Feature/OPED
Acquisition Approval Delays: The Wrong Look for Nigeria
By NJ Ayuk
The Nigerian government needs to step up its game regarding approvals for indigenous companies acquiring in-country foreign energy assets.
The negative consequences of approval delays, ranging from many months to two-plus years, include forfeited revenue from lost royalties and taxes, production shortfalls, investor discouragement, and safety issues that arise while maintenance is put on hold.
The government approval process has stymied several of these potential deals over the past couple of years. These puzzling delays raise questions about why they are happening, as well as how serious officials are about increasing energy production to help Nigeria’s economy and its people.
There is a crying need for a new level of efficiency, timeliness, and openness in the approval process to give a fair shake to domestic energy players. Without it, the country’s economy and its citizens have the most to lose. The government can and must do better than this to keep its oil industry competitive, profitable, and safe.
Chappal Energies: Unlocking Latent Resources
In July 2024 TotalEnergies EP Nigeria sold to Chappal Energies its 10% interest in the SPDC JV licenses in Nigeria for 860 million USD. These assets produce a lot of beautiful low-carbon gas from OML 23, OML 28 and OML 77.
In late 2023, Norway’s state-owned Equinor agreed to sell its Nigerian business, Nigeria Energy Company (ENEC), to Nigerian homegrown firm, Chappal Energies. The sale includes the unitized 20.21% interest Chevron operates in the country’s deepwater Agbami oil field, which has produced over 1 billion barrels of oil for Equinor since 1992.
Equinor has said it expects Chappal Energies will continue the development of its long-held assets in Nigeria, for the betterment of the country’s economy. Chappal is optimistic, too, with its managing director, Ufoma Immanuel, expecting positive effects on both the environment and the community.
Chappal has just the sort of attitude and drive Nigeria needs in its indigenous petroleum businesses, having stated that it is intent on “unlocking latent value in Nigeria’s and Africa’s oil and gas resources.”
The sale can only close after specified conditions and all regulatory and contractual approvals are finished. These are still pending.
Oando: Doubling its State Partnership Stake
In the early fall of 2023, in line with the Eni 2023-2026 Plan, Italian supermajor Eni agreed to sell Nigerian Agip Oil Company Ltd (NAOC) to Oando, a Nigerian stock exchange-listed provider of energy solutions.
Eni’s plan includes an effort to divest itself of resources that offer value and opportunity to other owners.
NAOC concentrates on producing onshore Nigerian oil and gas and on generating power. Its Nigerian holdings include interests in four onshore blocks, two power plants, and two onshore exploration leases. Besides these assets in the Niger River Delta, the deal includes an interest in the Brass River oil terminal.
Overall, the agreement means that Oando can double its interest in NAOC JV, the partnership it has with the state, to 40%, and increase its reserves to over 1 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe).
Oando’s CEO, Wale Tinubu, sees the purchase as being “in alignment” with his company’s strategy of “acquiring, enhancing, appraising, and efficiently developing reserves.”
Closing the sale depends on the authorization of all the relevant local and regulatory authorities — a process that is still ongoing nearly a year after the agreement was reached. There has been some talk of approvals set to happen soon.
Renaissance: Making a Large Onshore Investment
In January 2024, Shell agreed to sell Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria Limited (SPDC), its Nigerian onshore subsidiary, to Renaissance, an association made up of five Nigerian exploration and production companies (ND Western Limited, Aradel Holdings Plc, FIRST Exploration and Petroleum Development Company Limited, and The Waltersmith Group) plus an international energy group (Petrolin Limited). The firms agreed to a sales price of USD 1.3 billion.
All of SPDC’s operating capabilities and staff are to be maintained in the transaction, including technical expertise, management systems, and processes.
Describing Renaissance as “an experienced, ambitious Nigerian-led consortium,” Shell says the sale is part of its plan to concentrate its own Nigerian investment in deepwater and integrated gas.
With the bulk of Nigeria’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) feed gas coming from SPDC, it is important that Shell has agreed to play a supportive role after the sale so that all goes smoothly.
The sale cannot close until approvals from Nigeria’s federal government and other conditions are met.
Seplat: Securing a Long-Awaited Approval
There is, fortunately, one slow-moving approval story that has recently been resolved. On June 14, 2024, Arise News reported that NNPC has withdrawn its court case objecting to the ExxonMobil/Seplat deal, clearing a path for ExxonMobil to sell its entire interest in Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited to Seplat Energy.
Nigerian President Bola Tinubu had met with Liam Mallon, head of ExxonMobil, and members of the Ministers of Petroleum two months earlier, asking that officials remove barriers to approval.
The $1.28 billion deal was first greenlighted over two years ago by the parties, but politics and legalities hindered the sale from closing. The deal will turn over the U.S. company’s shallow-water OMLs 67, 68, 70, and 104 to Seplat and allow it to benefit from stakes in the Bonny River and Qua Iboe terminals and natural gas liquids recovery plants.
All of ExxonMobil’s offshore shallow-water operations are included in the agreement — the effect of which is to create a major independent Nigerian energy company. The upshot is that the sale is a very significant opportunity for the country to increase its daily crude production by 700,000 or more barrels.
The approvals process became gridlocked just months after the agreement was made when the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) cited an “overriding national interest,” and state-owned NNPC sued ExxonMobil.
Earlier this year, NUPRC tried to hasten regulatory approval for the sale, when NUPRC’s chief executive, Gbenga Komolafe, revisited a list of conditions that must be met for divestment.
Komolafe invited the parties involved to a May meeting and stated that, depending on the results of the meeting, approval might be given within two weeks.
A signed settlement agreement resulted, with Komolafe, emphasizing the issues of decommissioning, host community development, and environmental remediation.
The terms of the agreement include increasing NNPC’s interest in the four OMLs from 60% to 70%, and decreasing Seplat’s interest from 40% to 30%, while Seplat will gain a 10% interest in UTM Offshore’s floating LNG project.
Komalfe stated his unwillingness to Nigeria carries financial burdens resulting from divesting entities continuing to operate assets in the country.
Other issues that have been raised are:
While waiting on approvals, investors naturally don’t want to further invest further in these assets.
Production can decline while approvals are stalled.
Tinubu has asked ExxonMobil for suggestions on improving Nigeria’s oil and gas investment environment.
Step Up Approvals, for Nigeria’s Sake
President Tinubu’s efforts to bring together various parties around the ideas of stability, transparency, and an even playing field hold much promise for the role of Nigerian oil companies in increasing domestic production.
Delays in approvals for these companies’ acquisitions cripple the ability of these Nigerian companies to benefit their country. And that, after all, should be a goal that government regulators and homegrown petroleum firms share.
NJ Ayuk is the Executive Chairman of the African Energy Chamber
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
