may undermine investor confidence. Similarly, Dr. Walker Ogogo, pioneer Registrar of the Institute of Capital Market Registrars, noted that since the CBN already owns 16 percent of FMDQ, operating parallel infrastructure creates conflicts of interest that send negative signals to foreign investors.
MoneyCentral reports that the migration could trigger a 67 percent drop in FMDQ’s trading volume, weakening a system that has long supported Nigeria’s fixed-income ecosystem.
Veteran banker Victor Ogiemwonyi stated, “the CBN is not an exchange; it should not be involved in issuing, dealing, and settling securities. Conflating these roles creates unnecessary risk.” His concerns are grounded in the principle that market operators must be independent from regulators to prevent conflicts of interest. The CBN’s dual role as both regulator and operator blurs these lines and may set a dangerous precedent.
The real casualties of these structural conflicts will be SMEs and the broader private sector. These enterprises rely on bank credit to fund inventory, acquire machinery, expand operations, and withstand economic shocks. When banks prefer government securities over lending,
– SMEs face higher rates,
– stricter collateral requirements,
– fewer loan products, and shorter tenors.
– Many will be forced to downsize, lay off workers, or close altogether.
In an economy where SMEs account for over 90% of jobs, this contraction would be disastrous.
Another major overarching risk is that:
– The CBN’s consolidation of securities issuance power without corresponding checks from the DMO and Ministry of Finance creates an unbalanced financial architecture where monetary priorities overshadow fiscal realities and private-sector growth.
– Policies crafted in silos rarely produce macroeconomic stability. They produce distortions, uncertainty, and systemic fragility.
Nigeria stands at a critical junction. Securities issuance can be made transparent without centralizing all power in the CBN. Fixed-income markets can be cleaned up without dismantling the institutional balance that preserves confidence. What the country needs is coordination, not consolidation; collaboration, not domination.
If the CBN continues its takeover without robust guardrails, the result may be a financial system where banks stop lending, SMEs continue to collapse, interest rates remain high, the naira stays volatile, and regulatory conflicts scare away both local and foreign investors.
To avoid the dangerous risks ahead, Nigeria must:
- Strengthen collaboration between CBN, DMO, and Ministry of Finance. Debt issuance must reflect both monetary and fiscal realities not just liquidity needs.
- Prioritize long-term bonds over short-term T-Bills. This reduces rollover risk and provides stable funding at lower long-term cost.
- Implement SME-focused credit interventions through private banks, not direct CBN lending. Monetary policy should not attempt to replace commercial banking.
- Reduce government’s domestic borrowing needs. This requires fiscal reforms, spending discipline, and revenue expansion not more debt.
- Protect private-sector credit allocation. Regulators should discourage excessive bank investment in government securities.
Without these safeguards, the economy risks tilting dangerously toward monetary domination and private-sector suffocation.
The gains of transparency cannot come at the cost of institutional imbalance. Nigeria’s economic recovery depends on a thriving private sector, not an expanding government debt market. The central bank must not become the single most powerful issuer, dealer, regulator, and judge in its own market. That path leads not to stability but to systemic risk, risk that Nigeria’s fragile economy can ill afford.
Meanwhile, it is important for CBN to provide clarity on the economic rationale behind this centralisation of power. The CBN must come forward to justify how this shift will tangibly benefit the economy, particularly in the areas most sensitive to credit availability, financial stability and stability for Nigeria’s broader economy.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional writes from Lagos, can be reached via: [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Debt is Dragging Nigeria’s Future Down
By Abba Dukawa
A quiet fear is spreading across the hearts of Nigerians—one that grows heavier with every new headline about rising debt. It is no longer just numbers on paper; it feels like a shadow stretching over the nation’s future. The reality is stark and unsettling: nearly 50% of Nigeria’s revenue is now used to service debt. That is not just unsustainable—it is suffocating.
Behind these figures lies a deeper tragedy. Millions of Nigerians are trapped in what experts call “Multidimensional Poverty,” struggling daily for dignity and survival, while a privileged few continue to live in comfort, untouched by the hardship tightening around the nation. The contrast is painful, and the silence around it is even louder.
Since assuming office, Bola Ahmed Tinubu has embarked on an aggressive borrowing path, presenting it as a necessary step to revive the economy, rebuild infrastructure, and stabilise key sectors.
Between 2023 and 2026, billions of dollars have been secured or proposed in foreign loans. On paper, it is a strategy of hope. But in the hearts of many Nigerians, it feels like a gamble with consequences yet to unfold.
The numbers are staggering. A borrowing plan exceeding $21 billion, backed by the National Assembly, alongside additional billions in loans and grants, signals a government determined to keep spending and building. Another $6.9 billion facility follows closely behind. These are not just financial decisions; they are commitments that will echo into generations yet unborn.
And so, the questions refuse to go away. Who will bear this burden? Who will repay these debts when the time comes? Will it not fall on ordinary Nigerians already stretched thin to carry the weight of decisions they never made?
There is a growing fear that the nation may be walking into a future where its people become strangers in their own land, bound by obligations to distant creditors.
Even more troubling is the sense that something is not adding up. The removal of fuel subsidy was meant to free up resources, to create breathing room for meaningful development.
But where are the results? Why does it feel like sacrifice has not translated into relief? The silence surrounding these questions breeds suspicion, and suspicion slowly erodes trust. As of December 31, 2025, Nigeria’s public debt has risen to N159.28 trillion, according to the Debt Management Office.
The numbers keep climbing, but for many citizens, life keeps declining. This disconnect is what hurts the most. Borrowing, in itself, is not the enemy. Nations borrow to grow, to build, to invest in their future. But borrowing without visible progress, without accountability, without compassion for the people, it begins to feel less like strategy and more like a slow descent.
If these borrowed funds are truly building roads, schools, hospitals, and opportunities, then Nigerians deserve to see it, to feel it, to live it. But if they are funding excess, waste, or luxury, then this path is not just dangerous—it is devastating.
Nigeria’s growing loan profile is a double-edged sword. It can either accelerate development or deepen economic challenges. The key issue is not just borrowing, but what the country does with the money. Strong governance, transparency, and investment in productive sectors will determine whether these loans become a foundation for growth or a long-term liability. Because in the end, debt is not just an economic issue. It is a moral one. And if care is not taken, the price Nigeria will pay may not just be financial—it may be the future of its people.
Dukawa writes from Kano and can be reached at [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Nigeria’s Power Illusion: Why 6,000MW Is Not An Achievement
By Isah Kamisu Madachi
For decades, Nigeria has been called the Giant of Africa. The question no one in government wants to answer is why a giant cannot keep the lights on.
Nigeria sits on the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, holds the continent’s most populous nation at over 220 million people, and commands the fourth largest GDP on the continent at roughly $252 billion. It possesses vast deposits of solid minerals, a fintech ecosystem that accounts for 28% of all fintech companies on the African continent, and a diaspora that remits billions of dollars annually.
If potential were electricity, Nigeria would have been powering half the world. Instead, an immediate former minister is boasting about 6,000 megawatts.
Adebayo Adelabu resigned as Minister of Power on April 22, 2026, citing his ambition to contest the Oyo State governorship election. In his resignation letter, he listed among his achievements that peak generation had increased to over 6,000 megawatts during his tenure, supported by the integration of the Zungeru Hydropower Plant. It was presented as a great crowning legacy. The claim deserves scrutiny, and the numbers deserve context.
To begin with, the context. Ghana, Nigeria’s neighbour in West Africa, has a national electricity access rate of 85.9%, with 74% access in rural areas and 94% in urban areas. Kenya, with a 71.4% national electricity access rate, including 62.7% in rural areas, leads East Africa. Nigeria, by contrast, recorded an electricity access rate of just 61.2 per cent as of 2023, according to the World Bank. This is not a distant or poorer country outperforming Nigeria. Ghana’s GDP stands at approximately $113 billion, less than half of Nigeria’s. Kenya’s economy is around $141 billion. Ethiopia, which has invested massively in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and is already exporting electricity to neighbouring countries, has a GDP of roughly $126 billion. All three are doing more with far less.
Now to examine the 6,000-megawatt, Daily Trust obtained electricity generation data from the Association of Power Generation Companies and the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, covering quarterly performance from 2023 to 2025 and monthly data from January to March 2026. The data shows that in 2023, peak generation was approximately 5,000 megawatts; in 2024, it reached approximately 5,528 megawatts; in 2025, it ranged between 5,300 and 5,801 megawatts; and by March 2026, available capacity had declined to approximately 4,089 megawatts. The grid never recorded a verified peak of 6,000 megawatts or higher. Adelabu had, in fact, set the 6,000-megawatt target publicly on at least three separate occasions, missing each deadline, and later admitted the target was not achieved, attributing the failure to vandalism of key transmission infrastructure.
In February 2026, Nigeria’s national grid produced an average available capacity of 4,384 megawatts, the lowest monthly average since June 2024. For a country with over 220 million people, this means electricity supply remains far below national demand, with the grid delivering only about 32 per cent of its theoretical installed capacity of approximately 13,000 megawatts. To put that in sharper comparison: in 2018, 48 sub-Saharan African countries, home to nearly one billion people, produced about the same amount of electricity as Spain, a country of 45 million. Nigeria, the continent’s most resource-rich large economy, is a significant part of that embarrassing equation.
The tragedy here is not just technical. It is a governance failure with compounding human costs. An economy that cannot provide reliable electricity cannot competitively manufacture goods, cannot industrialise at scale, cannot attract the volume of foreign direct investment its endowments warrant, and cannot build the digital infrastructure that would allow it to lead on artificial intelligence, data governance, and the emerging critical minerals economy where Africa’s next great opportunity lies. Countries with a fraction of Nigeria’s mineral wealth and human capital are already debating those frontiers. Nigeria is still campaigning on megawatts.
What a departing minister should be able to say, given Nigeria’s endowments, is not that peak generation touched 6,000 megawatts at some unverified moment. He should be saying that Nigeria now generates reliably above 15,000 megawatts, that rural electrification has crossed 70 per cent, and that the country is on a credible trajectory toward the kind of energy sufficiency that unlocks industrial growth. That is the standard Nigeria’s size and resources demand. Anything below it is not an achievement. It is an apology dressed in a press release.
The power sector has received billions of dollars in investment across multiple administrations. The 2013 privatisation exercise, the Presidential Power Initiative, the Electricity Act of 2023, and successive reform promises have produced a sector that still, in 2026, cannot guarantee eight hours of reliable supply to the average Nigerian household. That a minister exits that ministry citing a megawatt figure that fact-checkers have shown was never actually reached, and that even if reached would be unworthy of celebration given Nigeria’s potential, captures the full depth of the problem. The ambition is too small. The accountability is too thin. And the country deserves better from those who are privileged to manage its extraordinary, squandered potential.
Isah Kamisu Madachi is a policy analyst and development practitioner. He writes via [email protected]
Feature/OPED
Systemically Weak Banks Put Nigeria’s $1 trillion Ambition at Risk
By Blaise Udunze
Nigeria’s banking sector has just undergone one of its most ambitious recapitalisation exercises in two decades, all thanks to the Central Bank of Nigeria under the leadership of Olayemi Cardoso. About N4.65 trillion ($3.38) has been raised. Balance sheets have been strengthened, at least the improvement could be said to exist in reports or accounting figures. Regulators have drawn a new line in the sand, proposing N500 billion for international banks, N200 billion for national banks, and N50 billion for regional players. This is a bold reset.
Meanwhile, as the dust settles, an uncomfortable question refuses to go away, which has been in the minds of many asking, “Has Nigeria once again solved yesterday’s problem, while tomorrow’s risks gather quietly ahead?”
At a period when banks globally are being tested against tougher buffers, cross-border shocks, and higher regulatory expectations, Nigeria’s revised benchmarks risk falling short of what the global system demands.
In a world where scale, resilience, and competitiveness define banking credibility, capital is not measured in isolation; it is judged relative to peers, risks, and ambition.
Because when placed side by side with a far more unsettling reality, that a single South African bank, Standard Bank Group, rivals or even exceeds the valuation and asset strength of Nigeria’s entire banking sector, the celebration begins to feel premature.
The recapitalisation may be necessary. But is it sufficient? The numbers are not just striking, they are deeply revealing. Standard Bank Group, with a market valuation hovering around $21-22 billion and assets approaching $190 billion, stands as a continental giant. In contrast, the combined market capitalisation of Nigeria’s listed banks, even after recent capital raises, struggles to match that scale.
The combined value of the 13 listed Nigerian banks reached N16.14 trillion (11.9 billion) using N1.367/$1 in early April 2026, following the recapitalisation momentum.
Even more revealing is the contrast at the top. Zenith Bank is valued at N4.7 trillion ($3.44 billion), Guaranty Trust Holding Company, widely admired for efficiency and profitability, is valued at under N4.6 trillion ($3.37 billion), while Access Holdings, despite managing tens of billions in assets, carries a market value below the upper Tier’s N1.4 trillion ($1.02 billion).
This is not merely a gap. It is a structural disconnect. And it raises a critical point, revealing that recapitalisation is not just about meeting regulatory thresholds; it is about closing credibility gaps.
With accounting figures or reports, Nigeria’s new capital thresholds appear formidable. But paper strength is not the same as real strength.
The naira’s persistent depreciation has quietly undermined the meaning of these figures. What looks like N500 billion in nominal terms translates into a much smaller and shrinking figure in dollar terms.
This is the misapprehension at the heart of Nigeria’s banking reform, as we are measuring financial strength in a currency that has been losing strength.
In real terms, some Nigerian banks today may not be significantly stronger than they were years ago, despite meeting much higher nominal thresholds. So while regulators see progress, global investors see vulnerability. Markets are rarely sentimental. They price risk with ruthless clarity.
The valuation gap between Nigerian banks and their South African counterparts is not an accident; it must be made known that it is strategic intentionality. By this, it truly reflects a deeper judgment about currency stability, regulatory predictability, governance standards, and long-term growth prospects. Investors are not just asking how much capital Nigerian banks have. They are asking how durable that capital is.
Even when Nigerian banks post strong profits, much of it has been driven by foreign exchange revaluation gains rather than core lending or operational efficiency. The CBN’s decision to restrict dividend payments from such gains is telling; it acknowledges that not all profits are created equal. True strength lies not in accounting gains, but in economic impact.
Nigeria has travelled this road before. Under Charles Soludo, the 2004-2006 banking consolidation raised minimum capital from N2 billion to N25 billion, reducing the number of banks dramatically and producing industry champions like Zenith Bank and United Bank for Africa. For a time, Nigerian banks expanded across Africa and became formidable competitors.
But the momentum did not last, emanating with lots of economic headwinds. One amongst all that played out was that the global financial crisis exposed weaknesses in governance and risk management, leading to another wave of reforms under Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. The lesson from that era remains clear, which revealed that capital reforms can stabilise a system, but they do not automatically transform it. Without bigger structural changes, the gains fade.
The real weakness of Nigeria’s current approach is not the size of the thresholds; it is their rigidity. Fixed capital requirements do not adjust for inflation, reflect currency depreciation, scale with systemic risk, or capture the complexity of modern banking.
In contrast, global regulatory frameworks are increasingly dynamic and risk-based. This is where Nigeria risks falling behind again. Because while the numbers have changed, the philosophy has not.
Nigeria’s economic aspirations are bold. The country speaks confidently about building a $1 trillion economy, expanding infrastructure, and driving industrialisation, but in dollar terms, many Nigerian banks remain small, too small for the scale of ambition the country now proclaims. Albeit, it must be understood that ambition alone does not finance growth. Banks do.
And here lies the uncomfortable mismatch, which is contradictory in nature because the economy Nigeria wants to build is significantly larger than the banks it currently has.
In South Africa, what Nigerian stakeholders are yet to understand is that large, well-capitalised banks play a central role in financing infrastructure, corporate expansion, and consumer credit. Their scale allows them to absorb risk and deploy capital at levels Nigerian banks struggle to match. Without comparable financial depth, Nigeria’s development ambitions risk being constrained by its own banking system.
At its core, banking is about channelling capital into productive sectors, as this stands as one of its responsibilities if it truly wants to ever catch up to a $1 trillion economy. Yet Nigerian banks have increasingly, in their usual ways, leaned toward safer, short-term returns, particularly government securities. This is not irrational. It is a response to high credit risk, regulatory uncertainty, and macroeconomic instability.
But it comes at a cost. Yes! The fact is that when banks prioritise safety over lending, the real economy suffers. What this tells us is that manufacturing, agriculture, and small businesses remain underfunded, limiting growth and job creation.
Recapitalisation is meant to change this dynamic. Stronger capital buffers should enable banks to take on more risk and finance larger projects. But capital alone will not solve the problem. Confidence will.
One of the most persistent obstacles facing Nigerian banks is currency volatility. Each major devaluation of the naira erodes investor returns and reduces the dollar value of bank capital. This creates a contradiction whereby banks appear profitable in naira terms, but unattractive in global markets.
In contrast, South Africa benefits from a more stable currency environment and deeper capital markets. Without much ado, it is clear that this stability attracts long-term institutional investors that Nigeria struggles to retain. Until this macroeconomic challenge is addressed, recapitalisation alone cannot close the gap because, without making it a priority, even the strongest banks will remain constrained.
In a global competitive financial market, one would agree that capital is necessary, but not sufficient. Beyond the capital, one crucial lesson stakeholders in Nigeria’s banking space must understand is that investors’ confidence is heavily influenced by governance standards and operational efficiency, which mainly guarantee more success and capability. Also, another relevant trait to sustainable banking is transparency, regulatory consistency, and accountability, which matter as much as balance sheet strength.
While Nigerian banks have made progress, lingering concerns remain around insider lending, regulatory unpredictability, and complex ownership structures. If policymakers revisit and reflect on the episodes involving institutions like First Bank of Nigeria and the liquidation of Heritage Bank, this will reinforce the perceptions of systemic risk.
Recapitalisation offers an opportunity to reset governance standards, but only if it is accompanied by stricter enforcement and greater transparency, with the key stakeholders seeing beyond the capital growth.
As if traditional challenges were not enough, Nigerian banks are also facing increasing competition from fintech companies. Nigeria has emerged as a leading fintech hub in Africa, reshaping payments, lending, and digital banking.
To remain relevant, banks must invest heavily in technology, an area that requires not just capital, but smart capital, ensuring that digital innovation becomes a core strength rather than an external add-on. The recapitalisation exercise provides the financial capacity. Whether banks use it effectively is another matter entirely.
So, are Nigeria’s new capital thresholds already outdated? Not yet. But they are already under pressure, pressure from inflation, currency weakness, global competition, and Nigeria’s own economic ambitions.
The truth is that the reforms are a step in the right direction, but they may already be systemically weak in the face of global realities. Whilst the actors keep focusing heavily on capital thresholds without addressing deeper structural issues, the reforms risk creating a system that is compliant, but not competitive, stable but not strong.
The recapitalisation exercise has bought Nigeria time. That is its greatest achievement. But time is only valuable if it is used wisely.
If policymakers treat this reform as a destination, the thresholds will age faster than expected. If they treat it as a foundation, Nigeria has a chance to build a banking system capable of supporting its ambitions.
It can either strengthen its financial foundations to match its economic ambitions or continue to pursue growth on a fragile base.
The warning signs are already visible. Systemic weaknesses, if left unaddressed, will not remain contained; they will surface at the worst possible moment, undermining confidence and limiting progress.
Otherwise, the uncomfortable truth will persist; one well-capitalised bank elsewhere will continue to stand taller than an entire banking system at home. Whilst a $1 trillion economy cannot be built on a weak banking system. The sooner this reality is acknowledged, the better Nigeria’s chances of turning ambition into achievement.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
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